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ISSN: 1948-0105 (Electronic)

ISSN: 1948-0091 (Print)

Indexing and Cataloguing:

- Directory of Open Access Journals
- EBSCOhost
- the online Bibliography of Asian Studies of the Association of Asian Studies
- OpenJGate

Contact Information:

editor@journal.vpweb.com

Mailing Address:

Central American Institute of Asia Pacific Studies (CAI-APS),
P.O. Box: 219-1250,
Escazu, Costa Rica

Physical Address:

CAI-APS, Office B1, Second Floor, IUHS, Scotia Bank, 200 Mts. Oeste, 800 mts. Sur.
No.1, Condominios Felipe II.
Urbanizacion Monte Roca, Escazu, San Jose, Costa Rica
Tel: (506)-2289-3037, (506) 2289-3003, and 1-561-749-0603

<http://www.japss.org/JournalAsiaPacificStudies.html>

Journal of Asia Pacific Studies

ISSN: 1948-0105 (Electronic)

ISSN: 1948-0091 (Print)

Volume 2, Issue 1, May 2011

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Chuka Enuka

Globalization and the Malaysian Experience: Upsides and Downsides¹

See Hoon Peow, KBU International College (Malaysia)¹

Abstract: *In this short article I wish to show how Malaysia and Malaysians respond to the globalization process, especially in issues related education, culture and identity. Using this experience several important theoretical issues about the nature of the globalization process is addressed. The Malaysian case may shed some new lights on whether globalisation is a one centre and one directional process; or a multi-central and multi-directional process.*

Keywords: *Malaysia; Globalization; Glocalization; Modernization; Movement of People; Economy; Media; Education; Culture; Religion.*

Introduction

Globalization is a buzzword today. Much has been written about it and much has been confused. It is often regarded as if it is a natural process by the popular media.

¹ I would like to thank Dr Voon Ping Keong, Director of the Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies for his invaluable comments.

¹ Dr. See Hoon Peow received his LLB (Hons) from University of Glamorgan in 1995, M. Phil in Sociology of Law in 2001 from University of Malaya and PhD in Sociology and Anthropology from International Islamic University Malaysia. His M. Phil thesis is entitled *Law and Child Labour in Malaysia: A Case Study in Balakong New Village* (Published by Pelanduk in 2007). The title of his Ph. D dissertation is *The Use of Folk Literature in Modern Education: A Case Study of the Chinese Language Textbooks*.

Dr. Hoon Peow is now Principal of KBU International College offering courses up to Bachelor Degree level in Malaysia. He is also member of the Board of Director of the Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies (CMCS) in Kuala Lumpur. CMCS is a NGO founded and supported by the Chinese Community in Malaysia.

Hoon Peow has a wide academic interest in Humanities and Social Sciences. He has published books and articles on education, comparative religions, social problems, medical negligence, etc. He also speaks regularly on education, teen culture and juvenile problems in interviews, at seminar, forums and on local radio programmes.

Contact: hoonpeow@gmail.com

Even sociologists like Giddens think that we are inevitably propelled into a global order. It is as if we have no choice but to accept this inevitable fact of modern life. However, this article will argue that it is not a natural process but rather economically, “the process is mainly driven and enabled by policy choice at the global and national level that in recent years led to the rapid liberalization of finance, trade and investment” (Khor, 2000, p. ii) and culturally, the host culture often filters what is allowed to seep in. Nation states and local culture may choose their response to the process. Liberalizations of economy also often eventually have an effect culturally.

While there are government and people that welcome globalization warmly, Malaysia and Malaysians have received it with a lot of cautions.

In this short article I wish to show how Malaysia and Malaysians respond to the process, especially in issues related to movement of people, information flows, economic policies, education, religion and culture. However, this is not an empirical study; rather it is a theoretical article which uses the Malaysian experience to shed some light on the nature of the globalization process.

Globalization in Theory

Robertson (1992, p.8) one of the most influential exponents of globalization defines it as: “Globalization as a concept refers to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole”. While Giddens (1990, p.64) states that “Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”.

According to Bradley et al. (2000, p.15):

For Giddens, a key aspect of modernity has been the significance of what he calls ‘time-space instantiation’. By this Giddens is referring to the way in which, during the modern period, developments in

transportation and communications technologies have meant that local events and institutions have come to be increasingly influenced by distant developments.

For Tan (2002, p.82) globalization is predominantly an economic concept. Camilleri (1998, pp.5-18) and Khor (2000) certainly will agree with Tan. Camilleri (1998, p.7) especially sees the accelerating trade, investment, and finance and technology flow across national boundaries as the engine of globalization. Lodge (1995, p.xi) summarizes it in the following passage:

Globalization is a fact and a process. The fact is that the world's people and nations are more interdependent than ever before and becoming more so. The measures of interdependence are global flows of such things as trade, investment, and capital, and the related degradation that constantly reminds us that we are passengers on a spaceship, or, more ominously, a lifeboat.

The process of globalization is both technological and human. Technologically, new systems of global information and communication foster and link the agents of globalization-multinational corporations, sometime with governments as their partners. On the human side, globalization is pulled by exploding consumer desires, especially in the rapidly growing countries of Asia, and pushed by ingenious corporate managers, who themselves are driven by variety of urges- to serve their communities or their shareholders, to gain wealth and power, or simply to exercise their skills and talents.

Globalization is a promise of efficiency in spreading the good things of life to those who lack them. It is also a menace to those who are left behind, excluding from its benefits.

Scholte (qtd. in Smith, 2002) argues that there are at least five broad definitions of globalization: globalization as internationalization; globalization as liberalization; globalization as universalization; globalization as westernization or modernization; and globalization as

deterritorialization. According to Scholte only the globalization as deterritorialization can offer a clear definition of globalization (qtd. in Smith, 2002). In my opinion, globalization involves all the five processes, but it is more than any one of them. From the definitions and passage above we can summarize that Globalization involve a few important concepts, i.e. compression of the world or time/space (in Giddens' term); consciousness of the world as a whole; interdependence of people and nations and most important of all is the intense consciousness of this interdependence; and the evidences of the process is the global flow of such things as trade, investment, capital, people and popular culture. Eventually the world will become like a borderless village. Waters (2001, p.5) states that globalization is "a social process in which the constraints of geography on economic, social, and cultural arrangements recede, in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding and in which people act accordingly".

At this point it is appropriate to point out the mistake of some writers to equate colonialism with globalization; and argue that globalization has in fact begun many centuries ago. This view basically confuses internationalization and globalization. The differences between colonialism and internationalization with globalization lay in a few things. First, in the globalization concept the intensity of the interchange and compression of time-space is very important. It is the pace that makes things different. While for example there might be migration of people during the colonial period but it was basically very slow as compare to what is happening now. The speed of the process changes its nature. It is the speed that causes the compression of time/space. Secondly, the term interdependent is very important in globalization theory. Going international may not mean that we are interdependent. For example we have long exporting our products but we were never as dependent and as affected by global market. Thirdly, the consciousness of interdependent and the consciousness of being in one world also change the nature of the process. I dare claim that this consciousness is entirely new to us. Never in the

human history have the people of the world felt so interdependent.

On the other hand, while agreeing that economic globalization is the most important aspect of globalization both Robertson (1992) and Ritzer (2004) stress the importance of cultural globalization. Together with Giddens (1990, pp.63-65), Ritzer (2004, p.160) coin modernization (modernity or McDonaldization for Ritzer) as the engine of Globalization. As a matter of fact the whole world is modernizing. It is believed that there is going to be convergence everyway in the world. As with Giddens, Ritzer agrees that “modernity is inherently globalizing” (Bradley et al., 2000, p.15)

Here we can sense that globalization is often a one way process, the more powerful nations or Multinational Corporation influencing or forcing the weaker nations or people to change or to react. It is seldom the other way round. It is very difficult to speak about “interdependent” here. That is why many third world leaders equate globalization with colonialism in disguise. It is this aspect of the globalization process that this article is more interested in the Malaysian experience.

Is there really a convergence of things? While emphasizing the McDonaldization, Americanization and Globalization process, Ritzer (2004, pp.159-184) also speaks about what he calls Glocalization process. What he basically meant by glocalization is a process where the local culture react to the global influences, in his case McDonaldization, and force the McDonaldized system to adapt to the local culture, e.g. local flavor. He also differentiates between what he calls McDonaldization of “Nothing” and “Something”. “Nothing can be defined as a ‘social form that is generally centrally conceived, controlled and comparatively devoid of **distinctive content**¹” (Ritzer, 2004, p.167). “Something” can be defined as “a social form that is generally indigenously conceived, controlled, and comparatively **rich in distinctive substantive content**¹” (Ritzer, 2004, p.169).

¹ Emphasis added by present writer.

The difference between the two is in the people's comparative perceptions. Ritzer gives some example to explain the difference. For example "if the fast-foot restaurant is an example of nothing, than a meal cooked at home from scratch would be an example of something" (Ritzer, 2004, p.169). It is the something that is more resistant to change or McDonaldization. Using these concepts Ritzer is able to explain the lack convergence of certain things. I would like to submit that the perception of nothing and something is not as clear cut as Ritzer would think. McDonald, which Ritzer regards as nothing, is everyway regarded as something in Asia. It is regarded as something loaded with distinctive western substantive contents by most Asians. It is certainly so in the controversy of setting up a McDonald branch within University of Malaya some years ago.

Malaysian Society: A Brief Overview

Malaysia is one of the most successful Southeast Asian countries. The Malaysian society is complex and interesting. It is multi-racial, Multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-cultural, however the past years there is no sign of cultural assimilation as in other Southeast Asian countries. All the races in Malaysia although, live and work harmoniously together for years, but protect and develop their respective custom, religion, education and culture separately. However, all of them face the challenges of modernization in preserving their traditions.

Malaysia was a British colony, thus inherited the British political, legal, education and administrative system. These systems have been enshrined in the Constitution and are significant in the National building process. Currently, Malaysian Federation is still following the constitutional monarchy system. The highest monarch is called the *Yang Dipertuan Agung*. Every state has its own sultan or other rulers. Certain matters such as land and religion are placed under state control.

¹ Emphasis added by present writer.

The major races in Malaysia are the Malays, Chinese, Indians and the indigenous people (such as Kadazan, Iban and Dusuns). Both the Malays and the indigenous people are considered *Bumiputra* (Literally, sons of the soy). According to the Census of Population and Housing Malaysia 2000, produced by the Department of Statistics, Malaysia, the population breakdown is roughly as follows: *Bumiputra* 65%, Chinese 26%, Indian 8% and others 1%.

In 1957, during independence, Malaysians' average income was only about USD 200. In year 2000, Malaysians' average was USD 3884. This is an impressive achievement if it is compared to country such as Ghana, which is also former British colony that was granted independence at about the same time. Now, Malaysia is a highly industrialize country where agriculture only contribute to about 14% of the GDP. (Benjamin Asare & Alan Wong, 2004, p.1). In the 1980s, Malaysia begins to develop light and heavy industries; in 1990s the government adopted the privatization policies and ventured into hi-tech industries, especially information communication technologies industry. Now, the service industries and tourism are also valued.

In 1991, the then prime minister of Malaysia, Tun Mahathir Mohamad formulated the Vision 2020, in order to make Malaysia a developed nation by year 2020. Motivated by the Vision 2020, Malaysians make economic wonder in the 1990s, achieving about 8% growth yearly until the 1997 financial crisis (Puteh, 2006, p.105). However, Malaysia soon recovered from the crisis without adopting IMF's scheme, to achieve 4% to 5% growth yearly, until the 2008 global financial crisis breakout.

One of the key objectives in Vision 2020 is the development of the Information Communication Technology Industry so that Malaysia can take a quantum leap and become a developed nation. One of the biggest projects to achieve Vision 2020 is to develop the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a development area bounded from Kuala Lumpur city centre, Putra jaya, Kuala Lumpur International Airport and Cyber Jaya, a 15 KM by 50 KM area. Under this project there are seven flagship projects: E-Government, Smart School, E-Medicine, Smart Card, Research and

Development area, borderless marketing and world manufacturing network (蔡崇正, 2002, pp.35-64 ; 賴昭光 & 周忠信, 2002, pp.82-105)

Although, these projects are not entirely successful, but they definitely help accelerated the Malaysian social and economic growth. Now, Internet access and other information access is very common in Malaysia. Malaysia is definitely in a global and knowledge economy era (《馬哈迪 - 22 年叱吒風云》, 2004, pp.75-96)

Malaysia's and Malaysian communities' responds to globalization should be read in the light of the above developments.

Some Globalizing Phenomena in Malaysia

During the passed 30 years, the Malaysian economy has changed from an agrarian based economy to an industrialised economy; and now it is trying to develop into a K (Knowledge) Economy. All these mega projects have made Malaysia go global in one way or another (Phua and Soo, 2004, pp.151-182).

In order to achieve the above objectives Malaysia has to adopt a more open policy, not only economically but also socially and culturally. Now, Malaysian youth have more access to the alternative media, and are open to more influences from around the world (Phua and Soo, 2004, pp.151-182).

In 1990, the NEP was replaced by the more liberal National Development Plan (1990-2010). In 1991, in order for Malaysia to become a developed nation by the year 2020, the then Prime Minister, Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, announced Vision 2020. Consequently, there has been an opening up of the Malaysian market, migration of people in and out of Malaysia, opening up of education policies, etc.; all this marks a globalised era for Malaysia. This is in fact ambitious social engineering, and a deliberate policy choice in order to transform Malaysia. However, after the Asian economic crisis in 1997, Malaysia is now much more cautious about opening up its economy and other policies.

See Hoon Peow, KBU International College (Malaysia)

However, in order to achieve the above objective the Malaysian government still has to adopt a more open policy in a few key areas as compared to before, thus resulting in some globalizing experience.

Some of the globalizing phenomena in Malaysia are:

Movement of People

In order for Malaysia to be more competitive in agriculture, manufacturing and construction by lowering production cost, especially human resources cost, Malaysia had deliberately attract a large group of foreign workers since the 1980s. First the Indonesians to work in the agricultural sectors and construction sectors, later also other people, e.g. Pakistani and Bangladeshi in the manufacturing industries. "By 1997, one out of every four workers in Malaysia was foreign. The plantation industry depends on foreign workers for over 60 per cent of their work force, while the figure for the construction industry is 70 per cent. Large numbers are entering the manufacturing industry as well" (Phua & Soo, 2004, p.156). Now the total number of foreign workers in Malaysia is over two millions. Besides, foreign workers Malaysia has also open door to many other foreigners, including foreign student, businessmen, refugees, etc. A large number of foreigners are now populated some parts of the capital city, Kuala Lumpur.

The Economy

The Malaysian economy has been relaying on foreign direct investment, international trade and foreign capital to grow for many years. From an agrarian economy, Malaysia has become industrialized in about 30 year, where many multinational corporations have their operation here. "Seventy-five per cent of our manufacturing was produced by foreign multinational corporations which also employed 45 per cent of the work force" (Phua & Soo, 2004, p.158).

Table 1 shows the direction of Malaysia trade with various selected countries. It shows the volume and

percentage of Malaysia total export and import from 1995 to 2005. It shows that the Malaysian economy is increasing global in nature.

Table 1 Direction of Malaysian Global Business in the World Economy from 1990 to 2005

Direction	RM million*						% of Total					
	Exports			Imports			Exports			Imports		
	1990	2000	2005	1990	2000	2005	1990	2000	2005	1990	2000	2005
ASEAN	23065.5	99028	139208	15085.0	74940	110823	29.0	26.5	26.1	19.1	24.1	25.5
Singapore	18052.1	68574	83333	11800.0	44696	50828	22.7	18.4	15.6	14.9	14.4	11.7
Indonesia	920.7	6484	12580	850.8	8623	16566	1.2	1.7	2.4	1.1	2.8	3.8
Thailand	2788.0	13485	28723	1881.2	11987	22889	3.5	3.6	5.4	2.4	3.8	5.3
Philippines	1054.6	6558	7476	427.3	7562	12192	1.3	1.8	1.4	0.5	2.4	2.8
European Union	12204.5	51019	62629	12494.4	33527	50512	15.5	13.7	11.7	15.8	10.8	11.6
United Kingdom	3136.0	11566	9470	4312.3	6080	6522	3.9	3.1	1.8	5.5	2.0	1.5
Germany	3096.8	9336	11259	3389.2	9282	19265	3.9	2.5	2.1	4.3	3.0	4.4
USA	13487.0	76579	105033	13232.5	51744	55918	16.9	20.5	19.7	16.7	16.6	12.9
Canada	-	3043	2847	-	1445	2133	-	0.8	0.5	-	0.5	0.5
Australia	-	9210	18042	-	6052	8171	-	2.5	3.4	-	1.9	1.9
Selected NEA*	-	103784	149105	-	117828	169236	-	27.8	27.9	-	37.8	39.0
Japan	12588.9	48770	49918	23584.5	65513	62982	15.8	13.1	9.4	16.7	21.0	14.5
China	-	11507	35221	-	12321	49880	-	3.1	6.6	-	4.0	11.5
Hong Kong	2523.1	16854	31205	1497.5	8557	10797	3.2	4.5	5.8	1.9	2.7	2.5
Korea Rep.	3677.0	12464	17945	2033.6	13926	21604	4.6	3.3	3.4	2.6	4.5	5.0
Taiwan	1728.1	14189	14813	4323.0	17511	23974	2.2	3.8	2.8	5.5	5.6	5.5
South Asia	-	10529	21245	-	3030	4504	-	2.8	4.0	-	1.0	1.0
India	-	7312	14972	-	2748	4164	-	2.0	2.8	-	0.9	1.0
CSA	-	5633	6169	-	2587	6786	-	1.5	1.2	-	0.8	1.6
Africa	-	2996	7649	-	1421	2511	-	0.8	1.4	-	0.5	0.6
Others	-	11449	21866	-	18886	23415	-	3.1	4.1	-	6.1	5.4
Rest of the World	10372.3	-	-	11478.8	-	-	13.0	-	-	14.5	-	-

Sources: Department of Statistics.

* 1 US\$ = 3.5 RM

(From Al-Amin, Abul Quasem, Siwar, Chamhuri, Jaafar, Abdul Hamid and Mazumder, Mohammad Nurul Huda, Globalization, Environment and Policy: Malaysia Toward a Developed Nation (August 29, 2007). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010565>)

Malaysia enjoyed tremendous economic growth until the Asian economic crisis in 1997. In 1997 the other side of globalization, the ugly side was shown. In a short period of time all the past achievement was almost wipe away when there is a sudden outflow of foreign capital, triggered by speculation against a number of Asian currencies (Phua & Soo, 2004, p.159). However, it is also after this economic crisis that the Mahathir administration show globalization can be dealt with differently.

In recent years even the rural sectors are affected by the globalization. Take for example the padi farmers were faced tumbling prices and lower demand of their rice, due

mainly to larger quantity of imported rice. Now even the farmers have to compete in the global market (Khor, 2001).

Right after the economic crisis, Malaysia is facing another political crisis between Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the former Prime Minister and Dato Sri Anwar Ibrahim, the former Deputy Prime Minister. One of the biggest differences between them is over the issue of how to manage the Malaysian economy after the economic crisis. Answar is more in favour of following the IMF's (International Monetary Fund) strategies thus, for globalization, while Mahathir is very critical of them.

The visionary Mahathir is indeed one of the biggest critics of globalization after the economic crisis. For him globalization means westernization, and there is a continuity between the globalists and past colonialists. As such globalization is seen as a form of (neo) colonialism (Wong, 2004). On this, as we have discussed, Mahathir's perception of globalization may not be totally accurate. However, his reaction to globalization is understandable because globalization often means certain degree of lost of national sovereignty and national identity. Although, IMF denies that globalization is a threat to nation states (IMF, 2002), in reality the IMF package does come with conditions that are at odd with Malaysian political reality. Adopting the IMF package does means surrendering some national sovereignty in managing the economy and other social/cultural policies. "As such, for Mahathir, globalization is not benign but an ever-present threat and needed to critically interrogated and 'interpreted correctly if it is going to bring about a better world'" (Wong, 2004)

The Media

In order to achieve vision 2020 Malaysia need a generation of IT savvy youths to provide the human resource for a Knowledge economy. In order to encourage the use of IT and the Internet, the Malaysian government has time and again guaranteed the freedom of expression online. To this point, in my opinion this promise has been rather well kept. Although, the government has passed a few legislations to regulate online activities, but these regulations are mostly in

order to safeguard online security to encourage E-commerce. Only until in the “heat” of the pre 2008 general election, when the government feel the threat that the internet as an alternative media may affect the Barisan National’s (National Fronts) dominant that some actions have been taken against certain bloggers (Shanmuga, 2007, pp.59-60).

