

Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences (2009) Vol 1, No 2, 400-434

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis ¹

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

Abstract: *The foreign policy of Costa Rica has always been characterized by its emphasis on pacifism and human rights. As one of the few nation states lacking an army, it has carefully constructed an image of peace and democracy in a region historically plagued by political turmoil. This small Central American nation has taken advantage of the soft power created by taking a high moral ground on issues of international relations. The present paper undertakes a critical discursive analysis of the second Arias administration. By focusing on the presidency of the former Nobel Peace Prize winner, it is possible to analyze the press releases, speeches, and other government statements released during an exemplary period of Costa Rican diplomatic history. The transfer of recognition from Taipei to Beijing provides a brief glimpse at the neo-realist strategy being pursued by the Arias administration behind the veil of innocence provided by the co-optation of human rights, human security, pacifist, and cosmopolitan discourses. Moreover, the strategic importance of the government's human rights rhetoric is revealed through a detailed analysis of the process leading up to and directly following the recognition of Beijing through the application of a constructivist model of norm socialization, the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization. The paper concludes with a discussion of the possible application of the two-pronged method of critical discourse analysis combined with a constructivist interpretation of norm socialization to the foreign policy of other Latin American countries and its possible contribution to an improved understanding of the internal dynamics of this region.*

1. Introduction

The small Central American nation of Costa Rica is known for its peaceful history, ecotourism, and the Nobel Prize winner, Dr. Oscar Arias Sanchez. As an isolated territory of the vast Spanish Empire, the region was never considered to be pivotal to the Captaincy General of

¹ An early version of this paper was presented at the American Conference for Academic Disciplines which took place in Orlando, Florida (February 16-19, 2009). I also thank Anthony P. Johnson for reviewing early drafts of this paper.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

Guatemala (Barry, 1991; Eakin, 2007; Leonard, 1991; Perez-Brignoli, 1989; Williamson, 1992). Strategically, the entrepot of Panama far surpassed Costa Rica in importance and notoriety. However, this small and forgotten country followed a unique development path, that proved its worth by surpassing all of its neighbors in GDP per capita and in Human Development (Clark, 2001). This assertion becomes clearer when one compares the history of Costa Rica to that of its Central American neighbors. While in the 1980s the headlines were filled with stories of civil wars and power politics from most Central American States, Costa Rica was busy developing ecotourism and actively participating in the global deliberation about sustainable development.

Costa Ricans pride themselves in their emphasis on education as the surest road to development. After the brief civil war of 1948, the army was abolished and education was prioritized as a development goal (Barry, 1991). This gave Costa Rica one of the highest literacy rates in the world and raised the country to Middle Income Status. Nevertheless, from a foreign policy perspective, this left Costa Rica apparently defenseless in the “state of nature” found in the international system of independent nation-states (Kolodziej, 2005).

A small country with no armed forces and located in what was considered to be a bad neighborhood, needed to find a source of power that would help it carry out a successful foreign policy in defense of its interests. Costa Rica’s relative poverty precluded adopting a policy of “dollar diplomacy” and thus the Japanese model was not a viable option (Bix, 2000; Dore, 1997; Olenik, 2005; Smith, 1997; W. Scott Morton, 2005). Due to the previously mentioned institutional and situational constraints, Costa Rica adopted a version of responsible internationalism as the core of its foreign policy (Arias, 1998). The normative nature of this policy was influenced by environmentalism and sustainable development on the one hand, and respect for human rights and pacifism in the other. This combination proved to be congruent with the national consensus in that it reflected important Costa Rica values such as nonviolence and the respect of nature (Jon Hurwitz, 1993). In addition to that, the logic behind an internationalism based on the United Nations Organization and the theory of collective security

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

provided a perfect fit to the foreign policy challenges faced by a small and unarmed country. It is important to note that while the normative framework of Costa Rica's foreign policy was common security and the United Nations; its borders were protected by the threat of American intervention. In other words, American military might provided the hard power complementing the soft power provided by the norm of common security and territorial sovereignty (Leonard, 1991; Perez-Brignoli, 1989).

Costa Rica's foreign policy success was to raise the power of international norms as its pivotal source of influence. Constructivist Scholars have stressed the power that international norms can exert (Kollman, 2008; Rublee, 2008). However, most of those studies concentrate on the constraining effects of those norms on state behavior or on how they guide decision-making. Costa Rica managed to use the power of norms and use it as an important resource to conduct its foreign policy. The adoption of the discourse of Human Rights, Sustainable Development, Common Security, and finally Human Security happened concomitantly to its application in practice. Thus Costa Rica not only made use of the discourse of alternative development and Human Security but it also served as a model of what could be accomplished by following its recommendations. This was a powerful combination because it gave Costa Rica an air of moral authority in the international community. It was easier for a country without an army and with an impeccable human rights record to promote the discourse of Human Security than for a highly militarized state. The cognitive dissonance experienced by the international community when listening to a Soviet or American representative speaking about Human Rights and common security was absent when the Costa Rican representative took the floor. Someone was finally doing what he or she was preaching.

The soft-power accumulated over the years was used in order to defend important Costa Rican interests such as environmental protection and democracy. Furthermore, Costa Rican Presidents tended to recognize that their foreign policy had to follow the guidelines set about by Human Security and Sustainable development. The spread of democracy was another clear goal of Costa Rican foreign policy for much of the 20th century. Those foreign policy

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

goals were compatible with the prevalent attitudes of the population such as a strong anti-communism and pacifism.

One clear example of Costa Rican foreign policy in practice was its support for the Republic of China (Taiwan) rather than the People's Republic of China (PRC). Costa Rica and its Central American neighbors have historically recognized that the legitimate government of China is the one that fled the mainland in exile to settle in the island of Formosa (Cordoba, 2005). Support for Taiwan was even more justified after its successful transition to democracy and the liberalization of its economy. Taiwan became a role model for Central American States aiming for development and democracy. Thus Costa Rica's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan was compatible with important political attitudes held by the population and it also strengthened the country's international image as a defender of democracy and human rights.

The world was shocked when Costa Rica announced in the 7th of June 2007 that it had switched recognition to the People's Republic of China and had cut all official relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) (MOFA, 2007). Shocking as the announcement was by itself, the details of the agreement between Beijing and the Costa Rican government further aggravated the situation. An important Costa Rican newspaper, *La Nacion*, sued the government to release the details of the agreement with Beijing. The government replied that it could not release the details of the agreement because Beijing had asked to keep them secret (Mata, 2008). Finally, the Constitutional Court ordered the government to release the details of the agreement. The details of the agreement showed Beijings immoral dollar diplomacy and showed that the Costa Rican President had lied several times about his relationship to mainland China. Dr. Oscar Arias Sanchez, winner of the Noble Peace Prize and President of Costa Rica was selling his country's honor for \$300 million dollars ("Denuncia Nacional e Internacional: Oscar Arias militariza y usa aparatos represivos en Costa Rica," 2006; Mata, 2008; A. Murillo, 2008a, 2008b; E. M. a. A. Murillo, 2008). Or at least, that is how the Costa Rican public and most of the international community interpreted the events (Mata, 2008; A. Murillo, 2008a, 2008b; E. M. a. A. Murillo, 2008).

