
Alternative Perspectives in International Relations and Politics of the 21st Century

Dr. Getnet Tamene

Abstract: *As compared with the bygone centuries, the twenty-first century tends to provide a unique pattern of development to the human polity. It not only offers the news about the frequent downfall of authoritarian regimes here and there, but most importantly, it heralds that the unrelenting current trend of empires itself is on the death bed in contemporary international relations. This sheds light on the possibility of a new and amiable way of decision making in international politics. The arriving trend is thus different than the pattern hitherto known to mankind, the imperial orthodoxy, where the whole actors are doomed to accept decisions that are being imposed on them from a single inner center. This one way street approach is to disrupt due to new developments in international relations. At present, the international system displays a uni-multipolar system, which is a unilateralist multipolar system. The realities on the ground reflect incompatibility of this system to the 21st century. Discernibly, this has generated desperate needs for a compatible multi-multipolar system, which is a multilateralist multipolar perspective, as a choice.*

1. Introduction

This study focuses on multidisciplinary exploration of global issues, particularly those related to international development, in the areas of human rights, international security and cooperation. It tries to offer a comparative analysis and coherent picture of [International system development](#), which promotes reflection, debate, and scholarship in the vast and controversial field of international relations and politics.

The study addresses, in a nut-shell, how international power distribution is changing and the effect it will have on political, social, economic, security and environmental areas in local, national, and international contexts. The study embarks on presenting critical and innovative analytical

perspectives that challenge prevailing orthodoxies. It is based on original research that has an ambition of encompassing all regions of the world and is open to all theoretical and methodological approaches.

Major areas of investigation concentrate on the current development and the future of international relations and politics, while slightly touching political and state institutions, the effects of a changing international economy, political-economic models of growth and distribution, and the transformation of social structure and culture. It is a contribution to ongoing debates of social science research regarding international relations and politics.

The landscape of International politics today

We live in a transformed post-Cold War world. The political landscapes of this post-Cold War world in which actors interact include among others: an unprecedented global financial crisis, multi-polarity without multilateralism, rapidly increasing technological threat to international ecosystem, the evolving of new rules governing the use of force, a dominant hegemonic power, as well as, the rise of 'others', a declining Western influence, sporadically rising social conflicts, which have dramatic implications on the post-Cold War actors and the whole human polity alike.


This article will highlight how various endogenous and exogenous factors try to shape international relations and politics of the 21st century, as it is unfolding. It proceeds by elaborating orders; international political systems; the current hegemonic system; possible scenarios and further developments of international political system; as well as, the end of hegemony.

2. International Political Orders in Perspective

Since Westphalia,¹ modern human history has recorded nearly three large political orders each of which contain

¹ The Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 established European international system; it also dominated states from the rest of the world by imposing on them, for over three hundred years, the rules to which they were not parties.

various systems. These orders include: the Westphalia or Crown Society Order, the International Society Order, and the emerging World Society Order. (See figure 1 below)



On the subject of system transformation and international orders, among others, Robert M. Cutler offers an insightful material.¹ According to his analysis, the breakdown of the Westphalia or Crowned Society Order² into bipolarity in the two decades preceding WW I prefigured the bipolarity of the "International Society Order". The latter began in the early 1920s, marked notably by the beginning of the end of the British Empire through the London Conference of 1925.³ Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the present international transition, which began in 1989/1991, marks the end of this International Society Order's the "Short Twentieth Century System" or whether it marks the

¹ On this subject see Robert M. Cutler, "The Complex Evolution of International Orders and the Current International Transition," *Interjournal Complex Systems*, No. 255 (1999); reprinted in *Unifying Themes in Complex Systems*, ed. Y. Bar-Yam and A. Minai (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2004), pp. 515–522; available at <<http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ar00ij.html>>, accessed 04 May 2011. Also see Tamene, G. *Teórie medzinárodných vzťahov a svetová politika: stručný prehľad*. Bratislava: Iura Edition. 2010. Pp. 89-103.

² This refers to the fact that the Westphalia actors were solely royal sovereigns or monarchs, whereas actors in international society are states and international organizations; when it comes to world society the notion of actors improve to agents that do not confine to one border, or includes networks.

³ See The Dawes report and the London conference. (1924). Editorial research reports 1924 (Vol. II). Washington, DC: CQ Press. Retrieved from <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1924082200>.

