

personified and thus hypostatized, it is perceived as a daemon, the latter is said to play an elfin game. It is his identification with the mystifying, befogging anima that made Jung describe, and probably also experience, the soul this way. For our purposes let us treat all this as if it were a merely poetic-rhetorical embellishing form of expression (although it probably was more to Jung) and leave it aside. For then we can sift out the one precious insight this statement contains, namely the idea that the soul is *above* and *below* (and also *above and below*) human existence, and also, we could add, to the left and to the right of human existence, in other words, all around but not *in* the sphere of the specifically human.

The sphere of the human, all-too-human is free from soul (in the specific sense). It is as if it were an island or a walled garden, a safe place of civilized life to be led under familiar conditions. It is the middle between two extremes. As this middle ground, it can be, but does not have to be, mediocre. But at any rate, it is without mythic overdetermination. It is the sphere of the ordinary, commonplace, conventional. Also, it is the realm of (relative) human freedom and arbitration, of where man can make his own pragmatic decisions guided by what is felt to be truly his own human advantage, unburdened by the restraints and heavy load of Meaning imposed on life by the soul. In the modern Western world, most of our daily life takes place in this sphere of relative irrelevancy and liberalism, the sphere of emancipation from soul.

This safe island or garden is "threatened" on both sides ("above" and "below") by the incursion or manifestation of the soul, the "inhuman" soul.

With this conception or observation, we get a threefold scheme, whereas before we only had, as I pointed out, a duality and strict opposition of the human realm and the realm of the soul. Now it appears that the latter realm, that of the soul, is divided into two different regions with the realm of our human interests in between.

What Jung had in mind with "above" and "below" was, as the context shows, primarily to be understood in terms of the situation of mythological or metaphysical man; his next sentence begins with "Heaven and hell..." He obviously links his "above" with the upper, noble, ethically "good" forces of light, whereas "below" refers to the demonic, possibly destructive forces of darkness. Heaven and hell

belong to a bygone time. For us, living after the rise of psychology and the emergence of "psychological man," "above" and "below" take on a different meaning.

2.3.1 "From below"

"From below" the ordinary human realm, it is, in our modern psychological age, above all individual and collective psychopathology in which "the soul" makes itself felt. "The soul" disturbs our peace of mind by plaguing us with neurotic, irrational anxieties, obsessions, compulsions, psychosomatic disorders, hysterical symptoms, phobias, irrational impulses, depressions, and so on. In all these symptoms or conditions, the soul as the psychic Other, the "non-ego," stirs within us and demands attention. People can, for example, be possessed by jealousy to the point where they kill, kill either their rival or the person loved who rejects them.

It is also a well known phenomenon that all sorts of feeling-toned complexes can get the better of us and drive us to irrational, often unwanted behavior or maybe even to a behavior that is absolutely incompatible with our conscious attitudes, our values, belief systems, and habits. We also know this phenomenon from the collective level. In a crowd that turns into a mob, people can all of a sudden be induced to commit actions that they would never have dreamed of doing if they had been alone or in the company of only a few acquaintances and actions that afterwards they feel deeply ashamed of, acts of violence and destruction, rioting, vandalism, lynch law. On a political level, whole nations can go mad and systematically commit terrible atrocities, just think of Nazi Germany and Rwanda a few decades ago.

The soul can of course also present itself in psychotic symptoms, hallucinations, delusions.

Historically, the "from below" gave rise to the early psychological ideas of the subconscious and the unconscious (which was also usually located "beneath" consciousness, at least in the early days of psychology).

But concerning those phenomena that come from below, I now must express a warning. Things here are a bit complicated. Not everything that comes from below is *ipso facto* produced by the soul and a manifestation of it. We have to be very careful when there is a kind of "explosion" of an emotion or a complex. What erupts from

below can be a manifestation of soul, but it must not always be. Even if we ignore here cases of pathological behavior due to organic brain damage and the already mentioned *psychic* disorders, we must state that not every psychopathology is psychologically relevant. Many instances of pathological behavior (and I count emotional outbursts under psychopathological symptoms, even if they may be isolated and of minor importance) are psychic events, belong merely to the human, all-too-human, rather than to the soul and are expressions of the psyche, i.e., human biology. There are several distinct possibilities, both on the personal and collective level. We need to keep them theoretically and in therapeutic practice clearly apart, because if we ascribed soul dignity to what does not have any (or vice versa), we would be committing serious blunders. But we also have to know that it is not always perfectly clear whether a complex reaction is a moment of soul or of psyche.

