



The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Tackling Sectarianism and Extremism in Lebanon

Track-Two Diplomacy and Good Governance

Dr. Lina Haddad Kreidie

American University of Beirut, Lebanon

Email: linahkreidie@gmail.com

Hussein Itani

Middle East Prospect Forum, Beirut Lebanon

Email: husseinitany@gmail.com

1

¹ We would like to thank the following people for their very helpful comments: Thomas Haas, Carmen Geha, and Hiba Khodr for their in-depth comments and fruitful discussions at the Association for Middle Eastern Public Policy and Administration's (AMEPPA) in October of 2014

We would also like to thank Middle East Prospect Forum for giving us the opportunity to run the workshop about the Role of NGOs in tackling Extremism in Lebanon. Sincere thanks go as well to all those who participated in the

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Tackling Sectarianism and Extremism in Lebanon

Track-Two Diplomacy and Good Governance

Dr. Lina Haddad Kreidie and Hussein Itani

Abstract

The war on terrorism is global, but the strategies and tactics differ based on the various governmental and non-governmental actors that come to play. Tackling the problem of terror in Lebanon is layered with regional and global factors that continue to aggravate a long history of sectarianism with an increase in religious extremism. A confessional political system, a history of instabilities has made the job of the Lebanese government quite difficult in institutionalizing good governance. The weakness of the state has contributed to the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to fill this vacuum and to meet people's needs. However, rather than serving as objective third parties for the greater good, most of these organizations operate as social and economic arms of different political sectarian parties, thus deepening the political and religious divisiveness in Lebanon.

This article evaluates the ethics, goals, and strategies of NGOs in weak states – case study Lebanon – facing extremism. Insights are uncovered to reveal the root causes of inefficiency across NGOs threatening to further weaken the Lebanese social fabric. The findings expose poorly defined values, incoherent key messages, and vaguely demarcated target audiences as key reasons. The dissatisfaction of inter-NGO cooperation and vis-a-vis the government also gravely affects potential for greater NGO efficiency. Accordingly, a track two diplomacy that highlights the indirect use of soft power of NGOs is recommended to tackle extremism rooted in deep sectarian polarization, and to facilitate good governance via a platform for dialogue, and inclusive provision of human development services.

Keywords: NGOs, Terrorism, Extremism, Ethics, Good Governance, Indirect Soft Power, Track-Two Diplomacy

Global War on Extremism: The Sectarian Narrative in Lebanon

September 11, 2001 underscored the rise of clandestine and decentralized groups as new actors in international politics. It marked a global war that shook the foundations of the world's power structure, reinterpreted the syntax of the security narrative, shifted pre-existing ideological paradigms, and highlighted the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the people.

workshop and to special appreciation to the NGO leaders who agreed to be interviewed. Last but not least to Farah Abou Harb in assembling literature review; and to Liya Kreidie and Natalija Trojanovic in their effort in editing the final draft of the paper.

Years have passed since September 11, 2001 and the declaration of the global war on terror, yet the world is struggling to absorb the shock. Civil societies, socio-religious groups, political movements, and states as a whole are competing to make a difference – each according to their own ethics, interests, and objectives.

The means by which each of these groups will ascertain their varying objectives differ. Right and left wing authoritarian groups – including extremists, revolutionaries, and terrorist groups – made up of the disenfranchised and alienated, are revolting and using fear and violence to justify the attainment of their goals.² The majority of powerful governments and influential state actors have adopted costly defense tactics and hard power strategies to counter the spread of extremism.³ Civil society organizations, interchangeable with NGOs in the chapter, are trying to respond to extremism through the promotion of reforms and means such as charity, capacity building, and promoting human rights.

We argue that NGOs can be effective in tackling extremism, via utilizing soft power as an indirect strategy. This chapter defines NGOs as the broad spectrum of voluntary civil societies and organizations that share the normative values of their communities, and “are entirely or largely independent of the government and are not primarily motivated by commercial concerns”.⁴ It has long been recognized by many scholars that effective responses to extremism include an indirect strategy emphasizing soft power rather than the primacy of nonmilitary measures, such as good democratic governance and socioeconomic reforms.⁵ In his book, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From the Extremists*, EL Fadl emphasizes the significance of the role of progressive and modernist Muslims in exposing the extremists’ use of selective texts to promote their political goals.⁶ As such, effective and efficiently run NGOs can serve as catalysts for the reversal of extremist behavior in the most complex and fragmented societies, such as in the case of Lebanon.

Lebanon, once called the ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’, is now a kaleidoscope of sectarianism, socio-economic deprivation, and political polarization that begs extremism. In light of the fact that 92% of Lebanese express concerns about Islamic Extremism, NGOs across Lebanon attempt to unite the country in a number of ways – either by running national marathons, feeding the needy, providing education, or simply by expressing people’s dissatisfactions.⁷ Amidst this medley of developmental work, the role of the government has been virtually non-existent, as political leaders remain gridlocked in disagreement and

² Bob Altemeyer, *The Authoritarians* (Winnipeg: Robert Altemeyer, 2007)

³ Kumar Ramakrishna, "Countering the New Terrorism of Al Qaeda Without Generating Civilizational Conflict: The Need for an Indirect Strategy," in *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies*, ed. Andrew Tian Huat Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (Eastern Universities Press, 2002).

⁴ Adil Najam, "The Four C's of Government Third Sector-Government Relations," *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 10, no. 4 (2003): 9.

⁵ Ramakrishna, *Countering the New Terrorism of Al Qaeda Without Generating Civilizational Conflict: The Need for an Indirect Strategy*. Also see Andre Beaufre, *Strategy of Action*, Faber London, 1967

⁶ Khaled El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005).

⁷ "Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East," *Pew Research Centers*, July 1, 2014, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/>. (accessed October 24, 2015).

consequent stalemate. Civil societies have thus grown exponentially in an effort to fill the gaps that continue to stifle Lebanon's social, political, and economic development. Despite their attempts, however, NGOs have still only provided piecemeal solutions, unable to effectively create sustainable solutions to reduce the sectarianism and divisiveness among the Lebanese – one of the most detrimental challenges plaguing the country today. The blame for such a major problem does not rest solely on these organizations.

To determine the most effective approach for NGOs seeking to tackle extremism while focusing on sectarianism in Lebanon, several questions must be considered. Firstly, how can NGOs promote good governance in a multi-ethnic and confessional political system? What ethics, principles, and modes of action are needed to achieve a consensual united nation as one important criteria of good governance? Finally, what mechanisms have been or could be employed to avert extremism, to foster tolerance and peaceful coexistence, and to promote reconciliation in Lebanon? This chapter will answer the following questions and additionally will present good governance strategies and a two-track diplomacy to tackle extremism and mitigate sectarian discord in Lebanon.