On the other hand, many families in Malaysia have Astro satellite TV service. Foreign news, programmes and pop culture are common in Malaysia. According to Wong (2004):

In the case of Malaysia, there is a broad consensus that globalization is not a uniform concept. For some, it is the presence of foreign multinationals, brands and lifestyles; for others it is the internet, Astro (Satellite television), the ties of the Malays and its greater Islamic ummah (the family of Muslims), the rising significance of international non-governmental organizations and Malaysia’s exposure and vulnerability to global flows and vectors of capital and labour, amongst other possible developments. Clearly, globalization has far-reaching effects and is embedded in Malaysians’ daily lives.

Previously Malaysia is only consumer of entertainment, but now many Malaysian artists have also gone international.

Education

In order to make Malaysia a centre of education excellence in the region and to supply the industry with the relevant human resources, the Malaysian government passed five revolutionary pieces of legislations in 1995-6, i.e., the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act 1996, The National Accreditation Board Act 1996, The National Council of Higher Education Act 1996, and the Amendment to the

Education Act 1960 and the Universities and University Colleges Act 1965 (Tan, 2002, p.81). The total effect of these legislative changes is a more liberal education policy, especially at the higher education level. Many of the policies that the government guarded zealously for many years are now relaxed. The height of it is to allow the private educational institutions to offer 3+0 foreign degrees totally in Malaysia. According to Tan (2002, p.82) “global force exerts a major influence on nation states to change policy to open up access in higher education to produce human capital, to advance national competitiveness and to catch up with the reality of globalization”.

In the 1990s not only private universities and colleges are liberalised, many private schools and international schools are also built. Now, foreign capitals are allowed to hold up to 49% of the shares in any private educational company. Branch campuses of foreign universities are allowed, in fact attracted to set up in Malaysia. However, one question remain, is this liberalization, globalization and privatization of education good for Malaysians, especially the poor. Tooley concludes in his recent report *Could Globalization of Education Benefit the Poor?* That:

The argument began, first by showing that there are private schools available to, and patronized by, the poor in “developing” countries. Second, there is evidence showing that these schools are offering poor parents and children a better deal, educationally-speaking, than the state alternative. Teachers in the private schools, in particular, the research has suggested, show a much greater commitment to teaching than in the government schools. These two considerations suggest that private education in itself could be beneficial to the poor.

These arguments also holds true for Malaysia, except there is no private school that patronize the poor in Malaysia yet. But there are certainly private universities and colleges that patronize the poor in Malaysia. One thing for sure, the globalization of higher education has made obtaining a foreign degree a much cheaper affair. On the other hand, global competition also force universities and colleges, especially public institutions to improve on their quality and

the government to pump in more resources, thus benefit all students, especially the poor.

On the other hand, “the impact of the 1990s on the school system is also acute in terms of the invasion of the computer and the information age” (Rahimah, 1998, p.470). According to Chan (2002, p.2) the Ministry of Education has formulated three main policies for information communication technology (ICT) in education:

The **first policy** is that of ICT for all students, meaning that ICT is used as an enabler to reduce the digital gap between the schools. The **second policy** emphasizes the role and function of ICT in education as a teaching and learning tool, as part of a subject, and as a subject by itself...The **third policy** emphasizes using ICT to increase productivity, efficiency and effectiveness of management system.

The Smart School Project, which is one of the seven MSC flagships projects, was conceptualized in 1997, with the following four objectives:

- i) emphasis on maturity of thought, application of information technology’ and assimilation of high-minded values;
- ii) proficiency in science and mathematics;
- iii) enhancement of performance according to individual capabilities; and
- iv) contribution to the development of knowledge (Kamogawa, 2003, p.547).

In this project, technology aided teaching and learning is supposed to be implemented in the primary and secondary schools. This revolution in the pedagogy is supposed to tie-up with a change in the curriculum as well. “There are three pilot projects being implemented under the smart school initiative: Teaching-Learning Materials, Assessment Systems and Management Systems, and Smart School Integrated Solutions (SSIS)” (Kamogawa, 2003, p.547). Initially, the project was piloted in ninety schools in the country (Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000), and supposed to roll out to all schools in 2003. However, it has proven to be too ambitious and thus, the project has been slowed down. Now, the

Ministry of Education hopes that all schools will become smart schools by 2010.

Language Policy: Teaching Science and Mathematics in English

One of the most controversial policies in this era of globalisation is to change the medium of instruction for science and mathematics subjects in schools and institution of higher learning to English from 2003 (Kamogawa, 2003: p.547). According to Pillay (2003: p.1), “in the new millennium, the pressures of globalization and the need to have a work force that is competent in English to compete in the era of Science and Technology has given this issue a new urgency and once again brought this issue to the forefront”. “The Ministry of Education Circular Number 11/2002...states that it is compulsory to use English as the medium of instruction to teach Science and mathematics in Standard One and in Form One in 2003 onwards” (Pillay, 2003: pp.1-2). “From 2003 till 2007 public examination in primary and secondary national schools will offer examination papers for Science and Mathematics in both English and Bahasa Melayu (Pillay, 2003: p.2). Like wise examinations papers for the National Type schools will also be bi-lingual. According to Circular 12/2002, the subjects will be taught in both English and Mandarin in the Chinese schools (Pillay, 2003: p.2). 5 billion Ringgits was allocated in the 2003 budget, for implementation of this project between 2002 to 2008 (Pillay, 2003: p.2). “A large portion of the allocation goes towards the training of Mathematics and Science teachers, the design of teaching and educational aids, the provision of basic facilities as well as physical infrastructure” (Kon, Low & Kaliappan, 2005: pp.78-79).

This development can be seen as a compromise against the ultimate objective of the Malaysian education policy to make the Malay language an academic language, and this change is caused to some extent by globalization. The pre-Merdeka (Independence) Alliance Government announced in 1955 that they would introduce a national education system, and a 15-member committee headed by the Minister of Education, Abdul Razak, was set up to make

recommendations. The Razak Report (Report of the Education Committee) released in May 1956 declared that:

...the ultimate objective of the educational policy in this country must be to bring together the children of all races under a national education system in which the national language is the main medium of instruction.

...a national system of education acceptable to the people of the Federation as a whole which will satisfy their needs to promote their cultural, social, economic and political development as a nation, having regard to the intention of making Malay the national language of the country whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of the language and culture of other communities living in the country (qtd. in Kua, 1990: p.75).

Ever since then, it has been the policy of the government to make the Malay language or Bahasa Malayu/Malaysia an academic language (Omar, 1993: pp.120-136). “The 1956 Razak Report was legislated in the Education Ordinance in 1957 and it became the education policy of the newly Independent Federation of Malaya” (Kua, 1990: p.86). One important aspect of the Razak Report is that besides affirming the status of the Malay language as the medium of instruction in school, it also introduced common content syllabi with a Malaysian outlook into schools (Puteh, 2006: p.82). Therefore, “while the separate vernacular schools were allowed to remain at the primary level, the content subject matter, and syllabi in all schools were to be common in order to foster a *Malayan outlook*” (Puteh, 2006: p.83). A committee, headed by the Minister of Education, Abdul Rahman Talib, was set up after the General Elections of 1959 to review the implementation of the education policy. In its report known as the Rahman Talib Report, this committee made a number of recommendations¹, which were incorporated into the

¹ For example, fully-assisted Malay-medium primary schools, i.e. the Standard Schools should be called National Schools; and other fully-assisted primary schools should be called National Type Schools (Kua, 1990: 91; Puteh, 2006: 88).

Education Act 1961 that was in force till 1996. This policy basically has shape the country's education system till today.

What is most significant is a university such as the National University of Malaysia (UKM) which was set up in 1971 to champion to make the Malay language an academic language, is also force to adopt English as a medium of instruction for subjects in sciences and mathematics. According to Abdullah and Yahaya (2006: p.1) "the reversal in policy is of great concern to University Kebangsaan Malaysia, the national university which *raison d'être* is to serve as the pinnacle of the national education at the tertiary level since its establishment on May 18th 1970".

Abdullah and Yahaya (2006: p.2) summarize the reasons for the change of policy as follows:

The 2003 change in the language of instruction in Science and Mathematics from Malay to English have come about for a variety of reasons. The government of the day rationalized that Malaysia must maintain a competitive edge in the face of globalization. Rightly or wrongly, it was thought that having a good command of English would be added advantage for Malaysian. Furthermore, it was felt that using English in science and technology would enhance and facilitate the acquisition and access to science and technology more rapidly. Using English will also be an added advantage in promoting Malaysia as a regional and international education hub. In addition, the use of English in Science and Maths in School will have the added advantage of improving the English proficiency of Malaysians. The Malaysian Economic Action Council (MTEN) has found that graduates employability is partly related to their proficiency and ability to communicate in English.

In short, the change in the policy is to face and take advantage of globalization.

However, the private institutions of higher learning have always been allowed to adopt English as medium of instruction for all subjects, except they are asked to teach three compulsory subjects, i.e. the National Language, Moral

Studies/Islamic Studies and Malaysian Studies. Now, Mandarin is also allowed to be adopted as medium of instruction for New Era College's new Counseling degree programme, in collaboration with a Taiwanese university (20 August 2009, China Press) and Chinese Traditional Medicine programme in University Tuanku Abdul Rahman (15 Oct 2010, Nanyang Siang Pau) and Southern College (22 Oct 2010). This mark another liberation due to the increase importance of another globalize language, which is the national language of China, the second superpower of the world now.

Now, the importance of English for science and mathematics is much emphasized because it will equip the human resources to meet IT market needs both locally and globally (Kamogawa, 2003: p.547). However, this policy has attracted much criticism both from the Malay community and the non-Malay communities (especially the Chinese community) (Puteh, 2006: pp.131-134; Lim, Fatimah & Tang, 2007; Merdeka Review, 30 Sept 2008). Various reasons are cited against the policy. On the one hand, "detractors argued that science and technology is not dependent on the language is best acquired and taught using the mother tongue" (Abdullah and Yahaya, 2006: p.2). This has always been the position of the Chinese education movement, now it is also supported by the Malays who are against the policy of teaching Science and Mathematics in English. "Apart from that, national pride and nation building and integration also dictates that the national language should be the default language of instruction" (Abdullah and Yahaya, 2006: p.2).

However, it is very clear that the government is taking a very pragmatic approach in adopting this policy. English is only implemented as the medium of instruction for Science and Mathematics and not other subjects. So, the government is trying to enjoy the best of both worlds; the globalize and the glocalize. In fact, the policy is welcomed by many parents, especially parents from urban middle class background. Perhaps, the real problem is in the implementation plan, which is too ambitious and too fast, although, a transition period is in fact allowed in the

guidelines and directives for the implementation (Abdullah and Yahaya, 2006: p.3). One of the most significant criticisms against this policy is that the schools, teachers and students are not ready for it (Abdullah and Yahaya, 2006; Lim, Fatimah & Tang, 2007). It is interesting to note here that the students of UKM in Abdullah and Yahaya's (2006: pp.5-8) survey in fact prefer English as the medium of instruction. It is the lecturers that are struggling.

The policy of teaching Science and Mathematic in the English language has finally been decided to be reversed again by 2012, in 2009; the medium of instruction for these subjects will be reverted to the original language (The Star, 8 July 2009). This marks the victory of the local critics in this matter. However, this issue is far from over and dusted. Recently, Rogers (2010) commented recently that "too many people have misconstrued the issue as an either-or situation". His comments are worth reproduced here:

Rather than usurping an existing identity, content-based language instruction, such as the teaching of maths and science in English, actually invites learners to see their own identities in a new light.

While encouraging learners to identify with a foreign culture, it also raises their awareness of their own culture.

...The use of information and communication technology to study these two subjects also clearly underscores the critical need for the use of English.

It gives Malaysian students access to a huge repository of technical knowledge written in the world's lingua franca and will, of course, enhance their international career prospects, putting them on at least an equal footing with their foreign counterparts, be they in nearby India or Singapore or further afield in the US or in Europe (Roger, 2010).

He has rightly pointed out that the use of information technology in teaching learning in school demand the use of English as medium of instruction. Thus, this policy is very much in line with the other policies, which includes the smart school project, which envision that learning should be

borderless, through the internet, Malaysian students should gain access to a wide variety of materials; and teaching and learning should be student centred, as the teacher plays the function of a facilitator. However, if the students are not proficient in English or more specifically Scientific English, all the above dreams will remain dream; simply because English is the language of Science and Technology as well as the internet.

He also demonstrates that countries such as Japan, South Korea, France and Germany, which as often cited against the use of English in technical field, are in fact placing high priority on English but at the same time preserve their own languages in other fields (Roger, 2010: p.3).

The present author concur with Roger that this is not an either-or situation. In fact, some Chinese Independent schools, such as Chung Hua High School, Seremban and Chung Ling High School, Penang, have long adopted English textbook for Maths and Science as second textbook; and English as second medium of instruction for these subjects. This system has successfully produced generation of high achieving students. As mention earlier, the government is in fact taking a very pragmatic approach by only changing the medium of instruction for two subjects only. In fact, it is a mater of implementation. Should the government was not too ambitious and implement this policy in selected schools only at the initial stage, such as in the Smart Schools, and give parents the choice of whether to send their children to these schools, the debate will probably take a different course. The debate will probably be whether the government should allow elite schools to exist, and the complains will come from parents of students that fail to get into those schools and eventually more schools will adopt English as medium of instruction for maths and science due to popular demand.

All the above mention developments are also very significant to understand the impact of globalization on Malaysia culturally.

Culture

At the social and cultural level, Lee (2006, pp.230-259) claims that globalization has an adverse effect on ethnic relations in Malaysia. This adverse effect is manifested in the increasing enrolment in Chinese primary schools and the Muslim religious schools¹. According to Lee (2006, p.247):

A paradoxical development of globalization is that, while it is increasingly welding the world into a single global village, it has also led ethnic and religious communities in different parts of the world to revive their cultural heritage and identity. In Malaysia, the ethnic and religious resurgence has had a negative impact on ethnic integration in the development of Malaysian education.

What Lee is trying to explain is a “glocalising” process in Ritzer’s term. What Ritzer (2004, pp.159-184) basically means by glocalisation is a process where the local culture resists and reacts to the global influences. Lee (2006, p.250) further explains that:

The increasing trend of Chinese student enrolment in Chinese primary schools could be attributed to several factors: economic and educational advantages in learning Mandarin especially with the rise of China as a major economic player, declining quality of education in the national primary schools, ethnic discrimination, failure of multicultural education in the national primary schools, and lastly, to learn Mandarin as an identity marker and preserve their Chineseness.

¹ The school system in Malaysia is very complex. For example, at the primary level there are a few types of primary schools in Malaysia, namely the National Schools (SRK, *Sekolah Rendah Kebangsaan*), Vision schools, Islamic Religious Schools (SRA, *Sekolah Rendah Agama*), Private Schools, International Schools, and the SRJKs. There are two types of SRJK, i.e., the SRJK (C) and the SRJK (T or Tamil). Mandarin and Tamil are used as medium of instruction in the respective type of SRJK. All the other types of school use the Malay language as medium of instruction (except for International Schools). At the secondary level, a few more type of schools, including the Chinese Independent Schools, can be added to the list.

By this, he implies that preserving Chineseness is the most important reason for the increasing enrolment in the National Type Chinese Primary Schools. However, the current trend of increasing enrolment in these Schools has to be read together with other facts. At present not only are the Chinese enrolling their children in the National Type Chinese Primary Schools, other races, especially the Malays, are also more likely to enroll their children in them. As compared to the 1980s and before, the Malaysian government's present policy on Chinese schools (in fact, to education in general) is comparatively more liberal. Since 2006, even the National Primary Schools teach Mandarin as a subject, although this has not materialised in many schools that are suppose to do so (Chok, 2008). On the other hand, the increasing emphasis on the learning of Mandarin is accompanied by a corresponding emphasis on the learning of English. Therefore, besides being a manifestation of what Ritzer calls "Glocalisation" process, the increase in the enrolment in the National Type Chinese Primary Schools is also a case of convergence, but not to the West; rather it is to another rising power in the East, that is, China. Today, as a result of globalization English and Mandarin¹ can arguably claim to be the two most important languages in the world. This argument is supported strongly by referring to the statements made by some Chinese education movement leaders to emphasize the importance of the Chinese language due to the rise of China as world economic and political power in the local Chinese newspapers.

Nurullah (2008, p.1, Abstract) argues that "globalization poses a challenge to Islamic cultural identity for several reasons: (a) globalization promote media to propagate the hegemony of Western culture, (b) it regenerates local culture to replace it with the Americanised secular one, (c) it challenges the collective Islamic ways of life, values, behavioural patterns, and principles." Essentially, cultural globalization is seen as a one way process from a single centre, i.e. the West or more

¹ About 1/4 of the world's population speak Mandarin.

specifically America. However, the Malaysian case shows that it is hardly so.

The increase in enrolment in the religious school for example, is related to the resurgence of Islam. The resurgence of Islam and other religious consciousness in Malaysia is a complex phenomenon. It started with the influence of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This phenomenon can in fact be witness across the world and not just Malaysia. The resurgence of Islam, to some extent, has given PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia), the conservative Islamist opposition party, a political boost. In order to counter that, UMNO (United Malays National Organization) has to develop their own Islamization projects. Therefore, while the resurgence of Islam may view as a glocalization process that counter the Westernization (especially at the pop culture level) that come with globalization, it is also part of the political parties' strategy to counter each other. At the international level, while opposing the West, Malaysia is allying with other Muslim nations. In fact, Malaysia has become a representation of a progressive, modern and successful Muslim country, an alternative to the kind of successful model advocated by the West (For full account of the resurgence of Islam in Malaysia, see Muzaffar, 1987). Therefore, the resurgence of Islam can be seen as a glocalizing process as well as a convergence (globalizing) process but the convergence is not with the west but with the other Islamic nations. Ahmad (2005) argues that:

...the religious resurgence has occurred precisely during the decades when globalization has influenced yields two strong implications. First, the religious revival reacts against the appeal of cultural and political cosmopolitanism...Second, the religious revival actually owes its strength to worldwide pathways of information exchange that only globalization has instituted.

Nevertheless, both the resurgence of Islam and the global secularizing force have also triggered the non-Muslim to react by forming a clearer religious and ethnic identity (for an interesting account of this interesting phenomena see

Ackerman & Lee, 1990). For example, most of the Malaysian Chinese are adherers of what some author call “Chinese Religion”, a syncretization of a few religions, i.e. Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. But they are referred to as Buddhists most of the time. Now, there are more and more Chinese that will clarify whether they are Buddhists, Taoist or adherers of the Chinese religion. There are also many international Buddhist groups such as the SOKA GAKAI, Chi Qi (慈喞公德会) and Fu Guang Shan (佛光山) that are active in Malaysia, together with other local Buddhist associations. The Persatuan Ajaran Taoism Malaysia (Taoist Association) was formally registered in 1995, to bring together all the Taoist temples in Malaysia and to clarify some of their doctrines.

Therefore, as Malaysia has become more globalize, it has not become more secularize as predicted by some globalization and modernization theories. Ahmad (2005, p.3) comments that: “various individuals have consciously chosen to evince religious identities in their personal, micro-political struggles in order to make sense of what has occurred in and around their lives.”

Conclusion: The Impact of Globalization on Malaysia

There is no doubt that Malaysia is affected by globalization. However, how Malaysia and Malaysians have responded to it is very interesting and it throws some new lights about the globalization process.

First of all, the Malaysian economy is no doubt globally link now. The two major economic crises, in 1997 and 2008, are both not triggered by local problems, although they do expose weaknesses in the Malaysian economic system. However, Malaysia has learn the lesson in 1997, that the 2008 crisis has not hit Malaysia as badly. The post 1997 Mahathir administration’s management of the Malaysian economy, though not without its downsides, has shown an example of a more managed globalization process. It shows that globalization is a deliberate policy choice, and the more demaging part of the economic globalization can be reduced by the right policy choices.

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The partially liberalized private education industry is a good example of the above argument. The industry has grown tremendously and remain stable so far, in the midst of the gradual and careful globalizing process. It has earned Malaysia millions of rigit in the of tuition fee and living expenses paid by foreign students. It has also benefit Malaysian students by making acquiring a foreign degree much cheaper and save Malaysia millions of riggits of money outflow every year by retaining Malaysian students at home.

