
When Solidarity and Brotherhood Among African States Are Questionable: Zimbabwe's Exportation of Insecurity to the Rest of Africa

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

Abstract: *The cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe confirms the absence of constitutionalism in the state and the same continues to receive international attention. The interconnectedness of the international system where developments in a state have direct impacts on the coterminous states and the global system at large raises some academic curiosity. The concept of regionalism as enshrined in the United Nations Organisation's (UNO) Charter could not solve the crisis which engulfs the state for various reasons. The African states are majorly quasi-states, because they are not financially buoyant, technologically competent and scientifically powerful, to address the outbreak of the disease caused by the neglect from various international institutions. The urge by the Mugabe government to remain in power irrespective of the economic and the political situation in the state has not only affected the state, but also the contiguous states feel its negative impacts in form of high rate of economic and political refugees influx. The implication of this on the rate of internationally organised crime, breeding of terrorists and unemployment problems received scientific discussions by some social scientists. Despite series of attempts by the Western Powers to curb the menace as part of their ordain responsibility to protect (R2P)¹, the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) attitudes were not encouraging to challenge the exegeses of human security of the post Cold War international system. Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki-led team to find a catholicon to the impasse failed because of the economic and socio-cultural interests of South Africa in Zimbabwe. Mass media and Non-governmental Organisations' (NGOs) attempts to reveal the degree of human rights abuses, electoral malpractices and prebendalised politics were muffled by the draconian laws and the mighty power of the state's security agents in the name of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other state/s dictum. As long as Mugabe cannot find a trusted successor within the Zimbabwe Africa National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) to rule the state, political instability and economic decay will continue in the country. There is a need to adopt a global solution to the globalised state crisis through R2P. This is necessary despite the financial conflagration that visited the international economic relations of which the United States (US) is a*

culprit.

Keywords: Human security, Humanitarian intervention, Human rights abuse.

Economic, social and political problems often spill over borders...unless we solve this basic problem, we should expect more crises of various kinds. And we should expect responses that are ad hoc and ineffective...all these challenges require coordinated responses, and in some cases institutions that can implement them – (Zakaria, 2008: 11).

In one sense...Zimbabwe is in a mess... is fast crashing and it's time for Robert Mugabe to pack his bags and leave State House. The world cannot sit back and see thousands of people continuing to suffer and die by the day – (Abramjee, 2008: 7).

1. Introduction

Political crisis in Zimbabwe started to develop into international concern after the Iron Curtain cut flame in the Eastern Europe. The supremacy of capitalism has brought about series of changes in African international relations. The need for the Great Powers to search for political support in the *uncommitted states* of Africa became things of the past from the mid-1980s. This contributed to the exposure of the Robert Mugabe's claimed populist government in the Southern African region. The final defeat of his unchallenged imperial administration was the majority government put in place in South Africa when the African National Congress (ANC), the supposedly allied of the ZANU-PF adhered to the neo-liberal economic and political development system. Human rights' abuses and undemocratic apartheid government in South African apartheid has enthused the ANC government to advocate human rights and democracy

as the cornerstone of her foreign policy.

The need to open up markets with little trade restrictions implies that power to control a state economy is taken away from the government. Private companies and individuals are the major actors in collating factors of production to generate wealth of a nation. The implication of this in the Zimbabwean foreign/political policy is that Mugabe could not, again, determine his direction of trade according to his wish. The urge to *forcefully* introduce democracy, democratisation, human rights, free and fair elections, multi-partism, involvement of international organisations, NGOs and various states at bilateral levels to observe election conducts without any hindrance is the gauge at which each state could be measured in determining how democratic it is.

The post-modern international system of the post-1989 is a departure from the hegemony and the balance of power system of the modern international relations arrangement. Notions of freedom and autonomy are less relevant (Cooper, 2004: 26-42; Gablik, 2004: 129). The defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU), with all its lapses and lack of relevance in the globalised international system, was noted for its harbouring of authoritarian regimes because of the clause of non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states. Though some African leaders sometimes violated this as Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) did against Idi Amin's government (Uganda) in the 1970s, this clause was used between 1963 and 2001 to allow non-democratic government to survive for a long time. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) set up to monitor the AU's members' progress in democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development (Adedeji, 2008: 241), challenged the notion of sovereignty and non-interference clauses. The same, to a large extent, determines how extra Africa states relate with the African states. The establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) also checks on autocratic government in Africa. NEPAD perpetuates globalization and by extension, political economy of interdependence. The implication of this is that Zimbabwe under Mugabe cannot, again, consider

political and economic developments in his state as solely internal affairs of Harare.

The European Union (EU), the US and the United Nations Organisation (UNO), mostly through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), have started to view Mugabe's blasé attitudes towards Zimbabweans as sources of political instability and economic underdevelopment. Cholera pandemic in Zimbabwe was caused by extreme poverty that made the majority of the people to depend on mangoes as a source of their food between October and December, 2008. Lack of treated water and poor sanitation system contributed to the spread of the disease. Mugabe's initial denial of cholera outbreak in the state receives condemnation from both the state's and non-state actors, mostly the NGOs. Of major concern by the NGOs was the pronouncement of the Mugabe's foreign minister, Sikkhayiso Ndlovu, about the involvement of the UK on the outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe. His thesis of biological chemical weapon that was said to be a calculated racist attack on the state was taken as a pinch of salt by every pro-democratic government in Africa.

Imposition of economic sanctions on Zimbabwe was counter-productive because its effects were much felt by the masses rather than by Mugabe and his lieutenants. The same contributed to the continuous influx of economic refugees to the neighbouring states of Botswana, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique.

As discussed elsewhere (Amusan, 2008) no state is an Island. The need to relate with proximate states is important because of the socio-cultural imperatives. A high degree of political and economic interdependence in international system caused some African leaders to call for a military intervention to give Mugabe a forceful exit. Kenyan Prime Minister, Raila Odinga and Botswana foreign minister, Phandu Skelemani, made such call in December 2008; though Mugabe hit out at them when he opined that "African leaders are not brave enough" to topple him (E-News Channel, 2008: December 19). Kenya's and Botswana's military solution to the Zimbabwe crisis could be attributed to the political development in Harare and its economic pressure on their fragile economy. The results of Zimbabwe's sham elections in March 2008 and the run-off that followed

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

on 28 June the same year caused economic meltdown, hunger crisis, fuel shortages, cholera epidemic and stalled power sharing talks coupled with the problem of delivering humanitarian assistance to the needy Zimbabweans. The same has affected the SADC region of which Botswana, Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, who have non-desultory relations with Harare, felt the political and economic impacts of this development.

The political crisis in Zimbabwe led to refugee problems, aggravation of internally displaced people, increase in the rate of crimes (mostly internationally organised crimes), disease infections, economic dislocation of the sub-region, and continuous militarisation of the state through the state's security agents. Despite SADC's and AU's efforts to intervene diplomatically into the internal affairs of the state, the inputs of Mugabe's security chiefs, who are personally afraid of retribution in the post-Mugabe government, always truncated any appreciable political solution to the state's crises. The same also entrenched what Hutchful (1998: 2) describes as the "ruler's security dilemma".

