Political Disruption and Governance in the Middle East[1]

Alexander Dawoody, Ph.D

---

[1] *A version of this article was previously published as a book chapter by the author at: Dawoody, A. (2016). Revolution and Terrorism in the Middle East. T. Klassen; D. Cepiku and T. J. Lah, (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Global Public Policy and Administration. London: Routledge.*

Political Disruption and Governance in the Middle East

Alexander Dawoody, Ph.D

Abstract

This article examines contemporary governance in the Middle East including linkages to revolution and political change. The article assesses major governance challenges in the Middle East their connection to current political development, including the evolution of fragile states, authoritarian regimes, and the manifestation of revolts and terrorism in the region. Analyzed in the article are four major causes of weak governance in the region: a limited for political opposition, foreign intervention, failed states and tribalism.

Keywords: Middle East, Governance, Failed States, Terrorism, Religion.

Introduction

Twentieth century governance and public administration in the Middle East has been significantly impacted by the inorganic creation of most Middle Eastern nation-states by colonial powers post WWI (Sorenson, 2013). France and Great Britain largely are responsible for the creation of the modern Middle East (Sorenson, 2013). The inorganic nature of this colonial creation provided an environment for injustice to be institutionalized and for marginalization and alienation of the public to become the norm. Although such inorganic creation occurred in other parts of the world, such as in Africa and Asia, in the Middle East its consequences have been particularly severe. Some observers suggest that some of the origins of the region's current failed states are a result of the nature of the birth of the some of the nations of the modern Middle East (Lynch, 2013).

Three movements emerged immediately after the creation of the modern Middle East, each attempting to deal with problems inherited by the inorganic nature of the region's creation: nationalism, socialism, and Political Islam. Nationalism arose from a new class whose leaders were educated abroad or exposed to Western bourgeoisie national ideologies. This class, later, came also to include members of the military from poorer classes that seized political power via military coups (Dawoody, 2014).

Overall, the nationalist movement formed political organization espousing patriarchal nationalistic ideologies and policies of economic protectionism. Puritanism, however, became the hallmark of this movement in many nations institutionalized as the cult of "Great Leader". In other words, dictatorships, that although initially had considerable popular support, eventually became unpopular because of their inability to resolve social problems through civic institutions, competent public administration, and sound economic development.

A second movement grew parallel with nationalism, espousing socialist ideology and challenging the first movement for control of public policy and political power. Although the Cold War gave some momentum to the movement, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in its demise. Today this movement is nothing but nostalgia and recital of outdated political dogma.

The third movement arose largely from Political Islam which developed at the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in the early years of the twentieth century. The objective of the movement was a return to, or adoption of, the Islamic Caliphate and Sharia-based governance as a model for a modern state. The third movement – partly because it was opposed, sometimes violently, by the other two movements – involved considerable grass roots development. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 that resulted in the overthrow of a police-state that was tied to Western interests in the region is the most enduring example of this movement (Lewis, 2004).

Ironically, parts of the region that we call the Middle East was some 3500 years ago the place where the art and science of administration were discovered, specifically by the scribes of Mesopotamia. Public administration became a viable tool for the foundation of the first state in history, known as Akkad. Administration was also the main element responsible for the creation of writing, an instrument that early Mesopotamian scribes needed in order to record offerings to the temples (Van De Mieroop, 1999).

The powerful empires of the ancient Middle East, such as Persian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Umayyad, and Abbasid, were sophisticated in administrative affairs, universities, libraries, hospitals, cities, irrigation systems, and military. Although governance was marred by socio-political conflicts and often manipulated for the benefits of the ruling oligarchies at the expense of vast sectors within the population, public policy and administration were responsible for transforming the region into a center of achievements in philosophy, science, music, poetry, and arts for more many centuries (Leick, 2003).

After the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 and the destruction of most administrative systems of the Abbasid state, the Middle East as a region entered a period of turmoil that to some extent continues to the present (Kennedy, 2006). For example, hydrocarbon resources (oil and gas) have produced massive wealth in the past for a few in the 70 years, while also creating a heavily depended non-producing swath of the population that lacks basic needs (Ross, 2013).

Governance in the Middle East today, except for very few nations, is a mix of authoritarian to marginal pseudo-democratic systems. Decades of manipulating governmental apparatus to siphon public resources for the benefits of the ruling oligarchies' grip on power has given rise to high levels of corruption, nepotism, lack of transparency, lack of accountability, and censorship, as well as an extensive and oppressive police state (Dawoody, 2013).

