
Pashtun tribes and Pakistani Taliban

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Abstract: *In addition to the Wahhabi influence on the Taliban, which can not be denied, there is another type of influence, the origins of which are entirely in a different, non-Arab region of spreading Islam. And the source of this influence is closer to the Taliban in terms of their religious traditions and ethnicity than Wahhabism. This influence on the Taliban is due to the historical and religious ties that Afghanistan has in Central Asia, India and Pakistan. That is in those countries that in different historical periods were part of a Great Mogul project of unification of the Central Asian region. An important role in this process was traditionally played, on the one hand, by the dynasty of the Timurids and the Baburids, and on the other, by the Sufi Order of Naqshbandiyya.*

Keywords: *Wahhabism, Taliban, Naqshbandiyya*

The Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan: the proportion of Pashtuns (or Pashtuns, they are actually Afghans, or ethnic Afghans, unlike Afghans by citizenship, in the population of present-day Afghanistan is estimated very differently. According to data for 1990, given in most international reference and abstract publications, the share of Pashtuns was considered less than 40%. Another large ethnic group - Tajiks (25%) lived compactly in the northeast, Hazaras (about 15%) - in the central part of the country, and Uzbeks, Charaimaks (Aimaks or Chaharaimakis) and Turkmens (together constituting another 15%) - in the north and the north-west. The reduction in the share of Pashtuns compared with the estimates for the 1960s and 1970s (43-49, even 52-53%) was due to the refinement of the data and the consequences of the massive migration of the Afghan population that began at the turn of the 1970s-1980s. Among refugee migrants, the percentage of the Pashtun population was significantly higher (up to 85%). The main direction of their redeployment was Pakistan. The largest proportion of Pashtun refugees were nomads and semi-nomads, and among them, especially the Gilsai. According to some information, almost all the gilzai-nomads moved with their flocks of sheep and goats, and more often without them, to Pakistani territory¹.

Estimates for the end of the first decade of this century, the internecine strife, the Taliban authorities in 1996-2001 and the subsequent period of the presence on the territory of the country of foreign, mainly US troops, also

¹ Alain Lamballe « Les Pachtouns. Un grand peuple sans pays » (VA Press).

vary, although international organizations tend to unify. Thus, according to the World Fact Book of the US Central Intelligence Agency, the share of Pashtuns in 2010 was 42%. At the same time, Tajiks accounted for 27%, Hazaras and Uzbeks - 9%, Aimaks - 4, Turkmen - 3, Baloch - 2 and all others - 4%. According to the estimates of the United Nations Demographic Service and the United States Bureau of Censuses, Afghanistan's population in 2010 was 29.1 million. At the same time, for a number of previous years, it was estimated to be significantly about 4 million higher. At the previous figure of 32-33 million people, the number of Pashtuns in Afghanistan was estimated at 13-14 million, and with the current accepted figure of 12 million.

The Pashtun area of Afghanistan includes a zone of traditional settlement of a large number of tribes, their units and clans. At the same time, according to the traditional pedigree, the tribes historically had 405, and in connection with their fragmentation by the 1980s there were about 1,700 tribes and independent units (hels). Among them, the predominant part is "real" in the sense of the genealogical genealogy, but there are also large groups named for habitats, for example, "hosti" or "hostwal".

There are three main structural divisions. The first of these is the tribes of durrani (abdali). Historically, they constituted a single tribal union (confederation), but in the modern period the sense of solidarity is largely lost to them, although there remains awareness of the common origin. Durrani inhabit a large area in the south-western, southern and south-eastern parts of the country. Their main units and habitats remained largely unchanged from the mid-18th - early 19th centuries. Genealogically durrani breaks into two branches - Zirak and Panjpao (panjpai). The first include a large tribe of populzais, including the emirs of Kabul subdivision of Sadozai, as well as Alikozai, Baraxai with 16 divisions, including "royal tribe" - Muhammadzai, and Aqqazai (Acakzai), and second - Nurzai (the largest by number), alizai and Iskhakzai. According to the data for the beginning and the middle of the 1980s, the number of Zirak tribes was approximately 2 million people, and the panjpao - about 1 million, i.e. Durrani together accounted for about a third of the total number of Pashtuns in the then Afghanistan:²

Durrani traditionally prevail in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Nimruz, Farah, are quite widely represented in Zabul and Herat, partly in Badghis. Between some tribes of Durrani, such as Nurzai and Achakzai, for a long time a state of hostility persisted. Both tribes are known as trade and intermediary. The center of the settlement of the Nurzai is located to the west of the Achakzai, which are the only Durrani on the Pakistani territory.