For the purposes of this study, we are going to employ systemic theory in the analysis of the Zimbabwean crisis. Supposedly Harare's internal affair is being *sub-regionalized*, if not *continentalized* and in effect *globalized*. Its effects on the state coterminous will be our main area of departure. Also of pertinence is the need to relate domestic political developments in Zimbabwe to the economic chaos of the state. That is, the aim of this paper is to navigate through the political developments in Zimbabwe as they affect SADC and AU states. The time frame of this paper extends between 2003 and 2008. In some cases, references will be made to the colonial era till 1980. This paper is divided into eight parts. Part 1 is the general introduction as discussed above. Part 2 focuses on the theoretical approach to the study of the problem. Here, we employ systemic theory as a tool of analysis. Part 3 concentrates on the globalization thesis (by extension, political economy approach) in analyzing the Zimbabwean problem. In this part, we look into the economic, political and socio-cultural impacts of the Zimbabwe political development on the SADC states. It is

also our intention to deal, albeit at tangential level, with the basic principles of globalisation as discussed by some scholars of the concept (Onimode, 2000; Khor, 2000 & 2001; Toyo, 2001; Stiglitz, 2002 & 2006; Bhagwati, 2004 and Saul, 2005). Similarities between systemic theory and the attributes of globalization in form of organic linkages of every state and different sectors will put the twin paradigms in proper perspective in our analysis of the Zimbabwean situation.

2. Systemic Theory

There is no concise definition of the concept of systems in social sciences. For the purposes of this paper, one can adopt the definition of Jordan (1973: 61) who says “when we wish to express the fact that the thing is perceived as consisting of a set of elements, of parts, that are interconnected with each other by a discriminable, distinguishable principle”. It is a *deus ex machina* in the analysis of the political and eventual economic crises in Zimbabwe. It is empirical in nature and focus on environmental variables as tools of analysis in determining political, economic and social life (Evans & Newnham, 1998: 525). This approach ensures the development of *scientific politics* and manifest different types of behaviour due to the dictate of the structure of the international system (Kaplan, 1964: 4). Richard Little's (1978: 183) systems analysis represents an attempt to focus attention on the complex interactions between states; its holistic nature in analyzing states' interactions has impacts on the global system. It is also a tool of analysis in explaining globalization concept. State actions and inactions have reverberating effects on the general system. This may be in form of penetrative, reactive or emulative approach (Rosenau, 1969: 45).

The holistic approach of this theory is supported by Little (1978: 183, 185) when he re-examined Kant's position that:

The state system reflected a predetermined design to make harmony spring from human discord...it assumes that the world around us is organized on the basis of rational principles and that nature fits

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

together as do the parts of a machine, each part interacting with another on the basis of invariant laws.

The idea of systemic theory is not a new development in international relations; it is only popularized in the 1950s and 1960s by the ilk of von Bertalanffy (1956), Arthur Kaplan (1964) and Oran Young (1967). Philosophers such as Emmanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, Plato, Fredrick Hegel and Karl Marx had adopted the same approach in their contribution to the study of international politics. Development in technology confirms the cobweb transnational relations *permeability/linkage* and the inputs of the non-state actors in the same system.² Infusion of systemic theory to the study of international politics is borrowed from natural science, mostly biology, where organic linkages among different parts make a whole and in which absence of one is tantamount to inexistence of the rest. The concatenation between systemic approach and scientific method of studying international relations continues to dwarf the relevance of historical import of analysis. The need to focus ones attention on the amalgamation of holistic and atomistic perspectives of scientific explanation later gains popularity by the work of Bertalanffy as quoted from Little (1978: 186-187). He opined that the dynamic interaction between parts and processes calls for their integration of knowledge for a scholarly understanding of the whole system. Contemporary scholars of systemic theory focus on the need to extend the boundary of the theory to accommodate non-state actors.

The positive contribution of this theory to international relations in general and to the study under consideration is succinctly described by Little (1978: 201-202) as:

The systems approach has encouraged writers to think theoretically; the approach has precipitated attempts to test systems propositions at an empirical level; and finally, systems thinking has encouraged writers to extend the horizons of International Relations. These

developments are far from negligible; they have transformed a narrow and inward-looking discipline into one of the most adventurous and outward-looking areas in the social sciences.

Like any other behavioural theories of international relations, systemic theory is a partial theory. The import of this is that it could not capture the whole gamut of Zimbabwe's political development as it affects international system, mostly the SADC region. Also of note, which this paper is going to look into later, is that the Mugabe's government attitude is not a reflection of his external environment, but the need to manipulate domestic variables to fraudulently garner legitimacy for his internationally proclaimed *illegal* government. It is the convictions of this paper that political economy approach will equally prominently feature in our discussion. Another hiatus of this theory in explaining international system, and by contraction, a state behaviour, is what physical scientists term as *teleological*; that is, any action and inaction of a state and its actors are based on purpose, which scientists jettison as non-scientific. It is not possible to provide a coherent and unambiguous statement about the essential characteristics of the systems approach to the study of international relations. There is no body of rules indicating how a system approach operates because it lacks formal methodological approach. Little's notion (1978: 189), as against Ojo & Sesay (1988: 12-13) in equating biological systems with social systems begs for academic curiosity. While detachment of a unit system from a whole system may not adversely affect the whole in an appreciable way in social science, this is not applicable in biological system. Another associated problem of this theory is its state-centric approach, which is supposed to be replaced by a world society where private individuals are the units of analysis. In trying to find panacea to these shortcomings of the systemic theory, the theory of R2P that came into the study of human security from the holistic perspective as popularized by Feigenblatt (2010: 267-70) where the issues of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states have been relegated to the background because of the reality

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

of the post-Cold War international relations. The need to entrench human security as against the employment of hard power, mostly in the post 9/11 is germane. Though it is the conviction of Feigenblatt that the medium and the civil societies are more into the R2P, one could equally notice several attempts of the Great Powers such as the US and the UK in introducing *public diplomacy*³ as a way of fighting terrorism. As of the opinion of the students of R2P, the Americans soft power introduced to the international system is a confirmation of furthering its national interest, mostly on War on Terror (WoT). In the works of Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacque Rousseau and John Lock, the concept of social contract, which is the forerunner theory of R2P placed much role of protecting individuals on the states in exchange for their security from the world of nature. Therefore, the problem in Zimbabwe is human security crisis of which it affects not only the coterminous states, but the global international system could not be academically captured without juxtaposition of R2P with systemic theory. How these affect the rest of the global system will be the next turn of our discussion under globalization and the Zimbabwean situation.

3. Globalization and the Zimbabwean Situation

The use of globalization as a concept in the analysis of states' relationship straddles political, economic, social and cultural fields. It is defined by Mansbach & Rafferty (2008: 743) as "those processes that knit people everywhere together, thereby producing worldwide interdependence and featuring the rapid and large-scale movement of persons, things, and ideas across sovereign borders." The implication of globalisation is that any development in a state, no matter how remote it is and mindless of its import in international relations, continues to have direct impacts on the rest of the system. For the purposes of this essay, we are going to look at the Zimbabwean problems from economic, political and socio-cultural angles and relate the same with its impacts on its contiguous states, the SADC, African continent and the rest of the world, mostly the Western World and

international civil society. This will enable us to clearly appreciate the complexity of the state political situation as it affects other sphere of relationship. This makes the political instability in Zimbabwe a major concern of the United Nations (UN), the US and the United Kingdom (UK). The Great Britain concern on the issue of the Zimbabwean crisis could be located on the cultural irredentism. The Cecil Rhodes' dream of Cape to Cairo continues to resonate in the mind of every government in the UK.

