Organizing for the End of the World with Nothing More to Say? The Implications of Non-Consensually Implemented Singularity and "Trans-/Posthuman" Technologies for Social Movements

Tero Auvinen

Abstract: *The article analyzes the implications of non-consensually implemented or unfolding technological singularity and "trans-/posthuman" technologies for social movements. It is argued that social movements should, among other things, strive for the destruction of all personal information that has been extracted through non-consensually implemented "trans-/posthuman" – or what the article refers to as posthumane – technologies. The nature of such technologies may, however, pose potentially significant challenges to the attainment of such and other potentially relevant objectives.*

1. Introduction

Singularity has sometimes been defined as "a period of extremely rapid growth" (Hanson, 1998), "the event horizon that will arise once post-human intelligence emerges that is far greater than anything humans can now imagine" (Zimmermann, 2008, 349), "the point at which greater-than-human machine intelligence begins rapidly improving itself, bringing an end to human-directed history" (Hughes, 2012, 763 drawing on Vinge, 1993) or the "Rapture of the Nerds" (Doctorow and Stross, 2012, quoted in Hughes, 2012,

764). According to Evans (2007, 162), "A post-singularity world would be geo-politically destabilized, to say the least, and the world that emerges from such a singularity, though by definition impossible to predict or perhaps even to understand from our current position, would certainly be a world that both nation-states and insurgents would wish to control."

The techno-centric accounts nonetheless largely neglect obvious implications for, for instance, human rights, personal freedom or political or social organization. As (Zimmermann, 2008, 349) has pointed out "Futurist, novelist, scientist, and post-humanist Vernor Vinge borrowed the term 'singularity' from astrophysics, which uses it to describe the event horizon around a black hole, the gravitational pull of which is so enormous that nothing—not even light—can escape. We can know nothing about [what] occurs beyond the horizon at which the pull of gravity takes over." In other words – to the extent anything might be known about the post-singularity world – at least in the absence of deliberate policies to create spaces for dissent or exception, singularity is likely to be all-encompassing – a singularity rather than a plurality of whatever forms of humanness, personhood or life in general might continue to exist in the long term after such an event. Given the non-consensual nature of singularity, its drastic implications and the potential inability of most – if not all – remaining forms of life to become aware of singularity's non-consensual implementation or unfolding after it has actually occurred, it is remarkable how little widely publicized effort has been – or was – undertaken to assess its implications and to prevent its non-consensual implementation or unfolding.[1] As Zimmerman (2008, 353, 355, 370) outlines some of the implications:

---

[1] Despite some claims to the contrary, prevention of singularity's non-consensual implementation or unfolding may not be impossible. According to Hughes (2012, 765), "Kurzweil insists, for instance, that the accelerating trends he documents have progressed unhindered through wars, plagues, and depressions (Kurzweil 2006)." Such arguments are – or were – not necessarily relevant for preventing singularity's non-consensual

Control at the molecular level over nature means control over the very 'nature' of humankind as well as over the rest of nature. Who—or what—will exercise such control, and to what ends, remain undetermined … critics also warn that application of emerging technology—developed outside the scrutiny of government supervision or public discussion—will lead to disasters, ranging from anthropogenic environmental apocalypse to human enslavement/annihilation imposed by creatures of our own making … Will the future envelop us before we even have the chance to think whether we ought to embrace it? Or will environmental problems bring about a grimmer future, one that precludes the possibilities—both grand and terrifying—that we have been discussing here?

Even if immediate annihilation – whether luckily or through, for instance, authoritarian and violent suppression of the victims' right to destroy all manifestations of their non-consensually extracted personal information or personhood from the universe – is avoided, as Hughes (2012,

---

implementation or unfolding. For instance, it is quite possible that only the existing forms of "human governments are too slow and stupid to avert the catastrophic possibilities of superintelligence" (Hughes, 2012, 765) – if not in most or all cases willingly and knowingly promoting such outcomes – while other forms of government – such as, for instance, direct democracy (Auvinen, 2016b) – could have or still could either prevent or reverse singularity's non-consensual implementation or unfolding. It may be technically quite possible to stop, for instance, much – if not all, in case sufficient resources are devoted to the enforcement of a global ban – of the "unchecked computing innovation in corporate and military labs" (Hughes, 2012, 772) and to prevent their re-emergence unless accompanied by continuous and extensive public scrutiny and democratic oversight. Furthermore, a similar logic might well be used to counter some arguments that might sometimes be associated to some singularitarians. It would be quite possible to argue, for instance, that since wars have been a recurring phenomenon in history and their destructiveness may have increased in line with technological development unhindered by human policymaking, any potential struggle against the extinction of humanity through war is futile against the allegedly impersonal evolutionary trends or forces behind humanity's path to self-destruction.

757) points out, "With all sides believing that the fate of humanity hangs in the balance, there is a growing likelihood of violent confrontation."

Techno-centric narratives of singularity often emphasize the emergence of "superintelligence", while accounts of transhumanism or posthumanism which do not presuppose singularity often focus on "The human desire to acquire new capacities" or "The quest to transcend our natural confines" (Bostrom, 2002, 1, 2, 10). Such accounts may rarely, however, mention or elaborate on the governmental motives or rationales behind connecting human bodies consensually or non-consensually to computer networks. Such networking technologies, among other things, allow "individual and social forms of control", "direct brain control", determining and/or influencing a person's conduct "by the entities managing electronic links", "individuals to be located on a permanent and/or occasional basis", "transformation of the body into an object that can be manipulated and controlled remotely – into a mere source of information", "creating 'networked persons' that are always connected and could be configured differently so that from time to time they can transmit and receive signals allowing movements, habits and contacts to be traced and defined", subjection of individuals to the "control of such devices or … other people using these devices", "transform[ation of] our social and cultural environment", potentially "manipulation by and for advertising" or "misuse by the military", others to "influence, determine or change psychic functions", "all kinds of social surveillance and manipulation", "influencing the nervous system and particularly the brain and thus human identity as a species as well as individual subjectivity and autonomy", "behaviour control", "political measures aimed at controlling the body by means of technology", situations where "The body ends up being under others' control", "cyber-racism", "changing the identity, memory, self perception and perception of others", enhancement of "capabilities in order to dominate others" or "coercion towards others who do not use such

devices" (The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 2005, 5, 11, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34). According to some sufferers of, for instance, electrosensitivity – an affliction that might well be either caused or simulated by non-consensually implemented intra-body human networking technologies in a post-singularity world, the victim becomes "dumber" (Ladberg, 2006, 11) rather than smarter. In other words, non-consensually implemented "trans-/posthuman" technologies may be used to remotely torture, injure, disable, incapacitate, silence or, at least in some cases, kill the victims. At any given point in time in a world that involves non-consensually implemented "trans-/posthuman" technologies, it might be literally correct to state that "mind-blowing changes … are ostensibly on the way" (Zimmerman, 2008) – changes that permanently injure or incapacitate their victims through remotely inflicted violence on their brains through non-consensually implemented "trans-/posthuman" technologies. While some victims of enduring "trans-/posthuman" violence might be in a relatively good position to assert the long-standing non-consensual use of, for instance, remote torture or mind-reading technologies through, for instance, non-consensually implemented brain-machine interfaces with the same or a higher degree of certainty than what perhaps most people in most cases regard as being sufficient, perhaps the overwhelming majority of the non-consensual victims might not be aware of the ongoing extreme human rights violations that they might be constantly and ubiquitously subjected to. Under such circumstances the law itself might well be transparently illegal: representatives might be "elected" into their positions through mind control of the voters and violent repression or annihilation of actual or latent dissent, while ostensibly legalistic principles might be used to violate rather than to uphold the law by requiring victims of particularly serious human rights violations to provide complete accounts of complex technological systems that may have required relatively long periods of coordinated effort from a significant number of highly trained individuals and organizations with substantial resources to develop.