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

The ironic turn of events was that the man who had taken Costa Rica to the apex of international respectability through his efforts at bringing about peace in Central America, was now involved in a game of *real politik* with the infamous Chinese government. It is clear that the president miscalculated and expected Costa Ricans to have adapted to the *zeitgeist* of other Western countries, and their emphasis on trade rather than Human Rights. However, the reaction of the public was swift in its condemnation of the government's actions. In addition to that, the President's popularity plummeted and the large reservoir of soft-power accumulated over the years dissipated in a few days. The president defied that national consensus and thus lost the respect of a large part of the population.

It is important to note that while the government followed a realist foreign policy, as shown by its recognition of the PRC, it kept the language of Human Security and related discourses. The National Development plan is worded in the traditional language of respect for Human Rights and the foreign policy it describes is still supposed to be guided by a responsible internationalism (Obregon, 2006). Government statements and press releases continue to use those rhetorical devices even though its actions are no longer in harmony with those beliefs. The Minister of Foreign affairs still stresses the importance of Human Rights but at the same time he emphasizes the value of territorial sovereignty (Quesada, 2008). This produces cognitive dissonance at the national and international level and the incongruity between government rhetoric and actions weaken the country's foreign policy and stain its international standing.

2. Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The present paper follows the tradition of critical research in that the status quo is not accepted as a given. Furthermore, the actions of the Arias administration will be compared and contrasted with its official discourse (Human Security, internationalism, sustainable development, democratic peace theory, and collective security), and with Costa Rica's traditional foreign policy as exemplified by the administrations preceding this one.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

Regarding the theoretical framework of the analysis of Costa Rica's foreign policy, a constructivist approach will be adopted. This will be complemented by a critical discursive analysis of official government statements, press releases, and speeches. The results of both approaches will then be used to construct a holistic model explaining the present state of affairs in Costa Rican foreign policy and the possible paths it may take in the near future.

3 A Constructivist Analysis of Costa Rica's Foreign Policy Before and After Establishing Relations with the People's Republic of China

3.1 The Spiral Model of Norm Socialization and the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization

The Spiral Model of Norm socialization developed by Risse and Sikkink explains that there is a logical progression in how norms are adopted (Kollman, 2008, p. 400). First, norms are created at the international level. In the case of Costa Rica, the pertinent norms are Human Rights and Collective security. Those norms were officially accepted at the international level during the early post-war period and were embodied in the Charter of the United Nations Organization (August, 1995; Khong, 2006; Kolodziej, 2005; Scott Cooper, 2008). The next step in the model deals with "norm violation". At this point Costa Rica, government leaders and the population, were aware of the existence of the international norm but did not necessarily follow it. The civil war of 1948 is a good example of this early stage (Barry, 1991; Eakin, 2007; Leonard, 1991; Perez-Brignoli, 1989; Williamson, 1992). The third stage of the process refers to the "denial of norm legitimacy" (Kollman, 2008). At this point decision makers not only violate the norm but also publicly argue that it lacks legitimacy. In other words, in this stage, decision makers fall back on the realist view of the international system as an anarchic community of independent sovereign states. The acceptance of sovereignty means that international norms are not legitimately binding

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

on state behavior. Costa Rica went through this stage rapidly due to the leadership of President Figueres and his decision to unilaterally abolish the army (Barry, 1991; Eakin, 2007).

After denial comes “tactical concessions” to the norm (Kollman, 2008, p. 400). At this point leaders start making small concessions to the norm but have not accepted its legitimacy. This stage is followed by the norm reaching a “prescriptive status” with policy makers. Policy makers follow the norm and it guides their behavior but they have not internalized the norm. In other words, they follow the rules but they do not believe in them. Finally, the last stage of the Spiral Model is when the norm is internalized and there is rule consistent behavior (Kollman, 2008, p. 401). This final stage is one in which policy makers and the majority of the population has adopted the norm as part of their core beliefs and their behavior is naturally guided by its precepts. Norm internalization and norm consistent behavior is the ideal level of norm institutionalization in policy making. However, I would like to add a few extra steps to the Spiral Model of Norm Socialization in order to better explain the case of Costa Rica.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University




Fig. 1 Linear Representation of the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization (First Seven steps adapted from the Spiral Model of Norm Socialization)

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

The Parallel Cyclical Model of Norm socialization includes the steps provided by the Spiral Model but divides the process into two twin cycles. One strand of the cycle deals with decision-makers and their process of norm socialization while a parallel strand deals with the socialization of their constituents, in the case of Costa Rica, the majority of the population. Thus, this adapted model holds that there are two parallel processes that follow the steps of the Spiral Model. However it adds an extra step to the two strands, this is the point in which the norm has been internalized but there is norm-inconsistent behavior. This extra step provides enough flexibility for there to be backtracking in respect to norm socialization and can be found both in the “general population” strand of the model and the “decision maker” strand. Another step is added to account for the possible modification or enlargement of an already internalized norm. An example of this was the gradual merging of alternative development norms with Human Rights and Collective Security in order to form the holistic norm of Human Security (August, 1995; Feigenblatt, 2007a, 2007b; Khong, 2006; Kolodziej, 2005; Scott Cooper, 2008). Every time a norm is modified at the international level it re-enters the twin cycles of norm socialization starting with the first step of the process. Evidently, the process is much faster if the building blocks of the modified norm have already been internalized.

The Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization gives a more nuanced explanation on how a country as a whole internalizes an international norm and how that shapes behavior. It is also important to note that there is a connection between the parallel cycles of the model. The population may exert pressure on decision makers to adopt, follow, or discard a norm and decision makers can do the same thing to the population. It is possible for one of the strands to be at a more advanced stage than the other and thus the rate of internalization is not necessarily equal in the two strands.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University




Fig. 1 Simplified Version of the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization
(This Figure only shows one strand which can be the one for “decision makers” or the one for the “population”).

3.2 Costa Rica’s Foreign Policy Before and After Establishing Diplomatic Relations with the PRC Analyzed Through the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization

This section will apply the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization to Costa Rica’s foreign policy for the period before and shortly after the recognition of the PRC. The meta-norm being analyzed is the Human Security paradigm due to its holistic nature and the public acceptance it has received by President Oscar Arias (Arias, 1998). Human Security is defined as “freedom from want”

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

and “freedom from fear” by the United Nations Commission on Human Security (Dhergoukassian, 2001; Feigenblatt, 2007b; Khong, 2006; Sisk, 2006; United-Nations, 2003). According to the prevalent definitions of Human Security it includes accepted international norms such as: Sustainable Development, Human Development, civil and political rights, economic, cultural and social rights, Collective Security, Common Security, self-determination, and respect for international law. All of those norms have gradually come together to form the Human Security paradigm (Khong, 2006). Human Security is not only a theory but it is also an approach to public policy-making and international relations (Dhergoukassian, 2001; Feigenblatt, 2007b; Khong, 2006; Sisk, 2006; United-Nations, 2003).