The Lancaster House agreement, which was not religiously actualized by the London governments, which led to the independence of the Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) where the UK promised to pay for land redistribution in favour of the Black Zimbabweans, was a weapon for Mugabe. Land, as discussed below forms the basis of economic, by extension, political crisis, in the state. The end result? The war veteran, the party sponsored militias (Green Bombers), state security agents (armed forces and paramilitary forces) and civil servants who had no previous farming experience were elevated to become farm owners by the ZANU-PF government. The implications of this were a drastic decrease in the farm productivity, laid off of workers, and economic sanctions from the pro-British government in the West. The December 2008 impositions of economic sanction on the Harare government by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) accentuate political economy of the crisis in the SADC region. Economic refugee this caused not only affected the labour market of the contiguous states; other implications such as increase in the level of organised crime, prostitution and its effects on the already saturated sub-regional economic underdevelopment and HIV/AIDs pandemic disease that knows no boundary worth academic interrogation.

Part of the indices of globalization concept is the enthronement of democratisation, human rights, and free and fair elections. It equally advocates unperturbed access of both local and international election observers in the conduct of periodic elections. Good governance and full participation in government regardless of religion, sex, colour and ethnic factors worth encouraging. For a proper democratisation, issues of economic development and employment should be taken into consideration. Few African

states, going by the above-mentioned attributes, would qualify to practise a true democracy. The question of whether government be should involved in the economic development of a state did not gain any appreciable acceptance in the Western world until the US experienced economic meltdown in November 2008. This brought about the need to call for John Maynard Keynes' macro-economic approach to rescue many states at the global level from economic maladjustment. Mugabe politically motivated land redistribution, officially claimed to have worked toward fair redistribution of state resources and ensuring economic growth and development. Realistically, this perpetuates poverty and unemployment crises with no immediate rescue plan in the offing. Allocation of white farmers' farms to the inexperienced black Zimbabweans has not only brought about food production shortage, it has also aggravated unemployment as many farm workers could not be paid because of the poor performance of the new farmers who are politically motivated rather than economically inspired.

The implication of land grapping from the white has not only affected food supply in the Southern region, its political and diplomatic implications, mostly from the Western states spearheaded by the UK relegated the Mugabe's government to a pariah status. Harare's poor management of the economy had weakened the state so much that it failed woefully and reduced the state to a failed one⁴ (Mansbach & Rafferty, 2008: 316-317). This made the opposition parties, mostly the Morgan Tsvangirai's led Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to attract international solidarity against the ZANU-PF government. The US and other Western countries employed NGOs' services to deliver humanitarian assistance to the cholera wrecked state. ZANU-PF government, on the order hand, employed aids politics to prop up the party members and use the same as a weapon to attract the Zimbabweans to the ruling party.

Despite the global call to ostracise Robert Mugabe's government, it was rumoured that China was in support of the failed state. The use of third party state, claimed to be DRC in the shipment of arms and ammunition to support acclaimed *illegal* government is a major concern for many

African states.⁵ As a result of the historical linkage and economic pressure that British-Zimbabweans white farmers would pose to the security of London if they were forced to move to the UK, in December 2008, the British minister for Africa, Mark Mallock Brown was in Pretoria to solicit for the African states' support in imposing comprehensive sanctions on Harare; with the intention of possibly reducing the state of terror introduced by the ZANU-PF government. In the same month, Jandai Frazer, the US Assistant Secretary of States for Africa was in Zimbabwe to find a catholicon to the crisis that bedevils the state. Almost at the same time, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, the UK Liberal Democrat Party leader, Nick Clegg and British Conservative leader, David Cameron with the US Secretary of States (2004-2008) Condoleezza Rice called for the imposition of various sanctions ranging from military, oil, trade to diplomatic isolation on Zimbabwe.

The EU position on the crisis expectedly was in line with the UK's. In July 2008, France as the president of the EU called for Morgan Tsvangirai led government in Zimbabwe as the only acceptable government by the powerful supranational institution. A member of the EU states, Holland, accorded refugee status to the MDC leader when the state's security agents declared him wanted and issued a warrant of arrest against him. Also sympathetic to the course of the MDC were the Nordic states. In December 2008, Jestina Mukoko, a human rights activist and a one time employee of the State National Television, was abducted in her house together with some of the Tsvangirai aides. She was accused of working for the West whose journalists were not allowed into the state. To check the outflow of information, the Mugabe government, against the rule of law, arrested Mukoko with no charges against her until late December 2008.

Russia's, China's and Germany's tacit supports for the Mugabe government were for different reasons. Russia as a member of the UNSC would always apply its veto power to make some political relevance at the international level. The post-Cold War international system arrangement has reduced Moscow to a mere participant as former Communist pro-Soviet states have started to join the NATO security umbrella. Pro-America stance of Georgia Republic was met

with military invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by the Russian government, possibly for military security concern or to consolidate socio-cultural and political cooperation of the state (King, 2008: 2-11). The ongoing civil war between the Russian government and the Chechnya separatist movement would have contributed to the support lent to the Mugabe government as a way of fighting a proxy war against the US and other Western capitalist states. Moscow's attempt to chastise Mugabe would affect its internal political repression against the Muslims in Chechnya.

China is known with her economic diplomacy because of the need to find a ready market for its products in Africa and the urge to attract unperturbed supply of raw materials for its emerging industries (Hutton, 2006: 223-224). These two factors and the need to be recognised politically as a power in the international system affect Beijing policy towards Zimbabwe. The rumours of supplying arms and ammunition to the government through DRC as mentioned above were refuted by China. Equally important in the state's attitudes towards Zimbabwe is her internal political arrangement. China's poor human rights records though liberalised its economy and joined the WTO, affects her relationship with the West. Attempt to condemn Zimbabwe's political development would be antithetical to her internal politics. Demarcation of politics from economics, which are inseparable, keeps on discrediting China's policy in Africa and the rest of the world. The richness in mineral resources such as gold, coal, diamond and copper, and potential agricultural products would have affected the attitudes of the Chinese government on the political debacle in Zimbabwe (Hutton, 2006: 223-224). After the Iron Curtain was dismantled, Germany has become a powerful state in Europe. The need to garner support at the international level to regain its lost glory from the World War 1 affects Berlin's policy towards the rest of the world. Chancellor Angela Merkel's support for the Mugabe government during the EU-African states summit when Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister of the UK vowed not to attend the conference if Mugabe was invited implies an attempt to create a sphere of influence in Africa. The promotion of the German heritage, mostly through Goethe Institute and series of bilateral

relations implies the need to recapture the lost glory as one of the German foreign policy objectives. Political support accorded to Harare implies the need to reciprocate the same to the state that could not be trusted by the rest of the *civilised* world (Stelzenmuller, 2005: 42-45). Because of cultural and economic imperatives of Germany and China, the duo could not uphold the doctrine of R2P despite humanitarian collapse in Zimbabwe.

The above problems notwithstanding, the UN still needs to get to the root of the crisis if the *leitmotif* of the organisation and international peace among member states are to be achieved. Though some agencies like the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organisation (WHO), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other international food relief agencies reacted to the crisis, there is the need to impose comprehensive sanctions on the Mugabe government. South Africa's, China's and Russia's roles in blocking sanctions on the state at the UNSC are antithetical to the general development envisaged by the SADC, the AU and the UN.