In terms of cultural identity, the glocalising process described by Ritzer does not seem to be a good explanation of the recent strong projection of identity by the major races or ethnic groups in Malaysia. As explained, identity conflict in Malaysia has always been a local phenomenon. In fact, globalization may help to ease some tension in the long run, as internal differences may be less significant in the light of westernization at a great speed. Now, that the major ethnic communities in Malaysia are facing the challenges of modernization and foreign influences as separate communities, it is hope that one day all Malaysian will face them as one multi-cultural Malaysian society.

Malaysia has not been “propelled” into the global order helplessly, as predicted by Giddens, although Malaysia is relatively small country in the world community. Instead, Malaysia is very careful in navigating through the global current and response to the challenges posed in the process. Malaysia is also one of the major critics of the unjust factors in the global order. On the other hand, Malaysia may have also deliberately alight with other world powers, e.g. China and other Muslim countries, to counter the western influence. This makes globalization seems like a multi-central and multi-directional process, thus post a challenge to sociological theories such as Giddens’ and Ritzer’s. However, globalization has made the complex multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-cultural society even more complex.

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Chinese National Pride and East Asian Regionalism among the Elite University Students in PRC¹

Pang Quin, Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR¹

Abstract: *The recently soaring Chinese national pride triggers wide concern about rising Chinese nationalism and its possible malicious effects on East Asia regionalism, which has always been curtailed by the rampant popular nationalisms in this region. Would the Chinese national pride undermine the Chinese support for East Asian regionalism? By surveying students from six elite universities in PRC, the research showed that students' national pride and regionalism, contrary to initial surmise, were positively correlated. The positive correlation, as revealed by further analysis, was mostly contributed by students' pride in "specific national achievements" rather than their "national pride emotions". Besides, among the four major areas of national achievements, pride in "domestic politics", "economic development" and "international influence" turned out to be closely and positively correlated with regionalism while pride in "traditions and culture" did not. To shed light on the results, two tentative explanations were offered relating to students' anti-West sentiments and broadened international horizons.*

Keywords: *nationalism, national pride, East Asian regionalism, East Asian identity*

¹ I would like to thank Rui Chen and Yuequn Chen for their help in my research in Beijing and Guangzhou, PRC. And I am also grateful for the research grant offered by the City University of Hong Kong. This paper was originally presented in the Third Annual China Undisciplined International Conference in UCLA, USA. I would also like to extend my thanks to Professor Cameron Campbell in UCLA and Professor William Case for their comments and advices on the draft.

¹ Contact: pampkinpang@gmail.com, 200611490@oamail.gdufs.edu.cn

Introduction

With a succession of media bombards of stirring national achievements such as the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai Expo, the past several years have witnessed surging waves of national pride among common Chinese people (Jacobs 2008; Prasso 2007), including the young (Bell, 2008). According to a poll by the Reputation Institute in September 2009, the Chinese index of people's trust, admiration, respect and pride in their own country reached around 80 out of 100, one of the highest among the 33 surveyed nations (*The Economist Online*, 2009). And the 2008 Pew Global Attitude survey also demonstrated that among the 24 surveyed nations, the Chinese were the most satisfied with the way things were going in their countries, with about 80 per cent expressing their contentment (Pew Research center, 2008).

Would the swelling national pride, backed up by China's increasing military and economic power, evolve into a "great power nationalism" and threaten the nascent East Asian regionalism, which has been constantly quashed by vibrant nationalisms in this region, exacerbated sometimes by historical rivalries and territorial disputes? To seek an answer, we conducted a survey about national pride and support for East Asian regionalism among the students in China's six elite universities. Students in these universities have always been the avant-gardes in China's nationalist movements since the May 4th movement in 1919 (Israel 1966:3); what's more, they also have great potential to be the future decision-makers in China's central and local governments (Cheng and Bachman 1989; Cheng 1994). And the results showed that the students' national pride and support for East Asian regionalism were, indeed, positively correlated. And this suggests the current national pride among the elite universities students did not undermine their initiatives for East Asian regional cooperation. Before coming to the details of the research, it is necessary to clarify the two basic variables: national pride and East Asian regionalism.

Defining Chinese National Pride & East Asian Regionalism

National Pride

National pride was generally defined as “individuals’ *sentiments of pride* directed towards the nation-state based on their national identity” (Kedourie 1993; Smith 1994, Hjerm 1998). Its working definition in this paper is “the *positive affective bond* to specific achievements and symbols of the nation-state” (Müller-Peters 1998:704). It contains not only *affect* but also the cognition that underpins the pride affect, that is, the recognition of specific national achievements and symbolsⁱ. Hence, national pride, in this paper, comprises of two basic components: “National Pride in Specific Achievements” (NPSA) and “General National Pride” (GNP). NPSA here refers to the recognition and understanding of the nation-state’s achievements and attributes; GNP simply means the feelings and emotions towards the nation-state (here mainly pride).

National pride is not new in China. In fact, it has been closely associated with various Chinese nationalisms. For example, it is indispensable for almost all “inward-oriented”ⁱⁱ Chinese nationalisms like the Chinese cultural nationalism (Zhao 2004; Barmé 1995&2009; Guo 2004) “affirmative Chinese nationalism” (Whiting 1995) and “confident Chinese nationalism” which “is rooted in confidence that over time China can regain its former greatness” (Oksenberg 1986:505).

However, national pride is different from nationalism. Their difference, according to Billig (1985), is that national pride is mainly about individual attitudes towards the nation-state while nationalism contains not only individual attitudes but also an ideology which is about unity among members of a society. In Hjerm’s words, “nationalism and national pride operate on different levels”. National pride is

more on individual level while nationalism concerns the whole society (Hjerm 1999:341).

East Asian Regionalism

“East Asia”, in this paper, refers to the Northeast Asia which mainly covers China (including Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau), Japan, North and South Korea.ⁱⁱⁱ The reason for confining it to the Northeast Asian region is straightforward: the threat of Chinese nationalism on regionalism is more conspicuous in this area than the Southeast Asian region where, though rivalry towards China does exist, the Chinese nationalism itself does not regard these Southeast Asian neighbors as its primary or main targets, in spite of recent disputes concerning the South China Sea.

As for the term “regionalism”, it is notoriously difficult to define because “regionalism” actually covers quite a few interrelated phenomena. For example, Hurrell (1995) believed that regionalism contains at least five interrelated elements: regionalization, regional awareness and identity, regional interstate cooperation, state-promoted regional integration and regional cohesion. And in Rozman’s (2005) view, regionalism involves at least five dimensions: economic integration, institutional integration, social integration, formation of regional identity and security integration. Complicated as “regionalism” is, it can be reduced into two basic levels: one is “ideological level” which includes “regional awareness and identity”, and the other is “practical level” which comprises of regional cooperation and integration in various areas, whether led by the state or market force.

Regionalism, in this paper, only covers the “ideological dimension” and it means “the *proneness* of the governments and peoples of the states to establish voluntary associations and to pool together resources in order to create common functional and institutional arrangements” (Kacowicz 1999). Regionalism thus defined overlaps with Kim’s definition of regionalism--- “a normative concept referring to shared values, norms, identity, and aspirations”(Kim 2004:39);

However, for regionalism in East Asia, unlike its European counterpart, it still remains arguable whether there exists a definite and common regional identity, especially among common people, as Anwar has pointed out that “Asia has not a settled identity at present; it is in the process of coming into being (Milner and Johnson 1997: 12)” Thus, regionalism in this research, rather than purely focusing on shared values and norms whose existence is still in question, mainly refers to the “*proneness*” or “*willingness*” of the governments and peoples to initiate regionalist cooperation.

In line with the previous definition, East Asian regionalism, in this paper, comprises three major components: (1) East Asian identity,^{iv} (2) views of the necessity for regional cooperation, and (3) views of other East Asian countries^v, all of which also served as indicators in measuring regionalism in our survey.

Research Questions and Theories

The research question is “*whether the national pride among elite universities students undermines their East Asian regionalism?*” The following part aims to review literature concerning the relations between the two; nevertheless, as regionalism in this paper is, in some ways, different from regionalism discussed elsewhere, the following part, instead, will review literature exploring connections between Chinese national pride and the components of East Asian regionalism: “East Asian identity” and “views of other East Asian countries” (as very few literature concerns “national pride” and “views of the necessity for regional cooperation”, connections between these two will not be addressed).

Relations between Chinese National Pride and “East Asian Identity”

It is still under debate about how the Chinese national pride would affect the Chinese people’s identity with East Asia. On the one hand, the two seemed to be mutually

compatible. In fact, the Chinese identity as East Asians has been argued to be an important part of modern Chinese national identity. Even during the late 19th century, "...the creation of Asia as a regional imaginary and a political reality, along with the firm identification of China as Asian, was purposively taken up by a variety of Qing intellectuals (in their nationalist discourses)" (Karl 2002:153). Besides, the intimate relationship between the two can be seen in the 1930s cultural debate about "Eastern spirituality versus Western materialism", Mao Zedong's "the third worldism" theory during the 1960s & 70s and the recent popularity of "East Asian miracles" and "East Asian values" in China.

While on the other hand, the Chinese preoccupation with its own country was regarded as handicapping the development of regional identity. Gilbert Rozman argued that "the self-perceived centrality of China in this long history creates psychological barriers for the Beijing leadership to get out of the China-centric framework, to embrace regionalism ..." (Rozman 1998:114). Akaha also believed the sensitive concern with national sovereignty and popular nationalism in East Asia have long "impeded the development of a regional identity transcending national borders." (Akaha 1995:367)

Relations between Chinese National Pride and "Views about other East Asian Countries"

The relations between the two are even more contentious. Controversy arose over whether the inflamed national pride would lead to derogation of other East Asian countries. There are two different opinions. On the one side, Whiting (1995) believed that "affirmative Chinese nationalism" (of which national pride is an indispensable part) only fosters patriotism and does not embody hostile implications towards other countries like aggressive and assertive nationalism. Oksenberg (1984) also argued that "confident Chinese nationalism" (of which national pride is an indispensable part) is patient and moderate in terms of foreign policy implications. And this view has its backup from some social-

psychological theories which argued that positive in-group evaluation (like national pride) may not necessarily lead to the out-group derogation (Hinkle & Brown 1990; Mummendey & Simon 1997; Mummendey & Klink 2001).

On the other side, however, Callahan (2009) and Gries (2004) argued that the Chinese popular nationalism which contained strong national pride was sometimes hostile and even belligerent towards foreign countries. And this can be shown in the university students' demonstrations against the US and Japanese government in 1999 and 2005 respectively (He 2007; Gries 2004). Besides, the social identity theory also lends credence to this view as this theory supports that "downward comparisons with other groups (nations)", that is, "derogation of other nations" leads to positive evaluation of one's nation (Tajfel & Turner 1984). And researches also support that people who are highly identified with their own group are especially quick to discriminate against others (Branscombe & Wann, 1992; Hodson, Dovidio & Esses 2003).

In sum, the current literature, as is shown in the previous review, seems unable to generate any definite answer to the research question; therefore, it still remains to be tested as for the relationship between national pride and East Asian regionalism.

Research Methods

Participants

We conducted surveys among 600 students from six elite universities in Beijing and Guangzhou, PRC. And the choice of the these universities is based on the following considerations: first, these are all key universities in China's metropolitan cities, thus their students' demographic compositions could be quite diversified, which means we can possibly have access to students from all over the PRC.

Second, the combination of Beijing and Guangzhou is based on the assumption that national pride among Beijing students may be stronger than that among their counterparts in Guangzhou, given Beijing's status as China's capital city and that Guangzhou, a commercial city distant

from the political center, has been devoid of big international show events until we conducted our survey. Thus, samples from the two cities can be more balanced and therefore more representative in reflecting the national pride among the elite university students in PRC.

Among the 600 participants, 48.7 per cent of them were male and 51.3 per cent were female; 93.7 per cent were Han nation, while 6.3 per cent, ethnic minorities. In addition, 11.7 per cent of them reported themselves as the Chinese Communist Party members and 83.7 per cent, the Chinese Communist Youth League members. 77.8 per cent of them were undergraduate students and 22.2 per cent were postgraduate. As for their family income levels, 5% of them reported that their family income per month was over 9,000RMB, 17% ranging as 5,000-8,999RMB, 46.7% as 2,000-4999RMB, 31.3% as below 2,000RMB

Procedures

To ensure representativeness of our sample, we used a sampling strategy which combines both stratified and random sampling methods. All the universities and colleges in these two cities, first of all, were classified into three groups: (1) comprehensive universities, (2) technological-institutes typed universities which focus on science and technology studies, and (3) universities concentrating on humanity and social sciences studies. Within each group, one elite university/institute/college was chosen. In this way, we chose three elite tertiary institutes in Beijing and Guangzhou respectively.^{vi}

In each university, around 100 students were randomly selected and invited to finish the questionnaires for us. Virtually, all of them were very cooperative and all together we collected 600 valid questionnaires from the six universities.

Reserach Results and Discussions

This section will, first of all, briefly outline the results of students' national pride and East Asian regionalism, then proceed to an extended analysis about the correlations

between the two, and finally offer some explanations for the results.

Results of Students' National Pride

The students' national pride was measured by a 7-point Likert scale adopted from the 1995 National Identity Study (NIS) of the International Social Studies Program (ISSP), which consists of two parts: assessment of "National Pride in Specific Achievements" (NPSA) and "General National Pride" (GNP). NPSA part measures students' pride of national achievements in four domains: national economy, domestic politics, tradition & culture, and international influence. GNP assesses general emotions of national pride like "I think China is a better country than most other countries in the world". In both parts of the scale, the lowest value is 1, and highest, 7, which respond to the two extreme responses, "not proud at all" and "strongly proud" respectively. The reliability of the two parts of the scale were acceptable, $\alpha(\text{NPSA})=.87$ & $\alpha(\text{GNP})=.71$. The specific questions are listed in table 1&2.

Most of the students, as the results demonstrate, had fervent national pride. They not only highly evaluated China's current achievements but also showed frenzied emotions of national pride. The students' evaluations of national achievements, except in the domain of "domestic politics", were remarkably high. Their highest evaluations were made for China's "traditions and culture", the three indicators of which scored the highest mean values, above 5.5, among all national aspects (table1 & figure1). They also revealed their gratifications at achievements in "national economy" and "international influence". The mean values in the two domains, in most cases, were above 5, the level of "somewhat proud".

The results of "General National Pride" (GNP) are shown in table 2. The students, generally speaking, had frenzied national pride emotions. Over 90 per cent^{vii} of them claimed to feel proud of being Chinese and very few of them agreed that they sometimes felt shameful for being Chinese (table 2). An overwhelming majority of them (over 85 per cent and 80 per cent) highly rated the Chinese people and China.

Besides, around 70 per cent of them agreed that they have never considered changing nationalities.

Table 1: The students' pride in specific national achievements^{viii}

Are you proud of ...?	Strongly proud	Proud	Somewhat Proud	Don't Know	Not Very Proud	Not Proud	Not Proud at all	Mean Value (Standard Deviation)
National economy								
Economic Development	11	16.2	49.5	12.7	9.3	1	0.3	5.02(1.1)
Confidence in the Future*	13	32.3	36.7	9.7	6.3	0.7	1.3	5.29(1.8)
Science & Technology	3.5	16.0	41.3	11.0	20.8	4.7	2.7	4.36(1.9)
Domestic politics								
Political Institutions	2.3	6.0	33.3	32.7	10.0	7.2	8.5	4.03(1.9)
Social Security	.0	3.3	13.2	28.5	25.0	18.7	11.3	3.23(1.9)
Social Fairness among All Classes	.7	2.0	8.3	31.3	16.0	19.3	22.3	2.93(1.2)
Traditions & culture								
Traditional Culture	29.3	21.3	33.7	9	4.7	2	.0	5.56(1.4)
Contemporary Arts & Literature	25.3	31	27.5	11.5	4	0.7	.0	5.60(1.3)
Chinese History	49.7	24.5	17.2	7.3	1.2	.0	.0	6.16(1.0)
International influence								

Political Influence	6.3	28.0	42.3	15.0	7.0	.7	.7	5.07(1.6)
Military Power	4.3	15.7	42.0	30.3	6.5	.0	1.2	4.75(1.4)
Sports Achievement	13.7	29.3	35.2	12.0	7.5	2.0	.0	5.23(1.8)

Notes: *Here the seven choosing items are “very strong”, “strong”, “somewhat strong”, “no idea”, “not very strong”, “not strong” and “not strong at all”. The numbers in the table except the last two columns are percentages. Numbers in the last two columns are the mean values and standard deviations of the students’ pride in each national aspect, for all of which the lowest value was 1 and highest was 7.




Figure 1. The mean values of the students' pride in specific national achievements (the abbreviations at the bottom, from the left to right, stand for the 12 items listed in table 1 from top to bottom)

Table 2. The students’ general national pride

General national pride	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Don't Know	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
“I am proud of being a Chinese”	34.5	25.3	30.5	5.0	3.3	1.3	.0

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Students in PRC*

“I sometimes feel shameful for being a Chinese”	.0	.0	.02	15.7	40.7	24.3	19.0
“The Chinese people, on the whole, is excellent”	31.8	32.0	23.2	8.3	3.3	.7	.7
“Generally speaking, China is a better country than most other countries”	30.2	31.2	19.5	11.0	4.7	3.3	.0
“I have never considered being citizens of other states”	15.3	28.3	22.7	16.0	13.0	3.2	1.5

Notes: the numbers in the table are percentages. They report students’ evaluations on each of the statements in the first left column ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”.

Results of Students’ East Asian Regionalism

Compared with the overwhelming national pride, students’ attitudes towards regionalism were mixed. The results of the three indicators of regionalism: (1) East Asian identity, (2) views on the necessity for regional cooperation and (3) attitudes towards other East Asian countries, painted a neither exciting nor depressing picture. Most of the students, on the one hand, identified themselves as East Asians and pledged support for regional cooperation; on the other hand, nevertheless, they did not perceive much commonality or interdependence between China and other regional countries. Their attitudes towards exclusive regional cooperation, therefore, were ambivalent or cautious at best. Besides, they held themselves somewhat aloof from other regional countries emotionally, which should have further hampered their enthusiasm for regionalism. The detailed results are displayed in the table 3, 4&5. And since results in this part are not the focus of this paper, no detailed analysis will be made except brief introduction of the measuring scales for the three components of regionalism.

East Asian Identity

Their East Asian identity was evaluated by a 7-pointed Likert scale adopted from one previously used by Cinnirella in measuring European identity (Cinnirella 1997; Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000). The scale contains nine questions which aim to measure (1) the students' self-identification with East Asia (in the first six questions) and (2) their views of intra-group commonality, especially in culture (through the last 3 questions). Like the previous scale measuring national pride, the lowest value is 1, and highest, 7, which respond to the two extreme responses, "strong disagree" and "strongly agree" respectively. The scale reliability was acceptable, $\alpha=.76$. For specific questions and results, please refer to table 3.

Views about the Necessity for Regional Cooperation

The students' views about the need for regional cooperation were evaluated by their responses to four statements concerning common regional interests, regional cooperation, interdependence of China and other regional countries, building of an EU styled East Asian Community. The scale reliability was acceptable, $\alpha=.76$. For specific questions and results, please refer to table 4.

Attitudes towards other East Asian Countries

Given the importance of Japan and South Korea in the regionalization process, "other East Asian countries", in this research, were represented by the two countries. The students' attitudes towards the two countries, their governments and common people were measured by their responses to statements like "I have favorable opinions towards..." In term of scale reliability, that for South Korea ($\alpha=.858$) was higher than Japan ($\alpha=.723$); and the results demonstrate that the students, on the whole, had only faint fondness of the two neighbors. For specific questions and results, please refer to table 5.

