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Transitional Democracies: The Challenges of Instability and Security

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Abstract: *Transitional democracies are inherently unstable due to the very nature of the transitional process that seeks to introduce sometimes very dramatic changes in a polity. Many of the transitional democracies in the last two decades have experienced broad based political reforms that were designed to dismantle the preceding authoritarian regimes and pave way for experimentation with democratic processes and rules of governance. The recession of authoritarianism is never without a fight against emerging democratic forces with new values, rules and procedures that challenge an established old order for a few that were strongly entrenched. The transition process generates tension of immense consequences for the economy and the polity raising incredible security concerns as a result of the inherent fluidity in emerging, but yet to be entrenched rules and procedures and processes. Transitional democracies, therefore, require strong and focused leadership to facilitate the construction of resilient democratic institutions to boost public confidence with transparent governance measures that lend legitimacy to emerging governance outcomes from the transition. This more than anything else is the surest way to deal with likely security challenges consequent upon the transition.*

Key words: *Transitional Democracies, security, authoritarianism, governance outcomes, leadership*

1. Introduction

Democratic peace represents the ultimate goal of democratic rule and has remained the most powerful appeal of democracy as a system of rule. This fact has long been established by Immanuel Kant in 1795 as elaborately paraphrased by Julie Browne (2012) "that a world in which every state were governed by a republican constitution would be in a state of perpetual peace…". Though Kant made this general assertion regarding the tendency to wage war by governments be they authoritarian or democratic, it was rooted in the institutional and procedural constraints provided by constitutional governments against reckless war adventures. This is in sharp contrast with autocratic regimes' quick tendencies to go to war in the absence of firm constitutional constraints against the ruling autocrat. These constitutional constraints are expressed in institutional provisions and practices that are duly observed by following established procedures and rules. All of these jointly constitute the ecology and praxis of institutional democratic peace explanations that emphasizes structural impediments that prevent democratic leaders from waging war (Rummel, 1993; Morgan and Campbell, 1991, Mansfield and Snyder, 2009).

Democratic peace is an important value that underscores the constant oscillation on the pendulum of authoritarianism and constitutional rule in the governance trajectory of any country. Going back to history, transitional democracies have emerged in all regions of the world under different experiences with dictatorship of military or civil kind. From France to England and Austria (Austro-Hungarian empire), Portugal, Spain, Italy and Germany in Europe to Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa to Brazil and Argentina, Chile and Colombia in Latin America. Indonesia, South Korea and Singapore offer useful examples also of transitional democracies in Asia. A very common character of these democracies is an apparently inherent instability due largely to the transition process that introduces dramatic changes in the polity. Flowing from the Huntingtonian third wave of global democratization that began in 1974, many countries in Africa and Latin America and Asia introduced broad political reforms intended to introduce democracy by replacing the existing military dictatorship running many of these countries. This paper argues that the transition

process as the experience in Nigeria and other African countries has shown; generates tension within the military ruling coalition and the emerging political class relating to the introduction of new rules and procedures and processes in the polity. These tensions have profound implications for instability and security. The tug between the pro-old ways and the emerging ways may result in a reverse to autocracy or push to democracy. This process is obviously unstable and perhaps in secure. Transitional democracies that eventually enthrone democratic rule require strong and resilient leadership through virile democratic and political institutions to consolidate democracy or risk a reversal to authoritarianism or what Fareed Zakaria (1997) calls illiberal democracies.

2. Transitional democracies: A History and Characterization

From policy experts on the economy to a broad spectrum of scholars and researchers and politicians, there is an indisputable consensus "that democracy is the best form of modern political governance" (Berman, 2007:28). This is founded on the democratic promises of respect for the rule of law, protection and guarantee of basic freedoms and human rights and the promotion of economic development. At the apex of the pyramid of these promises lies the democratic appeal of peace as a value which is court, nurtured and preserved through a restraint from outright declaration and refrain from abuse of citizens. It is these institutional guarantees and restraints that define democracy as a representative system of rule of the Dahlian polyarchies. As a government by the people (Lijphart,1999) in a majoritarian sense, democracy provides guarantees for freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes as well as alternative sources of information. Under a democracy are also provisions for free and fair elections and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preferences (Dahl, 1971:3). These institutional features of democracy constitute the selling points of democracy over and above any other form of modem political government. The peace that democracy promises and delivers is derived or achieved from meeting the aspirations of the electorate which is