Causes of Upheaval in the Middle East

The article examines the unique challenges to reforming governance structures in the Middle East. Four factors are analyzed:

- The role of political elites and opposition groups.

- The role of foreign involvement, especially that of the United States.
- The rise of failed states.
- The role of tribalism and religious factions.

Elites and Opposition

Since its creation after WWI, the modern Middle East and the new countries that were brought to existence at the aftermath of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 (Fromkin, 2009) have usually been governed by isolated oligarchies, military juntas and tribal chieftains that cared primarily about solidifying their position in power and enriching their lot (Khoury and Kostiner, 1991). The governmental apparatus acted as a tool of oppression creating massive, dysfunctional bureaucracies feeding on corruption, a police state, censorship of information, and nepotism, rather than serving the public interest. In such an atmosphere all forms of opposition were silenced and freedom of expression, gathering and organization were met with political torture, imprisonment, and summary executions (Lesch and Haas, 2012).

Internal and external enemies were created to justify the continuous imposition of laws suspending individual rights and prolonging the tenure of political leaders and parties by decree and in complete absence of participatory processes. Ideological indoctrination was imposed in each aspect of daily life to normalize this abnormal trend. In many nations, the central ideology gradually shifted from nationalism to socialism to Political Islam (Dawoody, 2014). The state and tribes (or religions) were interchangeable to persuade the citizen that an opposition of the status quo was an opposition to tribal orders (or religious teachings).

The relative absence of political debates in the Middle East and the domination of repetitive, mundane, and non-thinking forms of schooling reinforced by governmental propaganda machines had produced a class of citizens who were disfranchised segments but had few alternatives in expressing their grievances. This was compounded by the migration of highly educated individuals and families from the Middle East to the West due to economic, social, personal, and political reasons.

The absence of a viable political opposition that can lead public movements and demand political reforms had created a vacuum that in some cases was filled by Political Islam. Mosques were employed as connective nexus to maintain an ongoing network supported logistically, ideologically, and politically in order to feed an anti-establishment movement (Bokhari and Senzai, 2013). This role of mosques was a long-standing one in the centuries long of political oppression and tyrannical forms of governance.

After the Arab Spring in 2013 and the collapse of reactionary and tyrannical regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, the environment was right for the emergence of democratic and representative governments. Due to the absence of viable civic institutions, democratic opposition movements, and democratic traditions, these countries fell prey to Political Islam (Bradley, 2012). However, within a short time, these leaders were ejected from power and governance once again either returned to the rule by the old guard (as in Tunisia), the military (as in Egypt), or dissented into chaos (as in Libya and Yemen). Terrorist groups saw in the examples of Libya and Yemen a

perfect swamp for growth, while engaged the old guard that returned to power in Egypt and Tunisia in almost a daily confrontation (mostly in Egypt since the Brotherhood had suffered the most lost).

In Syria, however, the Arab Spring took a different turn from the paths that had emerged in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Although the popular uprising against the Assad government remained peaceful for the first six months, the movement lacked internal backing as it was the case elsewhere (Hokayem, 2013). The peaceful movement soon turned to armed struggle by defected Syrian soldiers that called themselves "The Free Syrian Army" (U.S. Government, 2014). Jihadist groups seized the vacuum created by the public's reluctance to support the Free Syrian Army to pour into Syria and utilize the situation for their advantage (Erlich and Chomsky, 2014).

With Iran, Iraq, Russia, and Hezbollah of Lebanon backing Assad both militarily and financially, the rich Arab oil countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait backed those were fighting against Assad (Hokayem, 2013). As the violence escalated and nearly 120,000 Syrian were killed and another two million became refugees, Syria became a no-man land. The capital city of Damascus and a narrow strip around it remained under Assad's government while the rest of the country was divided by fighting Jihadists: Groups such as Al Nusra, ISIS and other emerged espousing the most reactionary and violent doctrine (U.S. Government, 2014). Eventually, with Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah's help, the Assad government was able to defeat the Jihadist groups and liberate most of Syria (although pockets of the country remain under the control of Jihadists in the northwestern strip and the Kurds in the northeast).