Most African states were unable to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe for various reasons. The need to support other African brothers in the name of solidarity and brotherhood irrespective of its implications for the continent development looms large; also of importance are the historical links during the liberation period in Southern Africa. The Frontline States that eventually formed Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 could not come up in unison against Mugabe. The same reason affected, as mentioned above, the Central, Southern, Northern and Eastern African states.

4. Dollarization-Randinalization of Domestic Economy

Because of the battered economy in Zimbabwe, the state currency, Zimbabwean Dollar is less appealing to the citizen and private business organisations as a legal tender. The hyperinflation (about 1,000,000%) coupled with international economic sanctions against the government made the state currency unstable. The introduction of new currency denominators of between \$Z10 million and \$Z200 million where a loaf of bread costs \$Z35 million confirms a

symptom of financial crisis and lack of appropriate directive of economic growth and development. The implication of this in the economy of the state was that most professionals, who are supposed to contribute to the nation-building, left the country for neighbouring states such as South Africa and Botswana where they could get value for their services. Those that remain in the state called for salary increment and to be paid either in the US Dollars or South African Rand. The school teachers, both in the high school and tertiary institutions, were on strike for almost a year in 2008. Part of their deal with government was to be paid in foreign currency. Also, the giant mobile tele-communication company wholly owned by Zimbabweans in the state, ECONET mobile, charges in American Dollars or South African Rand without any litigation from government. Unavailability of foreign exchange in the apex bank, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe contributed to this. A few multinational companies, such as Hewlett Sugar, that remains in production *pillow-keep* their foreign exchange rather than deposits it in local commercial banks. This would enable them to procure necessary inputs and spare parts to remain in business.

When a state currency that should be a legal tender is being compromised with other currencies, it could be said that the government presumed to be a quasi-state as said above. Mugabe is unable and unwilling to protect his citizen against violence and destruction in exchange for his power consolidation. The administration is suffering from democratic deficit, as Mugabe regards himself as being beyond the reach of domestic and international law (Chomsky, 2006: 1-2). Zimbabwe, for the reason elucidated above could be classified as a failed state because of:

...the arbitrariness of power by the ruling parties is demonstrated by the non-observance of the rule of law; intolerance of the opposition, through the stifling of political competition and bull-doing of opponents into utter passivity; electoral malpractices, including the rigging of elections to stay in power; the denial of basic rights of the people; to much control of the

press, undermining of the independence of the judiciary, as well as lack of accountability, responsiveness and responsibility of the leaders to the ruled (Anifowose, 1999: 168-169).

The continuous struggle for government legitimacy as exemplified in the crisis between the state junior military officers and the Mugabe administration is what could be ascribed to the ruler's security dilemma. Though advised against this by his security chiefs in 2005, Mugabe ignored it because of his overreliance on the War Veteran and the militias to remain in power through election rigging and declaration of Operation *Chimurenga* to eliminate all his perceived opponents ranging from the main opposition party (MDC) to the NGO's who were in favour of delivering humanitarian assistance to the underprivileged Zimbabweans irrespective of their political belief.

5. Regional and Sub-regional Organizations' Reactions to the Zimbabwean Impasse

We are going to look into the AU and SADC as two different systems and actors, though inseparable in their actions and inactions on the issue of the crisis. Discussion of the position of Kenya, for instance, is going to receive broad African perspective on the problem. On the other hand, the Botswana's political roles in the crisis, notwithstanding, contrary to the SADC position, will receive some scholarly interrogation. It will be concluded later that the issue of non-interference in the internal affairs of the African states is being superseded by the current globalization (Zakaria, 2008: 11). Acclaimed solidarity within the SADC and the AU could no more hold water considering the less relevance of regional role blocking in member states' foreign and domestic policies. Issues raised here will receive some critical examination.

As mentioned earlier, the issue of non-interference clause in the internal affairs of the AU member states (Ar. 4(g)) is no more sacrosanct in the African international relations towards the 21st century. The birth of the

organisation came with some innovation that faces the challenges of globalisation and the nonpolarity international system (Haass, 2008: 45). The Constitutive Act of the AU (Ar. 4(h&J)) and the birth of the NEPAD made the need to interfere in the internal affairs of the member states a matter of reality as maintained by David Stephen Krasner (1999, 2004) and Mario Blaser (2001). The formation of African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to actualise the objectives and principles of the AU as stated in Articles 3 & 4 aimed at the general development of the continent. The self assessment of the member states before the APRM set up at Addis Ababa came to have an objective look into the issue of human rights and good governance in member states serve as a check on African states domestic policy. Lack of a common position in the AU regarding the political and the economic problems in Zimbabwe inspired Mugabe to have said that no African leader could topple his government. This could have been as a result of two opposing positions of the continent's leaders on the political logjam. While some states (Botswana and Kenya) advocated a tough comprehensive sanction against Mugabe's government, others (Angola, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania) could not come up openly against the perceived *illegal* government. The issue of an African High Command advocated by Kwame Nkrumah is being replaced by an African Standby Force with misty mandate to maintain continental military security. The gradualists' anti-United States of Africa, of which Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe are adherents (Lecoutre, 2008: 49) contributed to the entrenchment of bad governance in Harare. The same would have contributed to the outcome of the SADC troika (Angola, Swaziland and Tanzania) position, which was adopted by the AU, which called for the postponement of elections in Zimbabwe to give way for political stability. This is an attempt to allow Mugabe to consolidate himself in power. A continuation of political unrest in the state has made the AU and SADC to opt for the Kenyan style of power-sharing system.

Also of importance are the roles of mass-media which cannot be ignored for a long time by any state government without boomerang effects. Opinion on the Harare government as held by some states in international system

could be viewed from the picture painted by the international mass-media dominated by the Western world. They were critical of Mugabe's land grabbing, economic management system, electoral fraudulence and politics of ethnicity.

Their position formed the general opinion of some states in the West and Africa. The inputs of sub-regional organisations serve as a snag for some African states. In the case of the Zimbabwean problem, SADC persistent to serve as a check on the member states against Zimbabwe. Its pronouncement on the issue of human rights and good governance is questionable when one looks into the political situation in the state. Despite the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security's (the Organs) insistence on the need to have politically and economically stable sub-region, crises in the member states as in the DRC and Zimbabwe have been problematic on good governance and economic development in the area. The Organ could not maintain political stability Zimbabwe unlike its *Operation Boleas* in Lesotho in 1998 (Neethling, 1999: 1; *The Economist*. 1998. September 26: 43).

Both state and non-state actors accused Harare of iron-fist secutocracy and of being one of the worst observers of human rights in the continent. Militarisation of the state is at the expense of the Zimbabweans. In a bid to maintain the fragile government, Mugabe had to give out more fund to the police and soldiers who went on rampage for increase in salary.⁶ The 1991 Commonwealth Harare Declaration on democratisation, good governance and the upholding of human rights (Amusan, 2006: 96) was violated by Mugabe. The March 2008 elections that gave another mandate to Mugabe was declared one of the most fraudulent as the military, militias (Green Bombers) and war veterans, under an association named Zimbabwean National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), clamped down on opposition parties.⁷

In June 2008, Zimbabwe barred NGOs and Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs) from the country on the claim that they were agents of political crises. The AU, a lame dog on political and military solution to the continental crises continued to support the ailing administration of Mugabe. Jakaya Kikwete, the then Chairperson of the AU, who is incidentally from the SADC region, as the tradition of

the continental organisation, called for cooperation with rather than sanction on Zimbabwe at the G8 Japan Summit. The UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes' assessment of the state food crisis as alarming where almost half of the 12 million population would need food between January and March 2009. The international system in recent time is of more concern with economic growth and development of which laissez faire capitalism is the tenet of international relations.