Methodology

The study commences with a conceptual framework for the role of NGOs, tackling sectarianism and hence extremism in Lebanon. NGOs are regarded as track-two actors using indirect soft power to tackle extremism as one of the ills of sectarianism, thereby promoting good governance. Then, brief historical narrative highlighting factors that led to the rise of NGOs and their role in shaping the sectarian social and political fabric of Lebanon will be discussed. In addition to the historical context, the analysis will be based on how different NGOs tell their stories: identify their values, goals, and strategies. To obtain the narratives, we conducted: (1) a workshop of 24 NGO representatives and (2) one-to-one interviews with five leaders of faith, interfaith and secular based NGOs.

Bridging Good Governance with Track-Two diplomacy: The Literature Narrative

Track-one is the official negotiations and work conducted by the government to include state diplomats, regional and international governmental organizations⁸ while track-two is the work done by grass root movements to include individuals, civil societies, and corporations.⁹ Track-two diplomacy was initially devised by the Carter Center to deal with state-to-state negotiations. However today, with the blurring of lines between states and the spur of ethnic and sectarian differences, in addition to the increase in civilian involvement in conflicts, such forms of diplomacy have become applicable to intra and inter-state ethnic and sectarian conflicts. In today's global diffusion of power and authority, the role of NGOs, specifically in multi-ethnic societies, became more significant in managing and regulating conflicts.¹⁰ Analyzing the

⁸ Jeffrey Mapendere, Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks. COPOJ – Culture of Peace Online Journal, 2(1), 66-81.

⁹ J. Montville", Track Two Diplomacy: The Arrow and the Olive Branch." *The Psychodynamics of International Relations*, 2. 1991

¹⁰ Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall, [-Managing conflict](#) in a world Adrift. USIP 2015.

different approaches to peace building in Northern Ireland, Sean Byrne noted scholarly work on “the powerful potential of transformational politics and constructive conflict resolution leading to grass roots citizen empowerment and participatory democracy”.¹¹ It is therefore pertinent that NGOs, as track-two actors, play a significant role in shaping politics. The question remains what characteristics, approaches, and conditions are required for NGOs to successfully promote good governance, specifically while tackling sectarianism in a multi-ethnic/sectarian country like Lebanon.

Many scholars agree that good governance takes into consideration the role of formal and informal actors who are involved in decision-making and in effectively implementing them.¹² NGOs, as track-two actors, are not merely pressure groups or lobby groups, rather as Kofi Annan said in a speech at the Global Policy Forum in 2002, “NGOs are the ‘conscience of humanity’, even more so NGOs may be considered as bodies which could have great legitimacy, sometimes more than national authorities”.¹³

Nayef Al-Rodhan underscored eight major characteristics emphasizing the significance of good governance in promoting human dignity for a sustainable civilization:

It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.¹⁴

Andre Beaufre, a French strategist, further stressed the significance of a direct approach in dealing with intrastate conflicts, “that emphasized the primacy of nonmilitary measures, such as good democratic governance and socioeconomic reforms over a direct military strategy in dealing with popular Maoist insurgencies”.¹⁵ Direct communication can be facilitated by NGOs and may be one of the best ways to help the nation recover from trauma, while avoiding further polarization. Therefore, good governance and clear communication within NGOs is crucial in this context.¹⁶

The dilemma lies in the way track-two diplomacy would function in Lebanon, a country in which 90% of the population, whether individuals or civil societies, have expressed political

¹¹ Sean Byrne, "Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 3 (2001): 328-329.

¹² Magdalena Stankowska, "Good Governance and the Non-Governmental Organisations," *International Journal of Governmental Financial Management*, (2014).

¹³ Magdalena Stankowska, "Good Governance and the Non-Governmental Organizations," *International Journal of Governmental Financial Management* (2014): 45.

¹⁴ Nayef Al-Rodhan, *Sustainable History and the Dignity of Man: A Philosophy of History and Civilisational Triumph*. 2.

¹⁵ Ramakrishna, *Countering the New Terrorism of Al Qaeda Without Generating Civilizational Conflict: The Need for an Indirect Strategy*, 207.

¹⁶ Gilles De Kerchove, "Countering Violent Extremism: Governments Can't Do It Alone!" *The European Network Against Racism's*. 2010, <http://www.enargywebzine.eu/spip.php?article230>. (accessed October 24, 2015).

dissatisfaction in the government.¹⁷ This lack of trust has encouraged NGOs to fill the vacuum of social needs that the Lebanese government has ignored, thereby weakening the coordination between state institutions and non-state actors refusing to cooperate with the government. This politicization of the track-two approach resulted in bad governance, and fueled greater divisiveness, sectarianism, and hence extremism. More specifically, the people's perception and dissatisfaction of the government reduced the willingness and trust of NGOs as track-two organizations to work with track-one: the government. This, in itself, has posed a problem in getting policy reforms to be on the agenda of the Lebanese government. The lack of coordination between track-one and track-two in policy-making and recommendations delays the prospects of good governance, which Lebanon needs in its plight for neutrality and unification. It is the responsibility of both the people and the government to move Lebanon into a consensual nation whose different sectarian, ethnic, and political groups respect, coexist, and work together. The chapter focuses on NGOs as track-two players representing the people and their relationship with track-one players mainly representing the government.

According to a recent report, official records from the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities state the presence of 8,133 registered civil society organizations in Lebanon among which only 1,094 were proven to be active. The report also states that 54% of the respondents said that they did not participate in any dialogue with national or local authorities when it came to policy making.¹⁸ These findings are corroborated when we further discuss the history of civil societies in Lebanon and their relationship with the government.

A turbulent history and divergent allegiances aggravated by the lack of effective cooperation between the government and people resulted in a divided nation, with a centrifugal force pushing the people away from nationalism. Good governance is needed with a centripetal impetus that brings people back to the best interest of Lebanon as a strong united nation. Hence, in the case of Lebanon, the focus on strengthening two-track coordination is pivotal in shaping negotiations, fostering effective responsive participation, and in turn cultivating good governance.

Lebanon Civil Society impact on sectarianism: The Historical Narrative

Since the inception of greater Lebanon in 1920, civil societies have played a significant role in fulfilling social needs and shaping the fabric of Lebanese society. Beginning with education, the French empowered the elites, whereas religious and missionary social nonprofit organizations, composed of predominantly Western Christians, infiltrated the newly established country to indoctrinate and educate the people along religious canons.¹⁹ Accordingly, they set the foundations of different educational systems, and in turn drew faulty lines between the different religious groups across the country.