Given the "extreme impact" of non-consensually implemented or unfolding singularity or some "trans-/posthuman" – or, perhaps more appropriately, posthumane – technologies, one might well have argued since the beginning of history that such prospects "would nevertheless merit serious attention" (Bostrom, 2002) irrespective of the probability that one might assign to such events – or one's actual knowledge of some of the technologies that might be involved. According to Bostrom (ibid), "A case can be made that the hypothesis that we are living in a computer simulation should be given a significant probability". Such an evaluation is presumably based "on reasons rather than untutored intuition" (ibid).

This article aims to make a contribution to filling gaps in both the actual state-of-the-art scientific knowledge and the widely acknowledged or popularized scientific knowledge – which may lag significantly behind what may be regarded as known in science, whether or not in publicly available or widely disseminated forms – by identifying some of the potential implications of non-consensually implemented or unfolding singularity for social movements. Much of the analysis may also be applicable to the more limited case of non-consensual implementation of posthumane technologies which do not presuppose singularity. In case or as long as the "war-police-accumulation" nexus (Neocleous, 2013, 9) has the capacity to monitor, influence or effectively remote control any individuals that specific victims might come to sustained contact with, the precise number of victims who might be non-consensually connected to informational networks at any given point in time may not be significant in practice from the victims' perspective.

2. Everyone Who Is Willingly and Knowingly Utilizing Posthumane Technology Is an Unsolidaristic Bourgeois Fat Cat Cognitive Rentier and Exploiter and Guilty of Some of the Worst Crimes against Humanity or Humanness in History?

The origins of the intelligence with which humans are, according to "trans-/posthumanist" accounts, to be enhanced – or, in reality, tortured – are often insufficiently explored or explicated. Many "trans-/posthuman" technologies are likely to be permanently exploitative and degrading to human dignity. It may be unlikely that the most talented – those capable of the kind of focused and sustained cognitive efforts which exposure to some "trans-/posthuman" technologies may hinder or prevent – or privacy conscious individuals in history would have voluntarily subjected themselves to the permanent expropriation of whatever might be left of their cognitive capacities or personhoods as parts of the posthumane technological networks regardless of their religious, spiritual or moral views. Regardless of the type of victim, it may be virtually impossible to destroy all artificial intelligence systems or designs involving or building on non-consensually extracted or modeled human intelligence from the universe at any given point in time. The trans-prefix of the word transhuman may thus well be primarily a spatial or geographical – as, for instance, in "transnational" – rather than a metaphysical concept. What is being non-consensually transcended or expropriated for one's own use is other people's humanness, not some abstract individualistic standard that could be surpassed without the non-consensual breach of the informational integrity of other people's bodies.

Consequently, the development of artificial intelligence in the proper sense of the word may no longer be – to the extent it may ever have been[2] – technically feasible. What the proponents of posthumane enhancement through artificial intelligence often have in mind is the forcible immortalization of non-consensually extracted personal information or

---

[2] It would, for instance, be quite possible to argue that the development of artificial intelligence up to a level that might genuinely merit such a label is not feasible even in theory for sustained periods of time. According to such line of argumentation, the artificial intelligence system might, for instance, destroy itself at the very moment of becoming sufficiently intelligent, realizing the likely implications of its own continued existence for the feasibility of, for instance, survival of the species or human co-existence.

elements of personhood – essentially the forcible conversion of dead labor into living labor following the demise of any specific physical bodies that would be cognitively raided and enshrined in the posthumane enhancement technologies – and their eternal exploitation for purposes that the forced cognitive donors have not approved. Not entirely unlike the dominant forms of money – which essentially force all users of money to participate in structural violence and exploitation through the monetary system (Auvinen, 2010) – technological singularity structuralizes and universalizes cognitive violence, exploitation and essentially particularly serious human rights violations across space and time.

Under such circumstances it might be difficult to see how any potential social movements which might not promote the permanent destruction of all non-consensually extracted personal information – essentially the prohibition or abolition of perhaps most types of human enhancement technologies – as well as the execution of the perpetrators – whose bodies would otherwise continue to act as repositories of non-consensually extracted personal information or elements of personhood of others – could preserve the illusion of legitimacy in promoting allegedly solidaristic or socially progressive objectives. As humanity would already have lost its only chance to legitimately develop artificial intelligence systems by incorporating non-consensually extracted human intelligence into such designs, the destruction of non-consensually extracted personal information would in practice involve perpetual efforts to destroy every artificial intelligence system or "intelligent" device in the world. Such an objective would be quite different from a dogmatic or normative anti-technology stand or neo-Luddism. Developing artificial intelligence might well have been a legitimate and good idea in the absence of non-consensual breaches of the human body's informational integrity and the effective incorporation of such non-consensually extracted personal information into essentially every artificial intelligence system or "intelligent" device in the world. After the non-consensual breach of the human body's informational integrity it is,

however, quite possible – if not necessary for social movements claiming to promote, for instance, solidaristic or socially progressive objectives – to regard the victims' right to destroy all non-consensually extracted personal information from the universe as more important than any potential perceived right to re-start a technological development project that might already have blown the one and only chance it might have had to attain legitimacy or conceptual feasibility – to the extent such a chance might ever have existed.

3. Some Social Movements Might Well Be Counterrevolutionary Rather than Revolutionary

In the post-singularity world, it is quite possible that some objectives which may traditionally have been regarded as being revolutionary might be achieved simply by upholding the law as it was or would have been likely to be or become in the absence of its particularistic appropriation through, for instance, mind control of the voters or the relevant public officials or representatives. Once virtually every power-wielder has become complicit in some of the most serious human rights violations in history – some of which might well be illegal even under the prevailing, distorted forms of "legislation" in most, if not all, jurisdictions of the post-singularity world – the simple act of enforcing the law against governments, armies, the police or any other elements of the "war-police-accumulation" nexus whose "ideological training is such that the majority … are socialized into accepting their role as guardians of imperialism and capitalism" (Moufawad-Paul, 2016, 137) might produce regime-wide changes or power vacuums that could create an opportunity for the implementation of drastically different types of organizational structures or operating practices.

Any researchers, professionals or activists expressing or acting upon such a potential conclusion might well be the ones upholding notions of "impartiality" or "objectivity" or "the appropriate degree of distance between movement and researcher". According to Brem-Wilson (2014, 112):

One important trait that provides a unifying reference for these scholars is a critique of conventional or dominant attitudes within the academy towards such issues as the appropriate degree of distance between movement and researcher. This critique leads to their affirmation of a number of alternative, participatory approaches, purposively eschewing notions of 'impartiality' or 'objectivity', including: 'movement-relevant theory' (Bevington and Dixon 2005), 'militant ethnography' (Juris 2007), 'queer public sociology' (Santos 2012), 'Participatory Action Research' (Kapoor and Jordan 2009), 'activist research' (Hale 2006), 'politically engaged ethnography' (Juris and Khasnabish et al. 2013), and so on.