On November 30, 1925, the Reparation Commission Invited a Committee of Experts, since known as the Dawes Committee, to "Consider the means of balancing the budget and the measures to be taken to stabilize the currency of Germany". The Committee commenced its work on January 14, 1924, and submitted its Report on April 9, 1924. Also see, Rosmer, Alfred. *British Imperialism and French Imperialism After The London Conference*. In: *The Labour Monthly*, Vol. 6, September 1924, No. 9, pp. 535-543. With this Conference the US domination has underway.

transition to another international system within that order located as the "Long Twentieth Century System". If the former applies, then we are entering a new order (the World Society Order) that will be characterized by a tension between uni-polarity and multi-polarity over time across its constituent systems; if the latter applies, then we are entering another mainly bipolar international system within the same order, i.e. International Society Order.¹ Here, the Cold War (CW) bipolarity "degenerated" into what may be called *Multilateral Interdependence* towards the end of the twentieth century. In this case, the coordinative and collaborative aspects of *Multilateral Independence* are what will carry over into the next international order, which we may call the "World Society Order".² Otherwise, we may be experiencing a continued bipolarity referred to as Long twentieth Century System within the same International Society Order.

From what has been discussed above, we can identify that the International Society Order (Twentieth Century Order) comprises two systems: 1) the interwar system, and 2) the CW system. The *first international system* of this order, though apparently shorter, is *the Interwar System* from the early 1920s to 1941. The coordinative aspects of the system are represented in the military coalition against the Axis powers. The collaborative aspects emerge in the creation of the United Nations Organization (UN) on the basis of the League of Nations, plus an ideological collaboration on two sides,³ West and East.

¹ Cutler, Robert M, cf. Also see Tamene, G. *Teórie medzinárodných vzťahov a svetová politika: stručný prehľad*. Bratislava: Iura Edition. 2010. Pp. 89-103.

² The world society order sees actors based on the phenomenologist model different from the realist model. It never confines actor to a limited boundary. On this see Meyer John W. *World Society, Institutional Theories, and the Actor*, pdf, Stanford University, California, 2010, On the subject of system transformation, see Robert M. Cutler, "The Complex Evolution of International Orders and the Current International Transition," *Interjournal Complex Systems*, No. 255 (1999); reprinted in *Unifying Themes in Complex Systems*, ed. Y. Bar-Yam and A. Minai (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2004), pp. 515–522; available on: <<http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ar00ij.html>>, accessed 04 May 2011. Also see Tamene, G. *Teórie medzinárodných vzťahov a svetová politika: stručný prehľad*. Bratislava: Iura Edition. 2010. Pp. 89-103.

³ See Cutler, Robert M. cf.

As indicated above, *the second international system of the "International Society Order"*, which is relatively longer, is *the Cold War System*, from 1946/47 to 1991. Cutler outlines that this second system could be divided into two moments: 1946/47–1973/74 and 1979/80–1991. It is possible though that the years 1974/75–1979/80 mark a mini-transition between the two moments of the CW System. (These years are significant because they mark the decline and fall of SU-US détente, from Angola to Afghanistan. The biennium 1973/74 also marks the oil embargo that irrevocably changed post-1945 international politics and economics.) Thus the years 1946/47–1973/74 represent the system's tight bipolar moment, and the years 1979/80–1991 represent its loose bipolar moment.¹ According to this reasoning, such mini-transitions shown above, and the years following them, are susceptible to two interpretations. They may introduce a new international order, as did years 1894–1914 after the mini-transition within the *third international system* of the Westphalia or Crowned Society Order. If this is so, then just as unipolar/multipolar tension degenerated into bipolarity, we may suppose that CW bipolarity "degenerated" into what may be called *Multilateral Interdependence* towards the end of the twentieth century.²

Scholars have observed that International system transformation respects certain regularities. The whole process of transition since Westphalia or crown society order, displays, two regularities: Firstly, the length of an international transition is roughly one-quarter the length of the international system it succeeds. On this basis, it is possible to conclude that the present international transition, which started in 1991, has ended during the first half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, i.e. 2005. Secondly, the last international system of each international order splits into two "moments" by an interim mini-transition that is about one-quarter the length of the first moment. Of those two "moments," the second contains the seeds of the normative essence of the succeeding international order.³

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ See Cutler, Robert M. cf

If the years afterwards, up until the end of the CW system in 1991, are designated to be a separate and multilateral "moment" of that system, say, for example, the *Multilateral Interdependence moment*, then this represents the breakdown of Short Twentieth Century bipolarity and the transition to a new international order, referred to as the World Society Order, that will be characterized by the tension between multi-polarity and uni-polarity. However, if the current international transition, which began in 1991, inaugurates only another bilateral system, then there is no new international order, there will be just a Long Twentieth Century.¹