Table 3. The students' East Asian Identity

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Moderately Agree	Don't Know	Moderately Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Mean	Std. Deviation
I think I am an East Asian.	25.7	39.0	12.7	17.7	2.8	1.2	1.0	5.59	1.28
I feel emotionally attached to East Asia.	8.3	18	24	39.5	5.8	2	2.3	4.68	1.26
I am proud of being an East Asian.	6	15	33.7	35.2	8	1.3	0.8	4.69	1.09
I feel criticized if hearing someone blaming "East Asian people".	8.7	22.5	35.5	16	10	4.7	2	4.82	1.36
I feel I am a typical East Asian.	6.2	20.7	28.8	33.3	7.7	1.3	1.3	4.75	1.18
East Asian identity is important to me.	2.5	13.3	18.5	44.7	11	7	3	4.18	1.25
The East Asian countries share common Confucian traditions.	3.3	15	31.5	19	18.7	8	4.5	4.24	1.44
I feel intimate towards popular culture products from other East Asian countries.	1	14.3	19.5	28	18	10.7	8.5	3.87	1.48
I don't mind if people in other parts of the world think the Chinese, Japanese and Korean people belong to the same cultural group.	0.7	6.7	16.7	15.8	26	15.2	19	3.18	1.55

Notes:
The numbers in the table except the last two columns in the right are percentages. They report students' evaluations on each of the statements in the first left column. Numbers in the last two columns are the mean values and standard deviations for the students' evaluations in the nine statements, for all of which the lowest value was 1 and highest was 7

Table 4. The students' views of the need for East Asian cooperation

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Moderately Agree	Don't Know/Neutral	Moderately Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Mean	Std. Deviation
I think the East Asian countries share common interests	2.3	19.8	31.2	20.3	15.7	8.3	2.3	4.38	1.37
The East Asian regional cooperation is important for China	19.3	30.0	28.0	20.3	1.0	1.3	0	5.42	1.12
I think "other East Asian countries" are indispensable for China's development.	5.7	18.8	23.7	25.5	15.3	6.0	5.0	4.35	1.48
I support establishing an EU styled East Asian community where every country is equal.	6.5	13.7	19.3	36.0	13.0	6.3	5.2	4.26	1.45

Notes: The numbers in the table except the last two columns in the right are percentages. Numbers in the last two columns are the mean values and standard deviations for the students' evaluations in the four statements, for all of which the lowest value was 1 and highest was 7.

Table 5. The students' views about Japan and South Korea

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Moderately Agree	Don't Know/Neutral	Moderately Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Mean	Standard Deviation
Favorable about Japan	.0	12.0	19.0	27.0	23.7	9.3	9.0	3.73	1.42
Favorable about Japanese government.	.2	4.7	7.3	22.0	35.0	15.8	15.0	3.06	1.32
Favorable about common Japanese people.	1.3	19.5	25.2	30.7	14.0	5.0	4.3	4.30	1.33
Favorable about the South Korea.	1.3	12.0	16.3	32.7	21.7	4.7	11.3	3.79	1.47
Favorable about South Korean government.	.2	6.3	13.5	42.7	20.0	7.0	10.3	3.62	1.29
Favorable about common South Korean people.	1.3	16.3	20.3	37.0	11.5	6.0	7.5	4.11	1.41

Notes: The numbers in the table except the last two columns in the right are percentages. Numbers in the last two columns are the mean values and standard deviations for the students' evaluations of the six items, for all of which the lowest value was 1 and highest was 7.

The Correlations between Chinese National Pride and East Asian Regionalism

Correlation analysis between Chinese national pride and East Asian regionalism, by controlling the students' gender, ethnicity, family income, Party membership, differences in geographical locations (Beijing or Guangzhou) and university types (the three kinds of institutes mentioned in "procedure" part), showed that the two were positively correlated ($r=.308$, $p<.01$). This suggests that the students' national pride should possibly strengthen East Asian regionalism rather than obstruct it.

What accounted for the positive correlation? To explore this, we conducted further correlation analysis between the two components of national pride, NPSA & GNP, and regionalism, by controlling the students' gender, ethnicity, family income, Party membership, differences in geographical locations and university types. And the results, as can be seen in the 2nd and 3rd line in table 6, clearly displayed that "National Pride in Specific Achievements" (NPSA) was more positively correlated with regionalism than "General National Pride" (GNP). And this means NPSA weighed more than GNP in contributing to the positive correlations between Chinese national pride and regionalism.

To further trace the factors leading to the correlations between NPSA and regionalism, we made correlation analysis between the four elements of NPSA and regionalism, and the results, as are demonstrated in the last four lines in table 6, show that pride in "domestic politics", "economic development", and "international influence" were positively associated with regionalism while pride "traditions & culture" was not (table 6). Surprising and confusing as these correlation results may first seem to be, they are, in fact, rational as well as comprehensible. They revealed an important truth, that is, the ethnic pride (embodying in pride of "traditions and culture") and pure national pride emotion as measured by GNP, were not quite related with regionalism; rather, it was the students' views of national progress in politics, economy and international influence

that positively correlated with their regionalism. Though positive co-variations do not mean casual relations, they, at least, support that the national pride in those three domains were compatible, rather than in conflict, with regionalism. As for possible causes for their correlations, the paper offers two tentative explanations here.

Table 6. The correlation coefficients between Chinese national pride and East Asian regionalism controlling students' gender, ethnicity, family income, Party membership, differences in geographical locations and university types

	East Asian Regionalis m
Chinese National Pride	.308**
General National Pride	.178**
National Pride in Specific Achievements	.316**
Pride in “domestic politics”	.304**
Pride in “economic development”	.294**
Pride in “traditions & culture”	.108
Pride in “international influence”	.252**

Notes:

The numbers in the table are Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients which show the correlations among the variables. SPSS tells that the correlation coefficient is statistically significant at $p=.05$ (*), $p=.01$ (**), $p=.001$ (***).

Table 7. The correlation coefficients between pride in “domestic politics”, “economic development” and “international influence” and three indicators of “East Asian regionalism”, controlling students' gender, ethnicity, family income, Party membership, differences in geographical locations and university types

NPSA	East Asian Regionalism		
	East Asian Identity	Views of Regional Cooperation	Views of Japan & South Korea
Pride in “domestic politics”	.321**	.087	.244**

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Pride in “economic development”	.269**	.273**	.095
Pride in “international influence”	.280**	.257**	.099

Notes:

The numbers in the table are Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients which show the correlations among the variables. SPSS tells that the correlation coefficient is statistically significant at $p=.05$ (*), $p=.01$ (**), $p=.001$ (***).

First, an anti-Western assumption, may have underlain both students’ pride in “domestic politics” and their East Asian regionalism, and therefore accounted for their positive associations; There are, as we can see in table 7, positive correlations between “pride in domestic politics” and “East Asian identity” ($r=.321$, $p<.01$) / “views of Japan & South Korea” ($r=.224$, $p<.01$). And this simply means tendency exists that those more proud of China’s domestic politics are more likely to identify themselves as East Asians and approve of the two neighbors: Japan and South Korea.

The anti-Western assumption in the pride of “Chinese domestic politics” is obvious. China’s political institutions, from the liberalist’ point of view, are authoritarian or undemocratic, especially when compared with the Western democratic models; thus, those who still highly regard the Chinese domestic politics must, at least in some way, stand against liberalism but follow authoritarianism or the neo-authoritarianism, for which, an essential assumption is anti-Western stance.^{ix}

Incidentally, the Chinese conception of “Dongya” (東亞) has also contained strong anti-Western assumptions. Even at the turn of the 20th century, “Yazhou(亞洲) and Yaxiya (亞細亞) as words implied the meanings of ‘non-Europe’ and non-Western” (Zhao 1991) . “From early 20th century onward, the Chinese concept of “Asia” or “East Asia” has always contained a sense of “anti-West” in its recurrence in Chinese modern and contemporary history”(Karl 2002:58). For example, the 1930s cultural debate about “Eastern spirituality versus Western materialism” which listed China and India as “Asian” and “Eastern” while Europe and US as “Western”; even the notorious Japanese “East Asian Co-prosperity Circle”, made purposeful use of the “anti-Western implications” that were wrapped in the word “East Asia”. And

the recent “East Asian values”, once popular not only in China, also encompasses strong “anti-Western”, or at least “distinctive from the West”, connotations. Hence, it is understandable that those take pride in “China’s domestic politics” are more inclined to conceive themselves as “East Asians” and view more favourably about Japan and South Korea, which, after all, at least geographically, are included in East Asia.

The second explanation concerns the students’ pride in China’s “international influence” & “economic development”, which, as is shown in table 6, are positively associated with “East Asian identity” and “views of regional cooperation”. And this suggests that students who commend national achievements in these two domains would possibly have stronger “East Asian identity” and attach more importance on “regional cooperation” than those do not.

What is the rationale underneath the seemingly “far-fetched” links? Here is a surmise. If a student was proud of China’s “international influence”, it is assumed that they may have received and absorbed at least some information about China’s influence in other parts of the world, be it truth or just hype. And theoretically speaking, the broader the sphere where they perceived China’s influence has projected, the more proud they should be, as it is hard to imagine the students would take strong pride in China’s international influence if he conceived China’s influence as narrowly confined within a small area. Only the vision that China has become a powerful player in, at least, a large part of the world can sustain a strong pride. And this implies that those who were more proud of China’s international influence were more likely to view China with a broad, international horizon. And it is the horizon that gave rise to strengthened “East Asian identity” and support for “regional cooperation”, because in the enlarged international stage, their perception of other regions like Africa and European Union served as important “Others” for their conception of East Asia. After all, “East Asia” is only meaningful when in real or imagined presence of “Others”. And, in fact, the role of other regional actors like NAFTA and EU as “Others” in the East Asian regionalism, has already been widely recognized in academic

discourses (Terada 2003; Stubbs 2002). Therefore, the enlarged international horizon, no matter where it comes from, may have served as links for the seemingly discursive positive correlations. Similarly, the students' pride in "economic achievements" may have worked on their "East Asian identity" and "views of regional cooperation" in roughly the same way, given China's close involvement in global economy.

Conclusion: The Impact of Globalization on Malaysia

As stated at the outset, the research aimed to explore whether rampant national pride would obstruct the nascent East Asian regionalism among the elite university students in PRC. The results show that, contrary to initial surmise, the two were positively correlated, which means students' national pride, by no means, have weakened their initiatives for East Asian regionalism, and conversely, national pride may possibly bolster the regionalism, though direct causal links between the two can not be ascertained.

The primary contributing factor for the positive correlations, as further analysis has revealed, was students' pride in specific national achievement (NPSA), which turned out to be more positively correlated with regionalism than their general national pride emotions (GNP). And this indicates that the students' recognition of national progress played a larger and more decisive role than their emotions in the positive connections (between national pride and regionalism). Furthermore, among the four national aspects of NPSA, "domestic politics", "economic development", "international influence" and "traditions & culture", only the pride in the first three aspects were in significantly positive relations with regionalism, with pride in the "traditions and culture" (ethnic pride) being not. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that students' pride in "domestic politics", "economic development" and "international influence" should be the ultimate factors in effecting the positive correlations between national pride and regionalism. As for the positive links between pride in those three national aspects and

regionalism, they were, at last, tentatively ascribed to a shared anti-Western notion, which was encompassed in both “pride of domestic politics” and regionalism, and an enlarged international horizon, which, as a side effect of pride in “nation economy” and “international influence”, served also as a propeller for regionalism.

The data and analysis presented here, in all, are obviously only a small first step in understanding the Chinese national pride and its effects on East Asian regionalism among Chinese elite university students. Ideally, the survey needs to be expanded to larger elite universities student samples and followed up with both qualitative and quantitative researches verifying the two conjectured explanations for the positive connections between pride in specific national aspects and regionalism. And moreover, the results would be more meaningful, if the survey could be specifically targeted at international relations intellectuals or even political elites in China. Nevertheless, in all, given the Chinese government’s heavy reliance on nationalism for its legitimacy at least in the near future (see Zhao 2004, Barmé 1995, Gries 2004), it is expected that the national pride would continue to exert influence on Chinese people and their East Asian regionalism.

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ⁱ The idea that "national pride" involves both cognition and affect was inspired from the *ABC model of attitudes* in social-psychology, which stemmed originally from the *Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program* in Yale University during the 1950s and 60s (see Hilgard1980).

ⁱⁱ This concept was first introduced by Comaroff and Stern (1995).

ⁱⁱⁱ Despite the confinement, the reason for retaining the title "East Asia"

here in this paper is because most of the respondents, in our pilot study, expressed that they were more accustomed to the Chinese word of “East Asia” than “Northeast Asia” in referring to the region. Consequently, “East Asia”, accompanied with clear instructions of the geographical boundary for NEA, was used in all our subsequent questionnaires to refer to the NEA for the students.

^{iv} Though as mentioned before, there has not been a definite and shared regional identity in East Asia, many scholars believe that there is at least an “East Asian consciousness”, which is a kind of cultural identity based on common Confucian traditions shared among the East Asian countries. For a detailed discussion of “East Asian consciousness”(“東亞意識”), please refer to Zhang(1998), Li (1998&2005) and Chen (2001).

^v Researches show that attitudes towards other regional countries can also have an impact on regionalism. For a discussion of this, please see Tsuneo(1999).

^{vi} The three in Beijing are Peking university, Tsinghua university and People’s University of China and the other three in Guangzhou are Sun Yet-sen University, South China Institute of Technology, Guangdong Foreign Studies University.

^{vii} The percentage here includes those who moderately and strongly agreed with the statement in the left. And the following percentages in this paragraph do the same.

^{viii} In this table, the 12 items about the 12 different national aspects are just roughly sorted into the four categories: “national economy”, “domestic politics”, “tradition & culture”, and “international influence”. Some items may be contentious for which category to be included in, such as “science and technology” which can be argued as belonging to the category of

“culture” rather than “national economy”. However, considering the importance of science and technology in the current Chinese economy, we decide to put it into the “national economy” category.

^{ix} About the anti-Western assumption of neo-authoritarianism, see Zheng (1999).

The Body Dissatisfaction among Female Athletes and Non-athletes in Malaysia

Lim, C.L.S., Department of Sport Studies, Faculty of Educational Studies, University Putra Malaysia

Omar-Fauzee M.S., Department of Sport Studies, Faculty of Educational Studies and Head of Sport Development Laboratory, Sports Academy, University Putra Malaysia

Rosli, M.H., Sports Academy, University Putra Malaysia

Abstract: *This study was aimed to identify the body dissatisfaction among female athletes and in non- female athletes. This present study also examined ideals body size, and media influence towards body dissatisfaction perception among female recreational athletes and non-athletes. Participants were 40 women age ranged between 21 and 30 years: 20 recreational athletes who regularly go to the gym, do running and other sporting activities and 20 non athletes who lead a sedentary life completed self-report measures of ideal body size, body dissatisfaction, and media influence, and provided their demographic details. Results indicated that participants' Body Mass Index (BMI) did not play a role as a significant predictor of body dissatisfaction for the total sample. Female athletes prove to have higher body dissatisfaction on themselves compared to female non-athletes ($M= 2.1818, p<0.05$). These results clearly indicate that females participating in sports experience greater body dissatisfaction than non-athletes females.*

Introduction

Body image refers to the internal perception of one's own physical or outer appearance (Thompson, Heinberg, Altabe, & Tantleff-Dunn, 1999). In many developed countries, rates of body image dissatisfaction – typically measured as the difference between an individual's current and ideal body shape – are very high or rising, particularly among women (Allaz, Bernstein, Rouget, Archinard, & Morabia, 1998; Cash & Henry, 1995). For instance, a Psychology Today survey revealed that 56% of women were dissatisfied with their overall appearance (Garner,1997). One

particular subgroup that has received a great deal of attention of body image literature is female athletes. Specifically, it has been suggested that female athletes may be at higher risk of body image dissatisfaction and eating disorders due to a need to attain athletic physiques under task (e.g., performance advantages or weight requirements) or social pressure (Davis & Cowles, 1989; Sundgot-Borgen, 1994).

Some research indicates that athletes are at increased risk of eating disorders and body image dissatisfaction compared with the general population (Hausenblas & Carron, 1999; Taub & Blinde, 1992). In contrast, however, other research suggests that athletes report lower body image concerns than non-athletes (Anderson, Zager, Hetzler, Nahikian-Nelms, & Syler, 1996; Hausenblas & Mack, 1999), possibly as a result of increased self-esteem (Bowker, Gadbois, & Cornock, 2003). Self-presentation appears to be significant in sport and exercise environments (Leary, 1992). In both settings, women may perceive that others are evaluating their physique and skill level. This compels self-presentational concerns. Women often engage in exercise to acquire the ideal female body (or one as close to the ideal as possible) suggesting self-presentation concerns as a motive for exercise (Leary, 1992). Accordingly, research shows that many Women report that they exercise to reduce their weight and body fat, and to increase their muscle tone (Gill & Overdorf, 1994; McDonald & Thompson, 1992; Silberstein, Striegel-Moore, 1998). It seems that the fitness craze, for women, is more about the pursuit of thinness than the pursuit of good health (Davis, 1992).

Women who exercise for reasons specifically tied to self-presentation often are dissatisfied with their bodies and are at risk for developing unhealthy eating and exercise patterns (Davis, 1990; McDonald & Thompson, 1990). Thus, women who exercise primarily to obtain an ideal body may be at increased risk for developing potentially serious health problems. Women who exercise excessively may suffer from female athlete triad, a combination of disordered eating, amenorrhea, and osteoporosis that often goes unrecognized.

Body dissatisfaction is related to Social Physique Anxiety (SPA); females who exercise primarily to enhance their appearance (e.g., for weight control, body tone, attractiveness) tend to have high levels of SPA (Crawford & Eklund, 1994; Eklund & Crawford, 1994). Social physique anxiety also may increase women's risk of engaging in unhealthy eating and exercise behaviors (Johnson, Diehl, Petrie, & Rogers, 1995; McDonald & Thompson, 1992).

Two environments where there is pressure to conform to a certain body shape are aerobic exercise classes and competitive sport settings. It is important to reiterate that most, if not all, females in our society are exposed to cultural pressure to maintain a thin, toned appearance (Bartky, 1990; Bordo, 1993). Exercise and sport settings present additional pressures on female participants. The atmosphere in aerobic exercise classes emphasizes development of the ideal feminine body; women in these classes describe wanting to develop thin, toned bodies, yet also wanting to avoid becoming too muscular. This focus on attaining an ideal physical appearance is accentuated through the types of exercises employed, and through participants' perception that their appearance is being judged by other class members. This creates a sort of rivalry among some women in exercise classes concerning their body shape and size, and fitness level (Bartky, 1990).

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appearance is accentuated through the types of exercises employed (Markula, 1995), and through participants' perception that their appearance is being judged by other class members (Frederick & Shaw, 1995; Maguire & Mansfield, 1998). This creates a sort of rivalry among some women in exercise classes concerning their body shape and size, and fitness level (Maguire & Mansfield, 1998).

In the athletic environment, many athletes and coaches believe that it is necessary to maintain a certain weight and body shape for optimal athletic performance (Davis, 1992; Petrie, 1996). Athletes and coaches believe that excess weight inhibits speed, endurance, and agility; and it increases fatigue. Conversely, leanness is believed to enhance performance (Davis, 1992). In addition, some sports emphasize aesthetic appeal, or the athletes' appearance during performance (e.g., gymnastics, diving). One negative impact of these performance concerns is shown in studies revealing a disturbing incidence of disordered eating patterns in competitive athletes (Sundgot-Borgen, 1994).

Female athletes who feel that their body is being evaluated by others may be at greater risk. Thus, there is a greater likelihood of high Social Physique Anxiety (SPA) and low body satisfaction. This is consistent with the self-presentation framework, and previous research supports the need to examine this contention. For example, Fredrickson and colleagues (Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 1998) found that putting women into revealing clothing, even when no other people were able to observe them, increased their body shame, which was related to restrained eating. If an athlete perceives her body as less than ideal, this may increase the likelihood of body dissatisfaction and unhealthy eating behaviors.

Athletes had higher levels of perfectionism compared to non-athletes. Additionally, Wilmore (1996) showed that athletes high in perfectionism had a higher drive for thinness than athletes low in perfectionism. Athletes may be so concerned about their performance that they become quite

disappointed in themselves for performing poorly (Gotwals, Dunn, & Wayment, 2003). Researchers have found links between perfectionism and risk factors for developing eating disorders (Hausenblas & Carron, 1999). Krane et al. (2001) compared athletes with non-athletes and found that perfectionism was the only factor that significantly distinguished the groups. Athletes had higher levels of perfectionism compared to non-athletes. Additionally, Wilmore (1996) showed that athletes high in perfectionism had a higher drive for thinness than athletes low in perfectionism. Perfectionism is a personality trait characterized by striving for flawlessness and setting excessively high standards for performance, accompanied by tendencies toward overly critical evaluations of one's behavior (Flett & Hewitt, 2002). In sports, some researchers see perfectionism as an adaptive trait that helps to achieve elite performance (Gould, Dieffenbach, & Moffett, 2002).

Methodology

Participants

Participants were 40 women ranging in age between 21 and 30 years: 20 recreational athletes who regularly go to the gym, do running and other sporting activities and 20 non athletes who lead a sedentary life. ($M = 26.75$, $SD = 2.73$). Among the participants, 19 were Chinese, 6 Malays, 4 Indians and 1 Iban. All participants are recruited through personal contacts. All these women took part in this study voluntarily. All participants completed the questionnaires with the presence of a female experimenter and then debriefed after completing the questionnaires.