² Alain Lamballe « Les Pachtouns. Un grand peuple sans pays » (VA Press).

Their interests in the 1980s were crossed in the zone of cross-border operations with Pakistan.

The second major structural unit of Pashtuns of Afghanistan is the Gilsai. Although they belong to the main genealogical trunk (via Bitana, or Batana, the second son of the ancestor of Pashtuns, Kaisa Abdurrachid), their mixed origin was reflected in belonging to the lateral line from Shah Hussein (Shah-Hussein Gura) and the daughter of Bitan, Bibi Matho. This group of tribes is divided into two branches: the first, actually the Ghilzai, descendants of the eldest "illegitimate" son, and the second, the leading pedigree from the legitimate son of Ibrahim. Among the latter there are lodi, sur, lohani, dotani, nyazi, etc. Actually, the Gilzais break up, in turn, into two branches - the turan (hotaki, or khotak, hotek, ohtak, tohi, or tuhi, haroti, or haruti, or bulk) and Buran (Burkhan). The latter is divided into two lines: Yusuf (Suleiman -hel, Ali-hel, etc.) and Musa (Ahmadzei, Andar, Taraki, Sahak, etc.).

Representatives of the second branch of the Ghilzais (lodi-lohanis) constituted the main part of the group of nomadic tribes known as the povinda (pavinda) or kuchi (kochi), and kochi-povanda (povanda-kochan). In the 19th century the Pashtuns-Povinda made traditional migrations from the summits to the plateau of Afghanistan through the passes and passes of the southern slopes of the mountainous country formed by the spurs of the Hindu Kush (Gomal, Tochi, etc.), on the right bank of the Indus, in the region of Derajat. After spending the winter there (from October-December to March-May) and having made the transitions with the goods to India, they then returned back. In connection with the decline of such trade in the XX century, a significant number of nomadic tribes, entire tribal units settled in Derajat (mainly in the current region of Deraismaikhan)³.

The regions to the northeast of Kandahar near Kalat-i Gilzai, on the Ghazni-Kandahar plateau, are the site of the traditional settlement of the Hotakas, further to the north are the Toxi, Taraki, Andara, Suleiman-Hel, Akhmadza and others lands. (Gazni, Logar, Lagmane, as well as on the outskirts of Kabul and in the province of Wardak), where the level of tribalism in the 1980s was lower and the tribe lost its content as a form and type of social organizations, there were settlements of Dotanis, mula-hel, babrak-hel and other. Gilsai made up according to the data for the 80s of the 20th century also about a third of the total number of Pashtuns, and, as a rule, their numbers were estimated somewhat higher than the Durrani. In the first half of the 80s only the largest of the Ghilzai tribes totaled about 2

³ Alain Lamballe « Les Pachtouns. Un grand peuple sans pays » (VA Press).

million people (Suleiman-Hel - more than 500 thousand, ali-hel - over 200 thousand, hots, tochis and haruti, taken together, more than 500 thousand).

The third group of Pashtun tribes consists of various units that do not belong to Durrani and Ghilzai. Among them there are by origin close to the first tarts and burechas (the latter traditionally inhabited the southernmost regions of the country together with the Baluchis), as well as the cakars living in the southeast of Afghanistan, but mostly in neighboring areas of Pakistan. The core of this group, in number in the amount somewhat surpassing the Gilzais, was the mountaineers, who lived in the northeast. Among them was the main population of the “tribal zone” of Afghanistan, which in natural terms is the same as in Pakistan. Both include the most inaccessible regions of the mountain system (spurs of the Hindu Kush) that ran diagonally from the northeast to the southeast, which in 1893 was divided roughly in the middle by the Durand Line, which became the boundary between British India (and since 1947 Pakistan) and Afghanistan.