The multilateral "moment" did not endure, thus the whole process of transition drifted somehow, towards the tension between US unilateralism and multi-polarism of the rest. Current controversies between US unilateralism and other actors' multilateralism, reflects the major disagreements that lie in the new uni-multipolar, initial system of the World Society Order. The uni-polar system sounds incompatible with current phase of the human polity's development and with the World Society's Order in general. As empirical observations of current events of international environment show the United States (US), as a hegemonic power does not hesitate to adapt newly proposed international norms, such as, "the law of humanitarian intervention in civil conflict", this is to let others know that the system is predominantly unipolar, and that the US is the only (unilateral) decision maker. Thus it tries to act assertively, by enacting norms that justify a unipolar system in favor of its own particular influence or to impose its interests, unilaterally, on the rest of the actors. This approach fails, however, to produce cooperation, harmony, stability, peace and prosperity. That is why it is incompatible with the current level of human development. Contrary to this are cases like Chechnya and Tatarstan in Russia, and Tibet and Uighuristan (Xinjiang) in China, these provide a determination for domestic political-control, which explains why Russia and China oppose the new norms the US is unilaterally trying to impose. They oppose a new normative

¹Ibid.

basis in favor of seeking to conserve the old one, which is expressed through the bipolarity of the Twentieth Century Order. This is why we currently observe a unique development of the status quo power, the US, becoming the innovator of norms unilaterally for the new international order¹. The implication is the US would do all it can, in order to maintain its dominance in the new international political order, which it is trying to shape solely in accordance with its own interest and vision of governance.

Thus, if currently, emerging uni-multipolar system of the "World Society Order" emerges successfully; it could be an initial reflection of the new international order. By previous reasoning, the new order's first international system would be characterized by a tension between multi-polarity and uni-polarity. The consensus of a wide variety of "long-cycle" and "world-systems" research in political science, all with different assumptions assert, system-wide struggle over the structure of the international system will occur, whether peacefully or otherwise, around 2030–2050, supports the prediction² that the next system of the world society order will emerge at the end of the multi-polar and uni-polar tension. Presumably, this next system shall be multilateral multipolarism. The world society order of this new century and its institutions should not necessarily depend solely on the tradition of the single West, or on Western institutions that work in favor of advancing exclusively Western interests, nor would it rely on the set of Western norms alone, which are being dictated on others, without those others becoming part of the process of making those norms or institutions. The next system would be able to serve as a two-way-street for all centers of power in the available system of multilateral multipolarism. Only new institutions and norms, whose process of making involve the will of all actors would be able to underlie appropriately the 21st century world society order. This change is essential, in order, it to work effectively in the interests of all involved actors of all regions, or in the interests of human polity at large.

¹See Cutler, Robert M. cf.

²Denemark, R.A., 1999, World System History: From Traditional International Politics to the Study of Global Relations, in *International Studies Review*, Blackwell (Malden), 1, 2.

3. The US hegemony and the World Beyond

Currently, we are witnessing fundamental changes in the climate of international relations, due primarily to the obvious hegemony of the US, economically, culturally, and militarily. The history of human polity has seen series of empires among which Pax Britannica was one, currently Pax Americana thinks it is the 'end of history'¹; others, (for instance, China, India, Russia) are carefully observing the pattern, while queuing in line to take turn at one point of time. Empire is a vicious circle, which takes turn in the human history; however, a non-imperial, non-hegemonic constellation is not unthinkable in this century.

According to the hegemonic theory of international politics², the principal role of authority and government in the world is held by a single state. This role (named by political scientists in different ways such as global power, world power, global leader, hegemonic power, and even empire) is undertaken by a state after a general war in which it led to victory a coalition of states.³ This pretty relates with the behavior of the US.

The US seems to have one main reason for maintaining its membership in international alliances: such collective organizations provide a vehicle for the US to exercise its predominant influence in the world. In addition, its continued membership offers the possibility that the burden and cost of maintaining a worldwide order of solely its own vision can be spread widely over many countries.

Several authors thus suggest that the TAA in which the US holds a core position is just a toolbox to advance the imperial interest of the US hegemony. For instance,

¹ On this, see A Report of The Project for the New American Century September 2000, at :

www.newamericancentury.org

² A synthetic list of the major analysts of this school includes Gilpin (1981), Kennedy (1987), Modelski (1983), Nye (1990), and Rasler and Thompson (1994).

³ Attina, Fulvio. Transatlantic Relations under Stress: European and American Attitudes towards Intervention and Prevention. Romanian Journal of European Affairs Vol. 5, No. 2, 2005

(Ferguson, N., 2004¹, Tamene, G. 2010), have indicated the current correlation of the trend as an attempt of enhancing neoliberalism based 'democratic colonization' or 'liberal democratic empire' or unimpeded action of constructing the global neoliberal order² rather than an option directed to end the vicious circle of empires or repressive systems in which super powers take turn. (Modelski, 1999 and 2001)³ Relations of a hegemon and its allies with others are colored with various types of domination and intervention.