Chapter 8 of the UN Charter establishes and recognises regional organisations as the most appropriate institutions in solving some political, military and economic problems. In line with this notion, Zimbabwe was a party to the defunct SADCC formed to alleviate their economic over-reliance on the then apartheid South Africa. The formation of SADC with the inclusion of South Africa signified the end of segregation system in Pretoria and the expectation of the member states of the organisation is among others to promote economic development, human rights and democratisation based on equality of the member states irrespective of their population size, economic development and military power (Lee, 2003: 44-71). Sooner than later, Zimbabwe that used to be the only credible giant among the SADCC states started a Cold War with South Africa for hegemonic power in the sub-region. The nadir of this was the position of the Organs head, which Mugabe believed he was to permanently occupy the post. He did not favour rotational system among the members. South Africa appreciates the degree of political instability Mugabe could engineer in the sub-region. Instead of introducing power politics and *spree diplomacy* by Pretoria, she embarked on *behind-the-scene diplomacy* in dealing with Harare for various reasons. Pretoria wants to maintain friendly relations with abuttal states. Traditionally, political and economic relations between the two states are to the advantage of South Africa. This is a *status quo* Pretoria is always on line to sustain. Also paramount is the need to check against hatching of terrorists' cells close to a relatively stable economy and social order. Despite all these indices called for political support for Zimbabwe, the outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe could not be viewed as internal affairs as it has spread to almost SADC

states and beyond.

6. Cholera Epidemic and Its Effects on the Sub-regional Systems

When assessing the impacts of cholera epidemic on Zimbabwe and the rest of the SADC states, a conscious attempt should be made on the background to this crisis. This scenario could be traced to the 1990's political crisis caused by the economic nosedive resulted from resources mismanagement by President Mugabe in order to remain relevant politically at all cost. The promise made to the War Veteran by the ZANU during the liberation war turned to be a mirage. Attempts to live in luxury like the liberation-fighters-turned politicians, by the Veterans caused the 1996 to 1997 insurrection of these demobilised guerrilla fighters. The promise made in the jungle of expropriation of the white farms to the blacks in the name of land and economic redistribution could not be achieved. For Mugabe to win the ticket of the ZANU-PF at the party's Mutare National Conference coupled with political instability caused by the Veterans in 1997, the issue of land redistribution came to the fore. Hiding under the canopy of the UK, reneged on the promise of the Lancaster House Agreement on land question made Mugabe to grab white farms and allocated the same to the inexperienced overnight black farmers. Against the notion of taking the farms that were under-utilised or in the ownership of absentee landlords and adhering to the principle of willing buyer and willing seller, the farms that were slated for expropriation without compensation were the most productive in the state (Cornwell, 1996: 73). When the land was transferred to the black Zimbabweans, mostly to the civil servant, War Veterans, Green Bombers, security agents and ZANU-PF members, farm production plummeted for various reasons. The inexperienced new farmers got loans from government, but failed to use the same to improve their acquired farms. Very many of them thought that they had attained a new status in the society, they started buying houses in choice areas and going around in expensive cars as if the loans granted to them were not repayable. Also of

note was the *paper farming* introduced in Zimbabwe. Farm owners would be in the cities only instructing farm workers on what to do in the farm despite their poor knowledge on farming. The result of this was looting by the farm workers of the agricultural inputs such as tractor's spare parts, fertilizers and improved seedlings made available for the new farmers.

Aggravating the problems and total failure of land redistribution was the climate change, with its effects on the agricultural production. From 1996 till date, the erratic supply of rainwater, negative effects of climate change in Southern Africa brought about decrease in farmers' outputs. This has also affected the availability of good supply of drinkable water to the rural dwellers compounded by the dire need of financial resources to treat water supply in the cities. Worsening the situation further still is the high degree of corruption in relevant government departments that deal with health and sanitation; necessary chemicals to treat water supply to the people are either sold back to suppliers at discounted price or not purchased by the ruling party contractors. It is estimated that 30% of water supply through boreholes, wells and taps in Zimbabwe carries the *faecal coliform* bacteria responsible for cholera (*The Zimbabwean*, 2008: 6). Water and sanitation crises contribute to "the transfer of bacteria, viruses and parasites found in human excreta which... contaminate water resources, soil and food" and eventually lead to diarrhoea, cholera, schistosomiasis, and trachoma (*Awake! January* 2009: 3-4). The negative effects of this in the GDP of the state are enormous as predicted in 1996 by the Zimbabwean Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU).

Despite sectoral responsibility allocated to Zimbabwe within SADC focuses on food production, the state registered shortage in its actualization (Lee, 2003: 51; Malan, 1998: 5). This has indirectly impacted on the spread of cholera. Because of the unavailability of fund in the commercial and Reserve banks, rationing embarked upon by the government coupled with hyperinflation made some people turned majority rural dwellers to fruits and tubers gatherers from the bush irrespective of their hygienic status. Between October and December, season of mango fruits in Zimbabwe,

people resulted in picking disease-infected windfalls mangoes as their main food which caused diarrhoea and cholera diseases. The infected rural dwellers that travelled to the urban centres and vice-versa during the festive period in December contributed to the spread of this contagious disease. People who travelled to Zimbabwe from the coterminous states of, South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and DRC spread the same at the sub-regional level.

As mentioned earlier, there are some issues that could not be treated from national perspective because of their trans-border effects, but which can only find solution through multilateral approach. Some of these are the questions of terrorism, climate change, economic crisis and political instability. These are no more treated as internal affairs of the concerned states because of their effects on other states. When the cholera outbreak was officially reported in Zimbabwe, though initially denied by President Robert Mugabe, the UN agencies (UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, FAO and other multilateral organisations such as the AU and SADC) treated it as a global issue that needed international attention. The spread of it with no regard to international boundaries caused by movements of people across the borders daily, made the neighbouring states to react to the impact of the same in their territory. Cases of cholera were registered in Western Cape, part of South Africa, which is more than 1500 km away from the borders between Pretoria and Harare. The same was reported in Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana. As a result of the increase in the level of transportation and communication technology at the international system and the porosity of the international borders resulting from illegal means of crossing international borders by people of the same cultures, languages and geographical influences to the adjoining states demystifying the colonialist imposed boundary. The attendant effects of this are both negative and positive. The negative impact of it is the spread of the disease and the intra-states conflict. The government officials in the Limpopo province of South Africa that shares common border with Zimbabwe complained of overstressing state's resources because of the need to treat Zimbabweans that crossover. The same made South Africa to send team of

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

military medical officers to Zimbabwe to ascertain not only the degree of the disease in the state, but also its impact on the SADC region.