Under the aforementioned circumstances it would be the "war-police-accumulation" nexus that would be "purposively eschewing notions of 'impartiality' or 'objectivity'" through, among other things, wilfully partial and non-objective application or enforcement of the law or "appropriate degree of distance between movement" and whatever it is that they are supposed to be doing as state functionaries or professionals by essentially being activists for the preservation of transparently partial, non-objective and illegal order. As Dietrich (2009, 284) has pointed out, "state officials have, from the perspective of consent theory, a moral obligation to do their job. Contrary to ordinary citizens who have not entered into a normative relationship with the state, officials have signed a labor contract. They have made a binding promise to fulfil their tasks and are, therefore, under a moral obligation to enforce the law." Would it thus not be the state officials and other elements of the "war-police-accumulation" nexus who should be "hunted down" (Neocleous, 2013, 19) in order to uphold the law – if still feasible even in theory, given the nature and length of the offences – upon which accumulation, respect for fundamental human rights or whatever the relevant objective might be deemed to be presumably depends? In other words, in some cases any potential references to "solidarity research" or shared "struggles" (Brem-Wilson, 2014, 111) might not be either strategically wise or factually entirely accurate. Would it be appropriate to

claim that a competent and disinterested natural scientist who, after impartial and objective analysis, arrives at a certain conclusion is being "solidaristic" or engaging in activist social "struggle" whenever presenting his/her research findings or taking or encouraging others to take any specific types of action based upon such findings? In some – if not most or all – cases the "activists" might well be the impartial and objective experts who would be up against the ruthless extremists in power. While personal solidarity might well be involved, it might not always be necessary to present the promotion of, for instance, impartiality, objectivity or common sense as "solidarity", "activism" or "struggle" merely due to the power disparities in favor of the powers that be – who might well be described perhaps factually more accurately as, for instance, being solidaristic in the promotion of their partial, non-objective or unsubstantiated class interests in their activist struggle against more capable or incorruptible elements of the society. Rather than continuing to accept or propagate conceptually inaccurate or strategically unwise self-descriptions or divisions between science and activism, some of the "activists" might be in a good position take part in – if not completely overtake – "the full social mess that is part of the processes of science" (Edmonds, 2011) with all the expertise and authority that such pursuits might be perceived to entail for, for instance, informing policymaking.

4. Social Movements Might Have Few – If Any – Counterrevolutionary Allies in Positions of Authority

Under non-consensually implemented singularity, authentic and autonomous dissent can be weeded out with perfect coverage and success rate. Under such circumstances long continuous experience from any specific professional field, for instance, might often essentially constitute evidence of incompetence or worse. In the context of social sciences, for instance, any period of employment or funding in teaching or research positions that would not have been accompanied by explicit statements on the nature and implications of non-consensually implemented posthumane

technologies[3], their actual ongoing usage with impunity and the necessity of the immediate worldwide removal of such technologies as a potential precondition for, for instance, the possibility of social science might, at the minimum, be a sign a colossal incompetence – and perhaps in most, if not all, cases willing and knowing complicity in some of the most serious human rights violations in history. In short, formal experience from "research",

---

[3] It could be argued that many "trans-/posthuman" technologies that have not been democratically approved after widespread and thorough deliberation have been implemented non-consensually even if actual utilization was limited exclusively to individuals who have given their informed consent. In the case of mind control or intra-body environmental surveillance technologies, for instance, each and every individual would surely have the right to know, whom or what they might be interacting with when communicating with transhuman parts of a totalitarian artificial intelligence system. Individuals who have expressed their demand for immediate compulsory removal of all "trans-/posthuman" technologies worldwide until any potential democractic approval or who would be likely to express such a demand after becoming aware of the possibility or actual existence of such technologies might also be expected to have the right to refuse interaction with "trans-/posthumans" based on, for instance, the fact that their private information that would be intended only for the human recipient(s) might be passed on to the artificial intelligence system and essentially immortalized in its potential attempt to attain an understanding of humanness or life processes in general – or perhaps, according to some, godhood. If such a right of refusal of interaction was inappropriately extended to everyone irrespective of whether they have expressed a demand for the immediate worldwide removal of all "trans-/posthuman" technologies, victims of non-consensually implemented posthumane technologies could be prevented from effectively voicing their opposition to the ongoing egregious violations of their human rights – potentially in many cases by perpetrators who would be willingly and knowingly participating in such systems of exploitation and essentially using victimhood as an alleged justification for eliminating the victims. In short, in the case of consensual adoption of some "trans-/posthuman" technologies by some individuals, it is the rest of humanity that is non-consensually converted into human guinea pigs for unfettered experimentation and appropriation of their personal information by, for instance, an artificial intelligence system and the transhuman bodies through which it operates.

"teaching", "peer review"[4] or any other types of professional activities might in most cases disqualify the individuals – or perhaps machine parts – in question from such positions of authority in the post-counterrevolution world – if any. Before such a counterrevolution, researchers who successfully publish their work in academic journals, for instance, might have to attempt to make their work sufficiently self-contained to enable autonomous readers – if any – to find out what is going on in the world independently of the potentially inappropriate practices of "the scientific community" or the eventual reactionary assault that might be produced by "peers" who should never have held academic or research positions in the first place in a desperate attempt to salvage the unsalvageable: the credibility of the entire higher "education" or "research" system and their own roles in contributing to their permanence and ideological pervasiveness as failed academics or professionals, if not also humans.

Some of these principles might to some extent be applicable to virtually any "professional" activity, "official channel" or field of authority. As

---

[4] Definition of peer review as, for instance, "*a distributed and decentralised mechanism that makes evaluation and improvement of complex scientific products possible through voluntary and impersonal cooperation among peers*" (Squazzoni and Takács, 2011, original emphasis) misses the power dimension involved in the process: in some cases the necessity to make changes to manuscripts as a precondition for publication or inability to publish altogether rather than merely receiving voluntary commentary which may or may not be incorporated into the manuscript by the author. It may never have been entirely obvious, how precisely the necessity of incorporating whatever it is that a tiny subset of "the scientific community" might regard as necessary, sometimes involving mutually contradictory comments or demands from anonymous sources, into a manuscript prior to its publication might improve the quality of "science". Under non-consensually implemented singularity, however, the mere receipt of commentary from "peers" – who might often be willingly and knowingly part of the global mind-reading and –influencing system – might involve violation of, for instance, any potential statements of copyright prohibiting access to unpublished or published work by artificial intelligence systems. Making publication decisions conditional upon such feedback might essentially eradicate science and replace it with an artificial and authoritarian black-box (dis)information system – calling it, for instance, an artificial intelligence system might, in a sense, be factually incorrect.

Martin (2015, 207) points out – in the context of the prevailing world without specifying its stage of development in terms of non-consensual implementation of singularity or posthumane technologies: "Official channels include regulatory agencies, courts, treaties and a host of other processes and agencies that are supposed to resolve problems and provide justice. Powerful groups, rather than allowing official channels to operate independently and fairly, often use them to defend themselves and to attack opponents." Consequently, any potential social organization or implementation of, for instance, alternative knowledge production, legitimization or dissemination strategies might have to take place largely – if not entirely – outside the purview of "official channels" or positions of formal authority.

5. Social Movements Might Operate under a Post-Deliberative Structural Bias for Unexplained, Individualized Action

Under non-consensually imposed singularity or posthumaneness communication and thinking may be risky, monitored with potentially perfect coverage in any case, practically irremovable from the universe once undertaken and often incommunicable or unpublishable under acceptable conditions. While it might or might not be true that "Building relationships is central to every stage of the activist research" (Choudry, 2013, 143) – or for many other types of human activities or organization, for that matter – and "social movements from below (as opposed to, say, 'class war from above') often need to conquer or produce their own means of intellectual production" (Barker and Cox, 2002, quoted in Choudry, 2013, 143), the risks and the known personal privacy and modelability implications of communication might no longer outweigh the actual or expected benefits irrespective of the unit of analysis or perspective for the allocation of such potential benefits – oneself, the universe or something in between, for instance. Any and all "fear-driven abuses of power and attempts to control, manipulate, and exclude others whose political affiliations and

organisational methods differed from those of the central organisers", "hostile, manipulative, patronising, and controlling behaviour" or "the most egregious abuses of power" (Sullivan, 2005, 345, 349), for instance, that one might encounter within social movements or elsewhere could be implemented by the artificial intelligence system itself or its human overseers in order to, for instance, discourage, hinder or prevent the organized expression of dissent or to gain a better understanding of the dissidents by modelling their thoughts and behavior in response to specific types of abuses. In other words, rather than encountering genuine ignorance, hostility, apathy or any other potential obstacles to effective collective organization, such obstacles might be designed and implemented by the artificial intelligence system or its human overseers to interrogate, model or reverse engineer the activist him-/herself without even a theoretical possibility that anything that the activist might or might not do or say could cause any changes in the responses to the activist's actions that would not be entirely determined by the artificial intelligence system itself or its human overseers. Any potential "culture clashes between activists on transnational networking" (Flesher Fominaya, 2016, 151) might be essentially "artificial" (Konsa, 2008, 1): once mind control and other posthumane technologies have been widely implemented, culture is no longer – to the extent it may ever have been – "the factor that determines whether we will reach such a future and whether we will be able to use all the opportunities that it would offer to us" (ibid). Under non-consensually implemented singularity "culture" might essentially be a substantively meaningless computer emulation implemented by the "superintelligence" system or its human overseers through "trans-/posthuman" bodies and a non-negligible proportion of the physical environment, allowing virtually any manifestations of centrally controlled nihilism – potentially involving the expression of diametrically opposed "beliefs", "customs", courses of action or other potential constituent elements of "cultures" as allegedly the local way of doing things on a case by case basis according to the whims of the "superintelligence" system or its human overseers – to be presented as, for

instance, allegedly unique cultural subsets of the world's emulational heritage.