¹⁷ Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East, *Pew Research Centers*

¹⁸ "Mapping Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon," European Union External Action, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20150416_2_en.pdf. (Accessed October 24, 2015).

¹⁹ Geoffroy D'Aspremont, "The Development of Civil Society in Lebanon From the Ottoman Empire to the XXIST Century: A Driver of Political Changes?" *European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation*, 2011, <http://www.medeia.be/2011/12/the-development-of-the-civil-society-in-lebanon-from-the-ottoman-empire-to-the-xxist-century-a-driver-of-political-changes/>. (accessed October 25, 2015).

Seeking the spiritual conversion of individuals through Christian education, Protestant missionaries continued to arrive into the Ottoman Empire towards the beginning of the 19th century.²⁰ During this time, American, British, Danish, French, German, Italian, and Russian missionaries came to Lebanon and opened schools and universities to further their religious goals.²¹ The French Jesuits were the first to establish two schools in 1770, followed by the first national school of Ain Waraqa in 1782.²² In 1830, the American Protestant missionaries opened the American School for Girls, which is today the well-known Lebanese American University (LAU). In 1866, the Syrian Protestant College was founded in Beirut, currently known as the American University of Beirut (AUB), to be followed by the establishment of the Saint Joseph University (USJ) by the French Jesuits in 1875. The Saudi sponsored Al-Makassid Institution was established in 1877 as a charitable association providing for the education of Muslim children.²³

By the end of the 19th century, hundreds of missionary private schools opened, under the auspices of these non-profit social organizations, laying the foundation of primary and secondary education in the country using religiosity as the code of ethics shaping the mindsets of coming generations.²⁴

Through religious mobilization, global, regional, and local civil societies arose to meet the needs of the Lebanese people. As such, faith-based NGOs ingrained a sectarian political context as they emerged and replaced the role of the government to meet the needs of the society throughout the remainder of Lebanon's history. The maturity of the Lebanese civil society ecosystem waxed and waned depending on the status of the government and its willingness to intervene in social development. This process can be explained through different phases in Lebanon's history until present day.²⁵

Phase 1 (1860-1958), from province to early independence, was a period of the flourishing of civil societies in Lebanon as a result of modernization and economic development. 1958 till 1975 marks phase 2, during which strong governmental institutions were established that were effective in meeting public demands and in utilizing civil organizations to provide civic education rather than welfare services. The civil war and Taif accord, phase 3 (1975-1990), was a period of proliferation of NGOs and associations in response to the weakening governmental institutions and state and the rise in international development funding.²⁶ Following the war,

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Jad Chaaban and Karin Seyfert, "Faith Based NGOs in Multi-confessional Society: Evidence from Lebanon," *Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies* (2012).

²² Geoffroy D'Aspremont, "The Development of Civil Society in Lebanon From the Ottoman Empire to the XXIST Century: A Driver of Political Changes?" *European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperations*, 2011.

²³ Jon Bennet "Lebanon: The Lebanese NGO Forum and the Reconstruction of Civil Society, 1989-93," in *Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice*. London: Earthscan Publications, Inc., 118-144p. 1996

²⁴ Geoffroy D'Aspremont, "The Development of Civil Society in Lebanon From the Ottoman Empire to the XXIST Century: A Driver of Political Changes?" *European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperations*, 2011.

²⁵ Geoffroy D'Aspremont, "The Development of Civil Society in Lebanon From the Ottoman Empire to the XXIST Century: A Driver of Political Changes?" *European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperations*, 2011.

²⁶ Jad Chaaban and Karin Seyfert, "Faith Based NGOs in Multi-confessional Society: Evidence from Lebanon".

phase 4 (1990-2005), was a period of progress and further rise of local and global NGOs to address and reinforce post-war development. During this time, NGOs flourished in response to the Syrian protectorate pressure in Lebanon, escalation in corruption, and widening of the gap between the rich and the poor.²⁷

Events that mark phase 5 (2005-2015) include the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, and the 2011 war in Syria. These events triggered the inundation of NGOs in Lebanon. The assassination of Hariri sparked an awakening of unity among the Lebanese people. Around one million Lebanese people (25% of the population), of all sects, congregated in downtown Beirut at Martyr's Square, urging the departure of Syrian forces. Under the flag of the Cedar Revolution, the Lebanese people were chanting for independence, democracy, freedom, sovereignty, truth, and justice. This bold move exposed an otherwise veiled, yet poignant passion against sectarianism towards a common Lebanese identity.

Unfortunately, the entrenched political and social psychological impact of sectarianism turned this momentous unity into further divisiveness – with heightened tension. The resurgence of sectarianism resulted due to the rising narrative of fear from the other, ready-made judgments, and accusations concerning the death of Hariri, plus the overestimation of regional and global threats to the stability in Lebanon. Political leaders such as Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblat, Samir Geagea, and Michael Aoun, among others turned the Cedar Revolution into Lebanese politics. In addition, U.S. president George W. Bush and French president Jacques Chirac's pact over the Syrian presence in Lebanon aggravated the situation. Participating grass root movements digressed to voice the different political agendas that resurfaced. With the Syrian forces out, and the establishment of a UN sponsored international tribunal to target Hariri's killers, the Cedar Revolution and civil societies' call for independence, sovereignty, and unity came to an abrupt end. The fleeting hope for unity reversed to political and sectarian polarization of the country, forming two rival movements: (1) March 8 a pro Syria, Hezbollah Bloc – predominantly Shiite Muslims and Christians of the Free Patriotic movement and (2) March 14 a Hariri Bloc – made up of predominantly Sunni Muslims of the Future movement and other Christian political parties, including Lebanese forces and phalangists. Consequently, confessional and faith-based NGOs resurged to represent the different political/religious sects, further deepening the rift between different religions and political ideologies of the Lebanese.²⁸

The hyper sectarian narrative reached a pinnacle with the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. During the war, however, almost all civil societies rushed to help the displaced and injured. Nevertheless, since Hezbollah was not defeated by Israel's hegemony, the fear of the rise of Shiite Power and Iranian influence in Lebanon developed, and consequently Sunni Salafi groups emerged in an attempt to weaken advancement in Shiite control. Dissatisfied with the government's inaction, series of inter-sectarian extreme narratives and fighting was reflected in the rise of extremism among certain Islamic groups. While Shiite political parties and civil societies rallied and teamed together to defend their power position, Sunni faith-based NGOs rose to express dissatisfaction

²⁷ Nicholas Blanford, *Killing Mr. Lebanon the Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006).

