

The Politics and Failures of Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in African Conflicts

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Abstract: *Africa's instability, crisis, precarious situations and quagmires among others are still on. These problems, though complex and disturbing, had followed a particular trend in term of intervention and solutions to the numerous conflicts and crises to which agents of conflicts management had also failed. The process of interventions was mainly compounded by the failures in ethics of humanitarian intervention, especially on their activities. This Negativism and the inherent political intrigues in solution findings toward resolving many of the African conflicts are but obvious. Thus, Darfur in 2003 was made to pass the way of Rwandan crisis of 1994. The people were abandoned, neglected, and allowed to kill themselves for others, particularly neighbours to pick and count. The crises are never different from the roots that grown the annihilations of the vulnerable in every African conflicts, which are either government sponsored with foreign aids and neighbours' alliances as core partakers or otherwise. All participants to making peace in many atimes are cold feeted to act, but ever ready to observe the killings, count the number of deaths, while those harboured by them in the peace camps set next village ablaze after their patrol. Yet, intervention is taken place. Darfur crisis is like Rwandan crisis.*

Keywords: Crisis, Humanitarian Intervention, Negativism, Political Intrigues, Neglect and Abandonment.

1. Introduction

The area of focus here is the failure of the ethics of humanitarian arms interventions in African conflicts. The failures, weaknesses and negativism, which had played an encouraging role in escalating the magnitude of conflicts in the 1990s up to the beginning of the new millennium on the continent, cannot be over looked. The essence of peacekeeping if that is what it entails even helps to endanger

the lives of the vulnerable and peace seekers. According to the UN Guideline on Peacekeeping (1995:3-6) peacekeeping is an activity that aim to create the conditions for lasting peace. It anything that contributes to the furthering of a peace process, once established. However, evidences available in African conflicts situations points to the shortfall and inactions of the body meant to protect lives (Melven, 2000:24-28; 56,108). It is this facts and the negativism that had allowed for different arms conflicts, ranging from militias groups, rebels, insurgence, opposition parties' arms-wing and the divided national armies' to engages in arms scuffles that had intensified African insecurity problems.

Thus, African and her people are made to face with terrible situation of crises here and there that has gone beyond any possible amelioration. This several complex problems mostly created from conflicts of power struggle, corruptions, election rigging and one party state entrenchment syndrome, economic quagmire and resources control paradox among others, are however occasioned by the craze and desires for the euphoria of the enjoyment of the spoils of the state to maintain the statesquo. The continent in this respect was underscored as a continent of instabilities whose economy was uninteresting and people only good for charity recipients (Okigbo, 1992).

With several weak and failed states within the continent, the continental body (then, Organization of Africa Unity) whose followers had lost hope and loyalty to, was termed a toothless bull dog; a helper that is in itself helpless; and a Shepard whose sheep's had all gone astrayed in search of a greener pastures. The lands, the people and the continent, like a swollen wound, ripen and hoping for a free Medicare to the unabated pains, was easily wooed, treated and accosted with several analgesics by the ever ready pathologist of several pathogens.

Like, if the opportunity were already being awaited for all along, aides, sponsors and exploiter trotted into Africa for the second time to encourage mayhems of no abatement. As

it was noticed in the mining of Angola diamond at Cabinda, Liberia diamond and timber, Sierra Leone diamond at Konu, Tongofield and Kiodu, Congo DR diamond and gold at Kisangani and Lumumbashi amongst others that nearly every region of the continent was at home with more than two or more conflicts situation each or otherwise. While some had lasted, the taproots of some had started to germinate asymmetrically. With no measure, no high command, and no solution in sight, the every green African forest was set on fire uncontrollably. Whereas, the on lookers, the international community, divided on principle of gain and lost, struggles to appropriate the victims self imposed conditions and opportunities on themselves. Thence, humanitarian interventions was exacerbated, misinformation on crises was applauded and encouraged to escalations by the UN through the French in Rwanda and China and Russia in Sudan while the United States schemes for possible entry and re-colonising of the people (Wayne, 2001:80). The level of carnage and wanton destruction of the people and the ever green vegetation with the precarious situation of Africa was displayed once again like in the days of slave trade (HRW, 1999:33). The concept of no rule, no treaty and no clause was observed and employed in the course of interventions. The ethics of humanitarian interventions was betrayed, breached, and awful in implementation to enhance and advance human annihilations by fellow human in the contemporary era of Neo-democracy. This international politics in combination with the failures of ethnics of humanitarian arms intervention exerts its strength on Rwanda crisis and repeating itself in Darfur Sudan.

Premised on this, the work will further examine the general dimension of the problems, Rwanda and the failed intervention, Darfur and the Hocus-pocus of intervention, the analysis of issues, and suggestions and conclusion as points of departure.

