
India and China

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The geopolitical center of the future world is confidently and inexorably moving to Southeast Asia, which radically changes all the usual global layouts. The new outline of the mechanisms of the international economy inevitably affects the former strategic confrontations, for example the long-standing competition between India and China. With approximately equal initial conditions (due to the population size, the area of the territory, the level of supply with raw materials and energy resources, the level of scientific and technical and economic development, the share of the rural population), due to a successful coincidence of a number of circumstances, the Chinese dragon started somewhat earlier and clearly more energetic than the Indian elephant. Thanks to which now China has achieved quite successful results. But thus he forced the Hindus to become more active too. And since the initial conditions in Hindustan are generally similar to the Chinese, then India can make an economic leap only by relying on external resources. More precisely is the development of foreign markets. And she has little time, given the pace with which Beijing makes the world “Chinese”.¹

Not having the same opportunities, New Delhi, nevertheless, is implementing its own global plan for the development of the international trading space, aiming mainly at expanding trade with Central Asia and Russia, with a further aim through us to enter Europe. At first glance the scale here is clearly inferior to the Chinese “Silk Road”. This is mainly about expanding one seaport, to which Indians invest not so much to a highly impressive amount of \$160 million. But the details here change everything. First, this port - Chabahar - is located in Iran, and secondly, it ... is also located in Iran. The first means the formation on its basis of a kind of a large industrial and transport cluster that plays the role of a large gateway to the project of the Southern Transport Corridor (STC), which projects the Caucasus and Central Asia, and also opens access to cheap Indian goods. Thanks to this port, only the wheat in Afghanistan managed to sell more than a million tons, whereas earlier, by trucks through the mountains, the volumes of its supplies did not exceed 60-70 thousand tons.

However, these gates already in the near future are going to earn in both directions. Since March 2016, in the same Chabahara, India, based on an intergovernmental agreement between the countries, has started to build a plant for liquefying natural gas and a plant for its cracking. The interest here

¹ Александр Запольскис

is mutual. New Delhi receives a stable source of supplies of very much needed energy carriers, moreover, with a large discount from world market prices. In turn, Tehran with Indian aid is turning into a major LNG exporter whose scale will allow successfully to resist US economic sanctions. Indian investments directly into the LNG project will amount to 85 million dollars in tranches of about 20-22 million dollars per year.

In addition, the Indians are investing another \$ 1.6 billion in the Chabohar-Zahedan railway line with a length of more than 500 kilometers, allowing almost an orderly increase in the flow of goods from the coast of the ocean to Afghanistan, which will undoubtedly benefit both the volumes of mutual Afghan-Indian trade. and the further implementation of the STC project as a whole. In particular, India intends to raise trade with Russia from the current one to the desired \$ 30 billion a year. Hence the second - a sharp increase in the geopolitical significance and economic growth of Iran as a whole. Cooperation with India allows you to get both external resources for your own development, and transit revenues, and access of your own goods to all those markets that will be reached by STC.

This forms a kind of another geopolitical axis of the future world: India-Iran-Russia, which is able to balance China's influence to a certain extent, and also puts Russia on the position of a key link providing a link between New Delhi and Beijing. Well, the fact that Russia as a result is also at the crossroads of two key logistical flows turns out to be an additional pleasant bonus for Russia. Only the USA (and Britain) are losing in the process and losing geopolitical and economic importance. Not surprisingly, they are trying to take advantage of the moment and form a new global union with China against China, at the same time seeking to block Iran in every way, indirectly blocking the oxygen of India itself. The anti-Iranian sanctions were officially ignored by the European Union, and India also refused to observe them.

The scale here is certainly not “Chinese”, but the plan is clear and concrete, assuming the end of the key stages for 4-5 years already. It is not ruled out that the progress in the implementation of the project by the Hindus of the Southern Telecommunications Company project will significantly spur the pace of the Silk Road realization. In any case, in the next five years, especially taking into account the construction of a bridge to Sakhalin and further to Japan, the world expects great changes.