expressed in the protection of basic freedoms and fundamental rights of citizens. Countries that were ruled by authoritarian regimes including benevolent or liberal military regimes yearned for democracy by their citizens for these reasons and the continued suppression, oppression and denial or abuse of rights galvanized citizens to seize opportunities in history to demand for democracy in their countries. Democratic transitology from authoritarianism can be broadly reduced to three typologies following the works of Mainwaring and Viola (1985) and Mainwaring and Share (1986). These typologies are a synthesis of comparative analyses of Latin America and Southern Europe in the main. The experiences in Africa and Asia merely fit into this discriminating categorization. The first transition out of authoritarianism is that which occurred through a defeat or collapse of the authoritarian regimes such as in Argentina (1982-83), Portugal in 1975 and Greece in 1974 all of which led to the inauguration of democratic governments (Mainwaring, 1989). In Africa, Liberia and Sierra-Leone fall into the category following the defeat or collapse of Samuel Doe's regime (Omagu, 2001). Both authoritarian military regimes as well as illiberal democratic regimes run into crises and, without creative depth and adequate response, collapse. Uprisings as exemplified by the Arab spring in Tunisia and Egypt (Cortright and Reifenberg, 2012) and rebel movement against Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (DRC) are examples of authoritarian regime collapse or defeat leading to democratic transitions in most cases. Apparent internal division and the collapse of regime legitimacy, authoritarian regime leaders are confronted with a little choice to vacate office.

The second typology of transition to democracy occurs where an authoritarian government initiates the process of liberalization and remains a critical factor in the transition period of regulating the process through strategic measures towards democratization. This is transition through transaction (Mainwaring, 1989). Opposition elements to the authoritarian regime may be active but the regime elements retain the critical powers to shape the democratic process and determine its trajectories as the Nigerian transition to democracy evolved from 1987 to 1998. It becomes inevitable for the authoritarian regime to depart due to the deepening cost of staying in power exemplied by the prevalence of a crisis of succession, apparent

cracks in the military coalition and a rapid legitimacy decline. As the late General Sani Abacha regime intervened in 1993 following the crisis of legitimacy of the Ernest Shonekan led interim National Government (ING) with the hope of restoring democracy, so do transitions of this kind operate.

The third typology of transition to democracy is through extrication (Mainwaring, 1989) and represents a hybrid of the transaction model and transition through regime defeat. By extrication, the weak authoritarian regime retains some strength strong enough "to dictate important terms of the transition" (Mainwaring 1989:29). Authoritarian regimes that have retained power for a fairly long time may experience authority decay which over time weakened the regime but not to a degree of regime defeat and therefore can structure a transition in a manner that it determines some major features of the democratization process.

There is no one transition that is a replica of the other but these generalizations appear as salient marks that influence the coalition of the struggle for power and the negotiations between power blocs in most transitions. This explains the paradox of relinquishing power voluntarily of authoritarian regimes that initiate the process of exiting power through liberalization and those autocratic regimes that are thoroughly weak and heading for a collapse but insist on the control of power until it is removed by armed insurrection. This was the case in Zaire (DRC) and Liberia. The situation in Libya in 2011 suggests this trajectory except with an overwhelming external influence by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to enforce a no fly zone resolution of the United Nations (Vira and Cordesman, 2011).

Coming to terms with the typologies of transitions to democracy requires a historical review within a global context to illuminate the political contours of the struggles for democracy that have been shaped by the dynamics of political forces within different regions of the world. The modern history of transitology dates back to the French Revolution in 1789 which heralded the collapse of absolute monarchism in France. This period was hailed by concerned citizens as a new era in France. By 1791, a

constitutional monarchy with limited suffrage was introduced but was heavily criticized by intellectuals and reactionaries. Limited liberalization was widely denounced and the failure of King Louis XVI to respond decisively led to his being beheaded in 1793. Consequently, a republic was declared and universal suffrage introduced with additional political and civil rights thus establishing the modern democratic era in France (Sherman, 2007). This era was short lived due largely to the exertion of energy by the new regime to fight enemies of democracy, a fight that became a new chapter of terror in France. Consequently, by 1799, a palace coup to overthrow Louis XVI was staged by Napoleon Bonaparte. This marked an important reversal of a transition to autocracy. France within a short period moved from authoritarian monarchism to democracy to war and chaos domestically and again returned to dictatorship. Though democracy was short lived it entrenched the legacy of opposition to traditional dictatorship and accentuated extensive decisions in French society. Between 1793 and 1799, France was ruled by the military and returned to some constitutional monarchy under Louis XVIII, Charles X and more liberal king Louis-Philippe. The reforms introduced failed to satisfy a broad swath of French society especially as more instability and violence were prevalent, the middle class induced another revolution in 1848.