In 2014 the Syrian civil war spilled into Iraq, capitalizing on the weakness of the wooden Iraqi army and the despised sectarian policies of its corrupt and incompetent government (Cockburn, 2015). Supported by the local Sunni population who were marginalized since 2003, the Jihadist groups in Syria (namely ISIS) were able to build alliances with Saddam's former military officers and easily capture the provinces of Mosul, Salahhdin and Anbar (Hassan, 2015). Soon after, ISIS announced the rebirth of the Islamic caliphate and begun its terror campaign against the Iraqi Yazedies, Christians, and Shiites, destroying their homes, cities, and villages, killing their men, and raping their women. Only when ISIS fighters turned their attention to the Kurdish region that the West (headed by the United States) decided to intervene through air campaign to stop ISIS' advances (Cockburn, 2015). The US champaign, however, was intended to strengthen its footprint and military presence in Iraq, generate funds for the Military Industrial Complex, and prolong Iraq's paralysis than defeating ISIS. It took the endurance and military-political genius of Iranian commander Qassim Suleimani and the Grand Ayatollah Sistani's call for a popular resistance by Iraqi Shiites that eventually defeated ISIS and liberated the occupied provinces in 2018.

<u>Foreign Involvement</u>

Post world-war II, with the discovery of oil and the withdrawal of old colonial powers, the United States became the major power broker in the Middle East, seeking to advance its economic and political interests, especially in the oil-rich areas in the region.

Security and order became the mantra of the US, and its clients states in the region at the expense of democratization and individual freedoms (Migdal, 2014). The result was that the US supported tyrannical and reactionary regimes in the Middle East and on occasions directly interfering either

militarily or through overt intelligence operations to support these regimes. The most obvious examples of this include the orchestration of the 1953 coup in Iran against a democratically elected government, as well as US military intervention to support the oil sheikhs of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and financial resources for the dictatorships of Egypt.

The priority of the US to protecting oil supplies meant that Saddam Hussein and his Baath regime in Iraq regime enjoyed unwavering US military, financial and political support when his actions were beneficial to US interests, especially during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 (Hahn, 2005). When Saddam gassed Kurdish minorities in 1988 and killed more than 5,000 civilians with mustard gas, the US treated the actions as an internal matter. Only later when Saddam occupied Kuwait's oil fields and thus threatened US economic interests did the Kurdish massacre suddenly surface in American politics and Saddam was denounced for committing genocide and harboring weapons of mass destruction (Charountaki, 2010).

The two Gulf Wars led by the US against the Baath regime in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and the devastating United Nations imposed sanction on Iraq from 1991-2003 resulted in more than three million deaths in Iraq, destruction of the infrastructure, and high levels of malnutrition, poverty, unemployment, and institutionalized sectarian violence (Ismael and Ismael, 2015). Today Iraq is a model for a failed state ridden by terrorist bombs, kidnapping, beheading, corruption, and a dysfunctional governmental system (Al-Ali, 2014). Components of Iraq's ethnic and religious communities are fighting one another for control of power and resources: Sunnis against Shiites, Muslims against Christians, and Arabs against Kurds (Rayburn, 2014). When governance is incapacitated to such an extent as in Iraq, the environment becomes ripe for terrorist groups, such as ISIS to capitalize and manipulate the situation for its advantage.

Failed States

Poor governance, sometimes further compounded by foreign intervention, creates ineffective policies that results in political crisis, stagnation, and some form of lawlessness and disorder. For the most part these crises are manageable and can be placed under control although through repressive and undemocratic measures, such as military dictatorships. However, the Middle East, is saturated with failed states that in some cases became aided the growth and spread of terrorism. Examples of these failed states are Libya, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Lebanon, and Afghanistan.

In Libya, after four centuries of Qaddafi's tyrannical regime, NATO's military intervention at the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2013 and then pulling fast out of the country without helping Libyans build a strong government left the nation without internal peace and order (Engelbrekt and Mohlin, 2013). Today, the government in Libya is nothing but a runaway shadow of few individuals who are hiding in hotels while the country is torn between Jihadist terrorist groups supported by Qatar and Turkey who use these groups to force their own Islamist-driven political agenda on the entire region.

In Iraq, the occupation of the country by the US in 2003 resulted in the dismantling of the state and its administrative apparatus, the institutionalization of quota and sectarianism in the new Iraqi Constitution, and the alienation, as a result, of its Sunni community. The disempowered Sunnis saw in Islamist terrorist groups a perfect vehicle to force their demand and return to power. Iraq

today is torn between ethnic and sectarian violence with third of its land until recently was taken by terrorist organizations (Ismael and Ismael, 2015). The central government is powerless, decapitated by corruption, political opportunism, incompetence, and militia (Al-Ali, 2014). Ordinary Iraqi citizens are trapped between a government that represent the narrow views of militia and terrorist groups that want, through fear and terror, return Iraq to the 7th century.