2. General Dimension of the Problem

In retrospect, the end of Cold War, itself was a controversial period. The West and East while at this period heal their wounds, count their gains and loose, also oiled their weapons to the armoury for tomorrow and whenever, whereas Africa and her abode was turned into a transferred ground and grand-armoury recipient, where most of the unaccounted for, unregistered, the excess accumulated and or missing weapons used or paraded by actors (U.S, France, Russia, Britain and China among others) in the period of intense tensions and threat to others was shipped to (Melven, 2000:108). This politics of containment and engagement however, aroused several contradictions and confusion that are detrimental to the Africans. Against the reasons that the peoples are beginning to read meaning into what governance, spoils of the state, the wills of state power and political intrigues connotes.

While the controversy and demise of the above mentioned was on, many African States on the other hand enjoyed one party dictatorial system of governance, which allowed the shifting balance of power to be problematic and devastating in terms of the ensuing struggle (Yaker, 1998: 21). A condition that encouraged violence instigates intense political oppositions that pretentiously contains the nursed violence, and threatened the people and the state to submission. This negative platform, however, made many to develop a survival instinct that is not far from militia-military confrontation, rebel qua national armies' face-off and rebellion cum military invasion scenarios. Against this development, two-third of African States was subdued under military aberrational rule. A situation seen as part of our development, which was used to short-change the former one party state (Okechukwu, 2009: 83-84). However, with the outlawing of the former immediately thereafter, the UN, other international and continental-bodies such as the then weak OAU vowed never to recognize the aberrational regimes. Thus, the ill-advised Juntas informed of the situation, transformed from military jackets to civilian French suits, Agbada and or possibly Senegalese dress with their weapons still hidden underneath, to enhance their acceptability

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parlance of democratic disempowerment (Okechukwu, 2009: 83; Ake, 1994). Arising from these undemocratic transformations, Africa was quick to be turned into a battleground in the name of power struggle and possible resources control with some parties benefiting while some loses. In fact Turner (2005) observed that it is a criminal tendency and processes appropriated to attain to power at the end of the resolution of the crisis as the opposing group may be allowed to share power and seats of governance with the incumbent.

With many weapons on the streets, in the hand of the ex-military men, militiamen, political thugs, killer squads, rebel groups and the civilian class, the 1990s and into the new millennium witnesses 46 cases of armed conflicts, out of which analyst concluded that there are 89 cases of conflicts world over. And of the escalating violence going on in 29 countries in the period, Africa was at home with 13 of them Grono (2006) argued that these are the causes, which help to intensify the itemized points above.

Consequent these wars, fought, won and lost and or dragged for months and years, the civil society who are the vulnerable became the great victims of many deaths of high magnitude, despite their called for help. Many died agonized in pains that lasted for days, months and years and to some it was war hunger that snuff lives out of them (HRW, 1996: 88). Yet no help, no aid, no response to neighbours cries until after many had been lowered in a shallow grave of several bones, skeleton and decayed dusty dark-oily flesh, while some are left for dogs and birds of the air to prey on unceasingly.

No armed intervention, no humanitarian group could say let us stop this carnage, the pogrom, and human annihilations by fellow human. These rampant cases were emerging from Africa in the period when others were settling down to rebuild their nations. Yet, African crisis had defiled all known humanitarian gestures to ending or helping the needy in crisis zone.

It is these situations, thus, made the study to ask if it is justifiable with manner of states intervention in Africa several conflicts to say that the International community do take Africa conflicts serious. Being against the background that the processes of intervention, whether armed or

otherwise had not been with the required momentum and urgency. This negating criteria informed by many factors tends to play on the situation, even when the existing records from the conflict zone indicates that more deaths, maiming, dislocation and displacements of inhabitants are on the high side. Some questions that the research raises are: Is there ethics in humanitarian intervention in conflicts, with particular reference to African several conflicts? What could be the reasons behind the manner of intervention in Africa conflicts? Why had every nations, international agencies and groups alike played down to seeing the spate of killings go on and on without intervening? Have the people any particular sin that would warrant their total extermination before the intervention or intervention mechanisms of the UN are applied. Shouldn't International Society, local and or group's agency among others employed to stopping the continual carnage. Does states untimely intervention means that they had something to achieve or gain from the ongoing conflicts; and or should it be said that because the warring groups or state have no oil well, no diamond, no gold and no uranium amongst others, hence it is needless wasting time making peace or intervening, as the war supposedly ought to reduce their staggering population towards retaining food shortage and several have nots. Finally, does this same measure of inaction apply to all other states in conflict zone world wide?