4. The military power of India

In addition to its increased role in the international political and economic field and its assertion as a nuclear power, India, in accordance with financial and technological resources, develops a full complex of

defensive capabilities. Attracting about 3% of its gross domestic product to defense, a very reasonable percentage, considering regional instability, it has one of the most powerful military forces in the world, its strength, its officers' good level, the courage of its subordinate cadres and soldiers. Nevertheless, the quantity and quality of its equipment and weapons are lacking.

The defense industry is based on a set of public companies and arsenals that produce equipment for the three armies. Some production programs have failed or significantly delayed. The main shipyards are in Mumbai and Calcutta. At present, 35 warships are being built. Although the Indian defense industry is expanding, including the private sector, India still needs to import many of its equipment and weapons. Russia remains an important supplier country and fairly easily licenses production for some weapons systems, including aircraft. Ordinary licenses production are made even in the field of high technologies, for example, the supersonic cruise missile Brahmos (abbreviation: Brahmaputra and Moscow)¹.

But, as in the civil sphere, Western technologies are in great demand. Israel and Western countries are increasing their share in the arms market. The Americans adopted, in accordance with the ten-year defense agreement signed on June 27, 2005 and renewed in 2015 during the same period, the sale of modern weapons, including F16 and F18 aircraft, which will have competitors. European, including French (signed a contract for the purchase of 36 Rafales), large transport aircraft, a Poseidon 8 marine reconnaissance aircraft and an amphibious assault ship.

They also offer cooperation for the construction of aircraft carriers and in the field of antimissile defense. In addition, an agreement on space cooperation was signed. The army has more than 1 200 000 people, and equipment and weapons are sometimes relatively modern, but sometimes obsolete.

The rotational involvement of many units in operations against separatist insurgents in Kashmir, separatists or autonomists in the northeastern states has hardened the troops, but also used them and distracted them from their core mission. The reinforcement of troops deployed in the Himalayas against China, by creating a new army corps, lags behind. Therefore, the border is poorly protected. In addition, the army suffers from a shortage of officers the deficit is estimated at 11,000. This under observation may explain the stress of some non-commissioned officers assigned to Kashmir, who sometimes have barracks, violent fights and suicides. The air force has high-performance fighters, such as Mig 29

¹ Alain Lamballe L'Inde, puissance mondiale

and Su 30, which were purchased from Russia and deployed at numerous bases throughout the country. But while waiting for other fighters, he can build 33 squadrons when he needs 42.¹

The acquisition of Russian aircraft equipped with Israeli AWACS detection systems is a power multiplier. The navy strengthened with the acquisition of an aircraft carrier of Russian origin. The first in a series of six French submarines Scorpene, issued under license at the Mumbai, Mazagon Docks Limited, was launched in 2016. A submarine with a nuclear engine built at the Vishakapatnam shipyard also went to sea in 2016, but without its weapons, will not function for several years.

The recent completion of a very large base in Carvara, 100 km south of Goa in Karnataka, gives the Indian Navy new means. In existing naval bases, in Mumbai, Vishakapatnam and Cochin, the fleet must share objects with merchant ships. This is not the same in Carvar, which is an exclusively military complex, with a joint vocation, with not only a naval base capable of deploying in optimal conditions for the safety of surface ships and submarines, but also an air base and various other infrastructures.

This is in fact the largest base in South Asia, without any comparison with the naval base of Ormara and the civil and military port of Gwadar on the coast of Makran, Pakistan. Carvar should allow the Indian Navy to protect shipping from its western shores in the Arabian Sea and monitor Chinese ships that can multiply their stops in Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

The base is of interest both for the United States and for Russia (the aircraft carrier of the Indian Navy, of Russian origin is based there). It is possible that US ships can cease their presence after agreeing an agreement between New Delhi and Washington, the Memorandum of Understanding on Logistics (LEMOA), which should allow the mutual use of naval and air bases. In addition, the naval infrastructure in the archipelago Lakewidy and Minikoy is being strengthened. Thus, it will be easier for the Indian fleet to withstand the possible threat of the Chinese fleet in the Indian Ocean with the help of allies of circumstances.