What is clearly not a case of soul manifesting itself are those outbursts of emotions that are simply due to a lack of civilization, education, and adaptation. Children often go into temper tantrums because they have not learned to control their emotions in an appropriate way. Many adults unfortunately stay children in this regard, and often certain types of psychotherapy even foster in their patients the free expression of their emotions, confusing civilized self-control with repression and opting for an uninhibited display of what is going on in oneself. Jung was very clear about emotional outbursts. "And you always have emotions where you are not adapted. If you are adapted you need no emotion; an emotion is only an instinctive explosion which denotes that you have not been up to your task. When you don't know how to deal with a situation or with people, you get emotional. Since you were not adapted, you had a wrong idea of the situation ... to be emotional is already on the way to a pathological condition."¹¹⁴ "Affects always occur where there is a failure of adaptation" (*CW* 6 § 808). Very true. With an outburst of emotions, affects, and impulses, the human animal, the beast inside a person, is released. This is obviously something that has no soul dignity. What Jung here called "instinctive" explosions are events of (human) "nature."

¹¹⁴ C.G. Jung, *Nietzsche's Zarathustra. Notes of the Seminar Given in 1934-1939*, ed. by James L. Jarrett, vol. 2, Princeton University Press 1988, pp. 1497f.

But in addition to such phenomena which display simply a lack of civilization and education, there is another possibility of emotional outbursts: outbursts (as well as other pathological behavior) as a reaction of a feeling-toned *complex*. Complexes are of a different order from "instinctive" emotions. Complexes are not components of human "nature." They have a history. They originate in a person's life from experiences as the soul's response to those experiences.

Now Jung's view was that ultimately complexes had an archetypal nucleus. This would mean that they possessed some veritable soul dignity and a truly mythic dimension. I think this is a mistake. I find it essential to understand complexes and complex reactions as purely subjective and belonging to personal, private psychology, to the personal unconscious, which is *the ego's* unconscious, whereas with Jung's idea complexes would have one foot or root in Jung's collective unconscious and in the sphere of mythic meaning. The autonomy of complexes results, and can be sufficiently explained, from the fact that unresolved conflicts, resentments, narcissistic offences, and disappointments through the factual refutation by life of one's highest aspirations, values, and beliefs have been split off from consciousness and repressed. They are bundles of psychic energy which in each case are attached to a specific content that are not integrated into the personality and are, as it were, automatically triggered by appropriate stimuli. In other words, they are a case of systematic maladaptation in the psychological sense of the word, namely the soul's maladaptation to itself (rather than to external reality [which would *psychologically* be irrelevant]). Dissociation. An already in fact experienced truth is, against the soul's better knowledge, denied by the soul. Or, the other way around, something that has already been experienced to be a illusion is stubbornly maintained as a soul truth. Feeling-toned complexes (i.e., complex reactions¹¹⁵) are either so to speak "local" neuroses, neuroses *en miniature*, or individual components of a fully developed neurosis.

Because this alleged soul *truth* in complexes is in truth an untruth, (implicitly) *known* to be an untruth, you get explosive reactions or powerful, obstinate, irrational behavior the moment a life situation

¹¹⁵ A complex is not a subsisting thing, but exists only, indeed comes into being only, in its manifestations, in complex reactions such as emotional outbursts or stubborn irrational behavior.

touches on the topic that is at the core of this complex. The untruth has to make an excessive fuss, a powerful show of itself, to compensate for its lack of real truth and in order to pretend to be an absolute truth.