The demand for openness and political liberties represented in the revolution of 1848 contagiously reverberated in other parts of Europe and the continent erupted in an invigorated struggle for democracy in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy and Norway, Belgium and Sweden. This momentum was sustained until the 1850s when authoritarianism began to return to Europe but was being contested by democrats and reactionaries. Italy and Germany underwent the same struggle with limited liberalization and then a recession into domestic chaos, violence, social division and political alienation. By 1914, on the eve of World War I, Italy and Germany were overrun by fascists and the military. The first wave of democratization finally petered out in 1914 but by the end of the war the democratic wave returned in full force across much of Europe. Many of these young democracies were however weak and weighed down by

widespread political violence. Between 1922 and 1930 Italy was gripe by fascism, Germany by National Socialism while Spain and Austria descended into War (Sherman, 2007). As Germany and Italy moved against Europe in World War II, democratic memories remained faint, but the war was to end in 1945 with results in favour of democratic forces as the United States supported the reconstruction of Europe with a commitment to enthroning and sustaining democracy.

The second wave of democracy largely due to the political dynamics of World War II exerted immediate effect in Western Europe and later in the 1960s in Africa. The transition from colonial rule to democracy underwent a period of 30-40years of experimentation with structured and fragmented political liberalization that culminated in democratic rule in many African countries by the early 1960s. However, it must be noted that political independence on the shoulder of democracy came with huge expectations and aspirations for Africans. From Kenya to Nigeria, Egypt, Zaire now Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Central African Republic, Africans had hoped for a deepened political transformation of their countries as well as rapid progress on the economic front. Unfortunately, Nigeria as it were in Ghana and other countries a fierce contestation by political elites for access to political power along social lines exacerbated tensions beyond control and domestic chaos and political violence prevailed. With corruption and official malfeasance on the rise in the face of a yawning gap between political authorities and yearnings of the citizens, the ensuing crisis of expectations induced and accelerated the demand for change. Put slightly differently, once the peoples' expectations could not meet governance outcomes, democratic governments fell victim to military coups that were widely celebrated. By the middle of the 1960s many democratic regimes had collapsed due to tension, domestic chaos and political violence and served as impetus to military take over. By the early 1970s, the African story of democracy that began in Ghana in 1957 had run its course and much of the continent states had reverted to authoritarian military rule.

The euphoria of military rule to reverse the misfortunes of democratic rule and set the continent on the path of growth, political stability and

development soon began to wane as the impact of dictatorship started to bite. Political freedoms were stashed, human rights abuses were rampant and suppression of the opposition was widespread. Tension between the military and the political class began to rise and transaction transitions commenced in much of West Africa by the mid 1970s. Military leaders conceded to political opposition who were demanding political liberalization and the return to civil rule. The ban on party politics was lifted; political parties were formed, many on the ashes of independent parties and political associations. The ruling military regimes determined the salient features of the transitions and ensured that their progress was within their control. By 1979, Nigeria for instance returned to democracy along with Cameroon, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and Benin Republic as the 1980s set in its early phase.

Democracy on its second return held promises that were tainted with caution. The military was receding barely a few years after seizing power and with the taste of political power without significant achievements in governance, many welcomed democracy with cautious optimism. Besides, the way and manner of the general elections coupled with questionable reform of the political class attitude to politics, there was cause to be less optimistic that the situation would differ remarkably from the nepotistic, corrupt and misrule of the early 1960s.