The infrastructure of Indian fleet will improve on the east coast with the planned construction of new naval bases near Vishakapatnam and 40 km south of Chennai. They will be added to the common base of Port Blair on the Andaman Archipelago and Nicobar, which controls access to the Straits of Malacca. The nuclear component develops mainly in the army and air armies and extends to the fleet. India, like Pakistan, decided to apply a

¹ Alain Lamballe L'Inde, puissance mondiale

moratorium on nuclear testing, but the program of long-range ballistic missiles continues. Successful shooting of Agni 5 was made on April 12, 2007 at 3500 km and on April 19, 2012 by 5 000 km. Also tested cruise missiles; October 17, 2014 Nirbhay was launched more than 1,000 km.

Civilian observation satellites can have military applications. The first special military observation satellite was launched in August 2007. India is now a military space power. The missile defense system is beginning to be developed. India suffers from the inadequacy of its command assets. There is an embryo of the Joint Staff, but there is no real power.

There is no chief of staff of the armies and three armies, land, air and sea, it seems, hardly co-ordinates their planning and training. The rigidity of the team, perhaps the legacy of a close defense relationship with the Soviet Union, is also detrimental to operational efficiency, holding back the initiative.

The strategic command, which carries out nuclear weapons, does not seem to function fully. This is an alarming situation, since reaction times in the case of nuclear missile exchanges between India and Pakistan are extremely limited due to short distances. Despite some progress, the military is still poorly integrated into government decision-making structures, and officials from a powerful Indian administrative service want to retain their prerogatives even if their security and defense skills are weak. It seems that scientists participate in decision-making and from their ranks came the former president of the Republic, Muslim Abdul Kalam, who was an engineer-gunsmith and a missile specialist¹.

India also does not accept foreign bases at home and it has no points of support abroad. However, it has some facilities in Mauritius and in the Seychelles archipelago, relatively close to Djibouti, where China created a naval base. It does not carry out any strategic deployment of its armed forces simply by sending large contingents to peacekeeping operations conducted throughout the world by the United Nations, especially and especially in Africa. In this area, there is some imitation with Pakistan and Bangladesh, other major suppliers of peacekeepers.

The Indian Navy sent ships for the repatriation of its endangered citizens in Lebanon and Yemen. It will be able to protect the great diasporas in the future on the periphery of the Indian Ocean. Members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization made it clear that US bases in Central Asia should be closed. In this context, the rebuilding of the Farquhar airbase in Tajikistan by the forces of the Indian army and the air force is gaining

¹ Alain Lamballe L'Inde, puissance mondiale

increasing importance, demonstrating the will of India to provide a certain military presence, at least temporarily and insignificantly, in Central Asia, which caused a wave in Islamabad.

India remains uncertain about the use of nuclear weapons recognizing that it will not use it primarily, what can be understood against Pakistan, but less against China. It modernizes its concepts of employment for land, air and sea forces. India creates combat groups to act quickly in the depths of the battlefield, with air support. Their actions will be aimed at destroying well-localized enemy forces and not occupying territory.

India has also acquired a certain potential for projecting its forces thanks to its aviation, which has long-range bombers, long-distance air stations and long-range aircraft, as well as its navy from the aircraft carrier. In addition, the Iranian port of Chabahar can be provided to Indian warships, if necessary, in accordance with an agreement that would be signed between Tehran and Delhi, but which has not been confirmed. Therefore, India will be able to intervene in military affairs in the Indian Ocean and even on the outskirts of the Pacific, especially in South-East Asia, with or without ties to the naval forces of the coastal and American countries.

Joint maneuvers involving units of the three armies increasingly occur in India and abroad with Americans, British, French, Russian, South Africans and Iranians. Others are planned in Singapore, Mongolia and Uzbekistan. Sea maneuvers are regularly conducted with Japanese and Australian naval forces. In these exercises, special forces are sometimes involved. Since 2016, India has a national navigation system (Global Positioning System - GPS), operating throughout South Asia and its outskirts at a distance of up to 1500 km. Although not in the whole world, this set of seven satellites is a multiplier of power. The paramilitary forces, mainly dependent on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, supplement the security system¹.