(Of course, most of what in adult life may appear as an "instinctive explosion" is also based on complexes. In that case, it is not simply, as discussed before, a lack of civilization, but truly the manifestation of an uncontrollable force. Jung therefore spoke of the autonomy of complexes. I disregard here the correct assessment that even in the case of complex reactions one can speak of a lack of civilization after all, namely if one understands that it is the task of a civilized person to free himself of complexes. The difference to the former case of a lack of self-control remains nevertheless. Complexes cannot, and also need not, be controlled because it is part of their nature that they are autonomous powers, split off. They can only, and ought to, be *dissolved* through being made conscious and seen through as being an obstinate defense of an untruth, so that the dissociation of consciousness is ended. Simple emotions and desires, by contrast, can be kept in check. This is what education, and self-education, is about.)

It is crucial to see that in neurotic symptoms and complexes, although they belong to subjective, personal psychology and to the modern ego-personality, nevertheless *the soul* expresses itself. It is the *soul* that makes neurotic. But the soul that makes neurotic is a sick soul. In speaking about a sick soul what is meant is not that the *person* with a neurosis or with feeling-toned complexes is sick (or only indirectly so). Nor is meant that through the neurosis the soul becomes sick. No, it is really the soul that is sick and for this reason produces neurosis as its way of self-manifestation in a human being. And this is why psychotherapy must not be conceived as our curing the neurotic person, the human being,¹¹⁶ but as a work that allows the neurotic

¹¹⁶ With this I contradict Jung's view: "Its [medical psychology's] business is not with neuroses but with human beings—that, in fact, is the grand privilege of medical psychology: to treat the whole man and not an artificially segregated function" (CW 10 § 354). While I agree that we should not be concerned with artificially segregated functions and while in very different contexts the *psychological* notion of "the whole man," the *homo totus*, has a prominent place in my thinking, I nevertheless think that the focus of psychotherapy is the soul, which in the present context means neurosis and neurotic complexes, and *not* the human being (which is an extra-psychological concept!). Not only for reasons following from the logic of the discipline of psychology, but also for ethical reasons the human person should be taboo. The human being must not be made an object of treatment. No trespassing into the sphere of the patient's absolute freedom!

soul to cure itself. Neurosis has no redeeming value, despite the fact that it is produced by the soul. It is truly sick and nothing else. This essay about what soul is is of course not the appropriate place for a discussion in detail of the particular theme of neurosis; this will have to be the task of a separate study. But the unfamiliar notion of a sick soul needs some comment.

2.3.2 Excursion on "the sick soul"

The ruling idea in Jungian psychology is that the soul is healthy and that, if for whatever reason a psychological disorder happened to have come into being, it aims for the restitution of health. Jung explicitly conceived of the soul as a system of self-regulation (e.g., CW 7 § 92), and he integrated neurosis into the idea of self-regulation. This means that for him neurosis, far from being a real *noxa*, is much rather the compensating correction of a one-sidedness of consciousness, an attempt on the part of the soul to supply a person with what is missing or has been repressed, but essentially belongs. Maybe it is even the harbinger of a new personality that wants to emerge in the individual concerned. The neurosis is precisely the first manifestation of "the values which the individual lacks" (§ 93), and this is why Jung can say, "In the neurosis is hidden one's own best enemy or friend" (CW 10 § 359, transl. modif.). "We should even learn to be thankful to it.... *Not it is what is cured, rather it cures us.* A human being is ill, but the illness is nature's attempt to heal him" (§ 361, transl. modif., Jung's italics). Ultimately, neurosis thus becomes for Jung a *morbus sacer* (CW 11 § 521).

This standard Jungian view of neurosis distinguishes clearly cases of neurotic behavior from cases of emotional outbursts due to a simple lack of adaption and civilization. Neurosis is by Jung rightly not interpreted in terms of a lack or breakdown, nor as caused by mishaps (traumatic circumstances) in the sense of a causal-reductive approach, but on the contrary as being creatively productive and purposive. We can even say that neurosis is decidedly a project. Jung's "final-constructive" or "synthetic" interpretation is indispensable and accords with the real character of neurosis, as also with the finality intrinsic to the more isolated feeling-toned complexes.