Be that as it may be, this research has observed that analyst in this regard may be divided, and or may tend to postulate different opinions on why the situations in treating conflicts in Africa are always different and at times portends levity. Thus, construing from the sentence on ethics of humanitarian intervention, one begins to reason whether there are an accepted or set standard of Intervention Universally. Of course, the Security Council of the United Nations has a provision in its principles on the need to intervene in a conflict or disastrous situations to save life, and other continental bodies had also entrenched it in their charters (General Guideline, 1995: 15-24). Thus, made intervention to be defined according to Coady (2002: 5) as an 'intentional

act of one state or group of states or an international agency or groups among others to intervene in crisis. An act aimed at exercising overriding authority on what are normally the internal policies or practices of another state or groups of states that are detrimental to the peaceful existence of all within that state, whether the targeted state consent or not. Added to this, is the notion explaining humanitarian action as an expression which refers to the primary motive to intervene and save life that are in danger of death or otherwise whether national or foreign persons. The primary motive, mostly moral, according to Griffithi-Fitton (2001: 21) are those backed by sympathy and made with reasons that constitute sufficient conditions for the intervention...because it is the principle of considering the welfare and happiness of those in conflict zone before one's own that informed the course for action. This statement, however, agrees with the contention of Vacler (2000:12-27) when he opined that 'we live in a new world, in which all of us must begin to bear responsibility for everything that occurs. The protection of endangered populations in situation or armed conflict zone therefore becomes the basic responsibility of every citizens of the world.

Furthermore, against the assertions above, the research would want us not to centre reasons on the assertions wholistically, and neither should all thoughts be accepted on the notion that humanitarian intervention should be understood to mean variety of actions, which seeks to protect civilian population from grave human rights violations. It is no longer a form of forcible international military actions alone, but that meant to save life, like the use of aid-food, shelter, and health care among others, and as an effective entry point to solving the problem created by situations of grave human suffering. Workers in this respect are made to rely on the current crisis situation. The motivations behind their efforts is the obligation to protect and assist vulnerable populations, in particular, those suffering from grave human rights violation where there is significant or total breakdown of authority due to conflict (Griffithi-Fitton, 2001).

Implicit to this notion, intervention ought to be a mixture of ethics and courage, which enables the workers to endure the suffering around them, the risk to themselves and the constraints put on their work (Porteous, 2004). A closer look at the intentional act of military and non-military interventions, informed us that what both actions were for in essence was to save lives in grave danger of death. Thus, the manner of this interventions, the motives, the standards by which the act is accepted as a necessary evil if men, women and children in the conflict zone must live, have life, happiness and the joy of existence through the works and efforts of other humans involved in bringing this hope and expectation into reality becomes the end product of humanitarian intervention.

However, going by the concept of acceptable standard as stated above, which is in itself 'ethics' of one doing what he/she must do aright, whether consented or not by the state, whether the act is tantamount to violating the principle of state sovereignty or not, but means well to saving lives in danger of death or violations, seeks to explain the very reasons why the constructed sentence, 'ethics of humanitarian intervention is a necessary evil' in the present parlance, be it in any continent or sub-regions of the spherical world. Sovereign power (government) may be respected, but when such a sovereign power violates the rights of her citizenry, especially to the extent of taken lives, such a sovereign status is hereby abused and needs to be corrected and or questioned by otherwise. Thence, if this sentiments above is anything to go by, if it is universally accepted and, if it exists to mean well to all irrespective of race, color, sex and or creed amongst others, in so far as it exists today, then it would be evident to our mind and voice of reasoning to say how had such fare in the Africa context. An already raised question above on the kind of intervention taking place in Africa stands to answer the numerous questions.

Evidence available on the failure of states, UN and other international agencies to intervene in Africa crisis started in the post-cold war period when the war between Jonas Savimbi led UNITA and the MPLA government of

Eduardo Dos Santos in 1992 Angolan civil war over diamond and oil failed and prolonged. To which Porteous (2004) noted that over 250,000 people died in that war, that was seen as the playing ground of the cold war powers due to divided interest of the actors. The United States backed UNITA want to control the government and diamond field that was been backed by Russia, China, Cuba and other interest groups such as France and Britain. Even the colonial master of Angola, the Portuguese, could not help in stopping the carnage. Those who escaped with arms entered the inner forest, Congo Republic, Congo DR and Burundi/Rwanda amongst others from where they regrouped and become more sophisticated in jungle and rebel warfares.

Between 1993 and 1995, the United Nations and the United States deemed it not timely to intervene in the Somalian political conflict, until after over 200,000 people had died. Even when they eventually intervened, the drama between the US/UN failures in the period rendered the international system helpless in the faces of the emerging crisis in central Africa. America abandons Somalian people to the mercy of their killers because their owned soldiers were ambushed (Porteous, 2004). The Somalian war had not only made the state ungovernable till today, but it is surprising that after thirteen to sixteen years of that conflict that Somalia had no national government. Added to this is what Abraham (2003: 32) observed as the factionalization of the rebel groups which made it porous that there were sixteen different warlords commanding the same number of rebel groups. The purported established government in exile at Kenya in 2004/2005 even after relocation to Mogadishu had no successful base in term of control and governance.