Armed with about 1.3 million people, more than the army, they not only participate in the fight against internal insurgents, supporters of the ideology of Islamists or Maoists or militants of nationalistic causes, but also the observation of long sections (15,000 km) and sea (7,500 km) boundaries. In the case of an international conflict, they can, at least some of them, constitute a significant additional force. From the military side, India is expanding its vision. At the same time, it could financially exhaust Pakistan in the arms race, since the United States has successfully waged a campaign against the Soviet Union. It would not be good to achieve this result,

¹ Alain Lamballe L'Inde, puissance mondiale

pursuing its main goal - to gain significant military potential, some of which can be designed beyond even South Asia.

The Indo-Pakistani relationship

In the past year, the Indo-Pakistani relationship has reached such a high level that it has not been observed since the division of British India into two independent states - India and Pakistan. And even the terrorist actions of militants could not disrupt the progress of the dialogue between Delhi and Islamabad. In the last year there has been a steady positive forward movement in relations between Pakistan and India, which have been extremely tense since the very beginning of the emergence in 1947 of two independent states (directly from India and Pakistan).

We consider it expedient to analyze only the events that took place in Pakistani-Indian relations in the twenty-first century, focusing, naturally, on their condition in the last year and a possible scenario of development in the short term. We only note that political analysts who do not even deal with conflicts in Asia know well that for their two largest South Asian countries their bilateral relations are priority in the foreign policy sphere. Especially after a number of armed conflicts in the last century - bloody clashes during the partition of British India in 1947-1948, the war between these countries in the autumn of 1965, the armed conflict in late 1971 during the partition of Pakistan directly into Pakistan and Bangladesh and etc.

In the final decade of this century, the most serious conflict in the relations between these two states arose in 2002, when in May of that year, Kashmiri militants dressed in the form of Indian soldiers staged a bloody massacre in the Kashmir valley, for which there is a dispute. Then during the fighting hundreds of civilians were killed. The Indian side accused Pakistan of preparing and sending fighters, in turn, Pakistan categorically rejected this kind of accusation and dumped all the blame for what happened in Delhi. But the fact remained that a serious armed clash took place and, what is most dangerous, both sides openly spoke about the possibility of local use of nuclear weapons. Back in late March 2002, CIA director George Tenet said that there was a real danger of the outbreak of war.

Speaking later to the Senate International Affairs and Armed Services Commission, he stressed: "If India launches large-scale offensive operations in the part of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, Islamabad can strike back on the assumption that the nuclear threat will limit the possibilities of the Indian offensive" Fortunately, such potential actions on both sides were quickly prevented, starting with the meeting on cooperation and confidence-building measures in Asia held in Alma-Ata in early June 2002, in the course of which the leaders of Russia and China, Vladimir Putin

and Jiang Zemin, apparently managed to bring Pakistan's leaders (Pervez Musharraf) and India (Atal Bihari Vajpayee) to the whole danger of saber rattling with nuclear weapons.

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who visited both countries at the time, described the situation as follows: "We are now in a situation where vigilance is felt instead of growing tension, and we hope that this will pass with time". One way or another, the threat of a military confrontation was over. At the same time, as it is clear from the statements of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Delhi scored a significant victory without war. And Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf stresses that the conflict was avoided because his country has nuclear weapons. That is, both sides put themselves in the credit of easing tension and pay attention to their own gain.

We do not accidentally pay so much attention to the events of 18 years ago; the fact is that after 1971 it was, perhaps, the most dangerous confrontation between the two South Asian states. Further, relations between the two countries can be described as a state of the cold war, although certain positive outbursts and negative declines have occurred.

The meeting in Islamabad in early 2004 of the leaders of the two states was of great importance for reducing tensions and developing good-neighborly relations, during which a decision was taken to hold the "Integrated Dialogue" between the two countries. In this case, it was supposed to hold negotiations at the political level on almost all interstate issues, namely: the Kashmir problem, the dispute over the Suachin glacier, the watershed of the Indus river and the number of rivers flowing into it, terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking, trade and economic cooperation and etc. It was also decided to hold consultations on a regular basis.