The Charter of the United Nations served as the base for the previously mentioned international norms (Sisk, 2006). It marked the moment when an early version of those norms was accepted at the international level. This foundational moment corresponds to the first step of the model, “norm creation”. Since Costa Rica was involved as an ally during the War and joined most Breton Woods Institutions, it can be safely assumed that it was aware of the creation of the norm (Barry, 1991; Eakin, 2007; Leonard, 1991; Perez-Brignoli, 1989; Williamson, 1992).

It is important to note, that during the early 20th century Costa Rica did not have official diplomatic relations with China and that it forbade the entry of ethnic Chinese to the country (Cordoba, 2005, p. 2). This means that Costa Rica was in “violation of the norm” by discriminating against Chinese. That covers the second step of the model. At this time the leaders and probably most of the population held racist feelings toward the Chinese and refused to accept the legitimacy of the norm of non-discrimination and Human Rights (Cordoba, 2005, p. 3). The third step of the model “denial of norm legitimacy” explains the previous assertion. Consequently Costa Rica decided to open relations with China and to remove the law banning Chinese from entering the country, on the 5th of May 1944. The Soto Harrison-Yuen Tan Treaty opened relations between the Nationalist Government of China and Costa Rica (Cordoba, 2005, pp. 2-3). Since socialization is a gradual process it is evident that neither the population nor the leadership of the country had

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

internalized the norm of Human Rights at the time of the signing. Therefore, this treaty can be considered to be a “tactical concession”, the fourth stage in the model.

The early post-war years were dominated by civil and political rights in the West (Fukuyama, 1992). This emphasis was reinforced by the United States and its allies. Also the norm of anti-communism was actively fomented by the American government (Barber, 1996; Chua, 2007; Friedman, 2000; Fukuyama, 1992; Habermas, 2006; Lal, 2004). Those norms reached a “prescriptive level” since they guided the behavior of the Costa Rican government due to external pressure. The fifth step of the model, the “prescriptive level”, refers to the point in which a government follows a norm but has not internalized it yet. In other words at this point the Costa Rican government and the population had not yet internalized the norms of anti-communism and respect for human rights (Cordoba, 2005). This step coincides with the early cold war period and American pressure to join the West in its struggle against the spread of communism (Leonard, 1991). One example of how Costa Rica continued to follow the norm at a prescriptive level was by maintaining diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and not with the People’s Republic of China (Mainland China) (Cordoba, 2005). Since Costa Rica did not have much trade with Asia during the 50s and 60s nor any strategic interests in the region it can be assumed that Costa Rica upheld its diplomatic support of Taiwan due the prescriptive power of international norms.

Attitudes started to change in the 1970s and 1980s. The population and the leadership started to internalize international norms such as Human Rights, collective security, and anti-communism. This was probably due to the efforts of the United States to spread the norm through Official Development Aid and propaganda. Later on, the Sandinista threat in Nicaragua further promoted that internalization of the norm of anti-communism. Moreover, by the 1990s it is clear that the vast majority of the population and the leadership had internalized the norm of anti-communism and Human Security. This assertion will be supported by two sources of evidence. First of all attitudinal studies from the early 1990s show that Costa Ricans’ held more anti-communist attitudes than Americans at the time.

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

Large samples of Costa Ricans were asked questions related to the spread of communism, the possibility of coexistence with communist regimes, and the role Costa Rica should play regarding communism. Three questions summarize this point. The following questions were asked to 597 individuals in 1990 by researchers of the University of Costa Rica: “1. Any time a country goes Communist, it should be considered a threat to the vital interests and security of Costa Rica. % agree : 75.7

2. Costa Rica should do everything it can to prevent the spread of communism to any other part of Central America. % agree 85.2

3. Communism can be an acceptable form of government for some countries in the world. (% disagree) 69.8” (Jon Hurwitz, 1993). In addition to that, prominent Costa Rican intellectuals such as Dr. Oscar Arias, have written about Human Security and sustainable development (Arias, 1998). Government official statements from the 1990s also use the language of Human Security and stress the spread of democracy (Heubel, 1990). The previous discussion shows that both the Costa Rican leadership and the population had internalized the norm of Human Security and of anti-communism by the 1990s and that both were behaving consistently following the norm. At this point both strands of the model had reached the seventh step, “internalization of norm and rule consistent behavior”.

Costa Rican governments continued to respect the popular consensus in regard to respect for international norms and anti-communism. Regarding China, Costa Rica continued to support the Republic of China rather than the People’s Republic of China well into the 21st century, even though trade with mainland China exceeded trade with Taiwan (Cordoba, 2005, p. 105). Since the United States had switched its diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China and the Cold War had come to an end, then *realpolitik* cannot explain why Costa Rica continued to support Taiwan and its bid to join the United Nations. The prominent Costa Rican asianist, Prof. Cordoba Thais emphasizes the importance of norms in this regard.

The Republic of China and Costa Rica share programme of mutual interest for the whole international community as Human Rights and

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

Environmental Programme. Taiwan's standards of human rights, democracy, and basic freedoms have made great strides, from resistance to oppression in the early years, to mutual respect and compromise among people today. Human Rights for children, women, and aborigines have been greatly promoted (Cordoba, 2005, p. 76).

Prof. Thais' reasoning is clearly echoed by the official government statements of the time (MOFA, 2000, 2005).

June 2007 was a watershed in the history of Costa Rican foreign policy in that for the first time it diverged from the norms held by the population and by the leadership. Costa Rica switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing (MOFA, 2007). Two points about this change are important. First how the negotiations took place, and the reaction of the public after it was made public. The negotiations leading to the diplomatic switch were held in secret starting in 2004 between the then, pre-candidate Dr. Oscar Arias, and representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (E. M. a. A. Murillo, 2008). Dr. Arias did not reveal his position regarding Taiwan during the elections and made great efforts to keep it a secret until the public was alerted by Taiwanese intelligence (Mata, 2008). The President refused to make the details of the agreement public until he was forced to do so by an order of the Constitutional Court (Mata, 2008; MOFA, 2000, 2005, 2007; A. Murillo, 2008a, 2008b). The previous overview of the negotiations preceding the breakup of relations with Taiwan, show that the President was aware that he would meet public opposition to this move. Furthermore, the negative public response to the announcement clearly showed that the popular consensus supported the norms of anti-communism and Human Security (Mata, 2008; MOFA, 2000, 2005, 2007; A. Murillo, 2008a, 2008b). At this point the "decision making" strand of the Parallel Cycles Model had entered the seventh step, *norm internalization with norm inconsistent behavior*.

The cognitive inconsistency experienced by Costa Ricans after the breakup with Taiwan and the subsequent recognition of the PRC is shown by the general condemnation of the action, the arguments of inevitability given by the President, and the contradictory and convoluted

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding Tibet. These final pieces of evidence will be analyzed in the following sections through the use of critical discourse analysis but for now, it will suffice to assert that they offer further support for the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization in the case of Costa Rica. In summary, the Costa Rican leadership went through the eight stages of the model while the population is uncomfortably entering the eighth.