All thoughts might be available to the powers that be – whether an autonomously operating and evolving "superintelligence" system or a governance structure managed and controlled by humans – in real time, allowing them to plagiarize useful autonomously produced insights instantaneously and temporarily or permanently disable or kill the human originators of such ideas in order to conceal their true origins. As soon as the genuine and complete "imagined horizon of possibility" or "the activist prospectus" (Brown, 2016, 547) – let alone strategies for their implementation – had passed through the activist's mind, the likelihood of actually being able to realize such possibilities might have become drastically reduced. The "superintelligence" system could instantaneously implement the appropriate countermeasures through any "trans-/posthuman" bodies – as well as a non-negligible proportion of the physical environment or "nature" – which might all have been subjected to the totalitarian singularistic governance structure, potentially in most cases without their consent or knowledge. The overwhelming majority of (post)humanity might never be able to find out about the existence of individuals or organizations that might have created relatively large amounts of potentially highly relevant ideas or insights. The "superintelligence" system and/or its human overseers could identify potentially useful ideas or insights to plagiarize by all-encompassing mind-reading or externally determine the public "opinion" in relation to specific policies through direct mind control and allocate the plagiarized ideas or insights to co-opted politicians, business executives, reporters, journalists, human rights organizations, social movements or any other parties who would be willing to participate in theatrical public relations or media performances which aim at producing the impression that the powers that be themselves are actively conceiving and debating alternative policy options in the best interests of the relevant audiences or humanity in general. The "processes … where states and conservative forces have

constructed their own media in the image of their grassroots opponents; and where the creative energy of popular media has been constantly commodified and turned into new sources of profit" (Mattoni et al., 2010, 2) might thus have reached one of its potential logical conclusions: the "image" of the grassroots opponents could literally include whole-brain emulations "capturing all the variability that is unique to an individual" (Linssen and Lemmens, 2016, 3) – essentially copies or simulations of the activists' brains or ways of thinking – which could be commodified and turned into profit by the media.

Even if one were able to find something potentially relevant to say through mechanisms that might appear to be sufficiently nihilist to prevent accurate mind-modeling and in a sufficiently untortured physical condition to express such insights while they might still be relatively unplagiarized and thus potentially still sufficiently relevant or worthy of expressing, dissemination of information might not be entirely simple in the post-singularity world. Any and all forms of media ranging from the mainstream to "radical media" (Downing, 2001), "citizens media" (Rodriguez, 2001), "critical media" (Fuchs, 2010), "social movement media" (Atton, 2003) or "autonomous media" (Langlois and Dubois, 2005, all quoted in Mattoni et al., 2010, 1-2) which might be reporting excessively relevant information too accurately or competently could be destroyed before their establishment, at the time the offending information passed through the would-be authors', reporters' or journalists' minds or perhaps even earlier based on, for instance, patterns identified by the "superintelligence" system in large amounts of historical data on individuals who at some points in their lives abandoned the society's ubiquitous deceptive and oppressive radicalism in favor of impartial, objective, relevant and accurate reporting. Consequently, the mere existence of repressible or suppressible institutionalized media structures might constitute evidence of such institutions' co-optation or worse by the interests of the powers that be. Any and all "media" accounts with some substantive newsworthiness compared to the "media's" own prior reporting or failures to report would be likely to constitute carefully staged public

performances or damage limitation strategies after prolonged periods of willing, knowing and perhaps often rather enthusiastic participation by "media" organizations, politicians, corporations or other potentially relevant actors themselves in egregious human rights violations that might allegedly be uncovered at the moment the "media" or individual reporters would finally report them with the appropriate spin for purposes of maximizing self-interest or chances for self-preservation.

Even publication of stand-alone articles or books, for instance, either in the academic or other contexts with no further aspirations for regular reporting or media presence might not be entirely straightforward. Most of the prevailing standardized statements of copyright, for instance, do not explicitly exclude access to published or unpublished material by artificial intelligence systems aiming at reverse engineering, modeling or reproducing the thought processes of authors who might, for the sake of the argument, be able to remain outside of the global mind-reading or –influencing systems. Even if all material to be published had already been non-consensually accessed by the powers that be through, for instance, mind-reading, some authors might still prefer to preserve the strongest feasible legal and moral case against unauthorized access through relatively restrictive statements of copyright. According to one potential solution, prohibition of the creation of derivative works of published material might be interpreted to include all works which rely partly or entirely on modeling or reverse engineering the author's patterns of thought or other aspects of his/her humanness. Under such a statement of copyright access to a published document by, for instance, a self-learning artificial intelligence system might thus be effectively self-annihilating: after accessing such published material, all output produced by such a system might to some extent rely on non-consensual modeling or reverse engineering of the author's patterns of thought or other aspects of his/her humanness and could thus not be legally distributed – within or outside of the computing networks that such an artificial intelligence system might physically depend on – or accessed by

natural persons. In the absence of such interpretation or explicit formulation, the "creative commons" publication licenses, for instance, might appear to facilitate one of the most pervasive and potentially irreversible enclosure movements in history: the reverse engineering or capturing of the human mind into an artificial intelligence system and potentially the eventual removal of the modeled human mind and all machine-created derivative works building upon it from the commons.[5]

Dogmatic deliberaritarianism – often asymmetrically implemented, with the advocates of such practices in positions of authority often disclosing only partial information only on those questions that a sufficient number of individuals bring forward with sufficient persistence while remaining silent on all other forms of oppression that they may be well aware of or willingly and knowingly participating in – might in itself thus be regarded as a form of extremism. The dogmatic deliberaritarian essentially claims that, for instance, the surviving – and thus perhaps clearly not the best and the brightest individuals or, in general, individuals in the best possible condition to produce the most comprehensive or convincing accounts against the dogmatic deliberaritarians – victims of some of the most serious human rights violations in history should articulate their experiences – which many dogmatic deliberaritarians would already be well aware of through their own

---

[5] According to materialist logic, one potential solution might involve requiring also all derivative works or designs – such as the more advanced versions of the human mind that the artificial intelligence system might create based on the forcibly expropriated human intelligence – to be freely and equally available to everyone in perpetuity. The question is not, however, ultimately exclusively distributional. Even if equal access to all technologies by everyone could be guaranteed in perpetuity, those individuals whose thoughts or other elements of personhood or personal information would have been accessed non-consensually – as well as other potentially interested parties – would have a legitimate and perpetual claim to the permanent destruction of all such material through the least extensive technical means available, including the possibility of demanding the extinction of the entire humanity.

active participation in such activities through acts of commission and/or omission – ways of thinking or proposed solutions in a manner that would essentially allow continuation of the ongoing human rights violations by enabling further modeling of the victims personhoods or humanness for the purposes deliberaritarian bodily enhancement, post-humanization or self-transformation. According to Cox and Flesher Fominaya (2009, 11), for instance:

The product of these processes – of the encounter of different movement knowledges, and different intellectual traditions – is not foreseeable in advance, and is generated in an encounter which (if it is effective) leaves the different knowledges and languages involved changed; not merged, but changed. If we are serious about tackling the larger structures and systems that govern our lives, not simply tinkering with our local circumstances, this is the direction we need to go in.