During the CW period, questions of human rights were routinely treated as subjects for inter-bloc wrangling between the US, the Western hegemon and the Soviet Union (SU), the Eastern hegemon. The current hegemon and its allies' relations with those others, mainly, since the end of CW, have used the West's declared adherence to human rights in a way it simply was not possible previously.⁴ Contemporary relations are thus, where the West forcibly intervenes into domestic affairs of those who are beyond the West. Western interventions have largely been conducted under pretense of human rights and humanitarian intervention in non-Western entities.

Would the US hegemony based Western initiative thus act in favor of reversing the redundant course of imperial systems and cause an all-inclusive and more creative global

¹ Cited in Tamene, G. *et al.* (2010). *Studies in Contemporary International Relations and Politics: New Europe and Beyond*. Germany, BudrichUniPress Ltd. P. 22.

² See Kotz, David. 'Socialism and Global Neoliberal Capitalism'. Available at: www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/congreso/kotz_10abr03.pdf

Also see After Neoliberalism: Empire, Social Democracy, or Socialism? In: Monthly Review—an independent Socialist Magazine, Vol. 55, Issue 8, 2004.

³ On this issue Modelski has studied the evolutionary mechanisms of global politics of the past millennium, but his analysis of the long cycles of global power competition and succession of global leaders covers only the last five centuries. During these centuries, Portugal (1516-1609), the Dutch Republic (1609-1714), Great Britain (1714-1815 and 1815-1945) and the United States (1945-...) exercised global leadership. Each one of them was selected in the global warfare phase, and was gifted with the attributes (lead economy, open or democratic society, organization for global reach, and responsiveness to global problems) that fit to the role of the global leader for a cycle of world politics (also See Appendix 12, Table A and B).

⁴ See Brown, Chris. *Understanding International Relations*, 2nd Ed. Great Britain, Palgrave, 2001, pp.245-6.

political system? Historical experiences do not provide affirmative responses to these enquiries; however, we should not refrain ourselves from searching for any possible options available. Averting the stereotypical vicious circle of empire or super power based hegemonic systems and replacing it with a more productive and inclusive one, workable to most of humanity, is at the heart of international politics of this century. Super powers impose their wills in all hitherto types of systems of human history; this vicious pattern of empire which is favored by the main stream must disrupt; leaving space to a system that will end patterns of domination.¹

Today's, hegemonic nature of the structure of government of the world system will last until a new pact on the foundation and autonomy of the supreme political authority is introduced in the world's institutional structure.²

In the contemporary international system, i.e. a unimultipolar system, the consent of the followers and the legitimacy of the authority of the global leader depend to a great extent on exercising hegemony within multilateral institutions, such as the UN and the most important international economic regimes. Framing actions within multilateralism brings consent and additional resources to the global leader, and prevents its own exhaustion. Consent decreases, instead, when the global leader neglects multilateralism and violates long-standing procedures of the

¹ Surveys confirm, as Kissinger also mentions 'that almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values' (Kissinger, H., 1994, 17) he, of course, tries to defend this course lifting it somewhat closer to natural law. But the author of this work points out that this vicious pattern must disrupt, in order, to maintain systems that never cultivate and reproduce patterns of domination. Asserting that world political system will constantly destabilize unless a superpower permanently controls it, or advocating for a superpower's tutelage or policing, inclines towards fostering an everlasting domination of few actors in international political system. This notion supports a dictatorial tendency of tiny and well organized number of actors, race or economic groups over other majority. It misuses commonsense in order to impose its will on those others, suppressing principles of democratic practice, the belief in an ever-growing human capacity, and the search for alternative system.

² See Attina, pp. 6. Cf.

world political institutions¹. For instance, the Bush administration used the war in Iraq to change the structure of international system by introducing the principle of intervention against those autocratic regimes, who defy the Western system, and also to give to the UN the role of *Post-facto legitimizer or a rubber stamp* of the preventive/preemptive action of the global leader or hegemon.²

4. Hegemonic Power and Expansionist Interventions

The hegemon, with support of its allies, or even without their support implements the policy of intervention in the face of non-Western entities in contemporary world politics. There are at least three categories of interventions: first, intervention for humanitarian purposes. That is, for either containing the consequences of civil wars and violent clashes between domestic groups or restraining the action of governments responsible for humanitarian crises. In various cases, though, domestic clashes are provoked from outside for the sake of intervention. Nevertheless, consent on this form of intervention has been increasing over the recent past. Several international law experts seem to agree quickly on this new doctrine of intervention for humanitarian purposes, and military intervention for humanitarian purposes has been rapidly accepted as legitimate international action on condition that it is multilateral action. The West invokes this form of intervention, as an effective tool, to control the non-Western others in an attempt of converting them into liberal democratic system whether the entities prefer the forceful conversion or not.³ Furthermore, the logic of threat is fraudulently used to maintain a unipolar empire.