4. Critical Discourse Analysis of Selected Government Statements Preceding and Following the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the PRC

This section will analyze selected government statements regarding Taiwan and mainland China through critical discourse analysis. First two Joint Communiqués released by the governments of Taiwan and Costa Rica regarding the visit of the Taiwanese President to Costa Rica and the visit of the Costa Rican President to Taiwan will be analyzed so as to identify the discursive underpinnings of the documents (MOFA, 2000, 2005). Then, statements made by President Dr. Oscar Arias shortly before switching diplomatic recognition and shortly following the switch will be analyzed in order to show how he avoided giving ethical reasons for the action and how he stressed the inevitability of his decision (Mata, 2008; A. Murillo, 2008a, 2008b; E. M. a. A. Murillo, 2008). A short analysis of the actual agreement between Costa Rica and the People's Republic of China will be provided (MOFA, 2007). Also, the official statement of the Minister of Foreign Relations regarding unrest in Tibet will be analyzed so as to show the inconsistency and cognitive dissonance introduced by Costa Rica's recognition of the PRC combined with the internalization of Human Rights, cosmopolitan, and Human Security norms (Quesada, 2008). Finally the National Development Plan of the Arias Administration will be analyzed in detail so as to show how it continues to make use of the language of Human Security, democracy, and Human Rights.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

4.1 Joint Communiqués Regarding the Mutual Visits of the Presidents of Costa Rica and Taiwan

The first Communiqué describes the visit of President Chen Shui-Bian of the ROC (Republic of China) to Costa Rica in the year 2000 and his meeting with the then President of the Republic, Miguel Angel Rodriguez Echeverria (MOFA, 2000). Two passages are particularly important in that they stress the nature of the relationship between Taiwan and Costa Rica. One passage refers to a statement made by the President of Taiwan and the second summarizes the points made by the President of Costa Rica.

President Chen stressed the importance of Central America for the foreign policy of his government, and especially that of Costa Rica, due to its outstanding democratic trajectory and of respect for human rights (MOFA, 2000).¹

It is important to note from the previous passage that President Chen stresses two qualities of Costa Rican foreign policy that make it especially important as an ally in Central America. A democratic history and its respect for human rights are stressed as the main defining characteristics of Costa Rica's history and of its foreign policy.

When referring to the general elections held in the Republic of China, the past 18th of March, President Rodriguez manifested his great satisfaction regarding the high level of political participation achieved by the Chinese people in this process, which represents a clear demonstration of the value attributed by this society, to democratic principles and to the respect for the fundamental rights of its citizens (MOFA, 2000).²

¹ Translated from Spanish by the author.

² Translated from Spanish by the author.

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

The previous passage stresses that Costa Rica values Taiwan's democratic principles and that it admires that the Taiwanese government respects the political rights of its citizens. This passage echoes the language used by the Taiwanese president in the previous passage. Both passages talk about democracy and Human Rights. Thus, there is a clear affinity between the language and the actual policy of both countries at this point in time.

In 2005 a second meeting was held between the Presidents of both countries. The meeting was held in Taipei and the Costa Rican President was Abel Pacheco. One passage describing the comments made by President Pacheco echoes the main themes of the 2000 meeting.

The President, in particular, pointed out the high level of maturity reached by the democratization process in Taiwan, in addition to the efforts of the government guided by President Chen in order to achieve the consolidation of a multiparty democracy, demonstrating the will of the people of the Republic of China to live under a democratic system (MOFA, 2005).¹

This passage stresses, once again, the importance of democracy and political rights for the relationship between the two countries. Also, President Pacheco, specifies the kind of democracy he is referring to. A multiparty democracy with meaningful citizen participation is the one Costa Rica has in mind.

In summary, the Communiqués use the language of democracy and Human Security. The documents stress the similarity in values and policies that both countries share as the most important reason behind their diplomatic cooperation. At this point the foreign policy of Costa Rica followed its professed norms of respect for democracy and Human Rights.

¹ Translated from Spanish by the author.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

4.2 Important Statements Made by Dr. Oscar Arias Before, During, and After the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the PRC

This section will concentrate on public statements made by Dr. Oscar Arias before and after the switch of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. A discursive analysis of his remarks is important since they reveal important issues underlying the break with Taiwan, especially those regarding his support of the norms of Human Security and democratic governance.

A good start is his comments during the 61st UN General Assembly which took place on the 21th of September, 2006. These meetings are important occasions for presidents to meet in the sidelines and discuss regional issues. In the case of Taiwan and its relations with Central America, this is a time in which its allies introduce a motion to give Taiwan a seat in the United Nations. However, the People's Republic of China launched a massive diplomatic campaign in 2006 against Taiwan and managed to get four Taiwanese allies to avoid mentioning Taiwan in their speeches. Costa Rica was one of those countries. Moreover, China publicly proclaimed its wish to establish diplomatic relations with Costa Rica. Nevertheless the comments of President Oscar Arias regarding the events of the Assembly and his intentions regarding the PRC gave a different impression. "We are not considering ties with China at this moment" (Agentur, 2006). However a few months later after the event was made public he accepted that he had first made contact with China in October 2004 and that he met Jia Quinglin of the Communist Party but also noted that "I went as the intellectual that I am" (E. M. a. A. Murillo, 2008). Dr. Arias had requested that meeting with the Chinese official and was a pre-candidate for the Presidency for the Partido Liberacion Nacional. He travelled with the banker Alfredo Ortuno who would later play an important role in managing the funding received from China as part of the deal to break relations with Taiwan. The important thing about Dr. Arias' defensive comment is that he felt that he had to justify his visit and that he had to deny any political intentions. This means that he was indirectly accepting the

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

norm of anti-communism held by the majority of the population.

When Taiwanese intelligence revealed that Costa Rica was planning to break relations with Taiwan in favor of China and the public asked the President about his intentions, he denied the allegations. However, after the opening of relations with the PRC was made public officially, and the Constitutional Court forced the government to reveal the agreement signed by the Arias Administration, he accepted that he had lied about his intention to establish relations with China. Nevertheless he qualified the lie by asserting that his government did not have an option since the PRC required secrecy as part of the deal.

They (PRC) have never made the conditions of their foreign investments public, ...I imagine that there are about 169 countries that recognize the PRC and 168 of them respect that wish, and one that does not,, because the Constitutional Court ordered us to give that information (Mata, 2008).¹

The President was trying to defend his actions by stating that most countries that have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China do not reveal the details of their agreements due to Chinese pressure. By defending his actions based on extenuating circumstances he is indirectly accepting that his actions deviate from the accepted norms of political behavior in Costa Rican society.

President Oscar Arias' comments show his discomfort with the cognitive dissonance he experiences while carrying out a realist foreign policy in a country that has internalized norms that favor a responsible internationalism based on Human Security, Human Rights, and democracy. As a political scientist it is fair to assume that the President understood the possible negative reaction of the public to this move, and thus he has tried to make his decisions seem as contingent on factors outside of his control and thus deflect blame (Anglade, 1988).