According to the mythological genealogy “other”, or “mountain”, the tribes mainly refer to the carlani branch (carlari, carrani). The largest of them are jaji (dzadzi), jadran (zadran, zarran), mangalas, macbiles, shinvari, chamkani, wazirs, gurbuzas, hugiani, mandozais, sabri, tani, tourists, orakzai, etc. Their habitat is traditionally Paktika, Paktia, Nangarhar, Khost and Kunar. In the north of the mountainous country within Afghanistan lives a large tribe of Safi (or Kandari, Gandari), as well as non-Karmanian mommands, hygiani, tarclanis (tarkani), mice, sarcans. Living in the mountains, these tribes more plains save the customs and traditions of the Pashtuns. Therefore, this group is often considered the most “Pashtun”, i.e. to the greatest extent preserved traditional customs and ideas⁴.

To analyze the current situation, one should bear in mind that, in the more than 30-year period of wars, destruction and migration (from 1979 to 2010), there have apparently been considerable changes in the ways of organizing the life of Afghan Pashtuns and ways of their adaptation to external conditions. It is known that a very significant proportion of Pashtuns in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan found themselves in refugee camps on neighboring Pakistani territory. By the end of the 1980s, the number of refugees from the country amounted to 5-6 million people, of which only 3-4 million were in Pakistan. At the border with the Pakistani territory of Afghanistan, there remained hardly a third of those who lived there until 1979 Pashtuns. Intra-Afghan migration, both from one rural area to another, and also directed to cities, which gave more chances for survival, also acquired significant proportions. For this reason

^{4 4} Alain Lamballe « Les Pachtouns. Un grand peuple sans pays » (VA Press).

the share of the townspeople increased, apparently, by 1.5-2 times - up to 22-28%.

The “great resettlement” of the Pashtuns, apparently, quite significantly undermined the existing system of their territorial deployment. However, the calamities of the “troubled times” (internecine strife, Taliban rule and post-Talib government) could most likely only strengthen family-clan and clan-tribal cohesion, without violating the usual forms of communication and family life, although giving them some new specifics. In particular, the provision of humanitarian assistance by international organizations led to the emergence of new Maliki (chiefs) in the refugee camps responsible for distributing cash benefits and food cards.

In the 1990s, especially during the Taliban period, some refugees returned, but in Pakistan there were, according to various estimates, 1.2 to 1.6 or even 2 million Afghans. And those who returned did not necessarily "donkey" in the old place. After the defeat of the Taliban and the approval of the administration of President Hamid Karzai, Afghans began to move more actively from Pakistan to their homeland, although their situation in Afghanistan does not differ so far by stability and prosperity.



Pashtuns and Pashtun tribes of Pakistan

One of the five main ethnoses of Pakistan are Pashtuns, or Pakhtuns, with a hard pronunciation instead of a soft one. It distinguishes the eastern dialects of Pashto or Pashto from the western dialects, and hence the name of the patan widespread in the colonial period and in modern India, as well as the modern name of the North-Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, since 2010. Pashtuns inhabit mainly north-western, bordering areas with Afghanistan.

The share of Pashtuns in the population of Pakistan, according to the censuses held every 10 years, ranged from 13-15%. According to the last census of 1998 it was 15.4%. At that time, 23 million people considered themselves as the mother tongue at the total population of the country at 132.4 million. Considering that the population of Pakistan for 2010 is estimated at 178-184 million people, there are 27-28 million Pashtuns. They occupy the second place in Pakistan after the Punjabis (Punjabis), which make up about 60% of the inhabitants (together with the speakers of the Seraika and Hindko languages). Immediately following the Pashtuns, there are Sindhi (14%, inhabit the south of the country), Muhajirs (8%, the so-called settlers who speak mainly Urdu of refugees from India after the division of 1947, and now mainly their descendants) and Baluchis Together with bragui - 4%)⁵.