Instruments

In this study, we applied Sociocultural Attitudes Toward Appearance Questionnaire-3 (SATAQ-3) (Thompson

et al., 2004) set of question to assess the body image perception for both athletes and non-athletes.

This is a 30-item scale measuring the sociocultural influence of multiple dimensions of the mass media on body image and eating disturbance (1 = Definitely disagree, 5 = Definitely agree). Two dimensions of media influence are measured:

(a) Internalization- General (nine items indicating endorsement and acceptance of media messages touting unrealistic ideals for female beauty and the striving toward these ideals); and

(b) Internalization-Athlete (five items indicating endorsement and acceptance of an athletic and toned body ideal).

This questionnaire was used to assess women's recognition and acceptance of body appearance from media influence. Cronbach's α coefficients in this present study are as follows: Internalisation- General 0.88, and Internalisation-Athlete 0.85. (Thompson et al., 2004).

Besides SATAQ-3, we also used Photographic Figure Rating Scale (PFRS; Swami et al., 2008) in this study. This scale of photographic body image represents an advance on the more widely-used Contour Drawing Figure Rating Scale (Thompson & Gray, 1995) and consists of 10 gray-scale photographic figures of real women in front-view. The images represent two women from each of the established BMI categories: emaciated (<15 kg/m²), underweight (15–18.5 kg/m²), normal weight (18.5–24.9 kg/m²), overweight (25.0–29.9 kg/m²), and obese (>30 kg/m²). Fig.1 shows the PFRS used in this study. Previous study had shown that the PFRS has high construct validity and test-retest reliability (Swami et al., 2008).




Figure 1: Photographic Figure Rating Scale (PFRS; Swami et al., 2008)

Each of the nine figures was scored from 1 to 9, with "1" representing the most slender figure and "9" representing the heaviest figure. This score used two items: current body image and body image ideal. The current body image item asked the respondent to identify which figure most accurately represented her current body shape. The ideal body image item asked which body shape they desired. Subtracting the ideal body image from the current body image yielded the BD rating. The BD rating could range from -8 to 8. Thus, a BD rating of >0 indicated that the participant's current body image was heavier than her ideal body image. A BD rating of <0 indicated that the participant's current body image was lighter than her ideal body image. No discrepancy between the current and ideal body image indicated that she chose the same figure for both items and scored a zero for BD.

Results and Discussion

Statistical analysis was done in SPSS version 16.0. Independent T-test was used to determine whether there is a significant difference between Athlete and Non-athlete perception towards their body dissatisfaction. Mean score for athlete group is 2.18 (\pm SD 0.603) and non athlete type is 3.78 (\pm SD 1.092) $p<0.05$. Results indicate that there is a significant difference between athlete and non-athlete type and body dissatisfaction.

Table 1: Independent T-Test result between female athletes and non-athletes

Athlete Type	n	Mean	SD	t	p
Athlete	20	2.1818	0.603	3.920	0.002
Non-athlete	20	3.778	1.092		

These findings are consistent with previous studies that have shown body image disorders to be more prevalent among athletes involved in sports that promote leanness (de Bruin et al., 2007; Davidson et al., 2002) In other words, it maybe that athletes wish to be thinner not because they want to look more attractive, but because of their belief in an association between thinness and task performance (de Bruin et al., 2007). This has important implications, as it highlights the importance of body image satisfaction: successfully attaining idealised body shapes may result in improved self-esteem in sporting arenas, but athletes may also experience body dissatisfaction in social environments, where the perceived demands to conform to socially-prescribed norms of attractiveness are greater (Russell, 2004).

In this study also, the relationship between BMI and body dissatisfaction was being study. To determine the relationship between those two indicators, Pearson Correlation was used to measure how strong the relationship is between Participant BMI and Body Dissatisfaction among females' athletes and non athletes. In this statistical analysis, result indicates that there is no direct correlation between BMI and body dissatisfaction among respondents. Table 2 shows the result of the Pearson correlation analysis.

Table 2: Relationship between participant's BMI and body dissatisfaction

Variables	Pearson Correlation (r)	p
Participant BMI	-0.014	0.953
Body Dissatisfaction (BD)	1	

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Participants' BMI did not play a role as a significant predictor of body dissatisfaction for the total sample. This signifies that those with a lower BMI did not necessarily have higher body dissatisfaction in themselves. Since the average BMI is relatively low; there could not be an obvious relationship between these two variables, those with lower BMI are generally satisfied with their bodyweight or body shape and there is no a need for dieting or a drive for thinness. Another factor to why there is no relationship between these two variables is that the sample population is too small to gain any significant results on this relationship.

Pearson Correlation was used to measure how strong the relationship is between Internalization Athlete Score and Body Dissatisfaction among females. Results indicate that there is a direct correlation between the Internalization Athlete Score and body dissatisfaction among female athletes and non-athletes. Pearson Correlation was found out to be at 0.57 which means that the correlation relationship is moderately strong. The higher the Internalization Athlete Score is the higher the Body Dissatisfaction score is for the sample population. Higher Body Dissatisfaction score signifies a more dissatisfied perception of the body. Table 3 shows the relationship between Internalization Athlete Score and body dissatisfaction among participants.

Table 3: Relationship between Internalization Athlete Score and body dissatisfaction among participants.

Variables	Pearson Correlation (r)	p
Athlete Internalisation Score	0.57	0.008
Body Dissatisfaction (BD)	1	

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The higher the Internalization Athlete Score is, the lower the Body Dissatisfaction score is for the sample population. Lower Body Dissatisfaction score signifies a more dissatisfied perception of the body. Athletes had the highest scores on the Internalization-Athlete subscale of the SATAQ-3, indicating their greater acceptance of an athletic body ideal. Arguably, athletes are exposed to leaner, more muscular or more athletic images than other athletes or non-athletes, so this will result in greater body dissatisfaction (Zucker et al., 1999).

Limitation and future considerations

A small sample size may not have produced significant results on this research. It would be better this study was able to gather more respondents. Participants self-reported their attitudes and behaviors on this questionnaire, and may have not been completely honest in their responses. Individuals may have defined sports participation in a variety of ways. The category of athletes and non athletes is too broad. This study can be further researched in terms of body dissatisfaction in what kind of sports women are participating in, such as leanness-promoting sports or non leanness-promoting sports, and competitive or non competitive level sports. Despite these limitations, athletes, professors, and coaches can use these findings to help recognize female athletes that may be at risk for the development of eating disorders.

Conclusion

Results from this study suggest that female athlete is having more dissatisfaction towards their body image compared to non-female athletes. It was also found out that a person BMI did not reflect their true satisfaction towards their body image in reality. This study has long-term significance contribution in terms of suggesting that coaches and athletic departments of competitive athletes should be on the look-out for sports-related anxiety as these athletes may be at higher risk for eating disorder symptoms in comparison to women who are less anxious about their performance and those who are not involved in athletics. In conclusion, the present results suggest that athletes have a higher degree of body dissatisfaction than non-athletes. In some cases, body dissatisfaction may lead to the female athlete triad, a combination of disordered eating, amenorrhea, and osteoporosis that often goes unrecognized

(Hobart & Smucker, 2000). Early recognition of the female athlete triad may be improved by assessments and screening that take into account body dissatisfaction and media influences. Of course, there are also many situations in which sport participation can result in improved well-being, including higher self-esteem or life satisfaction (Bowker et al., 2003; Landers & Arent, 2001). The continuing task for psychologists, therefore, will be to identify those situations and thereby help improve body image among athletes.

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Voices from Tokelau: culturally appropriate, healthy and sustainable extended-family housing in New Zealand

John M Gray and Jacqueline McIntosh

School of Architecture, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

Abstract: *Tokelauans have more three-generation families living in one household than any other ethnic group living in New Zealand. They are also the most economically-deprived of all Pacific communities and consequently have little choice but to live in crowded conditions in old and relatively small dwellings at the low price end of the rental market. This paper reports on part of a cross-disciplinary study into health, and housing in which the focus is on the design, production and assessment of a purpose-built house for an extended family of Tokelauan origin. It provides an overview of findings from recent research on health and housing among Pacific peoples living in New Zealand, and identifies various architectural issues associated with health-related problems of cold, damp and crowding.*

Keywords: *Extended family housing; health, design, sustainable housing, Pacific*

Introduction

Among tropical Pacific island nations the indigenous house design has one open living/sleeping space, and a minimum of solid external walls (Howden-Chapman 2000). This arrangement serves cultural preferences for extended-family living, and the need to take full advantage of sea breezes in hot humid climates. In stark contrast, Pacific Island migrants to New Zealand arrive to a cool humid climate and encounter a housing stock that is highly compartmentalized yet modest in area (being traditionally

John M Gray and Jacqueline McIntosh

School of Architecture, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

built for people of Anglo-Saxon and European origins with a dominant nuclear-family culture and relatively small households). For Tokelauan people, as with many Pacific migrant groups, adaptation to a new physical and cultural environment is problematic, to the point where health and wellbeing are threatened (Wessen et. al., 1992, Pene et.al. 1999). Tokelauans living in New Zealand suffer a disproportionate rate of illness and disease (Howden-Chapman and Wilson, 2000; Baker et al, 2000).

Tokelauans are proportionally one of the smallest Pacific groups in New Zealand and one of the most socio-economically deprived. For migrants from the isolated tropical Tokelau atolls of Nukunonu, Atafu and Fakaofu, extended-family living is not only an important cultural practice, but also an economic survival strategy when living in New Zealand (Baker et al, 2003, Howden-Chapman and Wilson, 2000). The Tokelau community has a higher proportion of three-generation families living in one household than any other ethnic group in the country (SNZ 2007a). Most of these large households find that they must make do with the cheapest housing that is available, which generally means living in an un-insulated (pre-1980s) three-bedroom house. Such 'low end' housing stock is typically cold and damp internally, prohibitively expensive to heat, and practically impossible to adequately ventilate using only operable windows (Gray, 2004).

The housing and health experience of Tokelauan people in New Zealand is part of a broader pattern of poor quality inappropriate housing across various cultural and socio-economic sectors of society (Thorns 1988, Centre for Housing Research 2007a, 2007b, Ministry of Social Development 2008). There are two parts to this issue: one, the problem of cold, damp, poorly ventilated housing, is now widely recognised, if not widely acted on; the second, less recognised but no less important a problem is that a substantial part of the New Zealand's housing stock appears increasingly unsuited to the spatial and cultural needs of a

rapidly-changing demographic (Howden-Chapman 1999, SNZ 2007a, Viggers 2008). Although the association between poor housing and ill health is known, the lack of compelling quantifiable evidence linking environments and health outcomes has been an impediment, at a political and economic level, to demands for improved housing quality in New Zealand. However, important links in the *causal* chain are now understood, due in large part to research being conducted at the University of Otago Wellington School of Medicine and Health Science WSM (see www.healthyhousing.org.nz/). For example, we now know that indoor temperature is causally linked to certain health outcomes (Howden-Chapman 2008). Consequently, it is now possible to calculate the differential costs of house insulation and health.

The research reported in this paper formed part 4 of a He Kainga Oranga/Housing and Health research programme. The aim of the research was to determine the feasibility of the design, funding and construction of a house that would successfully deal with housing problems being experienced by Tokelauan and other Polynesian people living in New Zealand. Adopting a broad definition of sustainability (Agenda 21, see <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/>) the measures of success can be summarised thus: ongoing economic viability for the owner and occupants; social equity involving a fair use of resources to achieve appropriate and healthy living conditions; and ecological sustainability.

We set out to describe and discuss a ‘demonstration’ house that was designed, built and tested as part of a multi-disciplinary research project coordinated by the Wellington School of Medicine The resulting ‘Tokelauan House’ project was intended to provide a positive design response to a difficult set of technical, health, cultural, political and economic problems. In essence, this translated to the following challenge: to design and construct social housing that would be culturally and socially appropriate to a three-generation Polynesian extended family (some 10 people); that would remain warm and dry (even if the householders are

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not always vigilant about ventilation, heating and moisture control); that could be operated at moderate cost to the occupants; that was within the owner's (i.e. Housing New Zealand Corporation) limits of capital expenditure (NZD 1,450/m²), low maintenance expenditure; and that is politically/socially acceptable. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications and practical ramifications of the research findings for people working in the fields of design, health and policy

Relationships between housing and health

New Zealand has a cool to temperate climate, with mean winter daytime temperatures ranging from 10°C in the south to 16°C in the north. Two thirds of the housing stock comprises three bedroom and four bedroom stand alone wooden houses on wood or concrete piles (see SNZ, www.stats.govt.nz/default.htm). Houses usually last about 90 years and about a third has no insulation. Despite the cool temperatures, most people only heat the living room and occasionally a bedroom. Pre-1980's houses in NZ, typified by the 3-bedroom bungalow, still make up the majority of the housing stock of the country (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2008). Such bungalows, once well-suited to the lifestyle and size of nuclear European families, are increasingly unsuited to the spatial, functional, cultural and physiological needs of the contemporary households that occupy them (Altman, 1975, Centre for Housing Research, 2007b). The interior of a 1950's house, for instance, could be kept tolerable warm, dry and healthy because in that era someone would more than likely have been at home during the day, 'managing' the house by keeping it aired and heated, putting the laundry *out* to dry, and so on. The same house today is unmanageable and potentially unhealthy in the new circumstances of a large household (more moisture generated by cooking, washing, breathing and heating), with everyone away most days or for most of each day (the house

is locked up, windows closed, less ventilation, washing kept inside to dry because of the risk of theft if left outside), and with many people in close proximity to one another when the house is occupied (a significantly increased risk of serious sickness) (Gray, 2004).

Many extended families in New Zealand live in crowded three-bedroom houses, in part to lower the rent per person (Baker et al., 2003 Howden-Chapman and Wilson, 2000). Lower incomes also mean that a disproportionate number of extended families are living in state housing. Rates of household crowding for Māori and Pacific peoples are double those for Europeans (Baker and Zhang, 2005). There is strong evidence of a causal connection between humidity, crowding and health. Many studies now attest to the effects of damp and mould on pre-existing asthma and other health problems, while crowding increases the risk of close-contact infections, such as meningococcal disease, rheumatic fever, tuberculosis and skin disease (Baker et al., 2000, Jaine, 2007, Das et al., 2007, Baker et al., 2008).. Crowding also increases the risk of being exposed to second-hand smoke (Howden-Chapman and Tobias, 2000), which irritates the airways and increases the risks of infectious diseases. Tokelauans have the highest prevalence of smoking in any Pacific group (SNZ, 2007a).

There is also a causal relationship between low house temperatures, and occupants' health and wellbeing (Howden-Chapman et.al. 2007, 2008). New Zealand houses are cold, with over a third of the population living in houses below the World Health Organization recommended minimum of 16°C. In one large community based, cluster, single blinded randomised study of 1350 households across seven regions of New Zealand, it was shown (Howden-Chapman et al., 2007) that a relatively modest investment in insulation per house (around NZD1550 excluding taxes, or the cost of *one inpatient hospital admission*) raised the average temperature by about one degree, but led to significant improvements in the population's self reported health and a lower risk of children having time off school or adults having sick days off work. Participants in the

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intervention group had significant improvements in their general health, respiratory symptoms, sense of comfort and wellbeing, and in reduced heating costs

Experience of extended family living in a ‘standard’ bungalow

The experiences of the extended family living in a standard New Zealand bungalow were less than satisfactory. The hosting family worked long hours in low paying jobs and as a result were eligible for state housing. The family elders had moved from Tokelau to join their adult children in Wellington becoming permanent members of the extended family household and to assist with child rearing. Figure 1 is a photograph of a house that was occupied by the Tokelauan extended family prior to their move to a new purpose-built house (described later). The house had an area of 84m², comprising three bedrooms, one bathroom, a kitchen, small dining area, laundry and living room. The walls and floor were un-insulated and the roof was under-insulated. There was one solid fuel heater in the living room. The regular household of 10 people comprised two grandparents, two parents and five children, and a niece of the father. Visitors sometimes ‘landed’ on the family for periods lasting some weeks.



Figure 1 The 'before moving' house: a typical 3 bedroom, 84m² State house (Photographer John Gray)

Preliminary interviews with family members revealed problems of crowding, cold, damp, inadequate bath and toilet facilities, lack of privacy, lack of opportunity for homework, difficulty and embarrassment with hosting, and a general level of stress in the household from the combinations of pressures and problems. The following is a selection of evaluative comments from family members from the interviews held by public health researcher Gina Pene (Pene et al, 1999).

A problem for me is not being able to sit down together as a family to have a meal (father)

The house is very damp and cold, even though the curtains are pulled but it is still cold. Sometimes you can feel the dampness in the air and the air feels heavy and it does not feel right. The condensation on the wall – you can see the mould and I know it is not healthy. (daughter)

There are ten in our family and only three bedrooms. (father)

Our lounge is not only a lounge but also it is used as a dining room, sleeping area, and study area for the children to do their homework. (mother)

I share the bedroom with my Nana and my cousin. This is a single bedroom but because it's a three bedroom house there aren't enough rooms for people in our household (daughter)

When we get visitors the problem is worse because sometimes they stay over, but there aren't enough bedrooms so the lounge becomes a bedroom. (niece)

I feel we cannot function properly as a family because I want to have family discussion but there isn't the room... the lounge is used as a bedroom...I would love to do traditional Tokelau handicrafts in

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here but it is not possible because of the lack of space inside the house..... I am very concerned for my grandchildren because of the lack of space for them to do their homework, so they use our bedroom. (grandmother)

It is very depressing at times because the room is too small to even have a desk or a table to put my schoolbooks on or to do my school work. I have to sit on the bed to do my study as you can see it is hard to move around in this room because the space is taken up by the two beds. I wish there could be more space for me to do my study or have a desk or table in here. (niece)

The ... problem is having only one toilet for our large household. The mornings in our household are very busy, chaotic and very stressful because everyone has to wait in line for their turn. (mother)

I sometimes wish that I have my own bedroom... Because we are sharing one, sometimes I don't feel comfortable getting changed in the room. You try to use the bathroom but it's no good because it is too small. (daughter)

Method

The Tokelau Housing and Health project began with meetings with seven focus groups designed to identify what physical, financial and social aspects of housing, in the view of the Tokelau community, were most likely to affect the health of the household and the wider community. The focus groups consisted of elderly men, elderly women, teenagers, single mothers, community workers, tenants, and owners. The focus group discussions were followed by a survey of 150 households, involving interviews with 600 people. The findings from the survey and focus groups were

relayed back to the community and further discussed at an open forum.

From these initial meetings an action research model developed. While utilising a scientific body of research into health in relation to housing together with professional and technical knowledge of building, a key aspect of the approach is a commitment to partnerships between researchers, owner/providers and the community to develop an applied social science research agenda. In this model, we were looking at 'structural' factors affecting health, pathways through which such material matters influence health, and pathways for realising housing solutions that reduce the hazards to health.

Extending from the broader meetings, a representative Tokelauan working group was formed in order to undertake a study of the habits, preferences, relationships and behaviours of the target household type and culture – a task that clearly required the participation and advice of representatives from (in this case) the Tokelauan community in New Zealand. Given the range of imperatives and constraints involved in social housing, it was also clear that a team approach would be necessary. The key participants, apart from the Tokelau community representatives, were the public health researchers, the design/architectural researchers, various Housing New Zealand Corporation personnel (project management, policy, design, finance and political people), and (eventually) builders and local authorities.

The design process centred on a series of workshops between the research team and the representative group from the Tokelau community in Wellington where the proposed demonstration house was to be constructed. The workshops dealt with three phases in the design of a house: firstly, a briefing phase in which the quantitative and qualitative requirements are established; secondly, an initial design phase involving a free exchange of design ideas (small or encompassing) that would work well; and finally an evaluative phase during which designs developed by the

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architects are critically appraised and refined. The review process was aided by the use of large-scale models which could be dismantled and reassembled during discussions.



Figure 2: Photograph of the completed extended-family demonstration house (Photographer John Gray)

The demonstration house was completed and occupied in December 2007. As part of the building commissioning, a meeting was held with the building occupants and the architect to explain the house design and strategies for effective use. In preparation for post occupancy evaluation, data-logging equipment was installed throughout the house to record temperature and humidity, cameras were given to household members to record aspects of the building about which they had questions or comments and arrangements were made for interviews and focus group discussions in 5 months. Hence the post occupancy evaluation strategies employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques.