¹ Translated from Spanish by the Author

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

4.3 An Overview of the Act of Relations Between the Republic of Costa Rica and the People's Republic of China:¹

It is important to take a look at the actual Act of Relations signed by Costa Rica and the PRC in order to identify the theoretical framework underpinning the agreement. The agreement was signed in Beijing on June 1st 2007 by the Ministers of Foreign affairs of both countries (MOFA, 2007). It is important to remember that the agreement was signed in secret and that due to the power imbalance it reflects the input of the People's Republic of China more than that of Costa Rica. In addition to that, China uses a template format for its agreements with other countries.

For the following discussion we will be referring to the translation of selected parts of the agreement included in the appendix of this paper. The first part of the agreement deals with the demands made by China on Costa Rica. It states that Costa Rica is to end all official relations with the ROC immediately after the opening of relations is made public on the 7th of June, 2007. Costa Rica is to recall all personnel and close its embassy in Taipei and to expel all Taiwanese officials from the country within a month. The agreement then moves on to the concrete details of the agreement which are mostly economic transactions. It is stated that China will buy 300 million in Costa Rican sovereign bonds with an interest of 2 percent. It also states that China will give Costa Rica \$130 million as nonrefundable assistance. Then the documents moves on to details about the exact dates for payments and how those will be made. China states that it will try to increase the import of Costa Rican products and that it will promote Chinese FDI in Costa Rica. Finally, the agreement states that China will support Costa Rica's bid to join the Asia Pacific Forum for Economic Cooperation and its candidacy for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations (MOFA, 2007). In general, the document is a simple transaction between a buyer and a seller. China agreed to pay more than 300 million for Costa Rica to become the first Central America to betray Taiwan, and Costa Rica also received token support to join APEC and support in its failed bid for the seat in the Security Council.

¹ See Appendix 1 for a full version of the agreement.

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

The agreement clearly delineates the financial and material aspects of the deal but it ignores the political and social factors of the switch. The immense political capital that was spent by President Oscar Arias and the large savings of soft power that he squandered are not reflected by the realist wording of the agreement drafted mostly by the Chinese.

4.4 Costa Rica and Tibet: An official Statement Made by the Costa Rican Minister of Foreign Affairs Regarding Human Rights Issues in Tibet

This section gives an example of the new challenges posed by Costa Rica's decision to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC when dealing with Human Rights issues. The following statement is the official response to the events in Tibet that took place in early 2006. By the time of the statement, 100 Tibetans had died due to government repression and China had taken great pains not to get the International Community involved in the conflict. The Costa Rican Minister of Foreign Affairs made the following comment on March 16, 2006:

Costa Rica is a sovereign country and its foreign policy is independent, likewise, we respect the territorial sovereignty of the People's Republic of China; but at the same time we have dealt with the topic of human rights with them, which has been a topic for discussion at all levels, including the visit that Oscar Arias undertook to China and the conversations held with their ambassador in our country (Quesada, 2008).¹

This passage shows a very confusing picture. It is a combination of realist rhetoric, trumpeting absolute sovereignty, and at the same time it tries to include concern for Human Rights. The difference between this statement and the Joint Communiqués, analyzed in previous sections, is clear. It is also interesting that the Minister of Foreign

¹ Translated by the author

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

Affairs followed the previous statement with the following comments about religious freedom:

The topic of respect for religious and cultural diversity in Tibet should be dealt with; Costa Rica sees as a good sign, the fact that the International Press has been allowed to enter Tibet (Quesada, 2008).

The language of Human Rights and self-determination are combined in the same statement and followed with an implicit acceptance that freedom of the press is an important aspect of those rights.

Thus if the two statements are interpreted as a part of a whole, one gets two contradictory positions. One position is that sovereignty is absolute even regarding international norms such as Human Rights and self-determination. A second position follows the Costa Rican tradition of stressing the importance of international law and human rights. Including the two positions in a single statement gives the listener a feeling of cognitive dissonance or at a minimum sounds hypocritical.

The difficulties shown by the two previous statements regarding human rights abuses are due in part to the government's continued adherence to the norms of Human rights and Human Security, as shown by the official National Development Plan of the Arias Administration, and its realist foreign policy regarding China. The following section will analyze the 2006 National Development Plan of the Arias Administration, especially the sections dealing with foreign policy, and show how it follows a long tradition of a foreign policy based on international norms and responsible internationalism (MPNPE, 2006).

4.5 The National Development Plan of the Arias Administration

This section will analyze and interpret the National Development Plan of the Arias Administration. The Development Plan is a very important document since it explains the general principles an administration will follow during its years in power. It is divided into policy sections which are then subdivided into general principles and more concrete actions that will be undertaken. The introduction to

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

the paper describes the general philosophical principles that have characterized the foreign policy of the country as well as those of the Costa Rican Consensus, term used in the paper to refer to the political attitudes of the majority of the population at any one time.

Chapter 6 deals with foreign policy and starts by stating that Costa Rica has exerted more international influence than it would have been expected to be able to exert in relation to its small size and level of economic development (MPNPE, 2006, p. 101). The National Development Plan attributes Costa Rica's international influence to three factors: its history as a country that abolished its army in 1948, organized the Esquipulas Peace Process, and depends on international law for its foreign policy; its good track record regarding human rights; and its defense of natural resources at the international level (MPNPE, 2006, p. 101). The second factor is particularly important due to the language used in the National Development Plan:

Secondly, our trajectory as a country respectful of human rights, amply recognized by the international community, as evidenced by the selection of Costa Rica as the location for the Inter American Court for Human Rights, the leading role of Costa Rica in the negotiations and adoption of the Protocol for the Convention against Torture...(MPNPE, 2006, p. 101)

The language used in the passage just quoted is the discourse of Human Rights and responsible internationalism. A history of respect for Human Rights and responsible involvement in the implementation of international norms is given credit for Costa Rica's international influence. This serves as evidence to the continued adherence of the Arias administration to the norm of Human Rights and responsible internationalism. Going back to the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization described in earlier sections of the paper, it is clear that the Arias administration recognized that those norms were supported by the "Costa Rican Consensus" and also that Costa Rica had benefited through adherence to them in its

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

foreign policy. Assuming that the organizer of the Esquipulas Peace Process, Dr. Oscar Arias, still believes in those norms, then it shows that both the “decision-makers” and the population have internalized the norms of Human Rights and Human Security.

The challenges for the future, delineated by the National Development Plan, provide further evidence to the previous interpretation. Two great challenges are included in the National Development Plan: “improving the international image of the country, to strengthen its image and to provide it a leadership role, making use of its genuine historical support for causes and principles of great ethical value for humanity” and “to use its moral leadership to strengthen international law, of whose strength its national security depends in many respects” (MPNPE, 2006, p. 104).

The National Development Plan states that one important challenge is to continue to use the moral influence of Costa Rica through the continuation of its historical adherence and activism in the support of international norms. Moreover, the second challenge accepts that Costa Rica depends on the respect of international law and the consequent institutionalization of norms for its national security, since it lacks the traditional resources required by a realist foreign policy. The previous passage also shows that the government recognizes that there is a “genuine” internalization of international norms in Costa Rica. This further confirms the assertion that Costa Rican leaders and the population have internalized international norms.