²⁸ Jad Chaaban and Karin Seyfert, "Faith Based NGOs in Multi-confessional Society: Evidence from Lebanon".

with their official leaders, such as the Future Movement's handling of the political situation and the 2008 Hezbollah takeover of Sunni controlled areas of Beirut.

Ahmed El Asir, an Imam of a Mosque in South Lebanon, garnered Sunni support and the media's attention after vocally attacking the Syrian regime and leader of Hezbollah. As a result, a religious sect, within a sect, was formed and sectarian discord in Lebanon quickly spiraled downward into the abyss of extremism. At the same time, in the disadvantaged areas in the North of Lebanon, Sheikh Daia Al Islam Al Shahal, the leader of the exclusive Salafi movement Al Tahrir party, took center stage with his attack on all politicians and more so against the Lebanese army.²⁹ Along with other Islamist groups, violence and fighting with the Syrian supported Alawites erupted in Tripoli. The indirect and direct involvement of the Lebanese in the Syrian crisis combined with the vast influx of Syrian refugees in Lebanese territories has not only multiplied the social and economic challenges facing Lebanon, but has also further intensified the rise of religious extremism and terrorism. This posed yet another major challenge to civil societies of different backgrounds, specifically secular societies that are run and financially supported by the rich elites of their own communities – most of whom belong to, or follow a certain religion or sect. Rather than providing to all people, irrespective of sectarian or political backgrounds, these civil societies are now compelled to provide more to their own communities.³⁰

Today, phase 6, illustrates a recession in policymaking and weakening of official institutions. Series of governmental failures spurred the rise of frustrated secular-issue focused NGOs. Awaiting regional changes, the different ruling political parties paused their activities. This idle situation was reflected in the postponement of the 2014 elections and extension of the parliamentary term till 2017, the failure to elect a president for the Lebanese republic, the laxity in the public offices appointments, the inability to deal with worsening economy, and debilitating social services such as water and electricity provision, trash collection, and fiscal policies. All these issues presented an opportunity for the civil societies to take the streets to advocate and pressure the government to add much needed policies on their agenda. On the 29th of August, Beirut witnessed one of the most popular demonstrations that not only protested the latter issues, but also objected the unprecedented security forces shooting at the 22nd of August rally.³¹ Ongoing protests are trying to set the path for reforms, however time will judge their persistence, ability to withstand security bullying, and to maintain an issue-based representation. Irrespective of the controversial evaluation of the success or failure of the rising NGOs, the common observation is that they are issue-based, secular movements, which represent people from different backgrounds. With all this taken into consideration, the remaining question is how far can NGOs in Lebanon suppress the religious narrative?

²⁹ Moe Ali Nayel, "Tripoli's Unseen Faces," *Jadaliyya*, January 19, 2015, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20582/tripoli's-unseen-faces>. (accessed October 24, 2015).

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ "Lebanon: Police Violence Against Protesters," *Human Rights Watch*, August 22, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/22/lebanon-police-violence-against-protesters>. (Accessed October 24, 2015).

Countering Sectarianism: The Response Narrative

The precarious situation in the region, the deepening sectarian dialogue, and the rise of extremism triggered a counter narrative of secularization and interfaith. The focus on dialogue among the different conflicting groups was sought not only to find commonalities but also to promote understanding, tolerance, and respect of the others' beliefs and perspectives. To persuade people ingrained with fear of the other, the ultimate strategy is soft power, an approach best implemented by civil societies.

The rise of religious extremism exposes the unquestionable impact that faith-based NGOs have had in preserving the sectarian identity in Lebanon. The fragmented social welfare sectarian communities are disconnected from each other and from a unified national government, and still remain inundated with humanitarian needs. The lingering conflicts that plague Lebanon and the region, worsened by weak governmental institutions, sectarian division, and the rise of extremism shed light on the necessity of promoting good governance through an indirect strategy at track-two level. The goal is to fundamentally transform from a sectarian socio-political language that fosters extremism to a consensual dialogue. The strategy is to set a platform for coordination amongst NGOs, and to build lines of communication between NGOs and governmental institutions. To evaluate the impact of NGOs as track-two players in tackling sectarianism and extremism, we present analysis of the narrative of interfaith, faith and secular-based NGOs and their effectiveness in promoting good governance.

NGOs in Action: The Values Narrative

The Middle East Prospect Forum – an independent non-political think tank – organized a workshop in September 2014 to understand the ethics, values, mechanisms, and challenges (ethical and practical) that NGOs encounter in dealing with sectarianism and extremism. The workshop was comprised of three focus groups: representatives of (1) faith-based, (2) interfaith-based, and (3) secular-based organizations. Although the topic of the workshop was how NGOs tackle extremism and sectarianism in Lebanon, none of them mentioned that their work falls within the realm of the global war on terror.

To begin with, each organization discussed their strategy, including their mission and vision, values and principles, service offering, and their day-to-day activities. Analysis of the narratives underscored the following top values: secular, non-violence, human dignity, diversity, and pluralism. A total of 58% of NGOs representatives had poorly defined values, 38% with poorly defined key messages to the public, and 33% with a poorly identified target audience. Only 7 out of the 24 NGOs highlighted the secular basis of their work, emphasizing that their inclusivity strategies were addressed through catering to people of different backgrounds. It is also important to note that only 4 out of 24 NGOs focused on the promotion of non-violence.

Although many scholars emphasized the impact of human dignity in the Arab culture, only 4 NGOs mentioned the importance of human dignity and respect. Likewise, only four underscored diversity and plurality.

According to the United Nations (UN), the core criteria for good governance are: (1) quality, (2) solidarity and unity, (3) citizenship, (4) coexistence and inclusivity, and (5) partnership and

cooperation.³² Only 2 of the 24 NGOs referred to these criteria as key values of principals upheld by the organization. Similarly, honesty and neutrality, the main criteria advocated by the World Association of Non-Government Organizations (WANGO) was only mentioned by one of the NGOs. On the other hand, all NGOs mentioned that they respected their donors' wishes; nevertheless a prominent NGO confessed to losing funding from a major donor since they offered services to a group that was of no interest to the financiers. As such, it is evident that certain factors limit the role of NGOs in eliminating discrimination against the other.

NGO representatives that were able to share clear defined values about their organizations were also able to identify their key messages to a well-targeted audience. This sheds light on the significance of precisely defined values and stipulated principles on the effectiveness of an NGO in terms of internal communication and 'cultural cultivation' to transmit the organizational values on personal and professional levels. We assert that clear values, a well-targeted audience, and good communication mechanisms set the foundation of accountable and responsible NGOs. More specifically, soft power in the form of effective communication from within the communities is necessary in a polarized country like Lebanon, and even more so after a major outbreak of a conflict or an attack.