Barely two years after the return of democracy in Nigeria, were the tell-tale signs that democracy was failing were conspicuous despite the huge enthusiasm its return had evinced. Both in the polity and the economy, there were strong indications that the country's second republic democratic experience was heading for the rocks. Though there were six political parties. It was clear by 1982-83 that Nigeria was heading for a one-party state status. This palpability was reflecting in "the arrogance of power displayed by top NPN functionaries" which drove home the fear that even for one's personal safety, it was most wise to become NPN (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985:226). The 1983 general elections were highly contested because the stakes were high for the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and also for other political parties. This was evidenced in

the controversies generated leading to the election. For example, the appointment of Federal Electoral Commissioners was challenged by other parties alleging that the members were NPN party members or sympathizers. The appointment of FEDECO chairman Ovie Whisky was challenged in court on this ground to no avail though. Thus, it was obvious the possibility of a free and fair election was distant in the face of electoral officials whose neutrality and integrity were in doubt (Osaghae, 1998:143). The elections were massively rigged by all political parties, but it was NPN with the advantage of incumbency that rigged the most and thus won according to the Babalakin Report that examined the activities of FEDECO.

On the economic front, after nearly four years in power, the NPN was accused of economic mismanagement through corruption that resulted in food crisis, collapse of the health sector that turned hospitals into mere consulting clinics. The educational system was deteriorating while unemployment was on the rise compounded by non-payment of salaries (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985). With tension in the land accentuated by the result of the elections and worsening economic conditions it was predictable that a coup was imminent. And the military struck in a coup in December 1983 again returning the country to authoritarian military rule that was to last till 1999.

Mid way through military rule in 1986 following intense internal political pressure for political liberalization with complementary external support for democratization, the military laid out a transition programme of sequential development strategy with the inauguration of the Political Bureau in 1987. The transition period which was originally designed to terminate in 1990 effectively took off in 1987 with effect for political and institutional engineering to include the establishment of national commissions, and other institutions, creation of two states, conduct of a national census, enactment of a new constitution, registration of two political parties and ultimately staggered election from local government to state and federal elections (Oyediran & Agbaje 1991). The military managed the transition with a strong hand by manipulating the programme through alteration of rules and conditions along the way. This pattern fits

transitions by transaction in which an authoritarian regime determined the major elements of the transition by introducing rules intermittently as suggested by Mainwaring (1989: 30) that in the period the rules are in constant flux: they are neither widely known nor widely accepted. Such transitions witness sharp changes in the rule as a basic common. For example, different categories of politicians were banned and unbanned (old breed or new breed) to participate in the transition process (Momoh, 1997), a measure that raised anxiety and tension within the political class with attendant security concern that was to impact on stability. The same notion of political engineering caused the registration of only two political associations as political parties by turning down many for reasons that created disquiet among the political class. This and the manipulation of the transition process by also shifting its terminal date twice from 1990 culminated in the annulment of the presidential election in 1993, thus throwing the country into the worst moment of instability and insecurity in her recent history.

The post annulment phase represented a new level of authoritarian civilian rule under the Interim National Government. Though the military had left office, for the ING to steer the country through another transition to democracy, the ING proved incapable of managing the overarching polity under chaos and violence when the military conspicuously in the background seized power again and returned the country to full blown authoritarian military rule. General Sani Abacha (1993 - 1998) sought to transmute to a civilian president by co-opting a segment of the political class and by brutal suppression of opposition elements that belong to political groups such as the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) (Mustapha, 2001). His eventual natural death in 1998 propelled the country into another level of transition under General Abdulsalami Abubakar in less than a year. What the military could not complete in over a decade (1987 - 1997) was completed in less than a year with political parties registered, a new constitution enacted and seemingly fair and free elections conducted paving way for the inauguration of democratic rule on 29th May, 1999.

Africa has had a very rich and engaging experience with transition to democracy. Like Latin America, it had democratic legacies to fall back on as impetus to forward looking to democracy. This constituted an emboldened internal pressure in favour of democracy. The external environment consisting of the donor community and international financial institutions also evinced support and pressure for democratic reforms. During the period deteriorating economic conditions, a function of mismanagement and political instability, raised enormous security challenges that became notable way into the democratic phase of the country thus impacting democratic consolidation.

3. Instability and Security Challenges in Transition

The democratic story in Africa has been quite resourceful and engaging in the context of the political objective of stability. The struggle for democracy has been fierce and bitter on a continuum to moderate. By 1985, about 21 countries in Africa were under military authoritarian rule. Sierra Leone and Uganda were under democratic rule but had experienced military rule earlier. Chad and Cape Verde were being ruled by civilians merely heading military governments. Egypt and Algeria were under civilian rule headed by former military rulers (Ayoade, 1986). During the same period, Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, Swaziland and Zimbabwe had no experience with military dictatorship. These countries also had robust competitive party system. One party rule was also fashionable in East and Central Africa that offered citizens really no political choices. By the late 1990s, most of these countries had successfully transited to democracy.