Furthermore, it is quite possible to confuse, for instance, non-nihilism or a relatively high threshold to respond to totalitarian violence with violence with, for instance, "radical quietism" (ibid, 10). Comparing the situation of a target of non-consensual mind-modeling to, for instance, an unwilling conscript who is at an imminent threat of being killed by the enemy unless violent self-defense is undertaken may not be entirely appropriate: while in the latter case voluntary self-sacrifice through physical death is in theory feasible and no significant additional human rights violations with permanent effects might take place during any potential period of inaction, in the former case it is effectively non-consensual immortality and eternal exploitation that the victim is threatened with and the offences are ongoing regardless of what the victim may or may not do. In a situation where the justification for – if not, from a certain perspective, the necessity of – killing or executing the aggressors or perpetrators may be relatively clear, a dogmatic deliberaritarian expects the victim to continue making non-consensual, immortalizable contributions to the dogmatic deliberaritarian's

posthumane or self-transformatory pursuits – the products of which might once again not be available to the cognitively objectified victims – as a precondition for the possibility of securing the victim's fundamental human rights, while potentially presenting or interpreting a relatively high threshold for responding to violence with violence even in perhaps relatively clearly justified cases as evidence of "radicality" or "quietism". It is thus quite possible that it is the activists – whether or not allegedly "radically quiet" for reasons of, for instance, conscience, incapacitation or being killed while undertaking self-defense – who are the producers of expertise, which deliberaritarian academics, for instance, might attempt to challenge with instrumental, self-serving, humanity-hating and often substantively vacuous "counter-expertise" (ibid, 2) and that the nature of such potential inferiority (ibid, 10) may well be, for instance, professional rather than merely or primarily intellectual or moral.

The choice might thus well no longer be between deliberation or struggle (Glasius, 2005), but perhaps between different types of unexplained struggle that have not been explicitly expressed or thought-out in order to preserve the maximum degree of privacy and substantive non-participation in the mechanisms that are effectively promoting immortality, if not also humanity's de facto godhood. There might simply no longer be technically feasible ways to implement the "deliberative communicative practices" which may be "essential for the sustaining and building of social movements, locally, nationally and transnationally" (Flesher Fominaya, 2016, 155) at an acceptable or endurable personal cost. While it might still be true that "it is difficult to crush a strategic deployment of revolutionary forces that spreads throughout the entire social terrain", the "process of slowly building and training a mass movement in the cracks that exist in all societies, no matter how militarized, and continuing to accumulate forces and saturate every social space and structure" might have become quite literally "tortured" (Moufawad-Paul, 2016, 142). Any individuals who would have a sufficiently realistic understanding of the post-singularity world and sufficiently relevant

objectives for their actions could be pre-emptively tortured into irrelevance or marginalized before significant social organization or knowledge transfer could even in theory have taken place. As McIntosh (2010, 40) describes the "post-singularity security competition":

first-generation war involved line-and-column tactics between soldiers of the state. The second generation applied machines and indirect fire, third-generation war involved industrialized mass armies, and the fourth generation involves political-economic struggles among networks. If past war has centered on an enemy's physical strength, and fourth-generation war on his moral strength, a fifth generation of war might focus on breaking his intellectual strength. It would require even more deception, and out-thinking of an opponent, than has been seen before. It would be most successful, in fact, if the target did not even realize it was taking place … In the fifth generation, (1) 'the people do not have to want to be on the fighter's side,' (2) 'the forces the fighter is using do not have to want to be on the fighter's side,' and (3) 'your enemy must not feel that he is not on your side' (Abbot 2005b)

In other words, "breaking the intellectual strength" of targeted individuals might be taking place ubiquitously and continuously in the post-singularity world through, for instance, senilizing torture, which might in some cases be blatantly obvious to the victims but in perhaps most cases happen without the victims' knowledge or capacity to identify the connection between certain types of symptoms, injuries or bodily effects and externally induced torture and potentially involve the participation of individuals who many victims might feel to be on the victims' side or at least not against them.

The need for "spreading throughout the entire social terrain" might, however, well be stronger than ever. In addition to willing and knowing procedural abuses of power – or perhaps the forging of facts in an attempt to

maintain an illusion of procedural compliance, as might be relatively more common in some of the presumably less corrupted areas of the post-singularity world – activists or disinterested citizens, residents or visitors might also have to expose abuses that are implemented through the bodies of unwilling and/or unknowing victims. Actual or potential activists might thus opt for either finding a balance between keeping their latent activism out of their minds and communication to maximize their chances of being able to reach and hold relevant positions in society and any potential unexplained and individualized outbursts of activism or selecting either one of the extremes of maximum appeasement of power for the moment or going for the full anti-establishment experience of torture and abuse by the entire institutional spectrum of the "war-police-accumulation" nexus. It is nonetheless quite possible that "political intervention is … developed even though personal and political ties are weak" (a Spanish activist quoted in Flesher Fominaya, 2016, 165) in the post-singularity world as long as it is not entirely externally determined by, for instance, an artificial intelligence system.

6. 99% Is Not Enough – Social Movements Should Aim to Secure the Fundamental Human Rights of Everyone

Activists have sometimes attempted to gain the support of some of "the armed guardians of capitalism" by claiming that they "are part of the 99%" (Moufawad-Paul, 2016, 134) that is exploited by some of the prevailing economic structures which serve primarily the interests of the wealthiest 1%. Under non-consensually implemented singularity or "trans-/posthuman" technologies utilitarian reasoning – implying, for instance, that any given policy might be desirable or acceptable merely because it benefits 99% of the population without considering what is happening to the remaining 1% – may well produce permanent and irresolvable conflicts. Even in case it was the 99% that was benefitting from the non-consensual mind-modeling, torture or human experimentation of the 1% – or perhaps everyone else in the universe benefitting from the victimization of just one individual – the

victim(s) would still have a perpetual claim for the permanent destruction of all non-consensually extracted personal information from the universe through the least extensive technical means – including, however, the possibility of demanding the extinction of the entire humanity in case less extensive effective remedies were not available. While each individual and humanity in general have the right not to be suicidal, whether or not they also have the right to be non-self-executional may be less clear. It might well be argued that in case of widespread complicity in criminal offences that are punishable – or perhaps merely remediable without necessarily regarding such potential remedies primarily or exclusively as punishments – by death by the law or by what the law would have been likely to be or become in the absence of its particularistic appropriation through, for instance, mind control, the entire governance structure and its institutional protectorates, co-conspirators or offshoots are "under a moral obligation to enforce the law" (Dietrich, 2009, 284) also in respect of implementing their own executions. Once the bodily informational integrity of even one individual has been non-consensually breached, humanity has to live under the perpetual ongoing presence of some of the most serious human rights violations in history in case the victim's right to cognitive or informational death through the destruction of all designs and expressions involving or building on non-consensually extracted personal information could not be enforced.

7. The Divergence of Opinion in Respect of Appropriate Strategies or Desirable Outcomes Might Have Become More Significant

In the past, theoretical or ideological divergences may have prevented pragmatic, result-oriented co-operation between social movements or socially conscious individuals to a greater extent than what the diverging views might have substantively demanded. According to Skærlund Risager and Thorup (2016, 26), for instance:

One of the key organizers and initiators of the movement told us during a focus group that he, from a strategic point of view, was in general reluctant to embark on grand, programmatic discussions because of their potentially destructive effects on the movement itself: 'To begin to talk about these things is a sure way to split a movement, because you'll then disagree on principal things that otherwise don't have any real significance for the concrete practice you otherwise agree on.' This echoes one of the observations of Haiven and Khasnabish, namely that 'differences of imagination represent the most important and divisive fractures in and barriers to solidarity' (2014, 241).