Some NGOs in Lebanon have been able to implement such strategies and have thus played an ardent role in promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in addition to advancing the services of the public and private sector – they include Legal Agenda, ALEF, Abaad and others. The most recent success story was the domestic violence bill approved by the parliament after the pressure of a civil society led by KAFA. KAFA's committed values, specific directives, government relations, and strong communication strategy made their success possible. Civil societies form a vital part of Lebanon's democratic role, and they can continue to extend their scope and impact as long as they maintain the elements necessary for good governance.

In order to strengthen the findings of the workshop, the authors conducted one-on-one interviews with leaders of five NGOs: one interfaith-based, two faith-based (Sunni and Shiite), and two secular-based. The purpose of the interviews was to document how each organization identifies itself, in terms of the ethics that guide their strategies and the tactics they use to attain their goals. We further wanted to understand the challenges and opportunities each NGO faces in implementing policies during times of crisis. Leaders of the five NGOs were contacted in person, met at locations that are convenient for them, and were informed of the main objective of the interview.

Civil Leaders: The Secular, Faith, and Interfaith Narratives

The interviews outlined the opportunities and constraints such organizations have faced, thereby confirming that NGOs could play an important role in countering extremism and divisiveness in Lebanon. It is clear that NGOs can foster the spirit of national unity amongst the Lebanese by creating platforms of communication, cooperating with other NGOs, and in initiating sufficient coordination with the government and eventually set some base for good governance.

³² For the core criteria see: What is Good Governance. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>

The Interfaith-Based NGO Narrative

The first strategy used by NGOs to confront sectarianism is the interfaith narrative, which is used by organizations such as Adyan. Adyan's mission, launched in 2006, focuses on religious diversity in its conceptual and practical dimensions, and promotes coexistence and diversity among individuals and communities, on the social, political, educational and spiritual levels. Father Fadi Daou, a professor in political philosophy and the current chairman of Adyan, explains how the NGO also aims to foster peace, social cohesion, and spiritual solidarity between individuals and communities, through positive relations, objective understanding, and shared commitment. He also emphasizes the importance of Adyan and other interfaith-based organizations in the midst of current events that impact today's world causing division and diffusion in humanity. Based on this, Adyan goes beyond the interreligious dialogue to reach a state of solidarity for all. It was, therefore, created on the basis of promoting utmost authenticity and tolerance within the practice of religion and plays an active role in two-track diplomacy.

When faced with crisis, Adyan focuses on containing such challenges. The key is to transform the challenges to an opportunity for better understanding and moving forward. Through its programs, Adyan distances itself from emotional reactions as it works more on culture-making rather than opinion-making, and hence "long-term goals". Some projects (such as revisiting the civic books taught in middle and high school) at Adyan, which are in urgent need, were actually conceived years ago. This was mainly due Adyan's ability to evaluate the circumstances in Lebanon and in turn to foresee the challenges that that would arise and require immediate attention. This strategy differs from the hasty emotional short-term reactions that other organizations would often resort to in Lebanon. According to Fr. Daou, other NGOs lack or have negative inter-NGOs sphere relations and communication. He emphasizes the importance of building a network or coalition based on common goals over compromising the imagination of each individual narrative. Additionally, he highlights the importance of preserving the entrepreneur spirit of NGOs.

Today, NGOs in Lebanon do not understand their role in the public sphere, let alone how to access them or work with them. Adyan believes that NGOs should not work against each other, instead they must push for reform and work with all relevant stakeholders, whether they support the reform or not, to find common ground and to meet their objectives. It recently succeeded in passing a decree, through the ministry of education, for a new educational policy that aims in fostering diversity and inclusiveness within the school curriculum. Adyan was able to accomplish this through the communication with all relevant stakeholders from school principals, academics, and parents, despite their position on the reform project as explained by Fr. Fadi.

Despite all the work accomplished by the NGO, Fr. Daou envisioned the frailty of Lebanon due to failure of public services, weak common roots of the society, and the inability to perform normal democratic processes. Nevertheless, he believes in the chance to rebuild Lebanon. This skeptical reality that plagues Lebanon does not remove the responsibility of NGOs to work on a parallel track, or more specifically on a political track, to adopt and introduce projects and policies into the political discourse. Therefore, the role of NGOs is to have solutions and policies rather than pursuing political power and behave as political parties.

The Faith-Based NGO Narrative

The two faith-based organizations interviewed are: (1) Al Rabita, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood Association in Lebanon (Al Jamaa Al Islamiyah) and (2) Imam Mousa El Sadr Foundation, a Shiite based NGO.

According to the acting president of Al Rabita, Mohammad Estaiteyeh, the NGO aims to provide services to high school and university students. Believing that “Daawa” (the calling to the message of Islam) is one of the services, Al Rabita targets highly populated Sunni areas such as Tripoli, Sidon, some part of Mount Lebanon (Iqlim), and Beirut.

According to Estaiteyeh, although Al Rabita’s main beneficiaries are Sunni Muslim students, the primary aim of Rabita was to fill the educational gap in Lebanon and therefore have no objections to students of different religious background.

Estaiteyeh believes and encourages the empowerment of the youth in Lebanon, stating that “NGOs should give [the youth] more attention as they are crucial for the future of a better Lebanon”.

In response to the constraints and opportunities at times of crisis, Estaiteyeh attests that “Al Rabita acts politely, gently, and moderately”. He emphasizes that the association represents the moderate Muslim, clarifying that moderate does not mean that Al Rabita is weak. Estaiteyeh delineates the following steps the association takes in times of crisis: (1) assess the problem, (2) identify the causes, (3) identify the parties involved, and (4) search for diplomatic ways to resolve the issue. However, if “physical defense is needed, then they are ready to resort to force”. He adds that Al Rabita is not a typical pacifist organization, as at times of crisis and existential threat, military force is contacted as a last resort.

This contradictory statement sheds light on cooperation issues with other NGOs. Estaiteyeh stated that their mode of communication depends on the group, with “mutual respect” as one of the main principles. They are willing to cooperate with NGOs who serve a similar audience – in this case the Sunni community. Additionally, Al Rabita believes in cooperation and “positive competition” with NGOs that share a similar aim but target a different audience (in this case of different sect/faith) – though being uncommon.

Voicing his bewilderment with the growing number of NGOs in Lebanon and their largely inefficient nature, Estaiteyeh did not blame the founders of the associations, but instead the political situation. He believes that the inability of the NGOs to be proactive and recruit volunteers is due to the feeling of helplessness people have towards achieving any progress. He is certain that to be effective, NGOs should communicate with each other and have “some sort of common vision”. As for the future of Lebanon, Estaiteyeh uttered his pessimism saying, “Lebanon in itself poses a problem, as it cripples the efforts of the NGOs”.