In the same parlance, in 1990, it took the heart of a lion and the sympathy of the entrapped in conflict zone of Liberia for ECOMOG under Nigerian self-efforts to intervened in the conflict despite the different criticism, that went with it. From December 1989 to January 1990, the war had witnessed the death of over 80,000 Liberians, killed by Charles Taylor, Samuel Doe, Yormie Johnson and Charles Julu among others who led different rebel groups respectively. ECOMOG intervention was even late, some said, but it was better than none another group concord. The struggle for power, diamond and timber in Liberia by the

eleven warlords of different rebel groups was not in the priority list of the UN, US, Britain and France among others, until after ECOMOG had lost over 20,000 soldiers and over US\$30 billion dollars from the initiators toward executing the war Xlibris (2004), then saw the crave for one of the diamond field in the world, no longer blood diamond. This delay and levity of non-intervention confirmed the view of Alusala (2005) who noted that the UN never intervene in crisis either by force or peace enforcement because under the UN peacekeeping structure, it takes an average of three to six months from the time the UN Security Council might decides to establish a peacekeeping mission to the period it is able to deploy such mission...during these period...lives may be lost while conflict escalates, spilling over to ...regions. If this were the essence of the UN blue helmet, then it becomes unnecessary for any conflicting state or people to look forth for UN intervention.

Furthermore, in the 1990s, Sierra Leoneans was abandoned to their fate when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Foday Sankoh kill, maim and amputated the legs and limbs of many people while struggling for power against the military cum civilian administration. Not less than 480,000 people were killed with many living a destitution life today. Again the world, especially the British, UN and US did not intervened, thereby allowing Nigerians to shoulder the responsibility. According to Porteous (2004) the UN only intervened in 1999 after the incumbent Ahmed Tijan Kabba who was driven away by the rebel cum dissident military-coalition of Major Paul koromah and Sankoh had been reinstated by the single efforts of Nigeria, Gen Sani Abacha. In May 2000, the RUF tore the peace deal and kidnapped over 200 UN peacekeepers of mostly Britain, India and Pakistan, thereby prompting the immediate intervention of the British Army to save the lives of the peacekeepers. The British salvaged the UN's reputation in Africa not only by saving it from a humiliating failure, but also by subsequently insisting that the UN Security Council strengthen the operation in Sierra Leone so that it should be able to start fulfilling the mandate of bringing permanent peace to Sierra Leone. Thus, after the UN's dismal record in Africa, Sierra

Leone was a do or die test for the UN's credibility as a force for peace on the continent.

Against the above cited cases of inaction by the UN, US, France and Britain among others, and the reasons for not intervening in conflict zones until, after several lives had been wasted, Melvern (2004) aptly states that evident emerging from conflict zones had not only be a source of worry, but hinged on a political intrigues of neglect, victimization and possible pop reduction of those people and areas termed as problem zone in the globe. The Rwandan case of 1993 to 1994 war/genocide was a case of total abandonment, inactive, neglect and complicity. Complicity in the sense that there was a systematic killing of over one million ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus by the extremist Hutu nationalist government of late Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana in one hundred days in the presence of UN peacekeepers [UNAMIR] in Kigali, Byumba, Butare and Gisenyi among others; there was the presence of Belgian troops in almost all part of the country; there was also the presence of French Army in Kigali, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in addition to the UN troops (Keane, 1996; Nyankanzi, 1998; Melven, 2004). Then over there in the UN Security Council headquarters in New York, are the five permanent members, inclusive non-permanent members of Nigeria and Rwanda, representing Africa. In the controversial deliberations, that followed, Nigeria without any veto power was a voiceless voice in the strategy of masters of political gimmicks simply because France who supported the atrocities with the hocus-pocus of the Rwanda representative had convincely misinformed others that it was ethnic - in - fighting between Tutsi and Hutu, and since there was a democratic government in place, the matter would be resolved in no time distance (Power, 1998).

These notions, away from what Gen Romeo Dallaire, the UNAMIR force commander saw was a categorical act of betrayal, naiveté, racism and international politics against a small state whose diplomacy is near-zero in the international system. Evident to this inaction was the manner the text message and radio message sent to New York, informed that all was aware that genocide was been committed and what it needed was a response – instructing order to intervene and stopping the pogrom. But there was no instruction

forthcoming; otherwise in response request was a drastic reduction of the UN peacekeeper from the strength of 2700 to 250 personnel, made up of soldiers and MILOBs all together was left. The Belgium out of annoyance for losing ten of its soldiers backed out and left. France, committed to retaining the statusquo as Power (1998) noted, 'continued to arming, helping to arresting Tutsis, Mann checkpoints against the common enemies who are slated for the slaughter slabs. On the other hand, Africa and her toothless bull dog – OAU, were ever silent as the helplessness caused the death of over one million people in one hundred days.