Sixteen *dataloggers* were installed inside and outside the new house to gather reliable evidence of the technical performance in terms of temperature and humidity, throughout the building. The dataloggers collected data at hourly intervals for periods ranging from five months to 18

months. While the official post occupancy evaluation meeting took place at the 5 month interval, the continued use of the dataloggers assisted in establishing reliability, limiting any favourable results that might occur from the occupants changing behaviours to assist the researchers in achieving good results. Other records such as electricity and gas consumption were also reviewed to confirm reliability and to better understand the relationship between building fabric, external conditions, and use and management of the house.

To aid occupant memory and to gain perspectives from a wide range of family members, the qualitative aid *Photovoice* was used. *Photovoice* is a tool used in community-based participatory research to enable participants, who are usually 'subjects' of research, to take photos with disposable cameras in order to frame the issues they think are important, and potentially influence or create social change by conveying this to policy makers (Wang and Al, 2004, Macintyre, 2003). In this case, all members of the family were provided with a disposable camera to capture images of the 'old' house and the 'new' house. The resulting images were used as prompts in discussion with a researcher.

Focus group discussions (or interview) are tools that enable a free exchange of ideas and points of view among a small group of people. In this case several focus groups were formed from 18 Tokelauan teenagers to discuss their housing and family experiences. The main thrust of these discussions was to do with familial relations, but because they were open-ended discussions there were numerous references to physical factors in the house environment that were reported to influence individual and collective (family) wellbeing.

Findings and interpretations

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Building on work by the British Research Establishment, the Warwick School of Law distilled a list of all the potential hazards that could be found in dwellings to those that could be attributable to housing design and conditions (excluding any attributable solely to human behaviour, household equipment, furnishings and furniture). In doing so they found three kinds of health-related problems with housing – first, a group of hazards to *physiological* health, such as allergens, mould, dust mites and poisons; second, a group of cultural and social factors that can affect *psychological* (and sometimes physiological) wellbeing, including privacy, noise and crowding; and finally a group of risks relating to the layout, materials and construction of a house that may affect *safety*, and result in accidents such as fire, or falls [Warwick Law School 2006].

In the predesign stage, working from this list and the health literature (especially Howden-Chapman, 2004) and the Tokelauan community focus group, the relationship between health hazards and physical elements and environments in housing was mapped (Table 1). The table is organised according to seven fundamental sub-systems (Howden-Chapman, 2000, 2007). Against each of these systems we have arrayed pertinent health hazards, the mechanisms (in the form of building parts or elements) that ameliorate the hazards, and the anticipated outcome, in terms of the benefit from providing the mechanism.

Table 1: Mechanisms used in response to anticipated health hazards in a large household

System	Health hazard	Mechanism adopted	Expected result
Insulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Cold- Damp and mould- Stress (financial)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Extra-insulated floor, walls and roof- Double glazing (habitable rooms)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Retained warmth- Reduced radiant heat loss (from

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		and bathrooms)	the body to cold surfaces) - Reduced energy cost
Heating	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cold - Damp and mould - Dust - Poisons, pollutants, VOCs, allergens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Solar gain (sun-facing windows) - Heat pump including filter - Heat transfer duct including filter - Fan heater (bathroom) - Stack effect (chimney + vent) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Warmth (appropriate air temperature) - Dryness (in conjunction with heat-assisted ventilation, and avoidance of moisture-producing heaters) - Filtration (reduced dust) - Air movement (stack effect, fans)
Ventilation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Damp and mould - Infections and hygiene - Stress (e.g. psychological/cultural desire for moving air) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operable windows with cross-ventilation - Venting “chimney” with wind powered exhaust (to extract moist air from both bathrooms) - Kitchen range hood (exhaust fan to outside) - Operable “trickle” vents in window 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dryness (passive [involuntary] exhaust ventilation, especially from bathrooms, plus active [voluntary] ventilation throughout the house)

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		<p>frames</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fixed vents in bathrooms - Deliberate (occasional) overheating from solar gain to encourage ventilation and purging 	<p>via secure windows)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Occasional purging of moisture and pollutants by voluntary opening of upstairs windows in uncomfortably warm indoor conditions - Active (voluntary) ventilation by operable windows and doors, especially in kitchen/dining area - Discernible air movement on demand (operable windows and doors).
Materials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poisons, VOCs and pollutants - Infections and hygiene - Noise - Dust 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Concrete (polished semi-smooth finish) throughout ground floor, including 2 bedrooms - Stainless steel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimal off-gassing, VOCs - Minimal dust and dust mites

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Risk of accident (slips and falls) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> bench tops - Plywood cabinets (avoidance of MDF) - Prefinished bathroom linings (automotive paint technology) - Carpet (wool, upstairs only). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> in living areas and two bedrooms - Cleanability and hygiene - Dryness (minimal embodied moisture in materials)
Orientation and Layout	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Damp and mould - Stress (psychological/cultural) - Stress (financial) - Intrusion and lack of privacy - Infections - Crowding - Stress(growth environment) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Separation of wet areas from habitable areas - Zones for privacy control - Doors and buffer spaces for privacy control and access control - Openness (no corridors) - Flexibility/adaptability of use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dryness in habitable areas - Air movement - Surveillance of children and young adults - Options for sleeping arrangements (influences involving gender, relationship, generation, age, health condition and personality)
Amenity, space and size	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Damp and mould - Stress (cultural) - Crowding - Infections and hygiene - Risk of accident 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Two bathrooms, three toilets (one accessible from outside) - Separate laundry and outside drying facilities - Outside sink - Semi-habitable garage - Bed spaces for every household 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dryness in wet areas - Reasonable wait times for bathrooms and toilets - Capacity to accommodate visitors/family over the

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		<p>member, not more than 2 adults per room</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Wide doors - Generous access spaces internally and externally - Space and facilities for special events and gatherings 	<p>short to medium term (days to months)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capacity to accommodate permanent household members - Capacity for use by large-bodied people, and the mildly disabled - Access for coffins and bearers - Forecourt (before front door) to welcome visitors - Capacity indoors and outdoors to accommodate a crowd of people on special occasions
<p>Safety and security</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Risk of accident - Risk of attack or theft - Risk to personal safety and wellbeing in the neighbourhood 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Non-slip floor finishes - Limiters on all operable windows (opening too narrow for human body) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection against slips and falls - Protection against intruders - Control of

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stress (psychological, cultural) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fenced grounds including play area and clothes-drying area - Surveillance of entry zone 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> non-approved/secret outings by young household members
Household and owner (HNZC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stress (psychological) - Stress (financial) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Long-life lamps, insulation etc. - Simple, intuitively operated systems and components - Robust systems & components 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ease of management - Low operating costs - Tenure - Low maintenance costs

Physiological results

One of the most important aspects of a building design is its capability to modify the external environment (which is potentially hostile or uncomfortable) and render it habitable and safe. The ecological features of the Tokelauan demonstration house included an increase in building insulation, use of passive solar technologies with heat storage and a heat pump for backup and a passive ventilation system, comprising a vertical chimney-like duct with a wind driven exhaust fan to draw warm moist air from bathrooms by utilising Venturi and stack effects. Control of interior dampness for the highly populated building, in addition to ventilation was achieved through the separation of wet areas from inhabitable rooms.

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School of Architecture, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand




Figure 3 Average room temperature by time of day (autumn)

The graphs in figure 3 show the average temperatures observed over 6 weeks in the summer and autumn of 2008 over 24 hours together with the average external temperature. Interior habitable spaces are consistently above the minimum 16C recommended by the World Health Organization, despite low external temperatures. Between the seasons the average external temperature decreased by 7°C , but the average living room ceiling temperature decreased by only 1.2°C the average laundry temperature (the room that was perhaps most affected by external temperature) by 3.8°C . The strong downward shift of the black (outside) line on the autumn graph is clearly visible

Psychological results

Socio-cultural demands for privacy regulation and supervision were achieved through the design of the building

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layout and the relationships between circulation public and private areas which allowed the household the flexibility to alter the use of spaces to suit changes in household composition and activity. Crowding concerns were addressed through the design of sleeping areas as well as the provision of a 'garage' space designed for temporary inhabitation.




Figure 3: Purpose-built extended-family house

Photovoice enabled the researchers to gather a graphic idea of the frustrations and the pleasures of both inadequate and adequate aspects of housing. Together with the families' explanation of specific design features, which could be prompted by the photos they had taken, the evaluation provided a rich picture of extended family living and how it can be diminished or enhanced by the built environment.

The family's response to moving into the new house was, perhaps not surprisingly, overwhelmingly positive. By the time they were interviewed several months after move-in, they felt their health had improved. The children had room to play. The teenagers had space to do their homework and were doing better at school. The husband had returned to work after five years of unemployment. The family felt proud

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in their new home and liked to welcome their relatives and friends. The house had been designed to sleep 11, which meant that they were less crowded and they appreciated the sense of space and light. There were fewer privacy issues and they felt that their family life had improved.

The niece summarised the improvements that she has seen in the family.

I do enjoy living in a three generation household especially with my Nana. In our old house it was impossible to have a decent conversation with my aunty and uncle because of the lack of space. Now it is really good we can all sit together in the lounge and I can have open discussions with my problems with them. I have noticed a huge difference, everyone is interacting more with each other since we moved to this house – I myself feel a lot happy living here in this house – lots of fresh air and lots of space. In the old house we were so overcrowded and it was quite depressing at times. It's good to see the children get on really well with each other – less fighting and squabbles. There is a huge improvement with everyone health especially my uncle. His health has improved a lot and he seems a lot happier too. On the whole I think it was a positive move for everyone and I am very happy. The only thing that saddens me is I don't have as much time of sharing with my Nana like we use to in the old house because we do not share the same bedroom (niece)

Safety Results

Physical safety features of the house include the use of grips, non-slip floor finishes, limiters on all operable

windows (ensuring all openings are too narrow for a human body) and fenced grounds including the play areas and clothes drying areas. Design safety features include a layout that provides opportunities for both external surveillance through the placement of entry doors relative to other spaces and window placement as well as internal surveillance through the relationship of circulation spaces and access to sleeping areas from public parts of the house. While the success of these features will remain to be tested, to date, the family has reported positively particularly with respect to the surveillance aspects of the design.

Conclusion

With a generous budget the goal of a warm, dry and spacious house is not hard to achieve: one has simply to provide a lot of well-appointed space that is well insulated, well ventilated and well heated. But of course budgets for social housing are very constrained, both in terms of capital expenditure and operating expenses. This project met the capital cost limit set by Housing New Zealand Corporation of NZC \$1450 per square metre (2005) while satisfying the main design/health objectives:

To develop architectural design solutions and mechanisms that can be employed to keep a house warm and dry in the New Zealand climate, even when crowded, without recourse to mechanical ventilation, at minimum operating cost to the occupants and within HNZA guidelines for capital and maintenance expenditure.

The starting point for the research reported in this paper is the idea that research should do more than understand the world: it should help improve it. Application is the issue here: how might we progress from the health research to the completed healthy house? This sounds straightforward enough – with centuries of house building

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behind us, and improved scientific knowledge of building and health, we may reasonably expect good housing solutions to follow. Yet this goal can be frustratingly elusive. One reason is system complexity: a bad choice in any part of the system may lead to failure of the whole (Porteous 1992). Another reason is system sensitivity: a small variation in design, occupancy or context can result in a large unwanted effect – for example, seemingly minor adjustments to room dimensions or shape can affect furnishing arrangements in the room and limit the options for its use. Thus, the task of designing and delivering a healthy house, that meets the political, economic, social and technical imperatives outlined earlier, is one that requires more than a few simple adjustments or the addition of a few features to the ‘standard’ 3-bedroom house design.

The project was devised as a practical way to test and demonstrate that attention to health issues would, and should, influence the design of a house and that a well-designed house would provide a significantly healthier environment (Porteous, 1992, Lawrence, 1995). A key aspect of the approach was a commitment to partnerships between researchers in public health and architecture, owner/providers and the community (Matheson et al., 2005). With these cross-disciplinary and interdisciplinary connections, the participants joined forces in looking at the physical factors affecting health and the pathways for realising viable housing solutions that reduce the hazards to health. The action research model removes the line between research and social action (Sanoff, 2000) for architectural science. The role of the architect (and other professionals and experts) is of particular significance. Expertise, especially to do with technical and procedural matters, is important to the sensible and efficient working of a group engaged in participatory design. While it is important that experts listen more than talk, it is equally important that the expert speaks up, and if necessary argues a position, when he or she perceives that the group is in need of expert advice or information.

The pre- and post-occupancy evaluation of this extended family house has the limitations and strengths of any single comparative case study. Subjective feelings of well-being can be important predictors of health and life satisfaction but can also be biased in an effort to please the researcher. In this case, the quantitative data for thermal and moisture conditions support physiological health statements; which are also consistent with that called for in the health literature. While too soon to legitimately report on, household members medical records seem to also support the ongoing benefits of healthy housing.

This case-study highlighted that properly designed social housing can achieve multiple objectives. By providing good quality, appropriate housing at a reasonable cost, it can increase the disposable income of families and by allowing extended families to live together who want to, it can maintain minority languages across generations as well as improving the health and social well-being of family members. As our population ages, the care and consideration received by grandparents in these households provides a very positive model of aged care. This project also shows it is possible to have the undoubted benefits of extended-family living, without the burden of infectious diseases and family stress. In these three distinct realms, the economic, the socio-cultural and the ecological, this demonstration house can be seen to have met the requirements of successful sustainable housing.

Acknowledgements

The Tokelauan House research project formed part of the University of Otago, Wellington's *He Kainga Oranga*/Housing and Health Research Programme (2005) directed by Professor Philippa Howden-Chapman. The research was made possible through funding from the Health Research Council of New Zealand, the Families

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Commission of the Ministry of Social Development and Victoria University of Wellington. The authors wish to thank the Wellington Tokelau Association who gave continuous and generous support throughout this project, and Gina Pene for conducting focus group surveys. Other partners in the project were Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC); and the Centre for Building Performance Research at Victoria University of Wellington.

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China's Military Presence in Africa: Implications for Africa's Woobling Peace

Chuka Enuka, Center for Contemporary International Relations, Jilin University (China)¹

Abstract: *This paper surveys the military aspect of the age-long interaction between China and Africa, and how it impacts the peace of Africa. Issues that border on China-Africa relations have no doubt gained currency in academic discourses centering mainly on trade, and economic related factors. But the military dimensions of the relationship, especially China's military involvement in Africa are passing with minimal scholarly attention, yet needing examination. Within the general ambit of China's expanding engagement in Africa, this paper discusses the military factor. It historically contextualizes China-African military links, and argues that China's continued arms sales to Africa's problem areas, cynical military relations and support to rogue and blood-thirst regimes, and her double-dealing peacekeeping roles in Africa, do not help the peace condition of Africa's wobbling states*

Keywords: *Sino-African Relation, Arms Sales, Military Presence, Africa's Peace, Conflict*

Introduction

The Chinese approach to foreign relations is officially termed "noninterference in domestic affairs". But Beijing's recent military involvements in Africa and the handling of the conflict situation in places like Sudan shows that China is learning the limitations of noninterference. Because of

¹ **Chuka Enuka** is a lecturer at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria. Currently he is attached to the Center for Contemporary International Relations Studies, Jilin University, China, on a leave. His research interests include, war and peace studies, China-Africa studies and International History, on which he has published numerous articles in diverse journals and collected volumes.

Address: Friendship Guesthouse, 2699 Qianjin Street, Changchun, 130012, China.

strategic interests, China is enmeshed in cutting deals with bad governments and providing them with arms." Arms sales and military relationships help China gain important African allies in the United Nations—including Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria—for its political goals, including preventing Taiwanese independence and diverting attention from its own human rights record. To meet its oil and mineral needs, Beijing has consistently delivered arms to pariah states in Africa especially the conflict-torn zones which have come under western sanctions and United Nations' embargo, in their attempt to address the horrendous massacre and genocidal killings that have characterized the politics of those areas. Severally, China has been implicated in the proliferation of arms in Africa which either provoke conflicts or exacerbate the existing ones (Tongkeh, 2009, Alden, 2005, Taylor 2005, *SAVEDARFUR*, 2007). Many Chinese firms were accused of smuggling illegal arms: Chinese AK-47, machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers into Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Ivory Coast where rebels and mercenaries were involved in civil wars. These arms gain faster inroads owing to their relatively cheap costs. China sold 55million dollars worth of arms to Sudan between 2003 and 2006, flouting United Nations arms embargo (Shinn, 2008). It was with Chinese assistance that the Sudanese government built an arms factory in Khartoum at the heat of the war years in Sudan. When Zimbabwe came under western sanctions, its president Robert Mugabe turned east to China for military assistance. Faced with E U and U S embargo, Mugabe in 2004 bought fighter aircraft and military vehicles from China. The depth of the dubious military transactions between China and Mugabe was unveiled in the scandal involving a Chinese ship- An Yue Jiang, carrying weapons destined for Zimbabwe, but were stopped in South Africa in April 2008 (Brautigam, 2009). As China expands its engagement throughout Africa, it increasingly finds itself involved in African internal affairs militarily. This involvement takes essentially three forms: Chinese arms sales which make their way into conflict zones, Chinese participation in UN Peacekeeping operations, Chinese responses to the case of kidnapping of Chinese nationals or

attacks on Chinese facilities. On what the Chinese military roles in Africa truly portend, and how it impacts on the peace of the continent, opinions tend to differ. Some argue that through its military deals with Africa, that China offers security alternative to the west for African states, and that through its deployment of peacekeeping troops to Africa's boiling areas, China's military presence in Africa has impacted positively on the continent (Shinn, 2009, Kurlantzick 2009). On the contrary, this paper argues that with arms originating from China into Africa's troubled zones, and in defiance to the United Nations embargo, Chinese determination to militarily protect its economic interests in Africa at the expense of millions of lives of helpless Africans who either suffer death or are internally displaced, conflicts in Africa have been exacerbated. This unarguably has remained a negative impact on the much needed but lacked peace of Africa.

Historicizing China's Military Presence in Africa in the Pre-Independence Era

China's military relations with Africa stretches back to 1950s when China gave its support to revolutionary and independence movements in Africa. The Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia was seminal in the Sino-African relationship (Larkin 1971). The conference agenda captured the vexing issues of colonialism, imperialism and the hegemonic position of the Western powers. What the participating nations had in common was their shared history and perception of white dominance by the West (Foster et al, 2009; Looy, 2006). Thus, the conference was significant in spurring anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle of the colonially subjugated and imperialistically plundered African and Asian people. The conference marked the start of definite interest by the Peoples Republic of China in the overall African affairs and its anti-colonial struggle in particular. Beginning from this conference, China began gradually, its military involvement in the continent of Africa.

From 1957 until Algerian independence, China supplied the Algeria's National Liberation Front, FLN, with military weapons and training in Angola's fight against the French colonial power. China offered to send 280,000 volunteers to Egypt during the Suez crisis (Taylor 2006). Owing to the deteriorated relationship between China and the West (Chiefly USA) on one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other hand, China saw disruption and promotion of unrest in Africa as central to China's policy of frustrating the ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is on record that Chinese military instructors made Ghana a base for training guerrilla fighters in 1964, and that Rhodesian freedom fighters received training in China (Chuka 2010). Taylor (2006) contains that from Rhodesia, ZANU fighters were taken to China for military training. A pocketbook found on the body of a guerrilla fighter killed in Sinoia skirmish, showed that he had been a pupil at Nanjing's Military College in 1965. Eduardo Mondlane's Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO, fighters received free weapons from China and adopted Chinese tactics of guerrilla warfare. Shinn (2008), records that from the early 1960s FRELIMO began sending delegations to China. Within the framework of the Organization for African Unity, OAU, China equally coordinated its military training for liberation groups struggling for freedom from colonial subjugation. It provided the organization's liberation committee with 75% of all the military aid it received externally between 1971 and 1972 (Shinn 2008, Taylor 2006). China trained and supplied arms to a number of losing opposition and revolutionary groups in Africa. It gave early and initial support to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA. But as Angola strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union, China shifted its military assistance in the late 1960s to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA. Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's leader reportedly received military training in China (Rotberg 2008). Not many years after, China in a dramatic shift, had its support focused on the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA, and its leader, Holden Roberto. By the early 70s, China had its 112 military instructors deployed to Zaire, to train the FNLA. It was notable that

China ignored its rhetoric on noninterference, and got involved in Africa militarily

China's Recent Military Presence in Africa

China's recent military involvement in Africa takes essentially the forms of selling of Chinese arms, construction of small arms factory in a number of African states, participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and defense of Chinese oil investments and Chinese personnel who often come under heavy attacks in Africa's conflict zones. China is a major supplier of small arms and light weapons to Africa. As noted by Alden (2007), military cooperation and growth of arms sales are parts and aspects of China's relations with African governments, especially those under threat owing to civil war, insurgency or even domestic opposition but which are barred from obtaining weapons from traditional western sources. Chinese AK-47 assault rifles are common in national armies as well as among armed rebel groups such as those in eastern Congo. They also appeared in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and in Chad and Darfur in the Sudan. China's arms sales to Africa stood at \$ 1.3billion in 2003 (Alden 2007). From 2000 to 2003 China delivered about 13% of all arms to sub-Saharan Africa, the second highest provider after Russia. From 2004 to 2007, China's percentage increased to almost 18%, featuring the delivery of artillery pieces, armored cars, minor surface combatants, supersonic combat aircraft and other aircrafts (Grimmett 2008). While Chinese supplies may not be the highest, Chinese weaponry has nevertheless proved to be significant in some Africa's bloodiest conflicts, where decades of civil wars have provided a welcome market for foreign arms merchants. The classic contemporary example of China's weapon-exporting policy in Africa is China's involvement in Sudan's long war. In Sudan Beijing pursued a policy that was entirely based on economic interest, and have supplied the Sudanese government with fighter aircraft and an assortment of weaponry (Taylor 2006, Shinn 2009, Alden 2007, and Brown & Sriam 2008). The Chinese have set up

three small arms factories in Sudan that produce light weapons for use in the region as well as in Uganda.