President of the Imam Mousa El Sadr Foundation, Rabab El Sadr Sharafeddine, presents the foundation as the major contributor to the betterment of the Shiite community. Sharafeddine took over the leadership after the disappearance of her brother Imam Mussa El Sadr in 1978. The

Imam was revered and celebrated by the Lebanese Shiites as the savior and role model for the liberation, empowerment, and inclusion of the Shiite in the social, economic and political fabric of Lebanon. Shiite exclusivity of the NGO was a de facto, although Sharafeddine stresses that their mission is to help everyone irrespective of their religious or sectarian background: “We are here in the South for everyone, and we never close our doors to anyone”. When asked about the ratio of Shiites to non-Shiites, she responded by saying: “Our doors are open, but since the institute inception, over 95% of the attendees and those who sought our services were Shiites.”

Their mission and provision of services is highly appreciated locally and globally. Sharafeddine received many awards for excellence in volunteerism and promoting developmental programs. However, it is important to note that the financiers are well-to-do Shiites residing in Lebanon and different parts of the world. The foundation has an NGO branch in Detroit, whereby a good amount of funds are donated from Shiite Americans. The money collected in the United States is used for education, health, and disability services in Lebanon. Sharafeddine emphasized the significance of human rights, mainly the right for all to receive education, health, and other social services. She additionally insists that the foundation played a major role at times of crisis – during the Lebanese civil war and the 2006 war. In response to a question regarding the provision of services to Palestinian camps surrounding the location of the foundation, Sharafeddine explained that this population is out of their scope as they receive services from other organizations. Moreover, she explained that they do not have the allocated budgets for non-Lebanese: i.e. Palestinians and Syrian refugees.

Discussing the coordination with other NGOs and the government, Sharafeddine discussed the role the foundation played in planning and conducting workshops with other NGOs – although nothing serious was implemented. As for the government, she detailed the foundation’s efforts to fill the vacuum the government left in the country.

Again, no matter how inclusive, innovative, and independent NGOs try to be in Lebanon, they tend to dig deeper in the lines of sectarianism. The two faith-based organizations, however, do not necessarily breed extremism, but have no specific goal in promoting dialogue or impacting the narrative of their own communities away from extremism. Their developmental and social service programs might improve the socioeconomic status, but not necessarily the fear of the other and the sense of social and political deprivation certain groups have – hence a major cause for extremism.

The Secular-Based NGO Narrative

Azm & Saade and Ajjalouna are two NGOs that believe in the importance of working with completely secular notions, considering themselves as independent, non-governmental, and non-profit organizations in Lebanon. In 1988, Taha and Najib Mikati initiated Azm & Saade in recognition of their parents, Azmi and Saud. They expanded their services in 2005 to include health, social, educational, developmental, and religious values with a focus on youth and woman empowerment. To maintain their financial sustainability, the majority of donations come from the founding Mikati family, in addition to generating income from the sales of services and handcrafted products.

Azm and Saade support areas in the North of Lebanon, mainly Tripoli, and its surrounding areas, which is majority Sunni Muslim. In addition, the NGO's employees and volunteers are 90% Sunni Muslim. Like most NGOs, Azm & Saade faces many challenges due to the recurring conflicts and violence in the area. At times of crisis, they focus their efforts on relief and reconstruction. Azm & Saade offer religious training and education, which may help tackle extremism. Former Prime minister, Najib Mikati, and co-founder of Azm & Saade remain very concerned with the spread of extremism and violence in the North caused by the spillover of the Syrian crisis. In light of this, they established a religious institute that invites religious educators to train Imams and religious teachers on the concept of moderation to contain the spread of extremism, affecting mainly Northern areas of Lebanon.

Director of women empowerment at Azm & Saade, Jinan Mbayed Skaff, expressed her frustration with the lack of coordination between NGOs and the redundancy in the services they provide. She explained that this fact does not hinder Azm & Saade from continuously trying to cooperate with other associations. Irrespective of these relationships, though, they try their best to reach needy people and provide services in the region.

Ajialouna, another secular organization, initiated its mission in 1995 with a health project in public schools. Its beneficiaries come from different religious background without any form of discrimination. However, over 90 % of the active members are from one sectarian background. A number of donations come from individuals, while major companies, such as PepsiCo, also provide some support.

According to the founder and president, Dr. Lina Zaim Dada, Ajialouna believes in the right of all people to have equal access to good health, social security, and educational opportunities. This mission is delivered through a group of dedicated women in addition to student volunteers. Dr. Dada portrayed the association as a complex person with many facets in terms of projects, implementation, ways of getting funding, and most of all in dealing with people. She also described it as a very effective and predominant player in the NGO field in Lebanon. At times of crisis, Ajialouna has developed a special program that meet the immediate basic needs of food, health, and shelter. They also described to have an "excellent work relationship" with private institutions, mainly hospitals.

With respect to coordinating with other NGOs, Ajialouna is facing some challenges in managing the different agendas that arise from other partners. Ultimately, Ajialouna aims to work on projects that are not covered by other organizations due to their firm belief in "contributing to a better society from a holistic sense". Ajialouna aims to fill gaps in society that other organizations or the government are not addressing.

Dr. Dada, like the other NGO leaders, agrees that the number of organizations is doubling in Lebanon as the needs are increasing, and as the government is not able to meet the needs of the unemployed and needy. She, however, mentions that NGOs tend to have similar goals and are not being innovative: "Many NGOs started with a certain goal and then end up doing other things based on how and where they get their funding". She also discussed the dissatisfaction Lebanese people have towards the political, economic, and social situation. While NGOs try to meet those needs, most are ineffective, as they neither have the appropriate means nor the ideas

to provide relevant help for the people need. She emphasized that to have access to governmental facilities and to make large-scale positive impact, one needs excellent personal connections with politicians. Dr. Dada further explained the difficulty of expanding to other regions, due to the leaders of specific areas. Ajialouna, fortunately, does not face a problem with this as Dr. Dada has good personal contacts and connections with politicians and other powerful figures. Despite her connections, some complications and challenges due to bureaucratic and corrupt procedures in governmental institutions was encountered.

Faith, Interfaith, and Secular-Based NGOs: Analysis

In tackling extremism, we found that interfaith-based NGOs are more likely to be successful in promoting diversity, tolerance, and consensual tendencies than secular-based NGOs. Although faith-based organizations expressed their intentions and motivations to promote coexistence, their strategies and audience place them on a much more particularistic path, which ultimately reinforces further sectarianism – and at times of crisis, it may lead to extremism.