No humanitarian intervention or organization ever think of Rwanda until after barely one hundred and twenty five days; after the RPF of minority Tutsi had taken their destiny by their own hand to rescue the country from the extremist and their cronies. However, a belated international humanitarian intervention was later seen in the Eastern Zaire (Congo DR) camp of the fleeing refugees but it was meant to assist the genocidaires, an action that had raised several questions as to be are they the one that needed help or the victims of the carnage.

Complementing the view of Alusala (2005) in retrospect above, it is evident that the UN and her agencies are only good at intervening in a conflict zone where the deaths had been buried, where many had been dislocated, where diseases of all sorts had found a home in the human bodies, where international refugees over flow had becomes a problem to neighbours, and where the only work available for the UN are paper work, writing and resolutions manufacturing among others. This is because the UN has no moral justification by way of excuse to say anything contrary to failure, for not stopping an incident or carnage happening in its nose and eye-look. It is unbelievable and unheard off. And it explains the dirty and destructive role of international politics as displayed by some who does not know what it means.

Imperatively, the above observation of neglect, levity, denial, inaction and gross cynist approach to ending conflicts, are however one amongst the several reasons that many states in Africa had remained in perpetual conflict for

more than decades. The absence of proper ethics of humanitarian intervention in Africa conflicts, especially in the non-existence period of Africa Union, had encouraged the Congo DR crisis unabated, the Ugandan government versus the Lord Resistance Army in the North, the Senegalese government and the separatist rebel in the North-West, the healing wounds of the uncertainties amongst the Liberian rebels and the government, the Cote d'Ivoire - Gbagbo rebels groups and the National Government, the Guinea-Bissau government and the fighting oppositions, the Comoro Island and the separatist group, the unending Congo Republic Feud, the Beja, Janjaweed, CLM, JEM and the SPLA rebels against the Sudanese government before the division of the country, the Chadian rebel against the government, the Nigeria - Niger Delta Militia Force Confrontation and the FIS versus Algeria government crisis since 1992 among others. It is the inherent negativism in the manner of intervention of which most of the rebel groups believed that at worst they would be asked to share power with the incumbents as occasioned in Sierra Leone, Sudan and Angola, Kenya and Zimbabwe among other or made a general in the army without military background and or asked to head sensitive ministries among others had propelled many conflicts to continued unabated.

On the other hand, the world was implicated in closing its door and ears to the complaints of the oppressed and depraved who have out of frustration and neglect, decided to survive by engaging in conflict against bad leaders in the state who had denied the people good governance and development. For it is arguable that settlement of crisis ought to or should not be only when the war had escalated. The concept of preventive diplomacy early warning should be hided to by all concerned. There should be immediate reasoning with the views of the aggrieved, oppressor and aggressors and aggressed.

Furthermore, where election is to be conducted, the international community, monitoring groups and mediators, has gone to the extent of encouraging violence as they helped choiced candidate to win through rigging since they preferred that peace reign, whereas unknown to them that they are sowing seed of discord amongst the people. Such an act as occurred in Liberia in favour of Charles Taylor should

be desisting forthwith. This is because as already noted that in every conflict, there are always international dimension and foreign interest, which also one of reasons making for non-or quick intervention in African conflicts. The time and idea that states or agencies should intervene in conflicts within state or not, must depends on what is at stake and who are the parties in the game of power among others should be disapproved.

Sequel to these notions and other arguments that followed the international dimension to most conflicts and non-interventions or late interventions postures in African conflicts, which is a terrible factor that had kept many conflicts on and on, with unprecedented escalations, with a high magnitude of death and with a high degree of carnages and destructions, it is obvious that even when peace agents are brought in to broker peace, that its essence might be valueless and ineffective. Given these kinds of responses and or involvement as they codified it, there are evident making round that everyone should be mindful that not all intervention or foreign presence in conflicts zone meant well, even in the mind-eyes of intervention.

3. Rwanda and the Failed Intervention

The very reasons adduced above are however not different when re-examining the Rwanda situation in 1994. According to Melvern (2004) the Rwandan crisis of 1993 to 1994 war/genocide was a case of total abandonment, inaction, neglect and complicity. Complicity in the sense that there were systematic killings of over one million ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus by the extremist Hutu nationalist government of late Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana in one hundred days in the presence of the United Nations peacekeepers located in Kigali, Byumba, Bature, Gisenyi and Kibungo among others.