Syria, until recently was geographically partitioned into several distinct regions. The capital city of Damascus and the Alawites strip near the Mediterranean Sea was under the Assad government's control. Dara and most of southern Syria was under the Free Syrian Army control. Most of the western region was under Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra control. Aleppo, northern Syria, Ar-Raqqah and part of the eastern region was under ISIS control. Northeastern Syria was (ad continues to be) under Kurdish control (mainly PPK fighters who identify Turkey as their arch enemy). With nearly 120,000 Syrian civilians are killed, two million are refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey, and nearly 20,000 foreign Jihadist making their way to Syria (through the Turkish borders, often with knowledge and permission of the Turkish authorities), Syria today is struggling to put the pieces together and establish law and order in order for governance to function and carry out basic services while transitioning it from a hub that was a breeding ground for terrorism into a functioning state.

Somalia has been a failed state since the collapse of Mohammad Siad Barre's government in 1991 due to tribal and military conflicts and the agony of civil war that lasted until 2006 (Lewis, 2003). It was during this civil war that the world became aware of the famine caused by draught that was devastating the Somalia population. Warlords were high jacking international aid packages in order to solidify their power and control over the population (Fergusson, 2013). The U.S. military attempt in guarding these relief efforts resulted in the disastrous downing of U.S Black Hawk helicopter in 1993, and the killing and parading of the bodies of its pilots in the capital city Mogadishu (Clarke and Herbst, 1997). In 2012 a weak government was formed to restate the state's control and authority over a land that became disintegrated into three states: Somalia, Somali Land and Putland, and a population terrorized by pirates known as Al-Shabab (Hansen, 2013), an off-shoot of Al-Qaeda who recently affirmed its allegiance to ISIS.

Yemen, long ruled by its strong military man Ali Abdullah Salih, was forcibly united in 1990 after eight years of civil war between its northern and southern parts (Brehony, 2013), became the fourth country in the Middle East to witness the Arab Spring in 2011 after Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (Lynch, 2013). The demonstration continued to be peaceful despite military crackdown by Salih's regime. Eventually and after mediation by Saudi Arabia, Salih agreed to step down in 2012 to his Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (Rabi, 2015). The government of Hadi, however, collapsed by a Shiite tribal group known as Al-Houthies (Salmoni and Loidolt, 2010). Today, Yemen is one the hotspots to attract Al-Qaeda and other Wahhabi Jihadists, and with continuous war imposed by Saudi Arabia, committing some of the most atrocities of war crimes in modern history while shamelessly backed by the West, it is threatened to turn into a permanent failed state, pairing the way for organized terrorist groups (namely Al-Qaeda, since Yemen was the birthplace of its founder, Osama bin Laden) to force havoc on regional and world security, including maritime travel at the straits of Aden in the Red Sea.

Although better functioning than other failed states in the region, Lebanon, nevertheless, is a failed state and a hub for a notorious legitimized terrorist organization in the country: The Falangists. Not only the Falangists and Hezbollah paralyze the Lebanese state, but it is also the Lebanese state and the local agents of the regional Arab Petro-dollars that infiltrate its governments, such as Al-Mustaqbal Movement in general and the Harriri family in particular (Worrall and Clubb, 2015). No one is elected and placed in power, including the country's ceremonial Christian President, the Sunni Prime Minister, or the Shiite head of Parliament without regional approval, especially that of Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah has its own military, institutions, members of cabinet and members of Parliament and it seek maintaining Lebanon functional although under the Iranian influence. Because of such paralysis, Lebanon is a de facto failed state (Levitt, 2013).

In the case of Afghanistan, the US used the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as a recruiting round of Islamist Jihadists to fight the Soviets in the name of God and freedom. Once defeated, the Soviets and the US left Afghanistan in 1989, leaving the Jihadists fight among themselves over the control of the country (Coll, 2004). The fight and civil war continued until 1996 when an Afghani terrorist group named Taliban, trained, and armed by Pakistan, took control of power in Afghanistan and established one of the most reactionary, misogynist, and repressive regimes in modern history (Tanner, 2009). The Taliban hosted Osama Ben Laden and his Al-Qaeda network. After September 11, 2001, and when they refused to surrender Osama Bin Laden to the United States, the Taliban were driven out of power by the US military and Afghanistan came under US military control (Tucker-Jones, 2014).