The success of democratic transitions had ostensibly ended the debate between "democratic conditionists" and "democratic universalists". In other words, the debate between those who argued that democracy was not feasible without improved economic conditions were proved wrong as democracy had taken root in countries that were considered dire in economic conditions. The early phases of democracy contend with conditions of transition to democracy that found transitory feet in the post transition era. These issues bother on instability and security, the effective

management of which could consolidate democracy. Transitional democracies have electoral, governance and socio-economic issues to address in order to achieve stability and security.

Election is the cornerstone of democracy due to its capacity to regulate the dynamics of political power especially in Africa. The ethnic plurality in Africa has indeed given elections this powerful function and hence elections are a major issue among political competitors. No issue generates tension in Africa and Latin America and elsewhere especially transition democracies like elections. The zero sum nature of elections in Africa has automatically turned the exercise into a matter of high politics. Thus security consideration takes the military notion of armed personnel out to protect the electoral process by the state. Electoral competitors determined to win at all cost are fully prepared to arm supporters to protect and guarantee victory by illegitimate means such as rigging, ballot box snatching and stuffing. Indeed disrupting the voting process becomes an ultimate action in order for the candidate to win by raising and arming thugs or an organized militia (Matlosa, Shale and Motsamai, 2010). Thus before, during and after elections violence characterizes the entire process in many transitional democracies. The experiences of Kenya in 2008 and 2010, Nigeria after 2011 elections and the build up to the 2012 Togolese elections are apt illustrations. For the state, incumbent political actors use security forces to deny citizens franchise through intimidation and harassment to vote in specific directions or restrain citizens from elections thereby sowing political grievances that candidates are prepared to address through violence. Loss of confidence in the judiciary induces aggrieved candidates to seek such alternative avenues of redress. Political violence due to contestation over electoral outcomes or to influence outcomes destabilizes transition democracies by raising instability and destroying livelihoods, life and social order. These are enormous security issues for transition democracies. Elections and electoral issues are political issues that require political solutions that political leaders will address with courage and statesmanship by focusing on the goals of national development and social cohesion. Transparency in the electoral process is possible once political leaders are determined to achieve stability when

emphasis is shifted to protecting the citizens' interest rather than the candidates. One way of rethinking security in transition democracies is to open the political engagement process by ensuring inclusivity. In many transitional democracies, ruling elites act as if the national political arena is an exclusive preserve of anointed individuals and groups. This tendency creates a tranch and levels of aggrieved individuals and groups who may use their grievances as a common platform for mobilization of coalition of the aggrieved to destabilize the polity.

Transitional democracies are faced with critical governance issues ranging from non adherence to rule of law, lack of governmental integrity, weak political institutions and simmering social divisions. All of these derive from lack of ingrained respect for rule of law which translates to banal levels of personal rule, a situation Fareed Zakaria in Carothers (2007) refer to as prevailing trends in transitional democracies that have become illiberal democracies. The rabid abuse of power and denial of basic human rights have been promoted in Peru, Argentina, the Philippines and Kazakhstan have convinced Fareed Zakaria that perhaps the rapidity with which democratization was pursued in the latter part of the 20th century was responsible for the denial of liberties in new democracies. Providing the seeming justification for a crack down on human rights are preponderant ethnic conflicts and others in new democracies such as Russia, Nigeria and Kenya. These social and politically induced conflicts are viewed by Mansfield and Snyder (1995) as products of the nature of transitional democracies that were established simultaneously with market reforms that created few gainers. It is the failure of the rule of law and the growth of personal rule resulting in widespread social, ethnic and political conflicts that has led to the reversal of democratic fortunes towards authoritarianism even under the guise of democracy.