The second type external intervention targets those referred to as inefficient and irresponsible governments who provoke problems, such as mass migration and

¹ Ibid, pp. 6-7.

² Ibid.

³ Compare with Attina, pp. 14-15.

transnational crime that destabilize mainly Western countries and the whole system of international relations. Putting an end to domestic humanitarian crises and preventing the external diffusion of related problems pushed Western countries and international organizations to intervene with actions of different nature such as economic assistance programs, technical support programs (for instance, assistance to local police) and also military operations, in countries that are considered repressive, inefficient and corrupt, or tyrant regimes were responsible of the explosion of local and trans-border problems. These actions are carried out by means of bilateral and multilateral agreements that usually involve the government of the target state and the hegemonic power, who sees to shape the whole international system according to its own vision. Thus via implementing these forms of intervention in the domestic affairs of the target states, the hegemon, systematically, contractually or compulsorily reduce the authority of the governments of the target states. These actions are seen as intervention and preventive actions at the same time. Although protectorates and other forms of external assistance and interference were used by states in the past, the double nature (prevention and intervention) of these actions is seen as specific of contemporary world politics, with wider Western support and less opposition.¹

The third type of intervention relates with the rise of global terrorism, mainly with its culmination since 9/11 attacks on the US. The attacks put on the agenda of the world political system the issue of robust reaction to terrorist movements and against regimes that harbor them. Contrary to the larger consent on intervention for humanitarian purposes, and the increasing consent on actions to prevent the spread of problems from inefficient states to the international system, consent on carrying out military actions of prevention or preemption nature has indorsed less support even within the major Western bloc the transatlantic alliance (TAA) itself. There is a deepening rift within the TAA as a result of lack of consensus on this and various other issues (Attina, 2005). The US wants wider and stronger

¹ Compare with Attina, pp. 14-15.

approval also of these preventive or preemptive actions, including military actions against *rogue states*. Europe is divided on the matter of the political legitimacy of the doctrine of prevention but, generally speaking, European governments remain faithful to the legal concept of preventive war. According to this concept, recourse to armed intervention is illegitimate action when urgency to protect a country from an explicit threat of aggression is missing. The dissention between the US and EU in the TAA on this topic is one of defining the best strategy to cope with the present situation.¹ This refers to the disagreement of a fraudulent use of the logic of threat, which has been imposed by the hegemon, in order, to maintain a unipolar empire.

Even though the putative emergence in 1990s of an embryonic doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention' – the forcible intervention of one state, or a group of states, in the internal affairs of another, conducted mainly, in the interests of the inhabitants of the latter was seen as significant, it raises the issue whether this has assured the international protection of human rights. Each examples that relate with interventions since 1990 suggest that the notion of humanitarian intervention is highly controversial. In each case the humanitarian motives of the interveners have been questioned; this is hardly surprising since, whatever else is involved, forcible humanitarian action involves the domination of the weak by the strong. It is not clear how humanitarian action can be legitimized. Actions appear to be arbitrary. It is by no means clear that most humanitarian actions have actually produced the intended results. There is no well-developed legal norm that approves humanitarian interventions; to the contrary, the UN Charter, explicitly, forbids intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of states (Article 2(7)), and virtually all states have stoutly resisted the idea that others ought to possess any kind of right to intervene in their internal affairs.² It is understood as very much self-serving or a pretext for the West's lust of waging imperial wars to control those non-Western entities, located beyond it.

¹ Ibid.

² See Brown, Chris. *Understanding International Relations*, 2nd Ed. Great Britain, Palgrave, 2001, pp.245-8.

There is no plausible ground, thus, to assume that the current hegemonic wars, in their troubled form could deliver, as writes Tamene, despite the claim of some elites, who rigidly insist “nothing better could be ever envisioned beyond the global neo-liberal democratic empire”. He goes on writing, that “under empire, obviously, democracy will suffer from impediments even in the 21st century, thus there is a need for its re-exploration. In the absence of increased citizen participation and mounting elite domination, ‘the least bad system’ seems to have been growing to unprecedented ‘worst’ and moribund one’. (Tamene, G. 2010, p. 61)

Furthermore, the logic of threat that the realist school has provided to consolidate the hegemonic power and its allies is not often understood as a genuine threat but as a pretext for waging imperial wars. An external threat of a certain kind that has solidified Western alliances, in the past condition, for instance, during the CW period, is not necessarily relevant to the present objective condition. In order to avoid legitimate and natural internal and external differences intending to invent ranges of un-established threats, as pretext to war, sounds absurd and self-serving. In contemporary international politics, the idea that cooperation is not possible without external threat¹ would likely induce unethical tendencies, manipulation with power, knowledge, and turning the public into a strategic domain, a position in which they are encouraged to support unstinting policies of the hegemon and its allies. This will cause difficulty of making sense of democracy and its genuine substances.