Beginning from 2000, Mugabe's Zimbabwe was faced with a series of punitive measures by the Western countries. Faced with increased international isolation and economic crisis reaching epic proportions, president Mugabe in 2005 announced a new "Look East" policy, turning its back to the West, and facing the East "from where the sun rises" (Brautigam 2009). Despite the country's dangerous turmoil, and instability, China supplied Zimbabwe with about \$28million in arms between 2005 and 2007 (SIPRI, 2010). Aside selling of light weapons, China built a weapons factory for Zimbabwe (Meidan 2006). In 2005 China sold to Zimbabwe, 6 jets for its air force. This was soon followed by 12 jet fighters and 100 military vehicles, valued at about \$240million (Brown and Sriram 2008). China supplied tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft batteries, riot control gear and radio-jamming equipments (Eisenman 2008). Just after Zimbabwe's disputed March 2008 election, a Chinese freighter, An Yue Jiang, was returned to China after unions in South Africa and neighbouring countries refused to offload the cargo. Four of the thirty-six containers contained ammunition and rocket-propelled grenades intended for trans-shipment to Zimbabwe (Brautigam 2009). It was later reported that in that same year, that tones of that same ammunition were flown into Zimbabwe from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Nigerian government's frustration with US congressional interference in the delivery of patrol boats for the troubled Niger Delta contributed to its decision to switch to Chinese military equipment. China granted Nigeria \$1million in 2001 to upgrade its military facilities. A \$251million contract was negotiated between Nigeria and China to purchase twelve F-7M Airguard multipurpose combat aircraft and three FT-7NI dual-seat fighter trainer aircraft (Chau 2007). The deal included twenty three PL-9 short-range air-to-air missiles, unguided rockets, and bombs for anti-tank and run runway denial missions, and training twelve Nigerian pilots in China. Ghana received the sum of \$1.7million from China in 2007 for the

upgrading of its defense and military equipment. Earlier to this, the two countries inaugurated a combined military-police barracks at Burma Camp in Accra, financed by a \$ 3.8million interest free loan. China sells aircraft to Egypt and Kenya (Hellstrom 2009). Light strike aircraft such as the K-8 and the JF-17 multi-role combat aircraft have been sold to Algeria, Botswana, and Morocco (Grimmett 2008).

To sale or buy arms is not however by itself condemnable given especially the nature and order of international politics and practice (Morgenthau 1948, Waltz 2001). By supplying African governments with military equipment, China will be helping to strengthen the military capacities of its key allies in Africa, and expand its influence in oil-producing countries. The prospects for significant revenue earnings from arms sales to Africa are relatively small (Hellstrom 2009). Such sales is viewed as one sure means of enhancing China's status as an international political power, and increasing its ability to obtain access to significant natural resources, especially oil (Smith 2008, Wendell 2009, Dijk 2009). What however makes Chinese arms deals with Africa to come under serious criticism is its practice of flouting and breaching United Nations arms embargo, and supplying to belligerent groups, thereby worsening the already bad peace conditions of those areas into where such weapons are exported.

The past decade saw widespread changes in China's foreign defense policy. The 2006 White Paper, *China's National Defense in 2006*, charges the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with "implementing the military strategy of active defense"—a term that has grown to provide justification for use of military force outside the PRC's borders. For the first time, the paper outlines the PLA's responsibilities to: Take the initiative to prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars, take part in international security cooperation, strengthen strategic coordination and consultation with major powers and neighboring countries, and conduct bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises and play an active part in maintaining global and regional peace and

stability (Parenti 2009). Bolstered by the change in policy, China began to send her troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Chinese peacekeepers are deployed to United Nations peacekeeping operations worldwide, but their presence in Africa is striking. Of roughly 2,000 peacekeepers China has deployed around the world, on average during the first nine months in 2008, 77 percent were in Africa. China is by far the largest contributor to Africa peacekeeping among the Security Council's permanent members, with 63 percent of total p-5 contributions to the continent (Qiang and Tian 2009). China's participation in the United Nations peacekeeping regime and composition of its deployments allow Beijing to develop and nurture its national interests, maintain friendly relations with recipient governments, and at the same time project the image of a responsible stakeholder on the international stage. Sudan is a case in point. China has consistently opposed efforts within the Security Council to pressure or punish Khartoum, and in fact China has been among the large suppliers of weapons to the Sudanese government. Yet at the same time, it has deployed personnel to both United Nations Mission in Southern Sudan, and the hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (*SaveDarfur* 2007).

The composition of Chinese deployments is generally on the softer side of such military interventions. Of the total number of Chinese personnel contributed to missions around the globe, 5 percent are military observers, 14 percent are police, and 81 percent are troops (Parenti 2009). In Africa, the troop's component of China's contribution is even higher, at 91 percent. Troops carry out a variety of tasks and functions. In addition to combat units tasked with defending UN installations and personnel as well as local civilians in immediate danger, this component includes enabling units such as engineers, logistics staff, and medical personnel. Unlike the contingents of police and military observers which are composed of a mixture of personnel from all contributing countries, troops are deployed in their organic home units, which leave the contributing countries with substantial influence on their deployment whereabouts

and, though rare, the ability to utilize those troops for projects other than those mandated by the mission (Levy 2009).

In Africa, the vast majority of China's peacekeeping troops fall within the category of enabling units. China's contribution to United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), consisted of a 315 member engineering contingent dispatched to help with the construction of camps, roads and bridges. Well diggers and relevant equipment was also sent by China to Darfur region to solve the problem of water shortage facing the hybrid African Union-United Nations force. Similarly in Southern Sudan, China contributed to UN Mission in Sudan 460 engineers, transport experts, and medical personnel. In all, according to the vice director of the Peacekeeping Affairs office of China's Ministry of National Defense, Wei Yanwei, Chinese peacekeepers worldwide have built or repaired more than 200 bridges and 7, 500 kilometers of roads, airports, and water supply infrastructures, and they have treated nearly 50,000 local patients (*Buisness Day* 2004). The pattern is similar in Liberia where China's 530 peacekeeping troops consist of engineering, transportation, and medical staff. Of the approximately 200 Chinese peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 175 were engineers and 40 medical personnel who provided applauded medical support in Central Africa

While these various enabling units are tasked mainly with supporting the mission and its peacekeepers' needs, records show that in the process, many facilities, items of infrastructure, and services that benefit local populations are also being constructed and rehabilitated (Levy 2009, Harland 2004). In this aspect of peacekeeping, the soft security portion of nation building and reconstruction, the greatest opportunity lies for using soft power to promote China's wider national interests. Significantly, China's largest peacekeeping contributions in Africa are also where it has made large investments in natural resources, and where

good government-to-government relations will ultimately resound to its economic interest.

Peace Implication of Chinese Military Roles in Africa

Peace is a prominent, core feature in China's official presentation of its purpose in international affairs and Africa. The importance of peace and resolving conflict is regularly invoked by Beijing, but this is not significant in China's engagement with Africa. China's Africa policy (2006), for example devotes just one paragraph to this area (Large 2008). Likewise the humanitarian and peace assistance China has provided, mostly in kind, is minor in comparison to its investments in Africa. Chinese government has not proactively sought to involve itself in Africa's peace processes, rather it has affirmed the primary responsibility of the international community and engaged as and when its interests have been threatened. Chinese companies in places are reinforcing pre-existing resource-related conflict dynamics in Africa. For example, China's recent entry into the Nigerian oil sector has involved Chinese companies becoming caught up in conflict between the Nigerian state and militias, with China supplying fighter jets, missiles and training (Alden 2007). As such, the already wobbling peace condition of the continent has been negatively impacted upon by China's foray into Africa.

To meet its oil and mineral needs, Beijing has consistently delivered arms to pariah states in Africa especially the conflict-torn zones which have come under western sanctions and United Nations' embargo, in their attempt to address the horrendous massacre and genocidal killings that have characterized the politics of those areas. Severally, China has been implicated in the proliferation of arms in Africa which either provoke conflicts or exacerbate the existing ones (Tongkeh, 2009, Alden, 2005, Taylor 2005, *SaveDarfur*, 2007). Many Chinese firms were accused of smuggling illegal arms: Chinese AK-47, machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers into Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Ivory Coast where rebels and mercenaries were involved

in civil wars. These arms gain faster inroads owing to their relatively cheap costs. China can thus be held responsible (alongside with others) for the death and destruction that Africa's various wars have visited upon the people of the continent. Such military involvement in ongoing civil wars and conflict situations in Africa is not conducive for peace in Africa. There is a very real danger that Beijing's supposed 'non-interference' stance merely masks the bottom line: the chase for profits and oil (Taylor, 2006). This has been carried on with nonchalance towards Africa's political stability and peace. As Ian Taylor noted, "unmoved by ...concerns and without fear of political consequences, Chinese government seems willing to fuel a small-arms race in sub-Saharan Africa to generate additional revenues for the PLA" It is a common knowledge that China employed military means to protect her economic interests in Sudan and elsewhere in Africa, thereby contributing to a steady degeneration of the already tenuous security and humanitarian situations in the continent. At the instance of attack on its oil installations in Kordofan, a Sudanese region neighbouring Darfur, Chinese government reportedly deployed about 400 soldiers in civilian clothing, to protect its economic investment against the assault of the rebels (Gertz and Rowan 2004, Dijk 2009, Shinn 2008). This was the first time China directly got involved militarily in Africa's troubling domestic politics. While under attack in Ethiopia by the Ogaden Liberation Front, China was not to stand and watch its oil explorers die. Beijing's decision was to start defending and protecting its workers with armed guards (Puska 2008). In the Niger Delta in Nigeria, Chinese employees of Chinese oil companies have also been attacked. China concludes that such events make it difficult for China to maintain its non-interference stance (Dijk 2009). Hence China considered military presence in certain Africa countries, thereby becoming a part of Africa's exacerbating conflict situation rather than being a solution.

In Zimbabwe, oppressive rule has been sustained owing to some extent, China's substantial military support to president Robert Mugabe. It is on record that Mugabe raped

democracy in Zimbabwe, sanctioned brutal gang violence against opposition parties, condoned the kidnapping and torture of human rights activists, and encouraged a chaotic land redistribution that delivered many farms into the hands of politicians who coveted them, rather than the landless poor. This tenuous power-sharing arrangement provoked violence in the country. Attempts by human rights activists and the international community to redress and halt this abuse was frustrated by Chinese continued military support to the dictator. With assured weaponry and military supply from China, the brutality inflicted by the supporters of Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF was to continue (Brautigam 2009, Dijk 2009). Despite the country's dangerous turmoil and instability, China supplied Zimbabwe with millions of dollars worth of arms. This supply was intended for Mugabe's more lethal crackdown on his political opposition. It is widely believed that China's military support and supplies prolonged Zimbabwe's crisis.

Darfur reveals the hollowness of the post-Holocaust promise of "never again". In Darfur for nearly three years, the Sudanese government together with militia proxies committed widespread, systematic violence against the region's black African population. The violence was massive and often executed in broad daylight. Arab perpetrators displaced more than two million black Africans and claimed the lives of more than two hundred thousand civilians (Scott 2006). But what has been the role of China in this drama? China has played a direct role in selling arms to Sudan and in developing its weapons industry. Chinese arms sales rose twenty five fold within the Sudan's war years (*SaveDarfur* 2007). Much of this occurred in spite of United Nations Security Council's arm embargo. In spite of China's denials, evidences point to her indictment. Shell casings collected from various sites in Darfur suggest that most of the ammunition used by parties to the conflict in Darfur is manufactured in China (United Nations 2006). China has a huge investment in Sudanese economy, the oil sector in particular (Brautigam 2009, Dijk 2009, Rotberg 2008). China is the leading developer of Sudanese oil industry and major

purchaser of Sudanese oil. Though Beijing regularly justify China's economic involvement in Sudan as being key to that country's development, but it is obvious that in the context of rising imperative for peace and multilateral efforts to halt the blood-thirsty Khartoum regime, the concentration of wealth and weapons among the Sudan's ruling elite by Chinese investment and arms deals, unconditionally feeds conflict. As the Sudanese erstwhile Deputy Central Bank governor, Elijah Aleng said, "When you exploit oil resources and nothing goes to the population, then you are financing the war against them with resources and that is negative" (*Sunday Tribune* 2007). With the help of its Muslim Janjaweed militia groups and the blessing of Bashir, the Sudanese Air Force has used Chinese-given weapons against defenseless villagers in Darfur (Scott 2006, Puska, 2007). There have been also persistent claims by independent aid groups that Sudanese government troops and rebels have used Chinese oil company airstrips to conduct bombing raids on villages and hospitals. The pilots of the Fatan A5 jets used in massacres against unarmed civilians in Darfur, were trained by China (Bonincontro 2010).

It was for sure, during China's presidency of the United Nations Security Council that Resolution 1769 was passed, contributing as it appeared, to the peace of that highly disturbed part of Africa. But reports indicate that owing to her accruing economic gains from the sales of arms, China worked behind the scenes to significantly weaken the terms of the resolution (*SaveDarfur* 2007, Stakelbeck 2006). Working with Sudan, China succeeded in deleting language that would have set the stage for mandatory Security Council's targeted sanctions were Sudan to fail to cooperate in implementing the Resolution. The hybrid force's mandate to "seize and dispose" weapons found in Darfur in contravention of the arms embargo was diluted in the final text. The force was permitted merely to "monitor them" (*Small Arms Survey* 2007). China's prolonged reluctance to endorse United Nations entrance into Sudan, to halt the carnage and horrendous killings of thousands of especially children and women, was based on her deeply entrenched

economic gains arising from exportation of military arms and oil exploration, but neatly cloaked under the noninterference rhetoric. The Chinese officials and media claimed that the “root causes of the Darfur conflict were poverty and lack of development” (Stakelbeck 2006: 4). Even if we admit the twin factors of poverty and lack of development as causal factors in the Darfur conflict, we ask: will a continued military support and supply of weapons to the already boiling Sudan vitiate or exacerbate the internecine situation? Denying any logic in the China’s noninterference ploy, Stakebeck (2006: 4) concluded that “China’s Sudan policy is manipulative and opportunistic...” Ignoring the displacement of an estimated 2 million Sudanese villagers and the murder of 180, 000 others for its economic gain, China worked to have it both ways. While it sold lethal military weapons to the government of Bashir, and protected it from UN sanctions, it gave humanitarian aid to the estranged Darfur. At best the resultant effect is that the peace that is a desideratum became rather distanced as the north and south civil war in Darfur became perpetuated. In like manner, while Ethiopia and Eritrea were towards war, Chinese corporations transferred a substantial share of 1 billion US dollars in weapons to both countries between 1998 and 2000 (Taylor 2005). Rather than dousing the conflict in Rwanda, China’s arm deals with the belligerent groups worsened the already bad peace and security condition of that country. In 1995, a Chinese ship carrying 152 tones of ammunition and light weapons was refused permission to unload in Tanzania. The cargo was destined for the Tutsi-dominated army of Burundi, and Tanzania was concerned that ethnic conflict there would be exacerbated by the arms shipment (Williams and Taylor 2005). China’s delivery of these weapons goes with the tact of the final destinations being mislabeled and the weapons disguised as agricultural equipment (ODI, 1998). By these, China can be held responsible for impacting negatively on Africa’s wobbling peace.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chinese arms exporters furnished Laurent Kabila with arms in 1997, and had been supplying the vexed and troubled Kinshasa with

weapons. Sierra-Leone's brutal civil war was fuelled by extensive shipments of Chinese arms. Taylor (2005) notes that China has been Sierra-Leone's main arms supplier and stepped up shipments when the civil war began. Chinese arms deals in Sierra-Leone repeatedly broke United Nations sanctions and substantially helped to damage the country's aspiration for peace and development. One has to question the coherence and credibility of Chinese peacekeeping efforts in Africa when China otherwise pursues strategies which contribute to the eruption and prolongation of violent conflicts in the continent. For example, while China was an important troop-contributing country to the United Nations Mission in Liberia, its economic interests helped Charles Taylor to maintain himself in power. China imported almost half of Liberia's timber in 2000, and thus provided Taylor with considerable wherewithal (Tull, 2006). It was only in 2003 that China, an important buyer of Liberian timber brought itself to reluctantly nod through United Nations sanctions against Liberia which it had previously opposed on the devious grounds of "increased unemployment" in Liberia (Johnston 2004: 447)

The popular notion that China's peacekeeping involvement in Africa represents her interest in Africa's peace is at best abstract. Large (2008:37) argue rightly that "China's attitude to conflict resolution in Africa reflects contrasting policy priorities and economic interests". The importance of peace and resolving conflict is regularly invoked by Beijing, but this is not a significant aspect of Chinese engagement in Africa. The instances where China has actively and substantially responded to conflict resolution and mediation efforts in Africa are few. It has not proactively sought to involve itself in peace process, rather it has affirmed the primary responsibility of the international community, and engaged as and when its personal interests have been threatened. And when it gets involved, the Chinese government operates only a secondary support role. While the Chinese contributions to peacekeeping and anti-piracy may be said to be positive for Africa, its arms sales have had negative implications for Africa's peace.

Chinese arms sales to Africa fuels arm race. Chinese specialists in heavy military equipment were reportedly sent to Equatorial Guinea to provide training for equipments that the country do not even have (Taylor 2005). This was presumably in order to sell such weapons to Equatorial Guinea for oil reasons. For about three months, Chinese trainers worked with the local army, yet Equatorial Guinea has no such heavy weapons. The import of this was that given the climbing oil prices and its accruing financial profits Beijing stepped in to offer Equatorial Guinea military weapons and training for the protection of its oil wells from Nigeria, and Cameroon. The possible resultant effect of such moves is the fuelling of “some sort of arms race in the Gulf of Guinea” (Williams and Taylor 2005:96). In 2004, China sold military weapons to Zimbabwe worth \$ 40million (Brooks & Shin 2006). This included 12 Chinese-made FC-1 fighter aircraft and 100 military vehicles. The FC-1 is a multipurpose fighter, targeted to serve as a challenge to the JAS-39 Gripen multipurpose fighters purchased by South Africa from Sweden (Shinn 2008). This transaction caused considerable apprehension in South Africa, and led to international concerns about a regional arms race.

The eastern DRC constitutes one of the longest-running conflicts in Africa, with attendant murderous killings. Accounts are numerous that Chinese small arms have contributed to the killing. Amnesty International reported that Chinese AK-47s were common among soldiers, militia and armed groups operating in the Kivu Provinces and the Ituri District of the DRC where the weapons have been used to commit atrocities (Holslag 2007). China's act of continued arms sales to Africa's problem areas, cynical military relations and support to rogue and blood-thirst regimes, and her double-dealing peacekeeping roles in Africa, do not help the peace condition of Africa's wobbling states. It rather furnishes and escalates conflicts. As these conflicts surge, the lacked but much needed development in Africa is further distanced. Incontestably, conflicts have the capacity to severely constrain development endeavours by

destroying infrastructure, interrupting the production process and diverting resources away from productive uses (Chuka 2008). Sudanese erstwhile finance minister had to admit that up to 70% of Sudan's oil generated wealth in the inter war years was devoted to weapon acquisition and war execution (Gentleman, 2006). The obvious resultant effect of this is that even in the post conflict period, the state becomes emasculated of its provisioning power. There is a consensus among conflict theorists (Ali 2006, Azar 1994) that there is an indubitable causal linkage between underdevelopment and conflict. The feeling of frustration arising from the state's failure to provide basic needs for its people produces aggressive citizens who resort to aggression and conflict. Through this process, violence has assumed a circling phenomenon in Africa.