However, where I differ from Jung is that I claim that having the nature of a project must not *ipso facto* mean that it is a good and healthy one, and having a telos can under certain circumstances just as well be an obsessive getting on a dead end track as it can, under other circumstances, mean the way into an open future.

The idea that a new personality (or personality aspect) that wants to emerge in a person frequently, indeed usually, shows itself in its first immediacy in the form of a pathology, in disturbing symptoms, is a precious insight and a valuable heuristic premise of psychotherapy that I completely concur with. It helps to open one's eyes to the true nature of certain real phenomena in psychic life that otherwise might be seriously misunderstood. Here the *morbis sacer* idea, although far too high-faluting, is in place. But only here. However, this refers to entirely different phenomena from cases of neurosis proper. We must not confound the two types of phenomena.

Neurosis properly understood is precisely not a case of the soul's self-regulation and of an attempt on the part of the psyche to heal itself by completing the personality through bringing in "the values which the individual lacks." It is not in itself therapeutic, not one's *best enemy* or friend in Jung's sense of "best," although it is certainly *the neurotic's* (or rather *the neurotic soul's*) *best friend*—inasmuch as he (it) clings to it at all cost, loving it more than his well-being and sometimes even more than his life (just think, e.g., of *anorexia nervosa*, which in its most severe cases entails the only too real possibility of a lethal end). Neurosis (*if it is truly a neurosis*¹¹⁷) is simply sick, a terrible aberration, and a dead end. In contrast to certain other phenomena of psychopathology, in the case of which Jung's ideas are very much in place, it certainly does not cure us. It has, as I said, no redeeming value.

Furthermore, neurosis does not have an archetypal or mythic depth. It does not come about through the intrusion and powerful influence of archetypal images. It is not a mode of the survival of the mythic gods, the way Jung's dictum about "phobias, obsessions, and so forth: in a word, neurotic symptoms" suggests, namely that "The gods have become diseases; Zeus no longer rules Olympus but rather

¹¹⁷ Not every psychopathological condition that is not psychotic, psychopathic, etc. is neurotic. There are also merely *psychic* disorders. But neurosis is a *psychological* disorder. See the following paragraph.

the solar plexus..." (CW 13 § 37). A terrible mystification. The term "numinosity," which has its legitimate use in the area of religious experience in the widest sense, must not be brought in if one wants to discuss neurosis. The psychologist needs a well developed feeling-function in order to be able to resist confusing hysterical emotionality with genuine numinous experiences and manifestations of archetypes or gods. There is nothing epiphanic in neurosis proper. *Neurosis has no soul dignity*, despite the fact that it is the work of the soul.

But this was not possible for Jung to accept. Just as he felt in general that neurosis was, so to say, a sacred illness because he ascribed an archetypal depth to it, so he also was seduced into interpreting a socio-political mass movement, the Nazi movement, as an expression of an archaic Germanic god, Wotan ("They are all drunk with a wild god" CW 18 § 639). In my opinion, preposterous. Again we have to apply Occam's razor. There is no need, in fact it would be utterly wrong, to introduce the category of archetypes or gods for comprehending the Nazi movement. The latter can be adequately explained as resulting from a mixture of deep resentments due to undigested disappointments and not accepted losses, of unresolved conflicts, inferiority complexes compensated by a hysterical demonstration of grandiosity, of severe social and economic problems, genuine political fears, the use of ideology-formation and simulation as an ennobling cover, ingenious propaganda, much bluff, etc. etc.—at any rate in terms of nothing but human, all-too-human factors. No Wotan, no god. Nothing numinous or archetypal. Quite banal. Very worldly and superficial. As far as the semblance of numinosity is concerned, we find in the Nazi movement merely impressive theatrics, a great skill at staging bombastic shows and inciting emotions in masses. As I said: simulation. It is akin to what in art and religion is kitsch.