“Nevertheless, one shouldn’t forget that people, whatever atomized they are, overall they possess enormous potential for bringing change to their surroundings, through effective institutions, including the taming or outwitting of a socio-

¹ Realist and neorealist scholars hold onto the idea that in the absence of an external threat defensive realism takes over. For example, Kenneth N. Waltz put it, “In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance it.” In short, states will balance against a hegemonic member. See: Kenneth N. Waltz, “America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective,” PS, December 1991, 669.

political system.” (Tamene, G., 2010, p. 61) It is also possible that a counterbalancing ally, against the hegemon can emerge. Today, the US along with its transatlantic alliance is, probably, the most capable structure that demonstrates its ambition of shaping international system. Whether its active roles will meet expectations of the human polity, or whether it is a self-serving goal remains very open for closer examination.

In short, actors of international politics will not give up the effort of balancing against a hegemonic member. After the end of the CW the US government recognized this problem immediately and stated that the US “must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order.”¹ France, for instance, seems to perceive itself as a counterweight to the US in Europe, as the French minister of foreign affairs, Hubert Védrine, in 1998 stressed that “we cannot accept a unipolar political world and therefore we will fight for a multipolar world.”² To reach this goal France will attempt to influence and infuse its special domestic interests into the EU’s security and defense policies.³ It is possible that other international actors too, will organize effort to counter balance the US unilateralist behavior in international politics.

The World society order’s subsequently emerging system is empire free. It is not based on the domination of one sole power center; it is an inclusive system that relies on the cooperation of various apparently autonomous centers. It is not where interests of one hegemon or few actors dominate all; to the contrary it is where all interests meet and get fair treatment. In this case the policy of a hegemon or few actors is not being imposed on other actors, to the contrary policies are shaped and decisions are made with participation of all

¹Tyler,Patrick. “U.S. Strategy Plans for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World,” New York Times, March 8, 1992.

² Rüb, Matthias. *Der Atlantische Graben: Amerika und Europa auf getrennten Wegen* (Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2004), 49.

³Jahnel, Carsten H. *Transatlantic Relations – are Alliances a Function of an External Threat?* California, 2005, p. 91. Pdf.

actors, who live up to their common standards and also meet their responsibilities on the global stage.

5. The Current Hegemonic Power and Dynamic of Change

As it has been indicated earlier, the hegemonic government of the rebuilt world system persists as far as the global leader has the backing of *important* states. These states control key resources and the most important economic regimes and public policies of the system. The role of the global leader is firm on condition that it fairly respects the rules, institutions and procedures of the world system. These were either taken from the past international system and adapted to the new conditions, or agreed upon by the global leader coalition, and instituted after the global war.¹ In short, the present hegemonic world system, or as some scholars call it, the uni-multipolar system² invokes, above all, the UN and the international organizations of the world economic regimes. Thus, the structure of government of the hegemonic world political system consists of, institutions and procedures by which authoritative decisions are made and put into action to govern the world system.

Unlike the structures of governments of individual state political systems, the structure of government of the world political system is not founded upon a constitutional pact formally agreed and recognized by its members. Under hegemony, the importance of multilateralism is loosely acknowledged, thus the hegemon can evade the multilateral institutions at times of its desire. The term *hegemonic* structure of government points out that currently the leading role of government in the international system is exercised with the consent of allies, although not universal and uncritical consent. In particular, in the contemporary international system, the consent of the followers and the legitimacy of the authority of the global leader, i.e. the hegemonic power depends, to a great extent, on exercising hegemony within multilateral institutions, such as the UN

¹See Attina, pp. 6

²See Cutler cf.

and the most important international economic regimes. Framing actions within multilateralism brings consent and additional resources to the global leader, and prevents its own exhaustion. Consent decreases, instead, when the global leader neglects multilateralism and violates the procedures of the world political institutions.¹ The US, as current hegemon, with its strong unilateral tendencies would hardly endorse an enduring consent of a large coalition of important states on such important changes of the world government strategy. This would, as hints Tamene,² most probably lead to the formation of other coalition with ambition of creating a different system in which power is fairly distributed around the globe.

In fact, the UN rules and procedures, display a loose multilateral structure, nevertheless, they are fundamental to the structure of governance of the current world system. To be able to function well, the UN and their rules and procedures have to correspond with practice of member states mainly with the hegemonic state. Reform of the United Nations is possible only when great changes radically transform international relations and the world structure, eventually making the US abandon the role of global leader. As to now, there are times when the US has attempted to change the UN, informally (or *de facto*), without revising the Charter. The US has done this in its own favor, in order, to reinforce its global dominance, in other words to utilize the UN as a toolbox to impose its own interests on other actors.