According to the secular-based NGOs, through political connections and building relationships with the public sphere, a tangible development for Lebanon can materialize. From these interviews, it becomes clear that proactive NGOs, as track-two players, could facilitate national unity, promote human development, and accordingly reduce the tendency of people to fall on the extreme right of the continuum. This could further be achieved if interfaith-based organizations make efforts to reach out to larger numbers by expanding their dialogue platform, and ultimately promoting a moderate ideological paradigm to the growing and attentive population. At the same time, if secular, non-affiliated, organizations emerge and gain greater influence and scope with the provision of their services – through the cooperation with international organizations, other NGOs, and the government – they too would further reduce extremist recruitment by faith-based organizations. Together, interfaith-based and secular-based NGOs could attract the majority of the Lebanese population. While the faith-based NGOs will continue to exist, they will find it necessary to cooperate with the majority, diminishing their extremist religious influence on a national scale.

Prospects: A Different Narrative

Not only did the chapter signify the NGOs' potential ability to tackle sectarianism as the path to extremism, but also how they can participate effectively in promoting peace and coexistence as a way of life for the Lebanese. Given the significant role that civil societies have played thus far it becomes imperative that this sector in Lebanon can utilize soft power to silence the voice of extremism. While trust in the government wanes; the need for the empowerment of the NGOs' role-is mounting. In a country where violence and extremism are quickly becoming the only tools people resort to, the need to promote unity, peace, and nationalism is imminent.

Conclusion

NGOs in Lebanon remain reactive and in a stage of constant “survival.” Although rising against the government's inaction is a good initial sign, they need to evolve into proactive organizations that initiate long-term development that is impactful at a national level. In terms of values and

maintaining a code of ethics, 58% of the NGO participants' responses were vague about values, and would discuss their projects in general without a clear mission and vision. A total of 15 participants who specified their goals highlighted individualistic cultural values such as dignity and hopeful goals such as secularization. Only two focused on the consensual and inclusive values that are at the foundation of good governance. As for strategies, almost all NGOs' representatives stated that funding agencies shape their goals, objectives, and tactics. Donors often become the target audience and key beneficiaries of the NGOs, allocating the money and resources to cater to certain communities, which serve their own interests rather than those who may need it most. The donors' conditioning of NGOs – even those whose main intentions were to serve the greater good – has further deepened the divisiveness in Lebanon.

The workshop attendees and the five NGO leaders interviewed, however, agreed that good governance via citizenship awareness to promote coexistence and respect of the other should be embedded in educational programs and a hub for collaboration among NGOs. This was clearly stated in the strategies of Adyan and emphasized by Sharafeddine: “Our foundation participates in many workshops, and in local as well global conferences that train participants on conflict management especially at times of crisis. The first thing we learn is to help everyone as human beings irrespective of their background.”

We can conclude that NGOs do recognize the significance of their humanistic role and their role in mitigating the negative impact of the Lebanese confessional system. After discussing their values and goals, NGOs' representatives confessed to the confusion they experience in their everyday work trying to meet the needs of all, though usually serving their own community. Although, they also admit that in a multi-sectarian and polarized country like Lebanon, it is natural that each sect and or political group tends to seek self-help. Unless the governmental institutions work hand in hand with the different NGOs, the nation will tend to move in a centrifugal direction. Lebanon is generally a conflictive nation with scarce periods of cooperation, which is imposed either by strong governmental institutions (i.e. Chehab era) or during the post-civil war (i.e. Taif accord). When both waned, civil societies rose and functioned to fill in the vacuum. While this definitely helped maintain the resilience of the Lebanese people, it also strengthened the sectarian system. Lebanon continues to be highly vulnerable to any local and/or regional change that tests people ability to either rally around the flag or around each community's interest. To counter such centrifugal forces, and based on this study's analysis, we underscore important recommendations.

Recommendations

A - The Expansion of Interfaith-based NGOs: Pioneering Tolerance and Respect

The answer to sectarianism is a centripetal force exemplified in interfaith dialogue. This discourse is about people of different faiths coming to a mutual understanding and respect that allows them to live and cooperate with each other in spite of their differences. Interfaith-based NGOs have proven to be most successful in tackling the issue of “fear of the other” mainly among the different religious groups. Unlike the secular-based NGOs, they tackle nationwide challenges from an interfaith perspective that talks to the mind of religious practitioners thus fostering trust. This became explicit based on the success story of Adyan. Among the most

successful NGOs in Lebanon are those with have an interfaith approach, working to decrease intolerance and mistrust, while increasing cooperation and understanding among people of different faiths towards any small common grounds.

B - Stories of Coordination Between NGOs, Governmental Bodies, Businesses and the Private Sector: A Shared Responsibility in Good Governance

Governance is a comprehensive system where government institutions and NGOs interact with each other to produce effective implementable policies. The Carter Center track-two level diplomacy, which is mainly utilized in dealing with conflicts where civil societies facilitate management of conflict and reconciliation between the opposing parties, is highly recommended for this part of the world. This indirect strategy of soft power is vastly needed in Lebanon. Governmental institutions and employees are tainted by corruption. The relationship between people and the government has been shaken by lack of trust. Therefore, since the civil war, Lebanese have been seeking support from political elites and their affiliated social associations and even from global NGOs rather than from their own government. This perception however is somewhat exaggerated, given the human tendency to shut out politicians and the system as a whole, especially since a little has been done to change this status quo. We suggest that both sides, track-one and track-two, must push each other for change and reform. Realistic implementation in Lebanon will begin with the leaders of the NGOs who have “excellent contacts” and “connections” with the politicians. All NGOs with the aim of creating a tangible impact should follow suit. This is the Lebanese way, and it should be used in order for NGOs to set reforms on the national agenda, create the necessary policy, and implement their desired objectives.

C - NGO Empowerment Programs: The Policy of the Self

There are many NGOs that have been established with the sole purpose of NGO development, including Aie Serve, Qudurat, and most recently the pace program with UNSAID. These institutions work as “accelerators” that help NGOs to develop their internal strategy, vision, mission, and other very fundamental aspects in running such an organization. Given the weaknesses across the strategic execution of NGOs revealed through our study, we believe that accelerators and incubation programs will serve a critical role in expanding the scope of development for Lebanon and should be utilized across the board. These initiatives are yet to be empowered by governmental bodies to facilitate their involvement in policy-making; they are, however, gaining traction as awareness and demand for NGO development in Lebanon is on the rise.