The negotiation process has just started to gain momentum, as in July 2006 in the Indian city of Mumbai (formerly Bombay), a terrorist act was committed, which killed almost 200 people. The Indian side immediately accused Islamabad of direct assistance to the Kashmiri separatists in its implementation and demanded that they take all measures to eliminate cross-border terrorism. Fortunately, prudence prevailed, and after the meeting of the leaders of the two states in the framework of the Summit of Non-Aligned Countries in Havana in September of the same year, the negotiation process resumed. Among the decisions adopted later, one of the most important was the fight against terrorism and extremism through, inter alia, the exchange of intelligence information, as well as the coordination of anti-terrorist activities and investigations. According to the intention of developers of this kind of decisions, their adoption should help to eliminate allegations of each other in the commission of terrorist acts.

The barely put forward proposals began to be realized, as in the same Mumbai in 2 years (November 2008), explosions in a number of hotels once again thundered, armed groups opened fire on the streets for civilians. Almost 200 people were killed (including more than 20 foreigners who lived in hotels) and several hundred wounded. Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh immediately announced the involvement of Pakistan in this terrorist act, which, in general, already became the traditional position of India. Such charges were primarily attributed to the fact that terrorists operating in the Indian part of Kashmir penetrate there from Azad Kashmir territory, which is under Pakistani control.

Naturally, the official Islamabad immediately rejected these charges. The country's defense minister, Ahmed Mukhtar, firmly stated that Pakistan has not the slightest relation to these acts of terrorism. To this he added in his interview to representatives of the Indian media that such accusations, which have no foundation, completely undermine the positive that has been created in bilateral relations in recent years. Add to this that on the same day, November 27, 2008, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani expressed deep condolences to the Indian people and the country's leadership in connection with the tragedy.

A report from the intelligence agency of the CIA for South Asia noted that the armed forces of India are almost ready to conduct a military operation against Pakistan and are only waiting for a signal from the leadership of the country to conduct it, and the Indian security forces on the Line of Control in Kashmir are constantly on high alert. The Indian fighters began to openly and regularly violate Pakistani airspace near the Indo-Pakistani border.

Attempts to accuse Pakistan of organizing a terrorist attack in Mumbai are directly connected with the statement of the Indian side that Islamabad seeks (by the hands of Islamist militants) to “take revenge” on India for the monstrous explosion on September 20, 2008 in the best hotel of the Pakistani capital, “Marriott”, resulting in 53 people died (including foreigners, including the Czech Ambassador to Pakistan) and over 200 wounded. Although the Islamic terrorist group Fedayin-i-Islam (which is suspected of having close ties with Al Qaeda) assumed responsibility for the terrorist attack almost immediately, the Pakistani special services believe that the hand of Indian extremists should not be ruled out here.

We cited here the most serious terrorist acts carried out in both countries. The number of small shares of this kind is estimated in hundreds (first of all, for example, to note an unprecedented terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001). And in many cases both Pakistan and India accuse each other of complicity in carrying them out on the territory

of both countries. The removal of questions and claims in this and many other areas of bilateral relations was the focus of official meetings at various levels in 2009 and in the first six months of this year. We will note and analyze some of the most significant of them.

After the above-mentioned act of terrorism in Mumbai, the peaceful dialogue between the two countries was interrupted on the initiative of the Indian side in December 2008. Simultaneously, bilateral trade between the countries was frozen. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh unequivocally accused Pakistan of allowing terrorists to prepare for the bombings in this Indian city on Pakistani territory.

For the sake of justice, we note here that even if these accusations against Islamabad are justified, the leadership of Pakistan was largely prevented from suppressing this kind of training. The terrorist act was being prepared near the Afghan border in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP), where federal laws of Pakistan do not work and the opportunities for federal forces are extremely limited there. But in this case it is important for us that the Pakistani-Indian talks on existing problems in bilateral relations were interrupted, and interrupted for an indefinite time, despite all the assurances of Islamabad in its complete non-participation in the Indian tragedy.