As it stands today, a loose-multilateralism underlies the structure of government of the world political system, this is characterized by several downsides, two of which are: 1) a very low level of institutional differentiation and no meaningful judicial and enforcement institutions to take care of the international legal order. Due to this character, the world political system remains in sharp contrast with the states that developed their political systems in the liberal constitutionalism tradition. On this regard, the role of


¹See Attina, pp. 6-7.

²See Tamene, Getnet. 'The International Relations of Diplomacy.' In: *Economics and Politics: Has 9/11 Changed Anything?* In: Sergi, B., Bagatelas, W. (eds.), Iura edition, 2004. Pp. 61-67.

warden of international order or world police that the hegemonic power has self-appointed itself to in world politics shall remain active until a strong diversified institutional structure with judicial institutions, fully operational and independent from the states, is formed in the world system. 2) the hegemonic nature of the structure of today's government of the world system that will last until a new pact on the foundation and autonomy of the supreme political authority is introduced in the world institutional structure.¹ Hegemonic or imperial cycles could be deflected. (Figure 2)

Thus there is a possibility for a different system to emerge that will end the hegemonic cycle (empires). At least a quadruplet-polar version of multipolar international system of power sharing, which is based on mixture of both liberal and illiberal democracies will get stronger and disrupt the ambition of building liberal democratic empire by force, and ultimately lead to disrupting the succession of empires (see Figure 2). With this assumption put on action, traditional method of polarity and power conflict, suggested by Waltz's (1979) and Huntington's (1996) will decline, since war will lose the sense of being a permanent condition in a system which is less conducive to waging wars. The world beyond the hegemon will largely prefer this peace friendly system to the war mongering hegemonic one.

Figure 2: Depicts the possibility of disrupting the linear path of empires and a non-empire option of future development.



¹See Attina, pp. 6-7.

In the forecast analysis of the formation of the antagonist coalition, it is worth remarking that a wide alignment of discontented actors would consist of countries that oppose the *status quo* in the Asia-Pacific, the states and non-state actors that are frustrated by the current economic globalization process, the countries ruled by classes that fear the consequences of the current democratization process, and all those actors that incline toward cultural clash and fundamentalism. According to Modelski and Thompson (1999, 134), “such a counter coalition could increasingly comprise global public or even secret organizations focused on aspects of global politics, such as antifoignner movements or groups attacking the American position in world affairs. A confrontation between such forces involving East Asia, Southeast Asia, or the Middle East could conceivably spark a larger conflict and a wider conflagration, especially if and when linked to a major power challenger.” Tamene¹ seem to confirm that such are attributes of the turbulent contemporary international system that need to change to a multilateral multipolarism, which is more friendly system, as discussed above. The American empire may head to the end of imperial systems not in the sense that it shall be the hugest empire ever, but in the sense that a history of non-imperial systems shall start after it.

6. Possible Scenarios of International Political System

In connection with international political system as a whole, given current loose, but complex economic and political inter-dependence at least two primary scenarios of the future of international system are predictable: 1) the attempt of perpetuating imperial tendency will generate ranges of empires and a rising clout towards uninterrupted ambition of domination. According to this scenario an imperial cycle of world politics, a hegemonic global leader, and wars are permanent conditions, and no change will avoid this pattern. 2) at least a quadruplet-polar version of

¹See Tamene, Getnet. ‘The International Relations of Diplomacy.’ In: Economics and Politics: Has 9/11 Changed Anything? Sergi, B., Bagatelas, W. (eds.), Iura edition, 2004. Pp. 43-86.

multipolar international system of power sharing, which is based on mixture of both liberal and illiberal democracies will get stronger and disrupt the forceful ambition of building liberal democratic empire. According to this scenario, a real system of mutual cooperation¹ will open, in which the domination of a single power, the cycle of empires and related wars become irrelevant and avoidable.

Many scholars, who have conducted research about world political system and its transformation, such as (Modelski, Attina, Cutler), contrary to political scientists who pay more attention to domestic politics, emphasize the evolutionary process of world politics, and point out a possibility of major system change at global political system level in foreseeable future.