Conclusion

From the early years of contact with Africa, China has manifested military involvements in Africa. This has been in the areas of military training and assistance, arms sales, anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations. In as much as the peacekeeping efforts may have engaged China in a positive way in Africa's conflict zones, but continued arm sales in a manner that exacerbate African conflicts, China certainly cannot be helping the much needed peace in Africa. China was opposed to sanctions against Sudan and Zimbabwe and instead continued its controversial military arms sales to them for its economic gain, ignoring the tenuous security situations in those countries. Sale of arms may not by itself be cynical given the nature and order of international politics and practice. What however makes Chinese arms deals with Africa to come under serious criticism is its practice of flouting and breaching United Nations arms embargo, and supplying to belligerent groups, thereby worsening the already bad peace conditions of those areas where such weapons are exported. Through so many communiqué, China has consistently put Washington on the notice that it would not tolerate any United States' insensitivity to China's interests by demanding an end to US arm sales to Taiwan. Knowing the danger and threat continued sale of arms

portends to her peace and aspiration for a harmonious China, one will wonder why China will not extend such understanding in her relations with Africa.

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Regional Community Building in East Asia: Problems and Prospects

Chuka Enuka, Center for Contemporary International Relations, Jilin University (China)¹

Opinion Paper

Abstract: *Consequent upon the realization that in the modern era, nations have most frequently had more to gain through cooperation and integrated economic relationship than through exclusive economic spheres, the states in East Asia have put in motion a process of shift from regionalization to regionalism. The construction of an East Asian Economic Community was proposed. The proposal anticipates the inclusion of the ten member countries of the ASEAN and Japan, Korea and China. The motivating forces behind this proposal are to increase mutual trade, and to construct a regional group that will offer the participating members trading and economic advantage in the world. But assailing this move has been plethora of problems. Questions of whether the aspiration for an East Asia Community will be forlorn and if the undeniable centrifugal forces that challenge the transformation of the dream into a living reality will be eclipsed, defines the aim of this paper.*

Keywords: *Regional Community, ASEAN, East Asia, Regionalism*

Introduction

The imperative for regional integration derives from the enormous economic dividends it yields to the participating members (see Balaam and Veseth 2003). For this, relations among states since the recent past have shown indications

¹ **Chuka Enuka** is a lecturer at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria. Currently he is attached to the Center for Contemporary International Relations Studies, Jilin University, China, on a leave. His research interests include, war and peace studies, China-Africa studies and International History, on which he has published numerous articles in diverse journals and collected volumes.

Address: Friendship Guesthouse, 2699 Qianjin Street, Changchun, 130012, China.

towards trans-national groupings and regional cleavages. As captured by Balaam and Veseth, “One of the most powerful dynamics of this era in world history is regionalism with increased drive on states to unite economies for greater efficiency and growth” This is akin to the ethos and philosophy of globalization which to some reasonable degree defines the current international order. This global wave that prompts regionalism does also move in East Asia, manifesting itself in the current collective drive by both Northeast and Southeast Asian states towards the construction of an East Asia Community (Zhang 2008). The new thrusts of regional community building have been thriving within the ASEAN framework. ASEAN, quickly led to ASEAN+3(APT), which created East Asian Vision Group (EAVG). This creation was followed closely by the establishment of East Asia Study Group (EASG) (Termask 2008). In 2002, EASVG submitted its report to ASEAN+3 which included inter-alia, a recommendation to establish an East Asia Summit. The contested assumption is that the expected East Asia Community will arise from the EAS.

The discussion on the possibility of integrated regional relationship and construction of an economic community in East Asia has tended to take the form of a debate between adherents of two distinct schools of thought: Realism and Idealism. According to the realists, international anarchy breeds competition and conflicts among states, and debilitates states’ willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. The realists therefore, present a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation (Grieco 2004, Friedberg 2000). The Waltzian definition of the world system as anarchic informs Lairson and Skidmore’s (2004) view that competition for relative gains among states makes cooperation difficult and tenuous. Still within the purview of the realist pessimist perspective of international cooperation, worry is expressed that there is accelerating emergence of multi-polar system in East Asia with a cluster of big powers like Japan, China, Russia and India. The logic is that the competing agendas resulting from this multi-polarity distances the reality of an integrated

regional tie in the region. But idealists hold that in spite of barriers, cooperation is both possible and likely. Compared to realism, idealism offers more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve cooperation. The idealists reject that international politics is that which centers on wars and threats of it. Rather, the belief is that beyond the threats of war, international politics include many actions motivated by the desire to collaborate with others so as to derive mutual benefits. With the triumph of idealism manifested in the realization of the European Union and the creation of regional economic blocs in America and other parts of the globe, this paper predicts a possibility on the current move by the East Asian states to form a regional economic community.

Historicizing Regionalism in East Asia

The idea of regional cooperation as a means to bring forth reconstruction and development to both traditional states and newly independent states in the region had not been high on the agenda in East Asia. As Liu and Reginier (2001) contained, with the semi-exception of ASEAN, regional cooperation has either been largely absent or has tended to embrace politico-military arrangements manipulated by superpowers for most East Asian nations during the Cold War period. The whole concept of regionalism has been perceived as foreign. East Asian nations were tied up with various domestic and external priorities which on the contrary, have had very little to do with any regional commitment. As the authors assert, regionalism became truly, a fashionable construct in East Asia of late. A comparative consideration of the developments in European, America and Africa's regions evidences and authenticates Liu Reginier's statement.

Historically, the first explicit but ill-fated attempt at constructing a regional grouping in East Asia was made by Japan during the World War 11, in form of imperialist imposition of the Greater East Asia Co-operative Sphere, in

the wake Japanese invasion and occupation. Understandably, this was rejected by peoples and countries in the region, whose interpretation of the move was in the angle of exclusive benefit to Japan, rather than a collective interest (Zhang 2008, Wikipedia 2008). The creation of SEATO in the post World War 11 was not unconnected to the Cold War politics and the United State's desire to strengthen the anti-Soviet alliance, and solidify the political unity of the United States and it allies (Gilpin 2001).

Noteworthy is that the rationale for the two formations above was closely associated with the balance and counter balance of power strategies, and not so much with any sense of regional awareness. However, the attempts at regionalism did not wane. Convinced by the need to fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of the colonial powers, and to discourage the further stepping in of outsiders, into the Southeast Asia, Thanom Khoman, the then foreign affairs minister of Thailand, initiated a cooperative move. The result was an embryonic organization, ASA, the Association of Southeast Asia, comprising Malaysia, Philippine and Thailand. Soon after its creation in 1961, ASA ran into a snag. Quarrelsomeness and contestations over territorial borders became the defining feature of the relations among Malaysia, Philippine and Indonesia. This turn of events spelt the collapse of the fledgling ASA.

1966 witnessed a larger grouping with the East Asians under a new organization known as ASPAC, Asian and Pacific Council. Calamity again rocked this formation as the admission of the People's Republic of China and the eviction of Taiwan made it impossible for council members to sit agreeably on the same conference table (Khoman: 2002).

While dispute paralyzed ASA, and fledge ASPAC, Bangkok did not relax efforts at lasting and working regional cooperative body. In a meeting designed to address the age-long territorial disputes among disputants, Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippine, the foreign affairs minister of Thailand initiated the idea of forming an organization for

regional cooperation. This was afterwards consented to. With the signing of a short, simply worded document, the Bangkok Declaration, on the 8th of August, 1967, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations, ASEAN, was born. The membership comprised Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Philippine. Subsequently Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Brunei joined, totaling the membership to its present ten. The stated aims include among others, collaboration in economic and related fields, regional peace and stability (Bangkok Declaration 1967). The evolution of ASEAN as a sub regional project was attended by some structural and systemic constraints (Zhang 2008, Khoma 2002). Before the end of the Cold War, regional community among ASEAN countries was at best tentative. The first ASEAN Summit took place only in 1976, almost a decade after its inauguration. Zhang (2008), summarized that in terms of economic integration and confidence building, both precursors to community construction, progress was limited, though encouraging.

Accelerated efforts at regional community construction could rightly be traced to the end of the Cold War. The post Cold War removed the strategic rationale that fragmented the region and hampered rational economic integration. This necessitated the imperative and the launch of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1989.

Alarmed by the growing competition from the mushrooming free trade areas in the world, including the formation of a single European market, the market integration between the US and Canada, and that between the US and Mexico, which led to NAFTA, dismayed by the slow progress in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade relations, ASEAN began to improve its collective position in the face of the adverse world situation (Zhang 2008).

The idea to establish an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) began to be espoused in the 1990s by Mahathir, Malaysian prime minister. His view was that countries in East Asia (Northeast +Southeast Asia), should do more in consultation

and cooperation to help the economies in the region overcome their difficulties, given that ASEAN members were not strong enough to make a difference in world trade (Tersmak 2008).

The Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 proved a catalyst for regional community construction in East Asia. It provoked the recognition that greater cooperation by Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia is both necessary and beneficial, thus shaping the understanding of East Asia as a region. Consequently, the ASEAN+3 was established and subsequently institutionalized. Within the ASEAN +3 framework, determined thrusts of regional construction have been thriving. The East Asia Visionary Group (EAVG) was created in November 2000, by the ASEAN+3 Summit in Singapore, charged with the task of looking into the future of East Asia cooperation. The EAVG Report submitted to the ASEAN+3 leaders, proposed inter alia, the formation of an East Asia Community, establishment of an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA), supplanting of ASEAN+3 with an East Asia Summit and the broadening of East Asia cooperation. This submission necessitated the swinging into action by the EASG, East Asia Study Group, with the mandate to “assess the recommendations of the EAVG, and to explore the idea and implications of an East Asia Summit” (Tersmak 2008:8). The completed study and report the EASG upheld many of the EAVG recommendations, including the creation of an East Asia Community, and designation of East Asia Summit as a vehicle driving East Asia Community building. This has been however, not without twists. Detailed discourse of this is reserved for the succeeding section.

Problems of Regional Community Building in East Asia

It remains incontestably factual that the march towards a community construction in East Asia has been assailed by forces that are centrifugal. One sure plaque that eats too deep into the fabric of the East Asia community building is the rather pathological, historically rooted feeling of

animosity between China and Japan. Most of the conflicts between the two countries stem from questions that border around the World War 11 and the status of Taiwan. Many Chinese still believe Japan has never properly repented for her sins and atrocities committed during its brutal invasion in 1930s and 1940s, during which the notorious rape of Nanjing occurred. This has strained the relationship between the two countries, China and Japan. Three years ago, this resentment exploded into anti-Japan demonstrations in several Chinese cities (Times 2008). Recently, China voted against Japanese membership in the UN council. Japan perceives China as a rising economic competitor and a rival political influence in the region. These problems are further exacerbated by other disputes such as competing territorial claims, ownership of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea, dove-tailing into the politics of East Asian regionalism in centrifugal terms. In his expressed pessimism on the actualization of a regional community in East Asia, which was informed by the two countries' tremendous lack of trust and anxiety for themselves Toshikiko (2004: 6) wrote "When you are talking of combing Japan, China and ASEAN, you are just really mixing apples and oranges. I think it is worthwhile to recognize that difference" Adding to this, is Watanabe's observation that efforts at deeper cooperation in the region are utterly unrealistic, since relations between Korea and Japan, and China and Taiwan, far from improving, are growing increasingly tense. As aptly captured by the address of the former president Fidel Rasmos of the Republic of Philippine,

Ballistic missiles are being built competitively on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan straits. North Korea may have already developed the capability to target Alaska and the American west coast with its missiles; it has proved it can easily reach the vulnerable Japanese mainland. South Korea is negotiating with the United States the lengthening of the reach of its own missile systems, and Japan has agreed to take part in an American proposal for the coverage of its heartland by a theater-missile-defense system. Japan is also launching its own spy satellites - to give it independently early warning of any potential missile threat. On the other

hand, Taiwan is apparently contemplating its own missile defense system - against what it sees as china's growing capability is cruise-missile technology. Most unsettling of all is a resurgent China's effort to project power beyond mainland East Asia - where its strategic authority is already widely accepted -to the continent's maritime regions - particularly into the South China Sea, which East Asia has long regarded as its maritime heartland. For sure, what must not be argued about is that, an intra-regional antagonistic relationship is antithetical to regional community building. (Global Forum 2000).

Regionalism in Asia has become increasingly rife due to competing agendas for regional integration. Contending visions and conditions have continued to be articulated and issued. Japan would support the ultimate goal of building an East Asia Community but on the condition that the rest of Asia accept the United States-Japanese alliance as the bedrock of Japanese foreign policy, and democracy, human rights, the rule of law, international law and norms, good governance and other universal values would replace the anodyne phrase of the East Asia Vision Group, 'peace, prosperity, and progress' as the basis for regional cooperation (Noble 2008). Basically, Japan's position may be informed by her western inclinations and political orientations, which unarguably, may be un- suiting to other members. With this, discord has been common in the leaders' meetings over what becomes the hub of the East Asia Community. Some hope that the EAS which includes ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand would be step towards building an East Asia Community, but a major debate ensued when China insisted on differentiating core group which includes the original ASEAN+3 nations, from the peripheral group: India, Australia and New Zealand. A contrary view holds that Australia, India and New Zealand will be a balancer to the growing China's power.

Inter alia, fuzzy and uncertainty over geographical definition still surrounds the expected community. As Zhang (2008)

observed “it is hard to imagine a community without certain boundaries”. The inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and China in the East Asia Summit (EAS) poses some difficulty in any attempt to geographically define the community under construction. The issue becomes more confusedly compounded with the consideration of the United States as a member. One wonders how this scenario of close involvement of a distant hegemon is applicable across the Pacific. Besides the geo-definitional problem it poses, it makes fear likely that even if the East Asia Community becomes eventually constructed, the underlying aims for its creation may not be fulfilled. Among other reasons for the regional economic community, is to create a forum for regional economic freedom, which has been muzzled over the years by the same external societies whose admittance as members into EAS is under the region’s serious consideration. What again can be more perplexing? It boggles the mind imagining the rationale behind the EU and US membership of an East Asian regional body. Perhaps the question will need to be asked: Why is East Asian states not admitted into the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Organization (NATO), and Organization of American States (OAS)?

Begi (2005), an Indonesian scholar argues that the constituting members of ASEAN, ASEAN+3 and EAS that will hopefully integrate into the expected regional body, are historically more divided than united. The area in question encompasses a vast region with states of diverse religious beliefs, cultural traditions as well as ethnic groups. This is exacerbated by the diverse political systems, ideological patterns and differing levels of economic development and military attainments. Within ASEAN, pockets of grave poverty pose a threat to stability. Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are among the world’s poorest countries; they must be helped to ingrate themselves into ASEAN’s economic mainstream. Development schemes that ASEAN is already packaging -such as the Mekong river project and the Singapore-Kunming rail link - will stimulate growth in these countries. But they will need a lot of capital, technology and

years to harvest significant benefits. Against such background, the journey from conceiving East Asia as a region to constructing East Asia as a regional community is daunting. Generally the fear is not entirely dismissed that the less powerful might be marginalized, re-colonized and swallowed up by the bigger states (Rasmus 2000). The clamour for the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand as a counter balance against China's possible and perceived overbearing tendencies, is well premised on this context. Needless to say, an atmosphere of this form makes effective regionalization leave more to be desired.

The vision of a regional community has been plagued by outside interferences especially by the US. These interferences are situated in the perception that the fast growing China may exploit the regional platform to increase her geo-strategic might. Given China's ideological position, the feeling is not yet extricated from the mind of America that a new Cold War may upstart. Besides this strategic consideration, the Asian region which is becoming the global economic epicenter and the center of gravity for international relation in the 21st century is of large economic importance to the United States. The US exports to Asia is estimated at over 200 billion US dollars, accounting for nearly 25% of US total exports (Michalak 2006). This defines its competing interest in the region and its political affairs.

Prospects of Regional Community Construction in East Asia

The centrifugal force pitched against the success terrain of the region is indeed legion, but what might be encouraging is the noticeable common acceptance by the leaders in the region that cooperation for their future economic good is imperative. With this unflinching and concerted determination, surmounting their present obstacles looks possible. Common concerns today are driving East Asia to collaborate in ways that, though still lagging far behind the levels of cooperation achieved in Europe, could nevertheless be considered progressive in the Asian context. The post

1997 creation of regional financial arrangements in the hope of avoiding another 1997-style meltdown, the growth in regional intelligence, and law enforcement collaboration against the threats of terrorism and transnational criminal activities, the move by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) towards regional collaboration in disaster relief operations following the recent spate of natural disasters and humanitarian crises in the region, and so on. (Begi 2005) These have been as Seng (2009:17) put it, “a fair bit of low key cooperative efforts that incrementally and subtly serve as building blocks for more substantive cooperation among the regional actors”

For two thousand years before the arrival of the Western powers, East Asian international relation order was Sino-centric (Huntington 1996). Most of the other states in the region have long traditions of either cooperating with or being subordinate to China (Friedberg 2000) As Cohen (2000) will put it, Asians accept hierarchy, and indeed regard a clear ordering of relations as the key to domestic and international tranquility. Such attitude has deep roots in Confucian culture. Huntington (1996), suggests that similar patterns may well prevail in the future. With rapid Chinese power, Huntington predicts that the other East Asian states will be more likely to hop on the Chinese bandwagon, instead of joining together to balance the power of rising China (Friedberg 2000). In favour of this line of thought, Lairson and Skidmore (2004) reason that power relations matter considerably in cooperation. The existence of a single powerful state with significant economic resources and a strong commitment to regional international cooperation can play a key role in whether nations are able to work together. The hegemon’s power advantages can be used to win support from other states that otherwise might be reluctant to participate in cooperative ventures.

The Sino-Japanese age-long antagonism and differences may not hang on forever. History is replete with examples that one time chronic animosities can at a time be consigned into the farthest past through a purpose-driven dialogue in a

reconciliatory forum. History could be mined to demonstrate this possibility. France and Germany reconciled having had themselves smeared in several years of bitter antagonism and mutual suspicion. Today the Franco-German historical rivalry had to bend for a collective economic good under the European Union. East Asia can draw from this reservoir of example. The interesting fact of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, 1972, Peace and Friendship Treaty, 1978, and Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration, 1998, provide a solid political foundation and direction for the two countries to live in friendly co-existence.

The states have reasons to heal old wounds on the issue of the environment. This was a top topic of discussion when in May 2008, presidents Hu Jintao and Yasuo Fukuda met in Tokyo. The two leaders both agreed to place particular priority on working together in green technologies. Since 1999, Japan has extended 6.8 billion dollars in loans for environmental projects in China (Times 2008). Many more examples like China's request for aid from Japan for the victims of May's earthquake in Sichuan, Sino-Japanese agreement in June, 2008 to jointly develop disputed natural gas fields in East China Sea, and the recent docking of a Japanese warship in a Chinese port for the first time since after the World War 11, are serious indicators that the need for a collective regional community for East Asia will make collaboration between the two giants possible.

The problem of diversity within the East Asia region and the fear of the weak and the less developed in the march towards community construction is understandable. But the European Union should remain an encouraging example. The EU equally faced challenges. The members are diverse. In terms of population, they range from the island of Malta with 400,000 citizens, to Germany, France, and United Kingdom with 82.3 million, 59.2 million and 58.8 million respectively. The new entrants are diverse. From an economic standpoint, only Cyprus and Slovenia have per capita income are roughly comparable to previous EU members. Latvia's per capita income is just a tenth of

Denmark's (Balaam and Veseth 2005). Taken as a group, the new members of the EU do not have very much successful experience of the institutions of capitalism, democracy and rule of law that are necessary for them to achieve successful union with their European neighbours. If this reality can hold centripetally for the EU, it can also happen for East Asia.

Conclusion

East Asia encompasses vastly different political and economic systems. Religious and cultural cleavages are often intense and centrifugal. Unresolved territorial conflicts are numerous, and several of the world's most powerful nation-states have competing interests in the region. With so much combustible tinder spread across the region, reducing mutual mistrust is imperative. Though history, cultural diversity and economic rivalries continue to fragment East Asia, but in events in the world make it clear that there are no alternatives to closer economic integration and political solidarity for East Asia. The objective should be to replace the balance of power as the organizer of state relationship in East Asia with the balance of mutual benefit. East Asia has little choice but to construct a new architecture for the region's community building. The key question is not whether East Asia will integrate. It is how quickly.

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