However, in explaining the political intrigues and its importation sequel to this idea of being present to observed and witness the killings, Dallaire (2003) confirmed that the whole action and inaction of neglect and abandonment was

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the interplay of international politics... because they (UN) that sent the troops, may instigate their betrayal, project racism and promote international politics to abandon them and the victims... even when there is grave refusal to action to stopping the carnage.

The refusal or failure of arms intervention could equally explain the level of confidence given to those with non-arms. This is because if those that possess arms failed to stop those with less weapons like machetes, spike and club among others, then they are encouraged to turn and attack the armed bearers. This also expressly tells one that if you cannot stop us, then leave or we use your arms to kill you, which on one side explains the anger and vexation of the Rwanda soldiers and interahamwe rebels who bounced on the Belgian soldiers who were inactive in the peak of the crisis. For there was the presence of Belgian troops in almost all part of the country, just as the French soldiers who helped the killers in arresting the victims and separating the victims from the Hutu ethnic group by aiding and abetting the annihilation (Power, 1998).

At the same instance, it was the displayed of politics of betrayal of trust that made the UN peacekeeper at the airport on their way of departure to openly wept and throw away their blue helmet in anger since the international community had failed to apply arms intervention as enshrined in the peace enforcement section of its charter on peace engagement (Lifton, 2004:116).

At the same time, if the notion of Dallaire (2003) was anything to go by when he noted that... it means that in understanding of the moral minefield our peacekeepers are forced to negotiate when they are asked to step into the world's dirty wars...then what happened in Rwanda was like shaking hand with the devil. A statement that informed that apart from pains and horrors, that the life of peacekeepers are also at danger when they fails to intervene to prevent killings or death of the innocence', as the Belgian soldiers were targeted victims in the game of international politics, because of the failure of humanitarian arms intervention in the Rwanda crisis.

4. Darfur and the Hocus-Pocus of Intervention

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Imperatively, the Darfur crisis, though under the African Union peace initiative abnittio, is seen not to be different from the scenarios and characters of the Rwanda pogrom. The attendant human neglect, levity, denial, inaction and gross cynist approach towards ending the conflict makes the AU test-case-syndrome not only an impossible task but an awful chimera. A factor which also raises a waveling doubt on the AU – international community agreement; that they would only aid African peace initiative and intervention in conflicts zone within Africa and not to intervene any more; that henceforth the Africans should only expect logistics and materials from them instead of waiting and relying on international intervention. The absence of proper AU intervention capability mechanism towards peace enforcement mechanism should no longer derail African peacekeeping or intervention processes. This procedure of the international community washing off its hands from all African conflicts though means the Africans solving their problems by themselves looks good but the question is how long and what is the possibility of the assistance being receive when needed? This also explains again the tendency to failure of ethics of humanitarian intervention in Africa as experienced at Darfur in 2003. Despite AU stands on viability policy, a known non-sense venture and ideology to tackle all conflicts in the continent, which informed the choice of Burundi and Darfur as a test – cases situations. The evidences emanating from Darfur shows that the AU had failed to muster the muscles in attending to the Darfur crisis. As its failure had also affected all other peace initiatives and agents' efforts in Darfur. These actions also portrayed and betrayed the AU new charter principles of Interference, Indifference, Collective security, One High Command and Collective Sovereignty among others (Wikipedia, 2005).

Reasons extracted from this shortfall was also confirmed by the views of several observers and peace agents, as Azeeh (2007) blamed the AU, saying that the African Union intervention was not timely as many people and villages had been wiped out or destroyed in Darfur. A situation that had increasingly add to the number of refugee camps in the region. It was the prompt action of the AU –

AMIS, though, that spared the Mohajilia village from destruction by the Janjaweed rebels. To him, the AU will not succeed unless minimum force is applied. He however, accused Omar El-Bashiru of protecting the late Osman Bin Laden interest in Sudan – Darfur, hence the long delay of the UN intervention acceptance process by the government in Khartoum.

Agreeing with the issues raised above as factor negating the resolution of the Darfur crisis, Abdulrasheed (2007) observed that with the lost of over 450,000 lives and with the rate of deaths geometrically on the increase daily in Darfur, that genocide are being committed. As an observer, he further asserts that the AU mandate in Sudan is a failure. Implying that the AU troops have not fired a bullet since arrival in that crisis. The AU is there in Darfur to observe the fight and the killings. They only appear to pick the dead bodies at the end of each day battle. The AU is there only to observe the fight and not to counter the fight or stopping it. In his word; 'if you cannot quench the fire, don't add firewood'. This is because the AU is just doing nothing there. It is also political as some people who are running the AU are using it to achieve their own ends. The document or mandate are not been followed. The AU leaders are gaining from the Sudan conflict and that informed their backing of Omar El-Bashir. The contentions above are not only disheartening comments from several witnesses' views points but it has becomes a mark of politicisation and failures combined. The AU inadequacies however could be the reason on the other hand why UN who had pledged assisting with necessary logistics had to eventually takeover the mission to add insult to injury as their inactions in term of peace enforcement had continually witness the abysmal killings of peacekeepers by the rebels.