The influence of so-called archetypal powers or gods (such as Wotan) would mean that the Nazi movement had at its core a true substance, a real soul value. But in reality it was fundamentally empty, nihilistic. Not to see through to its real nihilistic hollowness and instead to view it as a sign of the alleged fact that the god Wotan had stirred in the German soul means falling for the hysterical theatrics and pompous ideological phrases. And in Jung's case it was probably also due to his enthusiastic belief in his own theory of archetypes and in the survival of gods in what he called "the unconscious," a belief that

was enthusiastic because it was backed up by a deep-seated personal desire or need for the continued presence of God or gods in our godless age and thus made him see the numinous everywhere, if only the least sign of a heightened emotionality offered itself as a peg to hang it on. Jung's own refusal to face modernity and his compensating enthusiasm about the compensating idea of "the collective unconscious" made him see a wild god even *into* such a phenomenon as the Nazi movement in which nothing of the sort can really be discovered.

Quite apart from the fact that the one word *furor* is far too poor and abstract a notion to do justice to the rich, complex nature and depth of a mythic god, an essential point is that from Adam of Bremen's brief definition, *Wotan id est furor*, one certainly cannot conclude that the reverse is also true, in other words, that also every *furor*, in our modern times, *est Wotan*. It is regrettable that the inventor of the notion of the feeling function did not show enough of a sophisticated psychological feeling function to be able to keep the heightened emotionality of a modernistic fanatic-ideological movement and the (rather rare) numinosity of manifestations of the divine apart. Regrettable, too, is his failure to set the quantitative impressiveness of emotions on "the horizontal plane" apart from the qualitative impressiveness of soul experiences belonging to "the vertical dimension." In this case Jung short-circuited the two levels or dimensions that in truth (and, as we have seen, often also for him) are objectively kept apart by the psychological difference, thereby inflating the banal (banal deludedness and hysterics, banal complex-riddenness) with a soul mystery and soul dignity merely on the basis of its inflatedness and enormity.

Whereas in mythic experiences there is a fundamental "innocence of being," modernity is characterized by cunningness, scheming, tricky contrivance. This distinction is not identical with that between the unconscious and consciousness. Modern ideology, simulation, and kitsch may be a product of very conscious deliberation. But in many cases, and so also in the Nazi movement, it happens to a large degree unconsciously. The fact that it may come from unconscious motivations must not be confused with innocent "primordial" experience. In modernity, unconscious impulses can be a manifestation of an unconsciously occurring contrivance that is far removed from any soul

dignity. The difference—"unconscious origin" and "conscious origin"—is not psychological, not decisive. It is only a psychic difference. It is not, just like that, identical with the psychological difference between archetypal (mythic, imaginal [in Corbin's and Hillman's sense]) and egoic (or ordinary human). This particular identification of course suggests itself the moment that "the unconscious" is substantiated as a subsisting separate realm radically dissociated from "consciousness," as is the case in Jung. Then it is likely that the vertical difference between two psychological dimensions is positivized and the one dimension is projected upon the construct of "the unconscious." The reified (and in this sense, ontologized) "unconscious" obviously invites its being identified with the realm of the archetypes, the imaginal, "the gods" that belong to a completely different *order* of categories. In psychic reality, on the empirical, horizontal level, the conscious/unconscious *split* normally does not exist. Most behavior, most human experience and producing, is both conscious and unconscious at the same time. Unconscious and conscious are descriptive adjectives for conditions of human consciousness. And they are an inseparable pair of polar opposites, so that normally every psychic phenomenon is (a) more the one and less the other one, but always both, and that in addition (b) it may also be the case that certain facets of a psychic phenomenon are conscious while others are unconscious.

Now I seem of course to have maneuvered myself into a contradiction: on the one hand, I claim that neurosis is a manifestation of soul; on the other hand, I say it has no soul dignity. This impression of contradiction also comes across from what I said earlier about complexes, which, after all, I view as "small-scale neuroses," namely, that they belong to and can satisfactorily be understood in terms of the ego's personal unconscious, an idea which likewise seems incompatible with the interpretation of neurosis as an expression and work of the soul. The resolution of this seeming contradiction is that it is not a contradiction in my theory, my contradicting myself, but the objective contradiction of the soul (soul in the traditional sense) the moment it makes its appearance in modernity. My seeming self-contradiction is a reflection of the fact that neurosis *is* the existing contradiction. The phenomenon of neurosis forces upon us the paradoxical concept of *a soul without soul dignity*.