The Pakistani Pashtuns, concentrated mainly in the northwest, break up in the distribution area into several compact groups. First of all, these are the Pashtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KhP) province. Based on the data of the 1998 census, they make up three quarters (74%) of the inhabitants of the province - 18-19 million people. The second group is the Pashtuns of the federal government (TFU) adjacent to the KP. It is necessary, however, to bear in mind that the federal government manages the TFU through the governor of KhP. This area (also known as the band or zone of independent Pashtun tribes) is currently inhabited by about 4 million people. The third group consists of the Pashtuns of the north-eastern districts of the province of Balochistan, adjacent to HP from the south. Their number is about 3 million people. Finally, the fourth category is a "diaspora" within Pakistan, consisting of "old" settlers of colonial and pre-colonial times, settled in the Punjab and Sind provinces (similar to the origin of the Pashtuns or Pathans of India), and "new" people from primordially Pashtun areas, concentrated in the largest cities - Karachi (about 2 million), Islamabad and Lahore.

Referring to the zone of mountain tribes, it should be noted that after gaining complete independence in 1919 following the end of the third

⁵ Alain Lamballe « Les Pachtouns. Un grand peuple sans pays » (VA Press).

Anglo-Afghan war, Afghanistan, while agreeing with the recognition of the Durand line, supported the anti-English annexations of the Pashtun tribes who lived east of it. And since the beginning of the 1930s and up to now, no government in Kabul has agreed to recognize the Durand line as a state border. The dispute over the border with Pakistan twice - in 1955 and 1961-63 - led to an acute crisis in relations between neighboring states.

The zone of mountain tribes (FATA) remains weakly included in the administrative structures of Pakistan. It continues the criminal legislation of colonial times, and the Pakistani state, in accordance with the old traditions, grants subsidies and privileges to the heads and leaders of the tribes (clan-tribal groups). Integration has intensified since the late 1960s after the abolition of the Pashtun principalities Amb, Swat, Dir and Chitral and their inclusion in the NWFP. Plans for the development of the tribal area, actively developed in the 1970s by the government of Z.A. Bhutto, were not implemented. And in the future, the tribal zone was firmly entangled in more than 30 years of military-political confrontation of various forces.

The FATA is not the only area in Pakistan where the mountain tribes and clans live compactly. They are also resettled in the area of Malakand, located north of the FATA. It includes the former Pashtun principalities mentioned above, and the most high-mountainous regions form one of the zones, united into another special administrative unit of the Territory of the Provincial Administration tribes. Finally, the tribes and clans of the Pashtun mountaineers are settled in the foothills of the plains mainly in the east and southeast of the FATA (the districts of KhP) (Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Deraismaykhan), as well as to the south and south-west of the TFU - in the districts of Zhob, Quetta, Pishin and Loralai in the province of Balochistan⁶.

Pashtun tribes of Pakistan, according to the mythological genealogy are divided into five large groups and have traditional places of preferential settlement. The first of these is the so-called western Pashtuns (Afghans), the bulk of which are the Abdali-Durrani. In Pakistan, they are mainly represented by the Achakzai division living in the Quetta and Pishina areas. Not included in the Durranian genealogical structure, the western Afghans consist of tarans, white and black - spin-tarans and tor-tarans, who own land in northern Balochistan. The second group consists of Pushtun-gurgushty, who live almost exclusively in Pakistan, mainly in the province of Balochistan. The largest and most famous tribe of this group is Kakar. In the districts of Quetta and Zhob there also live the mandhoel, shirani,

⁶ Alain Lamballe « Les Pachtouns. Un grand peuple sans pays » (VA Press).

mucahelle, luni, and panri belonging to this genealogical group. There are also settlements of spin-tarins and tor-tarins.

The third group is the Gilzai tribes, whose main settlement center is Afghanistan. The settlement of the Gilzais within Pakistan is served by the districts of the Deraismaykhan region, covering the lowland right bank of the Indus and the valleys of its numerous tributaries, Gomal. Through the passage in the mountains formed by this river (Gomal Pass), the Gilsai-nomads made last season's movements. With the settling of most of the nomads, the districts of the tribes of the lodi, gandapur, bitani (the genealogically direct descendants of the second son of Kais-Bitan), marvati, lohani, mianhel, babar, obsolete, jafar, kundi, nyazi were formed.