Adherence to the rule of law in governance is a basic requirement in democracy. Under law are all citizens irrespective of class and uniform application of law ensures broad respect for authority, institutions and governance process. For example, the selective application of anti-corruption laws during the Obasanjo administration (1999 - 2007) weakened political institutions, the legitimacy of his government and led

to over all vitiation of the integrity of government. Governance was rather personalized and institutions of the state lost the independent capacity to promote compliance and ensure social order. The justice system was highly politicized in Nigeria as conviction or lack of it depends on the whims and caprices of the president as the anti-corruption crusade progressed. In this way, the opposite of social cohesion, stability and guarantee of the social value system necessary for building polities were amplified. It is thus important to state that respect for the rule of law enhance the development of a fair and firm justice system as a cornerstone of democratic society and a modern economy. Effective administration of justice is a function of effective and efficient application of rule of law and this is instrumental to resolving conflicts and fostering social interaction on widely accepted legal platforms and social values. This also enhances predictability of governance, fair treatment, respect for human rights and accountable response to citizens' expectations and demand which evince the use and reliance on legal means to address grievances. Where governments abuse power and crack down on human rights, while elites and other privileged groups receive preferential treatments, then aggrieved groups resort to illegitimate means to meet their expectations and demands with conflict and chaos likely prevalences (USAID, 1998).

As an apparent outcome and direct flow from misgovernance in transitional democracies are socio-economic issues ranging from corruption to high unemployment and deepening phenomenon of poverty. These issues are hardly akin or peculiar to transitional democracies as they have continued to be noticed in even established democracies though to a lesser degree. Corruption, unemployment and poverty have assumed an important character in transition democracies due largely to the simultaneous introduction of austerity market reform with democratization. In countries such as Nigeria with a transaction transition, corruption is a carryover from the preceding military regime which was rather institutionalized (Genyi, 2009, Ibrahim, 2001) and only sustained since then. On this count, corruption in Nigeria in both the public and private sectors has not only been endemic, it has assumed a life of its own in governance in Nigeria. The monumental fraud in the banking sector

uncovered in 2011 banking sector reforms is very telling. The slow and painfully frustrating justice system in Nigeria has made elaborate convictions difficult except that of Cecilia Ibru, the former Chief Executive Officer/Managing Director of former Oceanic Bank, a new generation bank that caved in due to massive fraud is very illustrative (Odemwingie, 2013). In the public sector, the prevailing malfeasance has created a major dent on the public image of democracy in Nigeria. Democratic polities are then seen in the light of Nigeria's experience to be widely associated with corruption. This phenomenon is perverse and has been so widely acknowledged at all levels of governance in Nigeria. The phenomenal level of corruption in contemporary Nigeria is linked to the unwritten concession granted the military of an amnesty from investigation and prosecution for conceding to democracy. With the magnitude of corruption in Nigeria, development deliverables have been sacrificed on the altar of personal interest of political leaders and bureaucrats. In the wake is sustained rise in unemployment and deepening poverty which have continued to exacerbate crime and disruption to social order. The current spate of terrorist attacks from the insurgent Boko Haram has been widely attributed to excruciating poverty and high youth unemployment rate especially in Northern Nigeria (Olawale and Bello, 2012).

Transitional democracies have difficulties fighting corruption due to the weakness of political institutions, a fact that favours political leaders of the old order and who have raised cronies that are part of the new democratic era. While these cronies who may be part of the prevailing political leadership use their positions to protect their sponsors and service their own personal interests ensures that emerging democratic institutions remain weak in order to guarantee an existing order of malfeasance. Thus political institutions become perverse, serving illegitimate interest of political leaders while the welfare of the generality of the populace suffers. Thus, the consequences of corruption in institutional decay, unemployment and poverty underscore instability and security concerns of great magnitude. Stemming corruption through exemplary conduct by political leadership is the starting point to check deteriorating security situation in transitional democracies.

4. Conclusion

The notion of security has been altered since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. From high politics of military exclusivity, social-economic and political issues of poverty, unemployment and conduct of elections are major issues in security governance. In transitional democracies these are critical concerns for stability and consolidation of democracy. Corruption creates unemployment consisting of a pool dominated by the most energetic category of the population of a country whose conditions are exacerbated by poverty that accentuates frustration of hope for a better future. Out of desperation, unemployed youth represent the most potential threat to peace and of any country let alone transitional democracies that are volatile and fledgling. Emerging democracies can deal with these issues through creative inclusive strategies in governance that broaden participation of citizens in politics and security governance.

In addition, exemplary and strong political leadership is critical to enhancing governmental integrity and the legitimacy of political institutions to deliver on their mandate that meet citizens' expectations. Strong political institutions are a sure remedy to instability and a plethora of security challenges in transitional democracies.

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