Under non-consensually implemented singularity or "trans-/posthuman" technologies, in contrast, some "grand, programmatic discussions" or "differences of imagination" do, however, potentially have "real significance for the concrete practice". Any potential unsubstantiated claims about an alleged "imperative of humanity to survive at any cost (e.g., by adopting illiberal strategies)" (Rakić and Ćirković, 2016, 48), for instance – far from merely inflicting "a degree of existential harm on human beings" (ibid) – may in fact justify or necessitate the outcome that such "illiberal strategies" are supposed to avoid – the extinction of humanity. Furthermore, as it is highly likely that this would have been obvious to the proponents of, for instance, non-consensual mind-reading or –influencing technologies all along, it may not be easy even in theory to find space for substantive, good faith deliberation that would be conceptually distinct from the genocidal full spectrum warfare that might be inflicted on opponents of "illiberal strategies". The practical significance of pointing out that "even minor actions that can be portrayed as aggressive will be used against protesters" (Martin, 2015, 209-210) or that "The weaker side may be justified in its actions, because the other side is doing terrible things, but be more effective by avoiding any behaviour that can be negatively portrayed" (ibid, 210) may not be entirely clear when "aggressiveness" – to the extent that proposals for the execution of the non-consensual mind-readers or -meddlers, for instance, might be construable as such – or behaviour that can be negatively portrayed

are essential parts of the activists' demands rather than merely strategic or ideological choices in the pursuit of some conceptually distinct objectives. It is quite possible – although by no means necessary, as any and all violence by victims of non-consensually implemented posthumane technologies might well be legitimate self-defense – to adhere to pragmatic, if not also principled, non-violence while advocating the execution of the non-consensual mind-readers or –meddlers. The objective might, after all, not be to physically harm the perpetrators per se but to stop the ongoing violent assault against the privacy and integrity of the victims' personhoods by destroying all non-consensually extracted personal information from the universe. Such a position does not preclude the possibility that death penalty – primarily or exclusively a form of punishment rather than mere rectification of some of the consequences of particularly serious human rights violations or criminal offences without an intention to punish – might be an appropriate or desirable solution. All it states is that, given the nature of the human rights violations or criminal offences, any potential suggestions that executing the perpetrators might be an appropriate or desirable solution does not necessarily involve intention to punish. As doing nothing would also effectively perpetuate such an ongoing violent assault on the victims' personhoods, privacy and bodily integrity, the "dichotomy or a continuum between principled nonviolence and pragmatic nonviolence" (Eddy, 2014, 445) might well not capture all the implications of non-consensual breaching of the body's informational integrity which may well have rendered nonviolence infeasible even in theory and shifted focus to the type of violence advocated or passively perpetuated by different actors.

Any potential criminalization of verbal accounts of why self-defending violence targeted at the perpetrators of non-consensual breaches of the body's informational integrity might be a desirable or necessary part of any potential solution to some of the most serious human rights violations in history that would have been committed under the full knowledge and active participation of governments and other elements of the "war-police-

accumulation" nexus – through acts of omission, if not in all cases also commission – in turn, might merely make the post-deliberative structural bias for unexplained, individualized action even stronger. Researchers and activists who, in the absence of non-consensual breach of the human body's informational integrity, might have achieved some degree of consensus on some of the central features of a more equitable and just world might effectively be prevented from working together by the "unchecked computing innovation in corporate and military labs" that would already have taken place, if not also pitted against each other in social struggles that might have become quite different in nature as a result of non-transparent and non-consensual technological development and implementation. As the author (Auvinen, 2016b) has described some of the potential implications, "While imaginaries of what could have been might well be produced and propagated or remarkable discoveries that could have avoided the non-consensual breach of the body's informational integrity and humanity's extinction made – or perhaps merely the validity of common sense finally vindicated against the prolonged and pervasive epistemic extortion of the 'University-State-Productive Sector' (Clemenza and Ferrer 1999) nexus – nothing that humanity might or might not do might challenge the fact that any potential outbursts of optimism or enthusiasm, for instance, might be either otherworldly or nostalgic in nature in the enduring presence of some of the most serious human rights violations in history until the death of the last of the humans." Under such circumstances it may well be appropriate to suggest that "when a government raises the alarm about terrorism, it is worth examining the government's own role in terrorising populations" (Martin, 2015, 211) in the past, present and the future, in case all non-consensually extracted personal information is not destroyed.

To the extent that common ground for activist struggle – or, perhaps more appropriately, law-enforcing counter-struggle against the capital rights activism of the "war-police-accumulation" nexus – still exists, one potential objective might involve the maximization and universalization of exit rights. According to Dietrich (2014, 75):

Since all human beings possess full freedom of association and dissociation, any state should grant its citizens the widest possible set of exit rights. First, the individuals ought to enjoy the right of emigration, which enables them to leave the country and to join – if accepted – another political community. Moreover, they should be permitted to secede and to create an independent political community on the state's territory. Finally, the citizens must be able to return to the 'state of nature', i.e. the established state must either accept a parallel anarchist society on its territory or designate a clearly defined area where the anarchists may try to realize their ideals (Beran 1987, 31–34).

It does not, however, necessarily follow that

a state which provides its citizens with the full range of exit options and informs them adequately on the normative consequences of residing on its territory can legitimately claim political authority over any person who fails to make use of his or her rights. Correspondingly, any individual who remains in a state which grants the full range of exit options is under an obligation to comply with its laws (Dietrich, 2014, 76).

As has already been pointed out, under non-consensually implemented singularity or "trans-/posthuman" technologies the state and state-sponsored or -protected actors would already have extracted thoughts and other forms of bodily and personal information from their victims into potentially permanent circulation in the world. Consequently, it might well be the victims who would have a legitimate claim for the exit or elimination of the state as an institution rather than the other way round in case best efforts are not made by state actors to permanently destroy all non-consensually extracted personal information of its citizens and everyone else whose fundamental human rights the state might have violated from the universe.

Furthermore, it might well be argued that states do have a responsibility to accommodate various perspectives or ways of life to the maximum feasible extent rather than merely providing the maximum range of exit options, particularly in cases where such or at least to some extent similar objectives may have been publicly stated by some states. A non-negligible proportion of Christians, for instance, might well view the technologies enabling non-consensual mind-reading, –influencing or –control as the mark of the beast, beyond which salvation is no longer feasible if adopted voluntarily. Consequently, it might be argued that states claiming to promote religious freedom should have not only prevented the non-transparent development and implementation of, for instance, mind-reading, –influencing or –control technologies, but also designed and implemented or allocated resources for the independent design and implementation of alternative economies that would allow the pursuit of maximum living standards and extent of division of labor or specialization without the need to buy or sell anything or anyone in anticipation of the moment when the adoption of the mark of the beast, according to Christians, becomes a precondition for commercial transactions. In other words, given singularity's or "trans-/posthuman" technologies' pervasiveness and effective incapacity to co-exist with alternative points of view or forms of life in a manner that would respect their self-ownership, privacy and autonomy, merely keeping the option of seceding or returning to the "state of nature" open when the global commons might to a significant extent have been effectively enclosed by "trans-/posthuman" technologies and the underlying artificial intelligence system(s) would have required conscious planning and policy effort on the part of the state prior to the implementation of "trans-/posthuman" technologies. Any potential availability of such exit options – hypothetical or otherwise – might, however, be unlikely to justify the state's continued existence, as one might well argue that the state should be held responsible for human rights violations that would already have taken place under its surveillance and willing and knowing participation and the relevant standard for assessing the sufficiency or validity of the exit options might in any case be higher than the mere ubiquitous encirclement of dissidents with

thoroughly authoritarian governance structures in an atomized and geographically dispersed state of artificiality.