Although the United States allowed elections to be held for president and for an independent Afghani government to be formed, the US-protected Afghani government lacked any real existence outside the capital city of Kabul. Hence, the President of Afghanistan was best known as the Mayor of Kabul, until his cowardice escape from the country when his American backers fled Afghanistan. As of 2021 Afghanistan is fully back under Taliban control.

Tribalism and Religious Schisms

A final feature of governance in the Middle East is the continuous domination of tribalism and religious schisms (Kamrava, 1998). When individualism is crushed or undermined and decisions are made by tribal chieftains, group interests become more important than individual rights. If the state cannot broker the interests of different tribes (when government, for example, is dominated by other tribes and thus has to respond to the dominating tribes' interests), the disaffected parties invite terrorist groups to advance their objectives. This is, for example, is what is taking place in parts of Iraq today. When the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad had systemically excluded Sunni tribes from sharing power, these tribes invited terrorists such as ISIS to force its demands. Only when these tribes realize that such an alliance with the terrorist groups may limit their autonomy do these tribes then turn against their terrorist allies and expel them.

Tribalism reinforces sectarian divides in the Middle East, especially among the Sunnis and Shiites. The division between the Sunnis and Shiites in Islam is not recent but rather dates to the early years of Islam, particularity after the Prophet Muhammad's death when the caliphate passed to his friend and father-in-law instead of his cousin, Ali. Muslims, however, kept the division and for the bulk of history largely restricted to religious rituals (Hazleton, 2010). Recently, however, terrorist

groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, are using such divide for political reasons for one sect to have complete control of power at the expense of others.

Conclusion

Today in the Middle East two major paths have emerged in efforts to make governance more representative, transparent, accountable, and effective. The first path is tread by societal groups advocating a change in governance to be more transparent and better engaged in building a prosperous civil society. This group is largely unorganized and spontaneous. Unfortunately, and because of the newness and unorganized nature of the movement it is easily manipulated by traditional power brokers and entrenched groups. The second path is followed by groups that yearn for a change in governance that returns to, or builds on, the sixth century Islamic Caliphate, even if the means to achieving such goal employed suppression and violence.

It is imperative in analyzing changes in governance in the Middle East to differentiate between revolution and terrorism. Although both may share some causality (such as a rejection of the existing order), they differ regarding legitimacy. Revolution signifies the demand by large segments of the population for sound governance, better lives, and a better future. In the absence of democratic channels and viable opposition political movements, revolutions in form of mass protests, demonstrations, labor strikes and peaceful gatherings are both necessary and required to ensure legitimate governance. If tyrannical governmental apparatus responds to these mass protests with violence, then citizens have the right to fight oppression and defend their homes, families and pursue their demands. This is emphasized, for example, by the US Constitution that legitimizes arming a popular militia when government no longer democratically represents the will of the public.

In case of terrorism, however, there is less justification for violence. The main reason for this is that terrorism does not represent the free will of the people, but rather uses violence to impose a narrow ideology on the majority. In essence, terrorism ends the legitimacy of the state and replaces it with the savage Hobbesan notion of a lawless society where only the strong survives at the expense of security, freedom, and rights.

The region's recent experiments with representation, whether top-down as the one imported by outsiders such as in Iraq or Afghanistan or through internal strife such as the Arab Spring have largely failed to bring sustained change to governance structures. This article points to four barriers to sustained reform.

First, the absence of civic institutions on grassroots levels and the powerful conservative elite groups that seek to maintain the status quo.

Second, foreign involvement, especially the role of the US in supporting governance structures that meet is objectives.

Third, the existence of failed states that will require extraordinary efforts to establish robust governance systems, and that act as a means for the spread of terrorism in the Middle East.

Lastly, longstanding tribal and political schisms that impose limits on governance structures of modern states, along with tribal and cultural tradition that emphasizes collectivism at the expense of individualism.

References

Ali, Ayaan Hirsi. *The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam*. New York: Atria Books, 2008.

Al-Ali, Zaid. *The Struggle for Iraq's Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.

Bradley, John R. *After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked The Middle East Revolts*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Brehony, Noel. *Yemen Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2013.