Once upon a time—during the ages of myth and metaphysics—the soul used to be the organ of truth. As such, it was both the reflex in the human world of speculative (mythic or metaphysical) truths and provided man's access to those truths. It had veritable substantial contents, above all gods or, later, God. But in modernity it was ousted from within itself, alienated from its primordial unity with itself, exteriorized, and thus came under the sphere of jurisdiction of the ego. It is the soul on the *level*, or in the logical *status* of externality, the soul in the element of modernity and this means the ego. As such, it is a truthless soul, only the placeholder of the soul, an empty soul, the soul as sublated, in the status of negation and absence of self-fulfillment. (This absence and emptiness we can, however, understand as the first immediacy of the fact that the soul's fundamental quality of absolute negativity has now at long last come home to the soul, become syntactical and explicit).

As long as it holds its place in this emptiness and thus remains totally inconspicuous, no more than the "fair memory of things that once were" (CW9i § 50), everything is fine. But the moment the soul, under the conditions of modernity, nevertheless wants to become a present reality in life and to revive its former status of being in possession of substantial truth, it can only do so by way of simulation and thus turns into the sick soul. "Sick" because what its simulation achieves is by no means a new present reality of mythic, archetypal, or metaphysical truths, but only their imitation and thus the former truths *as* untruths.

But it is not really the former truths in the plural that make themselves felt in their simulation. More specifically, it is only the naked abstract concept of "The Absolute" in the singular, into which former metaphysics *as a whole* has been contracted or reduced, metaphysics's zero stage so to speak (much like, two and a half millennia earlier, in the transition from *mythos* to *logos*, the whole imaginal wealth of the mythic world was sublated and contracted into the one philosophical concept of Being and the manifold of the sensuous polytheistic pantheon was sublated into the One God of monotheism). The sick soul's thoroughly modern "The Absolute" (not to be confused with the same-named term in classical metaphysics) is only an idle claim to absoluteness *per se*, sheer power, or claim to power,

totally contentless. This contentlessness is, however, the reason why in concrete neuroses "The Absolute" attaches itself to, and decorates itself with, whatever happens to be their respective particular topic (what happens to have been chosen to be *absolutely* feared, to be considered *absolutely* intolerable, *absolutely* to be defended, avoided, or insisted upon, etc.), so that empirically (on the phenomenological level) the impression is created of a plurality of (simulated) archetypal truths ("the imaginal") as the core of the diverse types of neurosis. Only the naked abstraction of "The Absolute" is substantial. All particular contents are merely its indifferent dressing. If psychology "falls for" this impression, it becomes easy for it to understand itself as "polytheistic psychology."

Neurosis comprehended as a project means: the soul wants something, it wants to establish "The Absolute" as an unshakeable powerful truth and principle and thus as a token of verticality (metaphysics). It wants this principle to become real in lived life: a present reality, an obliging, committing truth, a fact. It celebrates "The Absolute" in whatever it chooses as its own particular highest values, its soul needs and purposes—values and purposes that, of course (as we have seen), have already been experienced as being untenable, untruths. And, reckless of our human interests and well-being, the soul forces these neurotic values on a person. As we know from Jung's thesis, neurosis is not, negatively, a mishap, something having gone wrong, the effect of a trauma or traumatizing circumstances. Nor is it the result of a *person's* (*ego's*) defense against, resistance to the soul. Rather, it is, positively, a program, intentional, in fact a devious plot, the neurotic soul's establishment of and insistence on its *untruth* as a truth. The person or ego-personality is in the grip of the sick soul, just as conversely the sick soul is a soul on the logical level of the modern ego. But usually people like to see neurosis exactly the other way around, as caused by traumatizing events and by the ego's defense mechanisms against or its repressions of indigestible or overtaxing aspects of one's reality—which, however, is itself the *neurotic* interpretation of neurosis.