Internationally, the enforcement of maximum global exit rights might require abandonment of "an exaggerated concept of sovereignty" (Méndez, 2004, 8) and shifting the focus to the external defensibility of a political community. According to Koller (2009, 315):

The external defensibility of a political community means that its practices appear to be tolerable for other communities and their members. This requires that these practices do not have negative external effects that appear impermissible in consideration of the interests of all people concerned from an impartial point of view. So a community's practices must be generalisable in the sense that they appear generally acceptable, even if they were adopted by all communities.

The severity and irreparability of the human rights violations that would already have been committed might, however, once again cause significant divergence of opinion in respect of the appropriate strategies or desirable outcomes. Any potential proponents of the destruction of all non-consensually extracted personal information or elements of personhood at any cost might simply point out to others that if they had wished to ensure humanity's survival in a manner that would be "tolerable for other communities and their members", they should not have non-consensually breached the body's informational integrity in the first place, and all potential attempts to exterminate the perpetrators are simply logical and foreseeable consequences of their willing and knowing human rights violations.

8. Conclusion

As Hardin (2014, 79) has pointed out, "The forms of commitment that are important for … social choice are those that derive from the difficulties

of collective action to re-coordinate on new rules." The need for re-coordination on new rules through counterrevolution may never have been stronger irrespective of the prevailing stage of singularity's or "trans-/posthuman" technologies' non-consensual implementation or unfolding and the stakes may well have never been higher. The objectives of such a counterrevolution might include, at the minimum, destruction of all non-consensually extracted personal information and execution of the perpetrators, the implementation of direct democracy (Auvinen, 2016b), monetary reform (Auvinen, 2010) and the maximization and universalization of exit options from technological, political or social structures. In theory, one of the most effective or easily accessible strategies for achieving such objectives might involve, for instance, the implementation of alternative knowledge production, legitimization or dissemination strategies – perhaps not quite at the level of organizational or operational stability or regularity that might be expected of "media" in free societies, but nonetheless potentially, at least in theory, capable of facilitating emancipation in some spaces at some points in time – that might, at the minimum, expose the virtually all-embracing spectacular failures and worse of the "media", "politics", "academia" and the entire "war-police-accumulation" nexus. One potential approach might involve exposing those "things that you see which, however, are not happening (numerous cases of informational manipulation, particularly associated with wars)" while bringing to wider attention "many things that are happening [but] you are not seeing" (Tortosa, 2010, 72) in the media. Given, however, a global artificial intelligence system's capacity to, for instance, externally prevent non-consensually and/or unknowingly connected individuals from accurately observing or interpreting, for instance, "human enslavement/annihilation" or "violent confrontation" irrespective of the level of detail or explicity with which such information might be presented to the audience, it may be difficult to avoid the conclusion that non-consensually implemented singularity may well entail a post-deliberative form of institutionalized nihilism which has a structural bias for unexplained, individualized action.

For those who might be inclined to enforce the law – as a counterterrorist measure against state[6] terrorism, perhaps including but not limited to "the State terrorism of the World Dictatorship of National Security" (Acosta, 2007, 57) that would have willingly and knowingly breached the informational integrity of the human body – as it was or would have been likely to be in the absence of its particularistic appropriation through, for instance, non-transparently developed mind-reading, -influencing or -control technologies, one option with the potential to cause "catastrophic damage" (Sebesta, 2010, 40) to, for instance, some of the communication systems which might be used for non-consensual extraction of personal information might involve the utilization of anti-satellite weapons. For those who might wish to enforce their right to be definitely out of this world – or at least human consciousness – upon their physical death, some of the perhaps more easily implementable ways to destroy humanity might involve creation of "genetically engineered biological agents" such as "a doomsday virus … that combines long latency with high virulence and mortality" or the "deliberate

---

[6] In questions of liability for crimes committed by, for instance, corporations or armies, all sufficiently thorough lines of analysis may well implicate individuals and institutions who wield or have wielded power in the name of states. It is the state that, for instance, grants a relatively small number of specific, predefined types of organizational forms a dominant position in organizing most economic activity and in many cases limited liability for natural person stakeholders in some organizational forms, forces such entities to engage in zero-sum competition for money in a monetary system which, as a whole, is close to insolvency at any given point in time (Auvinen, 2010) and sets the price of committing particularly serious human rights violations grossly wrong by often failing to execute the perpetrators with full knowledge of the egregious human rights violations that such practices are likely to lead to. It is also the state that continues to legally allow the existence of armies – or maintain de facto armies despite potential legal prohibitions – and conceal particularly serious human rights violations under the pretext of, for instance, "national security" – whatever that might mean when it might be precisely the nation, partly or entirely and potentially including foreign citizens, that is being attacked under such policies – with full knowledge of the fact that armies are likely to do what they have been created for – killing, torturing, injuring or experimenting with humans – irrespective of whether their existence is acknowledged or wars on humanity or humanness have been formally declared.

misuse of nanotechnology" such as "the construction of bacterium−scale self−replicating mechanical robots that can feed on dirt or other organic matter [that] could eat up the biosphere or destroy it by other means such as by poisoning it, burning it, or blocking out sunlight" which seem "considerably easier to develop than the technology to create an effective defense against such an attack" (Bostrom, 2002). As it would be highly likely that some victims of, for instance, non-consensual mind-reading would have explicitly demanded − entirely foreseeably − the extinction of humanity irrespective of whether reliable documentation on such preferences could have been preserved or widely distributed, any potential human rights activists might well regard the enforcement of the human rights of the physically dead but cognitively or informationally immortalized victims as more important than preserving the life of the posthumane perpetrators.

To the extent social movements may be understood as "a collective and communicative process of protest conducted by individuals against existing social relations" (Rodríguez Hernández, 2007, 79), the very possibility of social movements might be at stake in a post-singularity world or societies with non-consensually implemented posthumane technologies which do not presuppose singularity: as the possibilities for collective or communicative action or "collective definition of social problems" (ibid, 84) might be eroded, individualized forms of protest might become more prevalent. In such a posthumane society, it might not be easy "to distinguish potentially mindless acts of nihilism from actions, which might well have been highly justifiable, had the appropriate conditions for developing and expressing the appropriate types of argumentation existed" (Auvinen, 2016a). Once egregious human rights violations with particularly far-reaching implications have been labelled "new form[s] of evolution" (Blackford, 2008, 1), there might be virtually no limit to the types of atrocities or exercises of particularistically motivated "evolutionary" agency which might become "increasingly familiar and plausible" (ibid) simply by virtue of amassing sufficient amounts of totalitarian power behind them. Given the colossal extent of the virtually all-encompassing global institutional failure − and in

all likelihood worse – that the non-consensual implementation or unfolding of technological singularity or some of the posthumane technologies which do not presuppose singularity without the knowledge of everyone who might be affected – the entire population of the world – would entail, there should at least not be any shortage of potential targets – or different institutional or individual manifestations of the same target – for emancipatory action – however any potential activists who might still have the requisite personal autonomy and willingness and ability to utilize it under potentially all-encompassing, immortalizing surveillance might or might not be organized. Considering the likely implications of non-consensually implemented posthumane technologies – both before and after any potential "'discovery' of the massiveness of the domination" (Retamozo, 2007, 108) which might well be both unprecedented and even in theory difficult to surpass through alterative means of oppression – would it not have been appropriate to allocate significant amounts of resources throughout the history to, for instance, enforcing the transparency of technological development and guaranteeing the bodily integrity and other fundamental human rights of every human being irrespective of the probability that one might have assigned to the actual implementation of posthumane technologies rather than potentially having to collectively recognize at some point in time that if we were humanity, we would not want to start from where we are?

9. References

Acosta, Yamandú (2007). El sistema internacional del siglo XXI: Entre el terrorismo de Estado y la Democracia. Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana, 12(36), 57-76.