7. Conclusion

The attempt of defining international politics and economics in terms of the US vision alone sounds incomplete and pretty self-serving approach, some dare to call it 'a new world disorder' as indicated below:

"...Military overreach and serial economic crises have bequeathed us a generation of small leaders who battle with events that outsize them. They have stopped trying to fashion them, but appeal instead to a defensive desire. Protectionism not internationalism rules the day. The Middle East has been transformed from a zone of allies to one in which Washington has been reduced to the role of spectator. It is now largely [a taker of Middle Eastern policy](#), not one of its makers. There are other parts of the globe where US power projection finds natural allies, such as the Pacific, where China's rise is feared. So the paradox is that while [US military](#) power retains global reach (it is working on supersonic cruise missiles and long-range drones) its stewardship as world leader, as a generator of the next big idea, is gradually ending. There may come a time when international institutions are rebuilt to fill this vacuum. But

¹See Tamene, Getnet. 'The International Relations of Diplomacy.' In: Economics and Politics: Has 9/11 Changed Anything? Sergi, B., Bagatelas, W. (eds.), Iura edition, 2004. Pp. 61-70.

that time is not yet. Until then, a new world disorder would be nearer the mark.”¹

The world society order of this new century and its institutions should not necessarily depend on just the tradition of the single West, or it should not depend solely on institutions like the TAA that works in favor of advancing exclusively Western interests, or it should not rely only on the set of Western norms, which are being dictated upon others, and which those others are not part of the process of making these norms or institutions. Only new institutions and norms, whose process of making involve the will of all actors would be able to underlie appropriately the 21st century world society order. This change is essential, in order, it to work effectively in the interests of all involved actors, or in the interests of human polity at large.

Whether globalization itself, as it is currently practiced by Western corporations and nations, is feasible and moral long-term strategy is under critical scrutiny. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while seeming outwardly committed to free-trade values and open governance has been upholding a system which one commentator referred to as, “a game of one-way strip poker”, where the IMF insists that developing nations abandon trade barriers, while failing to mention that the barriers are erected by the Western nations in an attempt to slow the flow of cheap consumer goods (Klein, 2007). The new subsequent system of the world society order is capable enough to overcome such double standards and hypocrisy, because it will enhance a two-way cooperation contrary to the current uni-multipolar system.

References

Attina, Fulvio. (2005). Transatlantic Relations under Stress: European and American attitudes towards Intervention and Prevention. *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* Vol. 5, No. 2

¹United States as a Global Power: New World Disorder, *The Guardian/UK*, December 29, 2011, Editorial.

- Brown, Chris.(2001).*Understanding International Relations*, 2nd Ed. Great Britain, Palgrave.
- Cutler,Robert M. (1999).“The Complex Evolution of International Orders and the Current International Transition”.*Interjournal Complex Systems*, No. 255
- Denemark, R.A. (1999). *World System History: From Traditional International Politics to the Study of Global Relations*, in *International Studies Review*, Blackwell,(Malden).
- Ferguson, N. (2004). *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire*. New York. The PenguinGroup Inc.
- Gilpin Robert. (1981).*War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Jahnel, Carsten H. (2005). *Transatlantic Relations – are Alliances a Function of an External Threat?* California.Pdf.
- Kennedy Paul. (1987). *The rise and fall of the great powers: Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York, Random House.
- Klein, Noami. (2007). “Sacrificial Wolfie, The Nation, retrieved on 27 November, 2012, from: “<http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/all?page=11>
- Modelski George. (1983). *Long Cycles of World Leadership*, in Thompson W.R (ed), *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis*, London, Sage, 115-140.
- Modelski George. (1999). *From leadership to organization: the evolution of global politics*, in:Bornschier V. and Chase-Dunn C. eds., *The future of global conflict*, London, Sage, 11-39.
- Modelski George. (2001). *Evolutionary World Politics: Problems of Scope and Method*, in: Thompson W.R., ed., *Evolutionary interpretations of world politics*,London, Routledge, 16-29.
- Modelski George and Thompson William R. (1999).*The long and the short of global politics in the Twenty-first century: an evolutionary approach*, in: “*InternationalStudies Review*”, I, 2, 109-140.
- Nye Joseph S. (1990).*Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*.New York, Basic Books.
- Rasler Karen and Thompson William R. (1994).*The great powers and global struggle,1490-1990*.Lexington, Kentucky University Press.

- Rüb, Matthias. (2004). *Der Atlantische Graben: Amerika und Europa auf getrennten Wegen* (Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag), 49.
- Tamene, G. (2010). *Teórie medzinárodných vzťahov a svetová politika: stručný prehľad*. Bratislava: Iura Edition.
- Tamene, Getnet. (2004). "The International Relations of Diplomacy." In: *Economics and Politics: Has 9/11 Changed Anything?* In: Sergi, B., Bagatelas, W. (eds.), Iura edition, Pp. 61-67.
- Tamene, G. et al. (2010). *Studies in Contemporary International Relations and Politics: NewEurope and Beyond*. Germany, BudrichUniPress Ltd.
- Tyler, Patrick. "U.S. Strategy Plans for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992.