D - Formation of a Hub: A Common Narrative

As discussed in the literature review, 1094 NGOs among the 8133 registered were proven to be active. These organizations dedicate their time and energy to adjusting gaps left by the public institutions in Lebanon though not quite fulfilled. According to our study, however, NGOs are starting to develop the awareness of the importance for collaboration and the utmost need to a diversified hub to find new solutions to such upcoming challenges. NGOs will have the chance to work together, involve a wide and varied range of stakeholders, and to set strategic long-term

shared-focused common goals. Leveraging this prospect for collaboration will allow for the creation of policies that are backed by significant influence and clout. It is imperative to note that our focus on NGOs does not mean that the private sector is less significant as track-two player – determining this will require further research.

In a nutshell, NGOs with clear, defined values and strong inner capacities could play an effective role as track-two diplomacy to foster human development, coexistence, and a consensual national identity. In conflictive, multi-ethnic countries suffering from the ills of sectarianism and extremism, NGOs are not merely social enterprises that provide relief aid, but agents for the use of soft power that compliments or even replaces governmental hard power. This could best be achieved by setting a hub of communication between different NGOs, and between NGOs and the government that aid in building the centripetal bidirectional trust between the people and the government. Moreover, this coordination would push the government to become more accountable and responsive to the needs of the people, and more able to focus on the hard power related to security matters. Together, NGOs soft power in coordination with the government will mitigate sectarianism, reduce the propensity for extremism, and ultimately empower a strong sense of coexistence and consensual national identity.

About the Author:

Dr. Lina Haddad Kreidie received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Irvine and her M.A. in Political Studies and Public Administration from the American University- Beirut, Lebanon. She is a lecturer at the American University- Beirut. Prior to that she taught at the Lebanese American University, University of California-Irvine and Chapman University. She is a Fellow- Jerome and Hazel Tobis Chair at the University of California-Irvine and Vice Chair, Dean's International Council of University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy- Chicago. She also served as an Advisor to Prime Minister of Lebanon Mr. Najib Mikati, a Political Expert for the Middle East Prospect Forum (MEPF)- Beirut Lebanon and Co-Founder- director of Middle East studies Major Initiative at The University of California-Irvine.

References

- Agoston, Gabor and Bruce Masters. *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*. New York, NY, New York: Facts On File, 2008. 384-385.
- Al-Rodhan, Nayef. *Sustainable History and the Dignity of Man: A Philosophy of History and Civilisational Triumph*. 1st ed. Geneva: Lit, 2009.
- Altemeyer, Bob. *The Authoritarians*. Winnipeg: Robert Altemeyer, 2007.
- Beaufre, Andre 1967, *Strategy of Action*. London, Faber, 1967
- Bennett, Jon. "Lebanon: The Lebanese NGO Forum and the Reconstruction of Civil Society, 1989-93," in *Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice*. London: Earthscan Publications, Inc., 118-144. 1996

- Blanford, Nicholas. *Killing Mr. Lebanon the Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East*. New York, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006.
- Byrne, Sean. "Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland." *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 3 (2001): 327-52. doi: 10.1177/0022343301038003004.
- Chaaban, Jad and Karin Seyfert. "Faith Based NGOs in Multi-confessional Society: Evidence from Lebanon." *Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies*, 2012. Accessed October 24, 2015. <http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/b0b6a817-5284-4343-9bfe-5144b7486d01>.
- "Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East." Pew Research Centers. July 1, 2014. Accessed October 24, 2015. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/>.
- D'Aspremont, Geoffroy. "The Development of Civil Society in Lebanon From the Ottoman Empire to the XXIST Century: A Driver of Political Changes?" *European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperations*, 2011. Accessed October 25, 2015. <http://www.medeia.be/2011/12/the-development-of-the-civil-society-in-lebanon-from-the-ottoman-empire-to-the-xxist-century-a-driver-of-political-changes/>.
- De Kerchove, Gilles. "Countering Violent Extremism: Governments Can't Do It Alone!" The European Network Against Racism's. 2010. Accessed October 24, 2015. <http://www.enargywebzine.eu/spip.php?article230>.
- Evans, Becky. "Has the War on Terror Failed? Number of Terrorist Attacks Quadruple in Decade After 9/11." Mail Online. December 4, 2012. Accessed October 24, 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2242803/Has-War-Terror-failed-Number-terrorist-attacks-QUADRUPLE-decade-9-11.html>.
- Fadl, Khaled. *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*. New York, NY, New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Syrian Policy in Lebanon and the Palestinians." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (1986): 1-20.
- Jawad, Rana. "Lebanon." In *International Encyclopedia of Social Policy*, edited by Tony Fitzpatrick, Huck-ju Kwon, Nick Manning, and James Midgley, 763-766. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Keeling, Sarah, Charles Hollis, and Florence Wolstenholme. "Confronting Extremism: Lebanon's "War on Terror"." *Global Risk and Investigations Practice*, 2014.
- "Lebanon: Police Violence Against Protesters." Human Rights Watch. August 22, 2015.

Accessed October 24, 2015. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/22/lebanon-police-violence-against-protesters>.

Lennon, Alexander T. *The Battle for Hearts and Minds Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003.

Mapendere, Jeffrey. "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks." *Culture of Peace Online Journal* 2, no. 1 (2005): 66-81. Accessed October 24, 2015. http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TrackOneandaHalfDiplomacy_Mapendere.pdf.

Najam, Adil. "The Four C's of Government Third Sector-Government Relations." *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 10, no. 4 (2003): 375-96. doi:10.1002/nml.10403.

Nayel, Moe Ali. "Tripoli's Unseen Faces." *Jadaliyya*. January 19, 2015. Accessed October 24, 2015. <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20582/tripoli's-unseen-faces>.

Nelson, Paul J. *The World Bank and Non-governmental Organizations the Limits of a Political Development*. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Ramakrishna, Kumar. "Countering the New Terrorism of Al Qaeda Without Generating Civilizational Conflict: The Need for an Indirect Strategy." In *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies*, edited by Andrew Tian Huat Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, 207-232. Eastern Universities Press, 2002.

Stankowska, Magdalena. "Good Governance and the Non-Governmental Organisations." *International Journal of Governmental Financial Management*, 2014, 43-48.

Westall, Sylvia. "Thousands Rally in Beirut against Political Leaders, Rot." Reuters. August 29, 2015. Accessed October 24, 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/30/us-lebanon-crisis-politics-idUSKCN0QY08S20150830>.

"Mapping Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon." European Union External Action. 2014. Accessed October 24, 2015. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20150416_2_en.pdf. Beyond RD, "Mapping Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon", 2015. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20150416_2_en.pdf <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>