Regional predominance

Despite Pakistan's resistance and obstacles, India first established itself as a regional power in South Asia. Because of its size, its population and the importance of its economy, it dominates its regional partners who are willing or unwilling to use their hegemony. In addition to Pakistan, Bangladesh challenges it to a lesser degree, and Nepal suffers from this.

Despite its propensity for bilateral diplomacy, India has not opposed the establishment of a free trade agreement in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, perhaps because it sees easier access to countries outside the western borders of South Asia, which currently includes Afghanistan politically.

Possible agreement between India and China

Between India and China, there are still serious disagreements, including delineation of the border, a dispute around 130,000 square kilometers in the Himalayas. The planned but not yet decided construction a huge dam on the Brahmaputra before it enters to state Assam will cause great tension between the two countries, as well as between China and Bangladesh. Perhaps China renounces it but nevertheless builds various

works on the river and its tributaries. In addition, Beijing opposes India's accession to the UN Security Council as a permanent member and joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).



Both countries participate in some competitions in Asia. India perceives unfriendly projects in the Chinese initiatives in Pakistan and Burma. This is manifested in the construction of roads, participation in the construction in Pakistan of the deepwater port of Gwadar (which can serve as a base for warships, in addition to the Omararma naval base, also for McRahn), the use of the Mergui, Dawei, Thandwe and Sittwe ports in Burma and the installation of a listening station in Haggi on the Burmese island near Arakan. The creation of a corridor of economic cooperation linking Chinese Xinjiang with Pakistan, in particular Kashgar in Gwadar, crossing the disputed territory of Kashmir, is extremely inconvenient for India.

In addition, China has modernized the port of Hambantota in the south of Sri Lanka and will increase the capacity of the already important port of Colombo, the capital. His vain attempt, triggered by Pakistan, but denied by Beijing, to create a submarine base on the island of Marao in the Maldives, further strengthened Indian fears. To counter Chinese influence in Burma, India now considers it necessary to develop relations with this country. The

liberalization of the Burmese political regime, together with the relative withdrawal of public life from the army, helps bring the two countries closer together.

India is considering in particular the possibility of gas imports, but Bangladesh creates three conditions for the construction of a gas pipeline that will cross its territory: the possibility of importing hydroelectric power from Bhutan and Nepal, the right to transit to Nepal and Bhutan and trade rebalancing. Initially, India seemed very reluctant for the first two points, because it did not want too close contacts between Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. But the rapprochement between New Delhi and Dhaka has eliminated this reluctance. India has received from Bangladesh the possibility of transit by land and rail, as well as not only river, as now, men and goods between West Bengal and the northeastern states, which have virtually no access to the sea.

Permitting access for Assam and other northeastern states to the port of Chittagong will be considered a positive gesture in New Delhi. This should end. For the Indians, Bangladesh will help ease the opening to Southeast Asia. This will be the link between India and Burma. In the case of a political impossibility to build a gas pipeline between Bangladesh and Indian users through Bangladesh, New Delhi is considering a new route that will join the Mizoram through the valley of the Caladan and then Assam and West Bengal. Moreover, in order not to leave the area open to China, India provides military assistance to Burma. At the same time, he hopes to get more cooperation from this country for joint operations against insurgents in northeastern India.

China through its province of Xinjiang is also beginning to show interest in Afghanistan, where India has strengthened its influence after the fall of the Taliban regime. China's support for the Nepalese king in the fight against the Maoist rebels, including the supply of arms, has become a source of grief for India, which has suspended its exceptional military assistance express its dissatisfaction with the suppression of democracy. Taking advantage of the cooling relationship between India and Nepal in 2016, China is developing relations with India. The railway will soon connect Lhasa with the Nepalese border, and then join Kathmandu. China's attempts to reach an agreement with Bhutan regarding the delimitation of borders are very troubling to her, because she fears that Thimphu will make too many concessions, especially in the Chumbi Valley, the strategic importance to the India, as she commands access to the corridor connecting West Bengal with Assam. China seeks to penetrate deeper and deeper into the Himalayas from Tibet.

Despite the growing presence of China in South Asia and its periphery, the points of rapprochement between India and China are becoming increasingly clear. Adoption of China in 2009 as a member of the observer of the Association for Regional Cooperation of South Asia, namely India in 2017 as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, brings together two countries. The almost official recognition of Sikkim's membership in India facilitated rapprochement with New Delhi.