Bokhari, Kamran and Farid Senzai. *Political Islam in the Age of Democratization*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Capra, Francis. *The Hidden Connections: A Science for Sustainable Living*. New York: Anchor, 2004.

CBS/AP. "20,000 Foreign Fighters Flock to Syria, Iraq to Join Terrorists." CBS News. Accessed February 11, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ap-20000-foreign-fighters-flock-to-syria-iraq-to-join-terrorists/

Cesari, Jocelyne. *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Charountaki, Marianna. *The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International Relations in the Middle East since 1945*. London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Clarke, Walter S. and Jeffrey Herbst. *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.

Cockburn, Patrick. *The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution*. London and New York: Verso, 2015.

Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin Books, 2004.

Dalacoura, Katerina. *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Dawoody, Alexander. *Public Administration and Policy in the Middle East*. New York: Springer,

2014.

Dawoody, Alexander. "The Middle East and Learning from BRIC." *The Innovation Journal* 18 (2013), Article 4: 1-11.

Dawoody, Alexander. "Teaching Public Policy in a Global Context." In *Globalization,* edited by Hector Cuadra-Montiel. Rijeka, 275-290. Croatia: In-Tech Publication.

Engelbrekt, Kjell and Marcus Mohlin. *The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign.* London and New York: Routledge, 2013.

Erlich, Reese and Noam Chomsky. *Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2014.

Fergusson, James. *The World's Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia*. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2013.

Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East.* New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2009.

Hahn, Peter L. *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005.

Hansen, Stig Jarle. *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group.* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Hassan, Hassan. *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. New York: Regan Arts, 2015.

Hazleton, Lesley. *After the Prophet: The Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split in Islam*. New York: Anchor, 2010.

Hokayem, Emile. *Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant*. London and New York: Routledge, 2013.

Howard, Philip N. and Muzammil M. Hussain. *Democracy's Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Kabbani, Hisham. *The Salafi Movement Unveiled*. New York: Osmora Inc., 2014.

Kamrava, Mehran. *Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East*. New York and London: CQ Press, 1998.

Kennedy, Hugh. *When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World: The Rise and Fall of Islam's Greatest Dynasty.* Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006.

Khoury, Philip S. and Joseph Kostiner. *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*. Oakland,

CA: University of California Press, 1991.

Ismael, Tareq Y and Jacqueline S. Ismael. *Iraq in the Twenty-First Century: Regime Change and the Making of a Failed State*. New York: Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series, 2015.

Lappin, Yaakov. *Virtual Caliphate: Exposing the Islamist State on the Internet*. Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2010.

Leick, Gwendolyn. Mesopotamia: *The Invention of the City*. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.

Lesch, David W. and Mark L. Haas. *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2012.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. Athens, OH: New York: Random House, 2004.

Lewis, I.M. *A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. Ohio University Press, 2003.

Levitt, Matthew. *Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God*. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2013.

Lynch, Marc. *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs, 2013.

Maalouf Elza S. and Don Edward Beck. *Emerge!: The Rise of Functional Democracy and the Future of the Middle East.* New York: SelectBooks, 2014.

Mansoor, Peter R. *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.

Migdal, Joel S. *Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.

Overman, Sam E. The New Sciences of Administration: Chaos and Quantum Theory. *Public Administration Review* 56, 5 (1996): 487-491.

Rabi, Uzi. *Yemen: Revolution, Civil War and Unification*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2015.

Rayburn, Joel. *Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2014.

Ross, Michael L. *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013.

Salmoni, Barak A. and Bryce Loidolt. *Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010.

Saunders, Doug. *The Myth of the Muslim Tide: Do Immigrants Threaten the West?* New York: Vintage, 2012.

Sorenson, David. *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 2013.

Tanner, Stephen. *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban*. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009.

Tucker-Jones, Anthony. *The Afghan War: Operation Enduring Freedom 2001-2014*. South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Military, 2014.

U.S. Government. *The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq - AQIM, Ansar al-Sharia, Al Nusrah Front, ISIS, Islamic Front, Alleppo, Alawites, Sunni, AQAP, Assad, Al-Shabaab, Salafist*. New York: Progressive Management, 2014.

Van De Mieroop, Marc. *The Ancient Mesopotamian City*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Worrall, James and Gordon Clubb. *Hezbollah: From Islamic Resistance to Government*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2015.

Yasmeen, Samina and Nina Markovic. *Muslim Citizens in the West: Spaces and Agents of Inclusion and Exclusion*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub Co, 2014.