In a further revelation on the political intrigues and antics of actors in Darfur crisis, Onu (2007) noted that the presence of African Union – AMIS is nothing to write home about. This is because some of the African leaders are implicated in collaboration with few of the international

agencies who are using the avenue to amass wealth. The degree of AU – AMIS promise and fail to the people in term of food, make-shift camp, water and other logistics are failure. The villages of Abu-sufiuan, Angabor, Kelie-kelie, Labado, Sheria, and Muhajilia among others are the most affected area where there is abjectness and pains. The lacking in these areas, all had combined to make the people to loose confident on the ability of peacekeepers towards ending the crisis (HRW, 2008). Added to these observations, Ogu (2006) aptly blamed the AU – AMIS troops for not following the dictates of the document as they are seen aiding the Janjaweed rebels, SLM rebels, JEM rebels, Beja rebels, NMAS rebels, SLA rebels, and the min-groups rebels among others respectively in a separate situations. He further noted that the fractionalization of the crisis is international. In support of this notion (Abdulrasheed, 2007) further argued that in February alone, at the instance of AMIS reduction of the allowances of the rebels that there was an attack against both the AMIS soldiers and the indigenous people of Darfur.

The aforementioned instances apart from explaining the degree of failures and political intrigues in Darfur crisis goes a long way to add that the eventual takeover of the operation by the United Nation Mission was due to several inadequacies and failures of AMIS, but the body in its own explanation decried of incapacitation and lacks of the necessary logistics to actually move into the field. Although, the UN takeover did not stop the killings, the mass grave and shallow grave of the killed victims, but the implicating of the Sudanese President Omar El-Bashir actually helped in reducing the rate of destruction both human and properties among others. This also informed that if peace enforcement had been applied by either the AMIS or UN peacekeepers with the arrest warrant against the serving president, the rate and tempo of the killings would have been minimal.

Therefore, it is not a write-off that the shortfalls had encouraged the failure of ethics of humanitarian arms intervention in African Darfur region, but that the international community –China, Russia and others seemed not to be interested on whether peace is achieved in Sudan

conflict region of the south or not in so far they are benefitting from the natural mineral resources. This hardline stands of the international community in delaying to intervene in the Darfur crisis had also help to prolong the early resolution of the problem owing to individual states' interest in the wealth of the region. A factor that both the AU – AMIS and the latter UN – Mission had not only failed to explain to the world but had failed in implementing the instrument of the document based on their separate interest against the documents or mandates of the operation. Thereby, prompting the agreement of the research that the situation as recently occurred in Darfur is not in any way different from the events of 1993 to 1994 war/genocide in Rwanda.

5. Analysing the Issues

The situations of things in Darfur might be more devastating than the 1994 crisis in Rwanda, in the sense that Rwanda is a small tiny East African state whose land mass and population is one-third of Western Sudan. A close society where visitors and the indigenes can easily be differentiated in a minute compared to the large expanse of land and high population demography wilderness of the Darfur region. Furthermore, Rwanda has a small state diplomacy that is of no significance and no strategic importance to any power brokers of the international community compared to the Darfur region with enormous oil, gold and colbats wealths that attracts the West, East, Asia and even the Arabs interests. A situation that mathematically and by the figure the rate death and killings obtained from Amnesty international records, Rights watch arms project amongst others means nothing to the scavengers in so far it does not deter their interest at all. In the words Abdurasheed (2007) the record of deaths is insignificance to desires to see the conflict in Darfur continues. Such deaths had exceeded the figures quoted

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earlier as those already dead and buried in either mass grave or shallow graves are countless.

Another factor that suggested that Omar El-Bashir and some notorious African leaders who are critical of his indictment by the international court of justice (ICJ), for committing genocide is that while the Rwanda genocide occurred in one hundred and twenty-five days, the Darfur genocide had occurred gradually from the year 2000 to date. A reason implying that the rate of killings, maiming and general annihilation of the people might have followed the same processes compared to Rwanda where the corps and bodies were seen littered the street, roads, hills, streams rivers banks and flowing rivers. The deserts, where the Darfur killings are taken place, however, have enough sand to cover the bodies where birds and wide animals had a left over of some of the sudden foods to prey on.