The reaction of the Botswana government heightened political crisis with Zimbabwe. It was rumoured by the Mugabe government that the Gaborone government provided a base for the MDC to train some Zimbabweans youth with the aim at fomenting political instability in Zimbabwe. This accusation was taken up by the Organ, which was incidentally chaired by Swaziland, a moderate pro-South Africa and by extension, pro-Mugabe government. The Organ sent a delegation to Zimbabwe and Botswana to ascertain the veracity of the rumours. The allegation could not be confirmed by the delegate. Some of the SADC states were worried about Mugabe's imperial rule that caused political and socio-economic maladjustment in the state, which by implication reverberated on the member states. Despite this, SADC's insisted on the need to co-minister the Department of Home Affairs in a Government of National Unity (GNU) envisaged being between the ZANU-PF and the MDC. The security chiefs in Zimbabwe preferred to remain under Mugabe control as against Tsvangirai for the security of their job and to avoid being prosecuted against their unconstitutional human rights abuses which they perpetrated in the guise of state security traceable to the *Operation Makavhotera Papi*.⁸ The ruler's security dilemma scenario Mugabe found himself and the need to remain in power together with his service chiefs entrenched political topsy-turvy.

Because of the political uncertainty, poor human rights record and bad governance in the state, South African President Kgalema Mothanye suspended a \$30 million promised to resuscitate agricultural sector of the economy by the former President, Thabo Mbeki. The loan was aimed at purchasing fertilizer, seedlings and other farm inputs for the inexperienced black farmers. Mothanye position was a reflection of the ruling, ANC, party's anti-Mugabe policy. Jacob Zuma, the ANC president, accused Mugabe of *anti-comradeship* religiously adhered to by the liberation movements in the Southern Africa between 1970's and 1990's (*The Star* 2008. December 19:1).⁹ It therefore implies

that the ANC and the South African government towed different lines of political solution to the Zimbabwean crisis is self-evident in 2008. While the party wanted severance of relationship with the ZANU-PF led government, the government wanted to tow a conservative, quiet and gradual engagement between the MDC and the ZANU-PF. The South African position could be as a result of the support, in 1991, by the new breed politicians in the SADC states against Kenneth Kaunda in favour of Fredrick Chiluba, a unionist leader. This was regarded as a political miscalculation because of the high rate of corruption and government of ethnic vengeance put in place by President Chiluba in the post-Kaunda administration. This position appeared antithetical to the *Mandela Doctrine* which called for other African states to intervene in the internal affairs of the OAU/AU states when tyranny is fished out as a result of a leader's slaughtering of people to remain in power (*Cape Times*. 1998. 10 June: 4). As much as South Africa intervene in Lesotho, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola and the DRC, the same could not be done in Zimbabwe.

The outbreak of cholera was expected to receive Pretoria solution, but the ANC government, possibly because of the populist agenda of the new executive of the party and its distaste for the Mugabe government, South Africa refused to come to the state's aid. In her reaction to the epidemic, the South African Minister for Health, Barbra Hogan, declared that her state was not interested in sending civilian medical doctors to Zimbabwe. Her official reason was that the state was in dire need of the same service, but agreed to send military doctors instead. This could be as a result of the government policy not to interact with Mugabe's government at bilateral level, but to kow-tow the sub-regional (SADC) and Commonwealth of Nations lines (*South Africa Yearbook*. 2003/04: 315).

Power sharing government that was recommended by the SADC could not see the light of the day until February 2009 because of series of political moves to frustrate its actualization. The military in the state, who gave their unalloyed support to the Mugabe government in return for job security vowed not to recognise MDC led-government. In a non-polarity world, where the use of military power is receding, Mugabe could have reduced the influence of the

military by changing their mission and roles from *collateral* to national development and peacekeeping. Making them busy with economic development of the state and serving as peacekeepers in the war ravaged African states would have diverted their attention away from *militocracy* (Hutchful, 1998: 12-13). Mbeki led SADC and AU political solution appeared to have been too slow to curtail Mugabe's hawkish administration. Mbeki was reported to have severally accused MDC of being an agent of the West against African solution to African problem (*The Sunday Independent*, 2008, December 29: 4). The outbreak of the disease is linked with the political instability in the state. It was also of the view of South Africa that the loan, if released to the Mugabe government through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, might be used to pay the salary of the civil servants which was not paid for months.

Possibly because of the need to maintain the political stability in Gaborone that has become a norm rather than exception and the urge to check the influx of refugees, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the state called for a change of regime in Zimbabwe. The problem of refugees is more than the traditional claim of pressure on social and infrastructural amenities. The possibility of hatching terrorism and organising criminal groups and tools for opposition parties in the host states would have prompted the state to call for a change of government in Zimbabwe. The Botswana Vice-President, Mompoti Merafhe, at the AU Summit in Cairo in July 2008 maintained that "In our considered view... the representatives of the current government in Zimbabwe should be excluded from attending SADC and AU meetings." This call could not be too far from the above-stated reasons. The June 2008 election re-run that was described as lack of transparency by the election's observers corroborated with the Gaborone's pro-MDC position.

The late President Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia perceived associated socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe as an end-result of the Mugabe's undemocratic government. He, against the silence and solidarity among African leaders' tradition and in line with the Prime Minister Odinga's (Kenya) belief, described Mugabe as a *sinking Titanic* (*Africa*

Today. 2008: 8). The implication of this is that the new emerging African leaders have started to view the sacrosanct of sovereignty and territoriality as myth that attract academic probe. His condemnation of the political development in Zimbabwe, though condemned by some African leaders and the tradition of the continent, he upheld the reality of the contemporary international system of good governance and functional macro-economic policy adherents. This development could have made Harare to accuse Zambia of providing launch pads for the British forces to attack. The pro-democratic position of the Zambian government also led to the accusation of the state to have engaged in military collaboration with Botswana to invade Zimbabwe from the state 2nd Battalion Tug Argan Barracks in Ndola (Zambia) (*The Zimbabwean*. 2008. December: 1).

Not very far from Mwanawasa's position was Odinga's call for military force to remove Mugabe which could be as a result of his experience from President Mwa Kibaki (Kenya) when the election that eventually brought him to power was rigged by the ruling party. Instability that followed in favour of Odinga's party brought about a GNU where he is serving as the Prime Minister. He wanted this to replicate itself in Zimbabwe.

Through the regional SADC, Swaziland was able to play some prominent roles in resolving the political crisis in Zimbabwe. Incidentally the state occupied the Chair of the Organ. Being a close ally of South Africa, for geographical, political and economic reasons, Mbabane could not impose her will on Mugabe without South Africa's support. Severely accusing Pretoria of being an agent of the White Afrikaners by Zimbabwe, Swaziland had to trek cautiously on the need to call for military action on Zimbabwe's political logjam (Malan, 1998: 38). In October 2008, Tsvangirai refused to travel to Swaziland on his temporary international passport to attend the Mbabane SADC meeting on Zimbabwe. His intention was to expose Mugabe's incompetence to rule the state and that power sharing government mooted by the SADC would be a palliative to the state's labyrinth crisis. Tsvangirai could have also used the Summit to register his anti-Swaziland stance on the Zimbabwe political snarl-up.