The fourth group consists of Pashtuns-Carlery. They are settled further north, in the plain districts of the Bannu, Kohat and Peshawar regions, as well as in the mountain areas of the tribal band. Representatives of such tribal groups live on the plains, as hattaki, utman-hel, bannucci. The main mountain tribes of this group are the wazirs. On their behalf, the name of the mountainous country of Waziristan and the two political agencies that make up the tribal zone - South and North Waziristan. The main tribes are wazirs and wazirs-massuds, or Masuds, as well as dervishes (separated from the vazirs at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries) and dauri (davara), living in the vicinity of one of the few urban centers of the MIFFU Miramshah.

Tribes of the Carlari group are inhabited by three agencies located north of Waziristan, which are part of the federal jurisdiction - Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber. The first of them bears the name of a large tribal union (half Shiite). In the valley of the river Kurram (where there is another passage through the mountains from Afghanistan) and on the southern slopes of the Spingar Range are Afridi (afridia). But the main place of their traditional habitat, which made this large tribe widely known, is the valley of the river. Kabul, the Khyber Passage area, as well as its tributary r. Bar. The borders of the Khyber Agency closely approach the main city of the present province of Peshawar HP, so that immediately after its "threshold" the land of the Afridians begins, disintegrating into the eight main clans (chels). The most influential of them are Adam-Hel and Cookie-Hel. In addition, in the three mentioned agencies, the bands of the tribes are also inhabited by chamkans and tourists (the only Shiite tribe), and in the mountain-plain areas of the tribal zone and the Kohat-Bangashi region⁷.

The fifth group is the tribes of Sarban. They are also known as the Eastern Pashtuns. The largest tribe of this group is Yusufzai, who from the

⁷ Alain Lamballe « Les Pachtouns. Un grand peuple sans pays » (VA Press).

middle of the 15th century established control over the Peshawar Valley and the areas to the north of it. Much later (in the XIX century) in the region was established a tribe of Momands, now inhabiting both the plains and the mountainous areas that are part of the Momand and Bajaur agencies. On the plain, the Momands own land in the Peshawar area, but mostly in Mardan (northwest of Peshawar), where they are known as the Bara-Momands, and the local Yusufsai as the Mandar-Yusufzai. In the same area there are settlements (neighborhoods of cities or the ends of villages) of other East Pashtun tribes - Tarklany (or Tarkani), Khalil, Muhammadzai, Gigiani, Mullagiri, etc.

In the mountainous region of Bajaur on the border with Afghanistan, mainly Tarkhlanian units, often figuring as independent tribes - Mamunds and Salarzais, live. Some of them live in Afghanistan in the region of Khost and to the north of it, in Kunar. Mountain tribes Mamunds and Salarzais, plain tribe Yusufsi make up the majority of the population in the Malakand region, in particular, the Swat valley and other intermountain hollows, as well as in the highland areas that make up the FATA.

Apart from rural, it is necessary to identify urban Pashtuns. In the urban centers of the Pashtun area, a small part of the population lives - 15-20%, almost twice the share of the average city of Pakistan. Moreover, in the cities of their range Pashtuns are often represented disproportionately - their specific weight is less than in the entire population. At the same time, 2-3 million Pashtuns permanently live in the largest Pakistani cities, where they form the basis of Pashtun's "middle class". Representatives of the latter can be found among rich industrialists and traders, officials and persons of free professions. Particularly large is the share of Pashtuns in the army and in the higher echelons of the armed forces of Pakistan. The ratio between Punjabis and Pashtuns in regular units is estimated as 85 to 15, but among the senior officers and generals the percentage of Pashtuns is higher.