Four main principles are identified by the National Development Plan as the core of the government’s vision for its foreign policy: “the defense of democracy”, “the promotion of human rights”, “the quest for peace and international disarmament”, and “the defense of multilateralism, the strict respect for international law and for the principles and values of the Charter of the United Nations” (MPNPE, 2006, p. 104). Since the previously stated principles are those of the Government, it is clear that it has internalized the norms of Human Security and Human Rights. The Government is also claiming to base its foreign policy on those four core principles: democracy, Human Rights, international peace, and respect for international law. Applying the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization this shows that the

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

“decision-maker” cycle of the Model has both internalized and tried to base its behavior on international norms.

Finally, the National Development Plan identifies some specific goals for the foreign policy of this administration. Two are of particular importance to this discussion. The first is to promote the adoption of international norms, Human Rights and Human Security, as part of the criteria used by International Financial Organizations and donor countries when dealing with official development aid and cooperation (MPNPE, 2006, p. 105). In other words, the government is trying to promote development aid conditionality. This is in line with the norm of alternative development paradigms such as sustainable development and Human Security (Feigenblatt, 2007b). The second goal deals with the regulation of the arms trade through international law and the role Costa Rica should play in promoting the adoption of those laws and regulations (MPNPE, 2006). Both goals show that the government is setting goals according to the international norms it has internalized.

In summary, the National Development Plan, shows that the Arias Administration continues to use the language of Human Rights and Human Security and that the paradigm and approach underlying the document follows international norms. The assertions made in earlier sections of this paper regarding the two cycles of the Parallel Cycle Model of Norm Socialization are supported by the evidence found in this document. The paper shows that the Government recognizes that the Costa Rican population has “genuinely” supported the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and related norms such as Human Rights and the spread of democracy. Moreover, the Government stresses the positive benefits the country has received through its historical adherence to those principles, such as moral international influence (soft power). The Government then clearly states that those norms are also at the core of its foreign policy and proposes more specific goals to implement them, such as the promotion of conditionality in Official Development Assistance and the regulation of the arms trade.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

4.6 Conclusions from the Critical Discursive Analysis

The Critical Discursive Analysis shows that Costa Rican foreign policy has historically followed international norms regarding Human Rights and Human Security. It also shows that in the case of its relationship with the Republic of China (Taiwan), the relationship was based on common goals and common values such as democracy and anti-communism. Moreover, the statements of President Arias regarding the PRC controversy, show that he implicitly recognized that the Costa Rican consensus was against establishing diplomatic relations with the mainland. In addition to that, the wording of the Act of Relations between the PRC and Costa Rica is very different from that of the Joint Communiqués drafted by Taiwan and Costa Rica. Since the National Development Plan was drafted by the Arias administration and it uses the discourse of Human Security and Human Rights, it is safe to assume that the PRC had a greater input into the drafting of the Act of Relations. Furthermore, the confusing wording of the official statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica regarding human rights abuses in Tibet, shows the cognitive dissonance and incongruence between the traditional Costa Rican practice of defending human rights and using its discourse, and the realist need to avoid criticizing Beijing. The goals outlined in the National Development Plan of the Arias administration further support the assertion that Costa Rica's foreign policy continues to pay lip service to the discourse of human rights and democratization. Some of the goals it identifies such as the spread of democracy and arms control can be considered to be incompatible with a relationship with one of the largest arms suppliers in the world which has a communist regime.

In summary, the Critical Discursive Analysis supports the results of the constructivist explanation given by the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization. It shows that decision makers have internalized the norms of Human Rights and Human Security and that they are acting against those norms in the case of China. This means that the "decision maker" cycle has reached the stage of "norm internalization with norm inconsistent behavior". The results of the Critical Discursive Analysis can also be interpreted to indirectly support the assertion that the "population cycle" of the

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

Model has also internalized the norms and is suffering from cognitive dissonance due to the actions of the decision makers.

5. Conclusions

This paper has shown by means of a constructivist interpretation and a critical discursive analysis that Costa Rica's establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC and the subsequent break of relations with the ROC goes against the Costa Rican consensus and also represents a sharp break with traditional Costa Rican foreign policy. This conclusion was reached through the use of an adapted version of the Spiral Model of Norm Socialization called the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization. Due to Costa Rica's historical reliance on international law and international regimes it was necessary to concentrate on the influence of norms on foreign policy decision making. The result of this constructivist interpretation is that both cycles of the model have internalized the norms of Human Security and Human Rights (and related norms such as democratization). The "decision maker" cycle has acted against the norms it holds and thus reached the stage in which there is "norm internalization with norm inconsistent behavior".

The Critical Discursive Analysis supported the constructivist interpretation of the break with Taiwan and showed some of the difficulties faced by policy makers in acting against norms they and the population have internalized. Furthermore, the language used by the Arias Administration in its National Development Plan shows that while conducting a realist foreign policy, as in the case of the PRC, it continues to use the language of Human Security and Human Rights. Thus we conclude that decision makers are co-opting the language of Human Security and Human Rights in order to protect themselves from the consequences of openly deviating from the Costa Rican consensus and also from forfeiting the benefits of the "soft-power" accumulated by Costa Rica over the years, through its responsible internationalism.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

6. Limitations and Further Research:

While this paper provides a two-pronged analysis of Costa Rica's sudden break with Taiwan, it concentrates on norms and discourse, and does not consider realist factors such as transfers of resources and power differentials. This approach has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand it is a very good fit for an interpretation of Costa Rican foreign policy due to its historical emphasis on international norms, the small size of the country, its lack of armed forces, and its limited economy. Those limiting factors decrease the influence of "hard" resources in guiding foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War and the rise of Costa Rica to middle-income status, has sharply reduced foreign aid for the peaceful country (MPNPE, 2006). This sharp decrease in foreign aid and the competition of larger markets has strained Costa Rica's welfare policies. Since Costa Rica's level of human development is far greater than would be expected when taking into consideration its economic development, it is easy for the international community to overlook the fact that the country is still in the process of economic development.

Added to the confusing signals sent by Costa Rica's high level of human development is the declining American interest in the region and the consequent diversion of funds to other regions. This has prompted the Costa Rican government to look for other sources of funding to cover the budget deficit and the quite large internal debt. While just a possible explanation for the break with Taiwan, the Chinese offer to buy \$300 million of internal debt in the form of government bonds could have exerted an important influence on the Arias Administration, as a palliative solution to the crisis in the welfare system. Also the large Chinese market may have also provided a strong incentive for the switch.

More research is needed regarding the economic aspects of the switch in order to complement the normative and discursive interpretations of the events. The relatively recent nature of the event and the secretive characteristics of the transaction make further research into the actual

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

negotiations difficult. Nevertheless a realist explanation of the event would complement the constructivist interpretation provided by the Critical Discursive Analysis and the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization provided in this paper.