With anti-Zimbabwe stance maintained by the most SADC states, DRC remained the only active state that

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

support Mugabe with military understanding between the two traceable to the 1998 buoyed-up which DRC received from Zimbabwe when Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda turned against Laurent Kabila's government. It was a complex political and economic relationship. It is treated somewhere else where we discussed the economic and political rewards Harare got in exchange for military support against the secessionist movement in the Kivu Region of Eastern Congo (Amusan, 1999: 28-29). The military officers' grip on the government of Zimbabwe came to play a prominent roles in the military and political supports received from Joseph Kabila, the DRC President. It was rumoured that the state received arms and ammunition on behalf of Zimbabwe of which the same would be air lifted to Harare from Kinshasa, though this is an allegation denied by both China and the DRC as above mentioned. The UN that accused DRC of supporting securitocracy in Zimbabwe later denied the same. It then could be said that economic rewards from both states affected Kabila's compromising position on the Zimbabwe crisis. With the influence of mass media, Mugabe's personalised government has been subjected to international exposure.

7. The Role of Mass Media

“Controlling the press would mean controlling not just public opinion but the people as well...Over the past few centuries, media have shaped culture, influenced politics, played an important role in business, and affected the daily lives of millions”. This is in support of Dieter Offenhausser claims that *our attitudes, our conduct, and even our fundamental moral values* are affected by mass media (Awake, 2005. October 22: 3). Mass media roles in shaping a state's domestic and foreign policy is invaluable in this era of technological development. Events at the global system are spread within seconds. Stephens (1995: 19-20) has this to say about the enormous values of mass-media in international relations:

...information technologies are
expanding access to information and

entertainment to people all over the world, and nation-states can do little to prevent transnational information/entertainment news flow. So while governments operating under various press systems try to control the kinds of messages people get, their borders are porous. Fax machines, cassettes, computer links to online database, satellite dishes, and direct broadcast satellites (DBS's), and broadcasts from other lands know no geographical boundaries.

Stephens' observation corroborates Olukotun's (2002: 213) position on the roles of international media that:

Increasingly, discussion in newspapers, on the Internet, on smuggled cassettes and television cross-cut and overlap, contributing to a common public space. New and accessible modes of communication have made these contests increasingly global, so that even local issues take on transnational dimensions.

The implication of this is that what used to be internal affairs of a state is being globalized and is receiving actions and policy position from different states and various governmental and non-governmental international organisations (NGOs). States and private individuals' inputs in information dissemination are not an issue to be swept under a carpet without a ricochet effects. Proliferation of private media houses receive some mixed approaches by African leaders. Zimbabwean situation is not unique on this. As discussed by Hertz (2001: 131-133), the distrust in politicians, political activities and paid advertisement made politicians to look for electorate's support from external sources. This is in form of editorial opinion and features writing with little or no financial commitment. Ownership of

private mass media in Zimbabwe has become a matter of the President decision. He appreciates the power of the press and therefore trying to prone this down in a situation where their support tends towards the opposition. Abuse of human rights, election rigging, political pronouncements by the head of states, relevant ministers in foreign affairs on critical decision making processes would be interpreted either favourably or otherwise by the media. The crises in Zimbabwe, most recently the outbreak of cholera epidemic that knows no border in the SADC region have received both constructive and destructive criticisms from media houses.

For the purposes of this paper, it is our intention to divide these media into two. One, those that are in support of the government, usually the government-controlled media (broadcasting houses and newspaper) and the ones on the pay role of government, but privately owned. *The Herald* newspaper, Zimbabwean Radio Corporation and National Television are the only credible mouth-piece of the government. The pro-African media, with a global outlook, that are in support of the Zimbabwean government are the *New Africa* and *African Business*.¹⁰ They are critical of the Western world's inputs towards African dislocation through economic sanction and cultural alienation. Their blanket, without a due process, in analyzing each state's peculiarity questions their originality on the issue of the Harare crises. The need to address the problem in holistic manner without ideological and sentimental attachment eludes these media institutions. This has been the source of instability and disunity in the state rather than a united convergent means of information dissemination. The economic hardship which resulted from the government policies, made it even harder for the government to secure foreign exchange for the importation of machinery and newsprint for publication. The broadcasting house that should be a rallying point for the Zimbabweans has been relegated and appreciated by the citizens as a mere ZANU-PF tool to further the party's agenda.

Two, the pro-West media criticized by some African politics scholars as agents of political and economic instability in the continent. Some of these media houses are located in South Africa and controlled by the white, together

with the Western media outfits. The contribution of the *Mail & Guardian*, a weekly newspaper owned by a Zimbabwean is highly critical of Mugabe's government. Some local newspapers that belong to this group were either proscribed or employed government bottleneck policy to give them a natural annihilation.

The need to curb information dissemination in Zimbabwe made Mugabe to embark on series of repressive Parliamentary Acts enacted against foreign media. The imposition of 70% import duties on these made South African newspapers, for example to be out of circulation in the state. Some foreign correspondents were also sent packing from the state; this policy affected the perceived pro-white Zimbabwean farmers who were rumoured to have financially supported the MDC anti-ZANU-PF positions. Also affected by this policy are the media houses that disseminate information about the activities of the NGOs' in the state. It was the opinion of the government that the NGOs with active involvement in the politics of the state are responsible for sensitive information tapping from various government departments and release the same to the international environment. Total clampdown on the NGOs and mass media received attention of the media both at the sub-regional and global levels. This discredit Mugabe's government and made international organization and some states to focus attention on the opposition party as the only credible alternative to salvage the state from economic chaos and political instability. Despite media suffocation, globalization has made it difficult for the government to muffle information dissemination because of changes in the level of communication and information gathering.

As much as the MDC stands to be the way out of the state socio-political and economic problems, the issue of credibility of the party in governance is what is affecting the coterminous states. South Africa in particular is of the view that the unknown MDC with no deep political history could not be supported against the ZANU-PF. The crisis is a source of political tension which generates in the South African foreign policy calculations within the tripartite alliance of the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC. While the ANC is of the support of *constructive engagement*, the other

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

members of the alliance advocated total political, economic, energy and diplomatic face off with Mugabe's government. The lukewarm attitudes could partly have resulted, as mentioned above, from the Frederic Chiluba's government in Zambia. The inexperienced trade unionist turned politician may compound human and military in the sub-region.

SADC states appreciate the havoc inflicted on them by the security problems in Zimbabwe. Food and political crises that engulfed the states have direct negative impacts on the neighbouring states, though with varying degrees. As long as South Africa is much affected, the links between the two have made Pretoria government to tow a soft line because of the fruits of instability in favour of the latter.¹¹ As mentioned earlier, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Malawi are the most affected states because of their limited resources to cope with the influx of refugees and the outbreak of cholera epidemic. They are wary of turning their territory to a launch pad for terrorist attack, organised crime centre and political instability by supporting local opposition parties with violence and unconstitutional change of government. The crisis as discussed above is beyond the confines of Zimbabwe and treating such as internal affairs of the state is lopsided. International system should look into the state's hydra-headed crises from a holistic perspective.

8. Conclusion

The Zimbabwean crisis was considered by some of social scientists to be internal affairs of the state. They failed to appreciate the import of globalisation where no state can lay claim of her territorial integrity and the norms of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Internationalisation of democratisation in international relations confirms the need for other states to involve themselves in the political, economic and socio-cultural affairs of the rest of the participants in order to arrest the state from barbarism and anarchy, "orgies of primordial savagery", and a "retreat from modernity" (Hutchful, 1998: 8). The theory discussed above, Systemic Theory, confirms the validity of globalization because any development in any

part of the globe either directly or indirectly affects the rest of the system. Though there are some limitations in the adoption of the theory in the analysis of state relations, the natural aspect of Systemic Theory dwarfs its applicability. Despite that, it is valid in the explanation of the political impact, which eventually led to an internal security problem in Zimbabwe. The same, as it affects the whole of the southern African region has been extensively discussed above. The need for the SADC and AU to interfere in the affairs of Zimbabwe and the promise, albeit, empty and palliative, made by the Mugabe's government to form a unity government confirms that the absolute sovereignty and independence of state in international system has received a radical change as against the pre-1989 states system (Cooper, 2004: 3-4).