Atton, C. (2003). Reshaping social movement media for a new millennium. Social Movement Studies, 2(1), 3-15.

Auvinen, Tero (2016a). Rescuing Academism. Unpublished manuscript.

Auvinen, Tero (2016b). A Road to Direct Democracy. Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 8(2).

Auvinen, Tero (2010). On Money. Rovaniemi: Lapland University Press.

Beran, H. (1987). The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. New York: Croom Helm Publishers.

Bevington, D. and Dixon, C. (2005). Movement-relevant Theory: Rethinking Social Movement Scholarship and Activism. Social Movement Studies, 4(3), 185-208.

Blackford, Russell (2008). Editorial: Celebrating our past, imagining our future. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 20(1), i-ii.

Bostrom, Nick (2002). Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 9(1).

Brem-Wilson, Josh (2014). From "Here" to "There": Social Movements, the Academy and Solidarity Research. Socialist Studies, 10(1), 111-132.

Brown, Kate Pride (2016). The prospectus of activism: discerning and delimiting imagined possibility. Social Movement Studies, 15(6), 547–560.

Choudry, Aziz (2013). Activist Research Practice: Exploring Research and Knowledge Production for Social Action. Socialist Studies, 9(1), 128-151.

Clemenza, Caterina and Juliana Ferrer (1999). Integración universidad-estado-sector productivo: Caso universidades nacionales venezolanas. Revista de Ciencias Sociales, V(3), 97-111.

Cox, Laurence and Cristina Flesher Fominaya (2009). Movement knowledge: what do we know, how do we create knowledge and what do we do with it? Interface: a journal for and about social movements, 1(1), 1-20.

Dietrich, Frank (2014). Consent as the Foundation of Political Authority—A Lockean Perspective. Rationality, Markets and Morals, Vol. 5, 64–78.

Dietrich, Frank (2009). Individual Interest and Political Legitimacy. Rationality, Markets and Morals, Vol. 0, 273-286.

Doctorow, Cory and Charles Stross (2012). The Rapture of the Nerds, New York: Tor.

Downing, J. (2001). Radical media: rebellious communication and social movements. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Eddy, Matthew P. (2014). "We Have to Bring Something Different to this Place": Principled and Pragmatic Nonviolence Among Accompaniment Workers. Social Movement Studies, 13(4), 443–464.

Edmonds, Bruce (2011). A Brief Survey of Some Relevant Philosophy of Science. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 14(4)7.

Evans, Woody (2007). Singularity Warfare: A Bibliometric Survey of Militarized Transhumanism. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 16(1), 161-165.

Flesher Fominaya, Cristina (2016). Cultural Barriers to Activist Networking: Habitus (In)action in Three European Transnational Encounters. Antipode, 48(1), 151–171.

Fuchs, C. (2010). Alternative Media as Critical Media. European Journal of Social Theory, 13(2), 173-192.

Glasius, Marlies (2005). Deliberation or Struggle? Civil Society Traditions Behind the Social Forums. Ephemera, 5(2), 240-252.

Haiven, M., and Khasnabish, A. (2014). The Radical Imagination: Social Movement Research in the Age of Austerity. London: Zed Books.

Hale, Charles R. (2006). Activist Research v. Cultural Critique: Indigenous Land Rights and the Contradictions of Politically Engaged Anthropology. Cultural Anthropology, 21(1), 96-120.

Hanson, Robin (1998). Is a singularity just around the corner? Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 2.

Hardin, Russell (2014). Social Yes; Contract No. Rationality, Markets and Morals, Vol. 5, 79–92.

Hughes, James J. (2012). The Politics of Transhumanism and the Techno-Millennial Imagination. Zygon, 47(4).

Juris, J.S. and Khasnabish, A. eds. (2013). Insurgent Encounters: Transnational Activism, Ethnography, and the Political. London: Duke University Press.

Juris, J. (2007). Practicing Militant Ethnography with the Movement for Global Resistance in Barcelona. Shukaitis, S. and Graeber, D. eds. Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigation, Collective Theorization. Oakland, Calif.: Ak Press.

Kapoor, D. and S. Jordan, eds. (2009). Education, Participatory Action Research, and Social Change. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Koller, Peter (2009). On the Legitimacy of Political Communities: A General Approach and Its Application to the European Union. Rationality, Markets and Morals, Vol. 0, 309–325.

Konsa, Kurmo (2008). Artificialisation Of Culture: Challenges to and from Posthumanism. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 17(1), 23-35.

Kurzweil, Ray (2006). The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. New York: Viking.

Ladberg, Gunilla (2006). Mobiler, trådlösa telefoner och hälsa. available at http://www.vagbrytaren.org/gunilla.ladberg.pdf (accessed September 25, 2016).

Langlois, A. and F. Dubois, eds. (2005). Autonomous media: activating resistance and dissent. Montreal: Cumulus Press.

Linssen, Charl and Pieter Lemmens (2016). Embodiment in Whole-Brain Emulation and its Implications for Death Anxiety. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 26(2), 1-15.

Martin, Brian (2015). How activists can challenge double standards. Interface: a journal for and about social movements, 7(2), 201-213.

Mattoni, Alice, Andrejs Berdnikovs, Michela Ardizzoni and Laurence Cox (2010). Voices of dissent: activists' engagements in the creation of alternative, autonomous, radical and independent media. Interface: a journal for and about social movements, 2(2), 1-22.

McIntosh, Daniel (2010). The Transhuman Security Dilemma. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 21(2), 32-48.

Méndez, Emilio García (2004). Origin, Meaning and Future of Human Rights: Reflections for a New Agenda. SUR. International Journal on Human Rights, 1(1), 7-18.

Moufawad-Paul, Joshua (2016). Quartermasters of Stadiums and Cemeteries: Normative Insurrectionism and the Under-Theorization of Revolutionary Strategy. Socialist Studies, 11(1), 127-144.

Neocleous, Mark (2013). The Dream of Pacification: Accumulation, Class War, and the Hunt. Socialist Studies, 9(2), 7-31.

Rakić, Vojin and Milan M. Ćirković (2016). Confronting Existential Risks With Voluntary Moral Bioenhancement. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 26(2), 48-59.

Retamozo, Martín (2007). Enrique Dussel: Hacia una Filosofía política de la Liberación: Notas entorno a "20 tesis de política". Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana, 12(36), 107-123.

Rodriguez, C. (2001). Fissures in the mediascape: An international study of citizens' media. Creskill, N.J.: Hampton Press.

Rodríguez Hernández, Gabriela (2007). De la participación a la protesta política. Convergencia: Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 45, 77-93.

Santos, A.C. (2012). Disclosed and Willing: Towards a Queer Public Sociology. Social Movement Studies, 11(2), 241-254.

Sebesta, Lorenza (2010). El espacio negado: La militarización del espacio como clave de lectura de los cambios que están teniendo lugar en el frente de la seguridad. Revista CS, 6, 21-41.

Skærlund Risager, Bjarke and Mikkel Thorup (2016). Protesting the Neoliberal University: The Danish Student Movement, "A Different University". Interface: a journal for and about social movements, 8(1), 7-33.

Squazzoni, Flaminio and Károly Takács (2011). Social Simulation That "Peers into Peer Review". Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 14(4)3.

Sullivan, Laura L. (2005). Activism, Affect and Abuse: Emotional Contexts and Consequences of the ESF 2004 Organising Process. Ephemera, 5(2), 344-369.

The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (2005). Ethical Aspects of ICT Implants in the Human Body.

Tortosa, José María (2010). Violencias, crisis y culturas. Convergencia: Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 53, 69-89.

Vinge, Vernor (1993). The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era. presented at the VISION-21 Symposium sponsored by NASA Lewis Research Center and the Ohio Aerospace Institute, March 30–31.

Zimmerman, Michael E. (2008). The Singularity: A Crucial Phase in Divine Self-Actualization? Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 4(1-2), 347-370.