Neurosis is the soul's having become stubbornly set on cocooning itself (and together with itself also the person suffering from it) in a scheme of which it precisely knows that it is its own untruth. If it were otherwise, it would not be *neurotic*. In neurosis the soul

unyieldingly pursues this scheme. It is the soul's free decision to refuse its real truth, a truth which in the case of the modern soul is its emptiness or absence, i.e., its negativity, and instead to insist on "The Absolute" as an artificial substitute for the lost metaphysics of two to three hundred years ago. Neurosis is not, as many people think, a natural reaction to, or caused by, events or circumstances, but rather fabricated. It is a creative design, a "planned edifice," as Jung had put it. As such, it is *contra naturam* (a negation of, and pushing off from, what is given, a logos work of freedom), which is the distinguishing mark which unmistakably shows that what produces a neurosis is the *soul* rather than the ego personality (which only has to dearly pay the price for the soul's indulging in a neurosis). But the neurosis is also sick, because it is the modern exteriorized soul's deliberate decision *against* its own truth (against what it already experienced, and knows, to have become its new truth) and its spiteful (and powerful) *mise en scène* of a counter-"truth."

The soul's general freedom to turn against its own truth is the condition of the soul's possibility to become a sick soul. Historically, this possibility has come into the world with the soul's entrance into modernity. Since the soul is essentially not a piece of nature, it has a choice. It can choose to go along with its own movement and fully adapt to and integrate the changes in its self-constitution that are imposed upon it either by the soul's own work upon itself or by altered external conditions. Or it can spitefully refuse to let itself be transformed by those changes, in which case it chooses to become sick. In addition to *psychic* disorders, which are caused by biological¹¹⁸ or external conditions, we have to take note of and distinguish between two kinds of *psychological* psychopathologies, those in which new or excluded soul aspects make themselves felt and try to force their way into consciousness, on the one hand, and neuroses, on the other hand. The former are expressions of the so to speak innocent self-movement, self-unfolding of the soul's life, whereas the latter are a devious, insidious plot on the part of the soul, with which it precisely disrupts and, once and for all, puts a stop to its own self-movement (and thus also to its "self-regulation" in Jung's sense).

¹¹⁸ Biological conditions are actually also external to the soul.

These few basic comments on the issue of the special case of a "sick soul" must suffice in our context. There remains of course a pressing question, namely, why the soul would choose spitefully to refuse to go along with its own movement, in other words, why it would want to turn into the sick soul. I will propose a very brief answer to this question below in the last chapter (4).

* * *

After this excursion we can return to the topic of the manifestation of the soul "from below."

So far, I have concentrated on pathology and neurosis. But the experiences or phenomena in which the soul manifests literally "from below" must by no means always be pathological, unpleasant, detrimental ones. Its manifestations can also be extraordinary in a very different, positive sense. "From below" generally means emerging from within the individual, as private experience. In this sense, the soul can come to us "from below" also in spontaneous personal experiences of meaning, general inner experiences of dreams and symbols in the context of what Jung called the "individuation process," spontaneous fantasy images in the course of other transformation processes and the like. They all belong to the group of phenomena in which the soul comes "from below." In some cases, mystic visions, auditory experiences, and experiences of illumination (like the *Zen satori* experience) may also fall under this heading.

The distinguishing *qualitative* characteristics of such illumining experiences inasmuch as they come from below (in contrast to "from above") is that what emerges here is the raw, crude, often incomplete (fragmentary), unrefined, unprocessed, uncivilized, sometimes downright barbaric. It has to be the raw in contrast to the cooked because it comes directly from the private individual mind and is a spontaneous or even eruptive manifestation of soul: "immediate" (of course only *at first glance* immediate! For a deeper view there is nothing truly immediate, because what seems to be immediate has also its own historical background through which it is mediated). A very good example of this is the wild, crude imagery and language of alchemy.

What comes "from below" ipso facto always belongs to the sphere of the *opus parvum* and is fundamentally private. It inevitably falls short