The same degree of abandonment and neglect as noted in Rwanda was seen in the Darfur. The lateness in arrival of the supposedly peace agents – UN and AMIS toed the same processes. The general idea of not willing with the available capability to enforcing the mandates to ending the killings was observed in both situations. Instead the people, the peace agents, and the peacekeepers or peace enforcement deliberately observed and witnessed the killings going on and on unabated. The only thing that differentiates Darfur from Rwanda is that humanitarian aids like food and sleeping materials are being delivered to the Darfurians unlike Rwanda where such was absent. The notorious act of aid hijacking, and aids stealing by the rebels was noted among the main rebel groups to the crisis in some respect. The interahamwe, gendarme and national army of Rwanda displayed such heinous crime of denial and deprivation of the vulnerable, just as the Janjaweed, SLM, JEM, SLA, and the host of others also played the same antics.

Meanwhile, against our major point of emphasis, that is, the failure of humanitarian arms interventions in African crisis, it is equivocally clear that the failure and level of politics displayed in Rwanda by the UN mission and the

AMIS/UN mission role in Darfur are clear indication of breach of protocol, neglect, abandonment, racism and political against the affected ethnic groups. Moreso, just as the African neighbours felt deaf ear to the killings in Rwanda in 1994, the people of Darfur whose was unceasingly and unabated could only see Rwandan and Nigerian troops being the only African states sympathising with the cries. Rwandan troops on its part praying that another African country should not experience the horror of 1994 genocide was the first to send troops whose presence with ill-equipped mechanism and capability could not make any difference as the killings by the government sponsored Janjaweed continually sack villages, kill people while creating many orphans, widows, and parentless generation. With many children becoming parents and bread-winners at the ages of 3 – 9 years respectively, and many traumatized becoming destitute at early years, the situations and character of events that took place at Rwanda had eventually repeated itself in another African state of Sudan – Darfur region. Thus, the characters, conditions, and events that played itself in Rwanda in 1994 genocide had not in any way being different from the Darfur genocide that had defile all solution even in the presence of the new peace agents in the region – the UN peace mission.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

To say that time has not come when peace making in African conflicts should take new dimension such as peace enforcement mechanism being applied to every African and major world conflicts is to adduce the lest on how peaceful settlement of issues like political demands, political differences, election rigging, political disagreement and political interest in conflict zones, which in itself are the major propeller of several political instabilities, crisis and war in the world today. Peace enforcement in its merit

discard absolute or cynical style of human annihilation of his fellow human as pretentiously portrayed by the mechanism for peacekeeping in Rwanda and Darfur respectively. The trial and success of these act was carried out in Sierra Leone against Sankoh and Major Paul Koromah, which of course had remained an evident and measure discouraging palatial treatment of descents, rebels and insurgent groups among others by peace enforcer as styled in peacekeeping negotiation and reconciliations paradigm. It is this concept that was missing in the Rwandan crisis even when Gen. Dallaire opted for it. The refusal and denial by the sponsor, however, later paved way for the awful destruction of over one million ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus by the extremist in one hundred days of killings. This work, though not explicating that violence should begets violence but if situation compel as such, then the peace agent should be left with no other options than the alternate, instead of deliberately romances with the rebels. The case of Darfur would have been treated in such manner if the AU – AMIS had followed the document as consistently lamented over by Abdulrasheed (2007) that the initiators if they had not displayed derailed attitude from the mandate, the result would have produce a successful dislodgement of the government sponsored Janjaweed rebels. It is this delayed tactics that had allowed the failure of ethics of humanitarian arms intervention in Darfur to be a worried paradox of our time. For while peacekeeping mechanism are being negotiated, the elements of political intrigues, political propaganda and interest aggregation are imported most at times to prolong and fault the terms of agreement by the parties to conflict basking for change and possible regretful to the deed of the mandate as affecting all. The dragging of foot by participants/perpetrators makes the conflict resolution mechanism a political hocus-pocus, as personal interest of participants in most cases are seen override their sense of judgement and reasons, as was portrayed in the early days of entry into Liberia among the west African states initial agreement. The UNITA's reasons for disapproving all peace agreement with MPLA in Angola, and the separatist group of ADFL – CZ of Congo DR, against the Kabilas after the defeat of Gen. Mobutu in 1997. The failure of ethics of humanitarian arms intervention in conflict zone does not

occur overnight, it is a premeditated act employed by interest groups to seeing the mission goal unattainable.

The political situation in Sudan wholly sponsored by late Osman Bin laden, using Omar El-Bashir as a pawn on the chess board is a typical scenarios of perpetrators buying time to commit enough havoc while calling for peacekeeping that may arrive conflict zone in three to six months time, compared to peace enforcement that needed the marching order to uproot the rebels with no hesitation and compromise. African conflicts, whether major or minor should by way of suggestion adopts peace enforcement so that the events in Rwanda and Darfur – Sudan among others may never repeat itself in the anal of contemporary African Union that preaches being indifferent to neighbours cry in conflict zone among the African people.

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