Though Mugabe has refused to yield to international pressure on the need to vacate the post as the President of the state, he listened to South Africa as the only credible power in the sub-region to form a GNU in the early 2009. The reason why Pretoria is pro-Mugabe, as discussed above, is to find a ready market for its goods and services, and keep the state as a trusted ally in future relationship of the two states. At the official level, the ANC government does not trust MDC as a credible successor in the political arrangement. The pro-western world outlook of the MDC is not ignorable by the South African government as Tsvangirai ascendancy to political power would challenge South Africa economic control of the state from the European and North American states. Though there was a call by some members of the SADC states, mostly Botswana, to forcefully remove Mugabe from power, the support of the DRC and South Africa, the most powerful members of the SADC in term of natural resources and industrial developments respectively cannot be ignored for a long time. Botswana's support for the anti-Mugabe stance could be located on the need to check against economic and political refugees to the relatively politically stable enclave. The support Botswana gave to MDC is a source of tension in the sub-region as SADC prefers, at the official level, to adopt quiet diplomacy in solving the impasse.

The AU, that should give a helping hand in form of political support for a true democracy in Zimbabwe, relies on

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

the SADC initiative. Thabo Mbeki's led reconciliation team was accused of being pro-Mugabe. Despite all the efforts put in place through this team, little headway was made. This prompted the Great Powers to call for more sanctions and the need for the AU to come up with a praxis solution to the political debacle. The rhetoric sanctions from the UN Security Council hardly address the crisis in Zimbabwe because of little economic interest of the Great Powers. The same led to the field day for China in exploiting the natural resources of the country. As long as humanitarian assistance in form of R2P is not in place the small and medium powers in the international system would hardly achieve sustainable development in Zimbabwe.

As long as the SADC cannot come up with more assertive solutions to the problem in Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF would continue to lord it over the state and the problem of instability in the whole sub-region would eventually have political and economic effects on the rest of Africa. The GNU formed is only a palliative solution as the government of two strange bedfellows cannot deliver all the dividend of democracy and constitutionalism in Zimbabwe.

Notes

1. The twin concepts of human security and responsibility to protect are introduced to the international relations in the 1990s because of the collapse of the Cold War bipolar system. The crises that follow this brought into prominence the need to curtail intrastate conflicts which are too cumbersome to address by the affected states, but should be holistically look into through the Great Powers' and the UNO. The unwillingness by the former and maze system of the later brought the roles of civil societies, mostly NGOs and medium power into the problem. For more explanation on this, see Otto F. Von Feigenblatt (2010: 267-70).
2. Many works are available on the impacts of non-state actors as the major impediment in the notion of state-centric international system. State-centric perspective of systems theory of the belief that state is cohesive, autonomous and rational. It should be noted that systems theory forgets the inputs of these actors and laid more premium on relations among nations. For more information on the roles of non-state actors in international relations see, Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2009; Noreena, H. 2002; Baylis, J. & Steve, S. (eds.). 1997; Russett & Starr, 1992; and Viotti, P. R. & Kauppi, M. V. 1987.
3. Through very reluctant to perform the roles of benign hegemonic leader after the end of the Cold War, the *Clash of Civilization* or what Moïsi Dominique called *Clash of Emotion* forced America to re-introduced what it terms public diplomacy in form of humanitarian assistance, but only to the terrorist prone states. For more explanation on this, see Flint & Taylor (2007: 216); also visit: <http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp>. (Accessed on 11 June 2010).
4. Some of the attributes of failed states are marked by violence and widespread human rights violations, high level of refugee and internally displaced person (IDP); vengeance seeking groups (Shona versus Ndebele that led to the 1980s Matabele Massacre); uneven economic and social development; loss of legitimacy by the state/government; collapse of public services; uneven application of rule of law and human rights; and brain drain for greener pasture. For more ingredients of a failed state, see Helman & Ratner (1992/1993: 8).
5. The support received from the DRC could be linked to the pro-Laurent Kabila war against Joseph Desire Mobutu Sese Seko when Zimbabwe, Angola, Libya, Chad, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi were in support of the latter. The need to repay Zimbabwe

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

for the economic linkages among Joseph Kabila, Mugabe and their respective senior military officers in exploiting the resources of the DRC in exchange for military support could have explained why DRC continues to be an *amiscuria* for Zimbabwe (Owoeye & Amusan, 2000: 172-184).

6. On 5 December 2008, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe had to print more money to add to the hyperinflation of the state where Z\$35 million can only buy a loaf of bread. For more information on this, see *The Zimbabwean* (Louis Trichardt). 2008. 11-17 December.
7. The ZNLWVA at initial stage did have audience of Mugabe government until they held one of his ministers hostage, abused and forced to flee for their safety in July 1997 (Cornwell, 1998: 70).
8. This operation was as a result of the March 2008 elections result that led MDC to receive more support from the people of Zimbabwe against Mugabe wish. The war veterans, soldiers, militia, intelligence operative and ruling party youth started abduction of suspected sympathisers of MDC, NGOs that were aim at alleviating food, political; and diseases crises were most affected people. Jestina Mukoko, a female director of the Zimbabwe Peace Project (CPP) was abducted. Her abduction led to international outcry against the Mugabe political system.
9. The umbilical cord that cemented the plethora of liberation movements in the southern Africa was so strong that during the 1970s, it was agreed that all the liberation movements should adopt gradual approach on the issue of liberation of the sub-region. The issue of South Africa was considered to be the last area of concentration while Zimbabwe was considered to be the first area of concentration of which Namibia would follow in order of preference. This was after the Lusophone states received their political independence. For more detail on this, see Joe Garba (1987) in his book titled *Diplomatic Soldiering*.
10. Possibly because of the financial support these media houses are receiving from the Mugabe government, they tend to be in favour of the appeared *illegal* government in Harare. See *New African* August/September 2005, no. 443 & August/September 2007, no. 465; *African Business* April 2003 no. 286 & January 2004, no. 294. On the other hand is a balanced news reporting by *Africa Today* with special reference to issues 2000 vol.6, no. 12; 2001 vol.7, no. 9 & 2003 vol. 9, no. 3. At the extreme ends are the magazines from the West who are critical of Mugabe's imperial

*When Solidarity and Brotherhood Among African States Are Questionable:
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rule. These are *The Economist* January 1999; *The Zimbabwean* (South Africa), a mouth piece of the opposition parties in Zimbabwe, South African based newspapers such as the *Mail & Guardian*, *Sunday Times*, *The Citizen*, *Sunday Independent* and *Pretoria News*.

11. In a situation of political instability, some states tend to benefit economically, mostly the political-military-industrial-complex. The belief that if south Africa fails to support Mugabe, other states such as China, North Korea and possibly, India, would for raw materials and market purposes. For more detail on this thesis, see White's (2005) position on *The Fruits of War*.

Lere Amusan, PhD, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)

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