7. Applying Critical Discourse Analysis and the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialization to other Latin American Countries

The two-pronged approach to the analysis of Costa Rica's foreign policy regarding China used in this paper can serve as an example for similar studies about other Latin American Countries. Its emphasis on norms and discourse may be more appropriate for some countries than others but it can complement the mostly realist literature dealing with the region's foreign policy (Barry, 1991; Eakin, 2007; Leonard, 1991; Perez-Brignoli, 1989; Williamson, 1992). Moreover, the sharp decrease in scholarly interest in the Central American region after the 1990s should be addressed. Central America's foreign policy deserves attention not only due to its strategic location joining the two Americas, but also due to its successful democratization. A better understanding of the foreign policy of the region may help policy-makers in developed countries harness the diplomatic energy of Central America for the promotion of international norms and the spread of democracy to other developing areas of the world.

References

- Agentur, D. P. (2006). Changes dateline, adds Costa Rican response [Electronic Version]. *therawstory*. Retrieved October 21, 2008, from http://rawstory.com/news/2006/Changes_dateline_adds_Costa_Rican_r_09212006.html
- Anglade, C. (1988). President Arias of Costa Rica. *Political Science and Politics*, 21(2), pp. 357+359.
- Arias, O. (1998). Globalization and the Challenges of Human Security [Electronic Version]. *OCHA*. Retrieved March 01, 2007, from <http://ochaonline.un.org/DocView.asp?DocID=3881>
- August, R. (1995). *Public International Law: Text, Cases, and Readings* (Paperback ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

- Barber, B. R. (1996). *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Barry, T. (1991). *Central America Inside Out: The Essential Guide to Its Societies, Politics, and Economies* (First ed.). New York: Grove Weidenfeld.
- Bix, H. P. (2000). *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (Paperback ed.). New York: Perennial.
- Chua, A. (2007). *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall* (First ed.). New York: Doubleday.
- Clark, M. A. (2001). *Gradual Economic Reform in Latin America: The Costa Rican experience*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Cordoba, T. M. (2005). *The Significance of Costa Rica in Taiwan's Diplomacy and the Competition from Beijing* (1st ed.). San Jose: Genesis.
- Denuncia Nacional e Internacional: Oscar Arias militariza y usa aparatos represivos en Costa Rica [Electronic. (2006). Version]. *bilaterals.org*. Retrieved October 21, 2008, from http://www.bilaterals.org/article-print.php?id_article=6110
- Dhergoukassian, K. (2001). Human Security: A Brief Report of the State of the Art [Electronic Version]. *Columbia International Affairs Online*. Retrieved February 23, 2007, from <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/dek01/dek01.pdf>
- Dore, R. (1997). *Japan, Internationalism and the UN* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
- Eakin, M. C. (2007). *The History of Latin America: Collision of Cultures* (Paperback ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Feigenblatt, O. v. (2007a). *Japan and Human Security: 21st Century ODA Policy Apologetics and Discursive Co-optation* (2nd ed.). Delray Beach: Academic Research International.
- Feigenblatt, O. v. (2007b, October 4-5). *Japan and Human Security: 21st Century Official Development Policy Apologetics and Discursive Co-optation*. Paper presented at the International Development Studies Conference on Mainstreaming Human Security: The Asian Contribution, Bangkok.
- Friedman, T. L. (2000). *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (Revised ed.). New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.
- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN*. New York: The Free Press.
- Habermas, J. (2006). *The Divided West* (C. Cronin, Trans.). Padstow: Polity.
- Heubel, E. J. (1990). Costa Rican Interpretations of Costa Rican Politics. *Latin American Research Review*, 25(2), pp. 217-225.
- Jon Hurwitz, M. P., Mitchell A. Seligson. (1993). Foreign Policy Belief Systems in Comparative Perspective: The United States and Costa Rica. *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(3), pp. 245-270.
- Khong, S. N. M. a. Y. F. (2006). *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History* (1st Edition ed.). Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Kollman, K. (2008). The Regulatory Power of Business Norms: A Call for a New Research Agenda. *International Studies Review*, 10(3), 397-419.
- Kolodziej, E. A. (2005). *Security and International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lal, D. (2004). *IN PRAISE OF EMPIRES: Globalization and Order* (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Leonard, T. M. (1991). *Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability*. Athens: The University of Georgia Press.

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

- Mata, E. (2008, September 13, 2008). Óscar Arias: 'Inteligencia de Taipéi nos pilló en la mentira' *La Nación*. Retrieved 09/24/2008, from http://www.nacion.com/ln_ee/2008/septiembre/13/pais1699840.html
- MOFA. (2000). *COMUNICADO CONJUNTO DE LOS SEÑORES MIGUEL ANGEL RODRIGUEZ ECHEVERRIA, PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA Y CHEN SHUI-BIAN, PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHINA*. Retrieved [9/24/2008. from [http://www.rree.go.cr/politica-exterior/index.php?stp=31&langtype=espanol&Submit=Download&download=yes&txt_name_file=China%20\(19082000\).htm](http://www.rree.go.cr/politica-exterior/index.php?stp=31&langtype=espanol&Submit=Download&download=yes&txt_name_file=China%20(19082000).htm).
- MOFA. (2005). *COMUNICADO CONJUNTO DE LOS EXCELENTÍSIMOS SEÑORES CHEN SHUI-BIAN, PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHINA(Taiwán) Y ABEL PACHECHO DE LA ESPRIELLA, PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA*. Retrieved 9/24/2008. from [http://www.rree.go.cr/politica-exterior/index.php?stp=31&langtype=espanol&Submit=Download&download=yes&txt_name_file=Taiwan\(140805\).doc](http://www.rree.go.cr/politica-exterior/index.php?stp=31&langtype=espanol&Submit=Download&download=yes&txt_name_file=Taiwan(140805).doc).
- MOFA. (2007). *Act of Relations between Costa Rica and China*. Retrieved 09/25/2008. from http://www.nacion.com/ln_ee/2008/septiembre/10/opinion1695379.html.
- MPNPE. (2006). *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo*. Retrieved. from.
- Murillo, A. (2008a, September 12, 2008). China evalua consecuencias de publicar datos en Costa Rica. *La Nación*. Retrieved October 21, 2008, from http://www.nacion.com/ln_ee/2008/septiembre/12/pais1698522.html
- Murillo, A. (2008b, September 13, 2008). Señalan a Costa Rica como ejemplo de estrategia de Pekín: Prensa mundial difunde noticia sobre venta de bonos a China *La Nación*. Retrieved 09/22/2008, from http://www.nacion.com/ln_ee/2008/septiembre/13/pais1699440.html
- Murillo, E. M. a. A. (2008, September 13, 2008). Presidente inició contacto con China en el 2004 *La Nación*. Retrieved 09/22/2008, from http://www.nacion.com/ln_ee/2008/septiembre/13/pais1699844.html
- Obregon, J. M. D. (2006). *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo*. Retrieved. from.
- Olenik, W. S. M. a. J. K. (2005). *Japan: Its History and Culture* (Fourth Edition ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.
- Perez-Brignoli, H. (1989). *A Brief History of Central America* (S. S. d. S. Ricardo B. Sawrey A. , Trans.). Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Quesada, L. (2008). Costa Rica aboga por el respeto de los derechos humanos en el Tibet [Electronic Version]. *Teletica Canal 7*. Retrieved October 21, 2008, from <http://www.teletica.com/imprimir.php?id=12112#>
- Ruble, M. R. (2008). Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness. *International Studies Review*, 10(3), 420-450.
- Scott Cooper, D. H., Wade Jacoby, and Daniel Nielson. (2008). Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions: Bringing System Structure Back In. *International Studies Review*, 10(3), 501-524.
- Sisk, J. L. a. T. D. (2006). *Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century*. Retrieved February 24, 2007,
- Smith, P. (1997). *Japan A Reinterpretation*. New York: Random House.