Both countries cooperate in many areas and increasingly meet. They reject a unipolar world dominated by the United States, and they advocate a multipolar world. They would be poles just like the United States, Japan, Russia, the European Union, Brazil and South Africa. India and China have established a strategic partnership on April 11, 2005, but the content remains uncertain. They are close to Iran. Currently the India-China-Russia union is being formed, specified by regular meetings of foreign ministers of the three countries. Moscow and Beijing want to prevent India from entering the American orbit of influence.

As Pakistan, India considers in the current state of affairs to ignore the US opposition to the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistani territory. China could benefit if this pipeline spread to Yunnan province through India. Repeated major terrorist attacks in India, such as in New Delhi on October 29, 2005 and Mumbai on July 11, 2006, may be enough to abandon this idea after cooling relations that inevitably follow between Pakistan and India.

The gas pipeline crossing Pakistan to get to Xinjiang seems to be a safer alternative to China, despite technical difficulties with the crossing of the Karakoram. This route will also be more attractive to Pakistan, as it will destroy India for the benefit of China. In both cases, Iran would be confident that it will have decent clients, India or China. The combination of the two options is also not eliminated.

India and China sometimes compete in world markets with a very clear advantage for the second (for example, China's trade with Latin America is ten times higher than in India). But they are great potential markets for each other, although production can be similar. They are ready to develop their trade mainly by the sea, but also by land. They improve the road network on both sides of the Himalayas, traversed at least at certain times of the year by many aisles and valleys.

But India is very careful, because the army has always expressed reservations, not wanting to promote the movement of Chinese troops in the event of an armed conflict. The Natu Pass (Natu La, meaning the Tibet Pass), reopened in 2006, is the third crossing point after Shipka La in

Himachal Pradesh and Lipuleh in Uttaranchal. China and India can also restore the historic road that US General Stilwell called, which was built to help China cope with the Japanese during World War II, from Assam through Burma. By developing trans-Himalayan land communications, India is still aware of the danger of being overloaded with Chinese products, like its neighbors. Already import by sea is a significant and unbalanced trade. Delhi takes protective measures, observing, as far as possible, international rules. Trade reached 75 billion dollars in 2015, which is a significant increase and could reach \$ 100 billion in 2020.

In fact they are similar to the relationship between a China as developed country exporter of complex products and India as developing country which supplies raw materials. China is much ahead of India in research, although it lags behind in areas such as software. For example, the number of growing scientific publications in China is 55,000 per year, compared with 19,000 for India. These two countries are now an important part of the global contribution to research. They complement each other, creating joint ventures relating to electronics, automotive and textile industries. Indian companies have established in China and Chinese companies in India. Indian companies have established in China and Chinese companies in India. This means that China now provides India, although sometimes it is reluctant for security reasons and is afraid of too much competition.

Although they are competitors in the search for sources of energy, particularly in Central Asia, they agreed to jointly study oil and gas fields in Iran and Sudan to the detriment of Western countries. Similar cooperation in Africa, Asia and Latin America is pending. Relations were also established in the military area with mutual visits and even some usual naval maneuvers. In international forums, the two countries adopt common positions, which often have a clear anti-Western connotation. However, the development of Sino-Indian relations can be compromised by a closer rapprochement between India and America. Wishing to improve their relations with both countries at the same time, New Delhi is engaged in a complex maneuver.

The United States takes seriously the development of relations between China and India. A close deal between India and China will have detrimental consequences for them and for the rest of the Western world. Washington not only tries to oppose any rapprochement between New Delhi and Beijing, but also persuade New Delhi to adopt a common strategy towards China. India is presented to the United States as an ally of potential weight, in the long term, to mitigate China's growth. Common democratic values unite them, as well as the fight against Islamic terrorism. Pakistan, with its semi-dictatorial military regime, is only temporarily a friendly

India and China

country, useful in the short term, for action in Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism. But the Americans know that he sometimes plays a double game and is afraid of it.