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

- United-Nations. (2003). *Human Security Now, Final Report of the Commission on Human Security*. Retrieved February 23, 2007, from <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf>
- W. Scott Morton, J. K. O. (2005). *Japan: Its History and Culture* (4th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.
- Williamson, E. (1992). *The Penguin History of Latin America* (Paperback ed.). London: Penguin Books.

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

APPENDIX

ACT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN COSTA RICA AND CHINA
(OFFICIAL VERSION IN SPANISH RELEASED BY LA NACION)¹

Acta de Relaciones entre Costa Rica y China

Durante las negociaciones para el establecimiento de sus relaciones diplomáticas, el Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica y el Gobierno de la República Popular China, además del Comunicado Conjunto sobre el Establecimiento de Relaciones Diplomáticas, han convenido en lo siguiente:

- I. A partir de la fecha del establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas entre la República de Costa Rica y la República Popular China, el Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica romperá sus “relaciones diplomáticas” con Taiwán, cerrando su “Embajada” en la otra parte y retirando su “personal de “Embajada” en un lapso no mayor de (1) mes.

Al mismo tiempo, cerrara la “Embajada” de las autoridades de Taiwán en la República de Costa Rica y ordenara la retirada de todo el personal de dicha institución.

- II. El Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica se compromete a no entrar más en vinculación oficial en ninguna de las formas con Taiwán, una vez establecidas las relaciones diplomáticas entre la República de Costa Rica y la República Popular China. El Gobierno de la República Popular China se compromete a no poner objeción al mantenimiento de relaciones económicas, comerciales, científicas, tecnológicas, educacionales y culturales, de carácter no oficial, por parte de la República de Costa Rica con Taiwán.

- III. A partir del establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas entre la República de Costa Rica y la República Popular china, el Gobierno de la República Popular China pondrá cuenta antes en marcha, a la luz de lo acordado entre los dos Gobiernos, la cooperación binacional en los proyectos de interés del Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica.

Concretamente, el Gobierno de la República Popular China:

1. Ofrecerá a la República de Costa Rica, en un lapso de tres (3) a cinco (5) años a partir del establecimiento de sus relaciones diplomáticas, una asistencia no reembolsable de ciento treinta

¹ (MOFA, 2007)

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

- millones (130.000.000) de dólares norteamericanos, de los cuales treinta millones (30.000.000) de dólares irán en efectivo durante dos (2) ejercicios fiscales, cancelándose veinte millones (20.000.000) de dólares en el primer ejercicio y diez millones (10.000.000) de dólares en el segundo ejercicio; y el resto, denominado en yuanes Renminbi y equivalente a cien millones (100.000.000) de dólares, será destinado para implementar los proyectos que necesite Costa Rica, incluidos los de cooperación económica y técnica dejados por Taiwán.
2. Una vez establecidas las relaciones diplomáticas, comprará en dos (2) tramos iguales, en enero 2008 y enero 2009, la suma de trescientos (300) millones de dólares norteamericanos en bonos de la República de Costa Rica con las siguientes características.
 - a. Tipo de título: bonos de deuda interna emitidos en dólares norteamericanos por el Ministerio de Hacienda de la República de Costa Rica;
 - b. Tasa de interés: dos (2) por ciento anual, pagadera semestralmente;
 - c. Plazo: doce (12) años;
 - d. Pago del principal: una vez al vencimiento (al cumplirse los doce años);
 - e. Garantía: soberana del Gobierno de Costa Rica.
 3. Considerará favorablemente el incremento de la importación desde Costa Rica y enviará cuanto antes, una vez establecidas las relaciones diplomáticas, expertos a Costa Rica, a fin de negociar con la parte costarricense la pronta suscripción de acuerdos binacionales de inspección y cuarentena en materia zoonosanitaria y fitosanitaria con miras a crear condiciones para el aumento de la importación de productos costarricenses por la parte china y a evaluar conjuntamente con la parte costarricense la factibilidad de suscribir un Tratado Libre Comercio (TLC) entre los dos países.
 4. Proporcionará a la República de Costa Rica un total anual de veinte (20) becas gubernamentales para cursar estudios en la República Popular China.
 5. Designará a la República de Costa Rica, después del establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas, como destino turístico de los ciudadanos chinos, a solicitud del Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica.
 6. Se dispondrá a promover junto con la parte costarricense, una vez establecidas las relaciones diplomáticas y sobre la base de respeto mutuo, igualdad, beneficios recíprocos y desarrollo compartido, los estudios y la pronta suscripción de convenios de cooperación en

Costa Rica and the Two Chinas: A Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

materia política, económico-comercial, cultural, educacional y científico-tecnológica.

A la luz de este espíritu, el Gobierno chino alentara a las empresas chinas a considerar prioritariamente a Costa Rica como un destino de inversión en virtud de que Costa Rica es el primer país centroamericano en establecer relaciones diplomáticas con China. En este sentido, en la eventualidad de que una empresa china sea adjudicataria, con derecho a voz, en el Proyecto de refinería Mesoamericana, se le asignara esta prioridad a Costa Rica para su instalación.

7. Una vez establecidas las relaciones diplomáticas, estará dispuesto a fortalecer la cooperación con la República de Costa Rica en los asuntos internacionales y apoyara la participación de Costa Rica en el APEC y su candidatura a un puesto no permanente del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas para el periodo 2008-2009. Con este fin y sobre la base del respeto mutuo y los beneficios recíprocos que pueden surgir de un tratamiento estructurado de la agenda bilateral y multilateral, ambas partes se comprometen a establecer el y mantener un intenso diálogo político con reuniones ministeriales cada dos (2) años.
 8. Después del establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas, las dos partes, según las necesidades y posibilidades, reducirán y exonerarán, mediante consultas amistosas, parte de los costos de arrendamiento de las instalaciones de oficina diplomáticas.
- IV. Las dos partes acuerdan hacer público, en sus respectivas capitales, en forma oficial el establecimiento de sus relaciones diplomáticas a las cuatro (4) horas de la tarde del 7 de junio de 2007, hora de Costa Rica y a las seis (6) horas de la mañana del 8 de junio de 2007, hora de Beijing.
- Firmado en Beijing, al primer día del mes de junio del año dos mil siete, en dos ejemplares originales, cada uno en los idiomas español y chino, siendo ambos textos igualmente válidos.
- Por el Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica, Bruno Stagno Ugarte. Por el Gobierno de la República Popular china, Yang Jie Chi.