The many rich and influential families of Pakistan traditionally rank themselves to the Pashtuns. They are long separated from the Pashtun lands and not knowing the Pashtu language and form a kind of class stratum of generous and well-off citizens, included in the category "ashraf" (noble). The layer called "patan" and is distinguished by the name component "Khan. Comparing information on two parts of the Pashtun area, we come to the conclusion that the center of gravity of the Pashtuns (Afghans) resettlement, traditionally located on the territory of Afghanistan, since the 1970s, has shifted decisively towards Pakistan. If 12-14 million Pashtuns currently live in Afghanistan, then in Pakistan - 27-29 million. Out of a total of about 40 million, Afghanistan accounts for only a third.

In connection with the questions posed in the preamble about the unity and differences between the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan, we note one aspect of their linguistic and cultural identity. A significant part of the Afghan Pashtuns is bilingual; speaks and owns two official, state languages - Pashto and Dari. According to some reports, up to 50% of the Afghan population is called Dari (Persian, Tajik) as their first language, and only 35% consider it Pashto. A similar situation is observed in Pakistan. The first language of instruction for the majority of Pashtuns is the official language of Pakistan- Urdu. The children from Pashtun families study on Pashto, as a rule, only in some schools, and then only in primary classes, as well as in madrassas (religious schools).⁸

As a result, as noted by T. Rahman, “Urduization” of Pashtuns are observed, which for people with higher education is replaced by their “Anglicization”. The main area where the Pashtun language retains its role and importance is mountainous and mountainous and desert areas along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (their current population is approximately 7-9 million people). There is the center of resistance to Imperialism, Dari, Urdu and English, and the Taliban find the greatest support.

5. Pakistani Taliban

In fact, there are two Taliban. The first, well known to everyone since the mid-1990s, is the Afghan, one might say, classic Taliban, nurtured by Islamabad and carefully guarded by it. It began in the late 1980s, during the Afghan war, when the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) drew attention to the young prospective grenade launcher Mohammed Omar, who was trained in one of the many mujahideen camps in Pakistan. The ISI did not make a mistake by making a bet on him-under his leadership (more precisely, already Mullah Omar) in 1996 the newly-formed Taliban movement seized Kabul and announced the creation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, recognized the new regime and, contrary to UN sanctions, provided him with direct financial and military assistance, sending military advisors and thousands of soldiers to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban.

After the September 11 attacks, Islamabad, fearing losing American financial support, condemned terrorism and tried to distance itself from the Taliban. However, when Kabul fell under the onslaught of the Northern Alliance troops, Taliban fighters found refuge in Pakistan. Quetta turned into the unofficial capital of the movement, where the militants were practically walking about the streets, gaining strength and preparing for new

⁸ Alain Lamballe « Les Pachtouns. Un grand peuple sans pays » (VA Press).

battles. Three years later, regrouping, the Taliban invaded Afghanistan. Ironically, at the same time, President George W. Bush declared Pakistan an important American ally, giving the go-ahead for the supply of the most modern weapons. Islamabad continued to support the Taliban - with money, weapons, and instructors.

In the middle of 2000 formed the second, already Pakistani Taliban. It was based on foreign fighters of Al-Qaeda - Arabs, Chechens, Tajiks and Uzbeks, who fled to the Pakistani border, fleeing American bombs. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Pakistani Taliban or Taliban Movement of Pakistan (پاکستان طالبان تحریک "Tehrik-e-Talebani Pakistan") is one of the powerful military structures of "Taliban". Began to take shape in 2002, when the Pakistani army launched a military action in "the Tribal Areas" against foreign militants attacking NATO troops in neighboring Afghanistan. This caused the resistance of clan leaders and the local population. In 2007, the disparate groups adopted the common name "Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan" (TTP), elected a leader - Baytullah Mehsud and started active hostilities, attacking roadblocks and launching terrorist attacks in the cities.

The relationship between the two Taliban is intricate to the point of impossibility. On the one hand, immediately after the formation of the TTP, its leaders acknowledged the supremacy of Mullah Omar. On the other hand, the official representative of the Afghan Taliban publicly stated: "We do not want to be linked to the TTP, and we publicly deny any contacts with the Pakistani Taliban. We sympathize with them as Muslims, but no more." Pakistani Taliban is regularly found in Afghanistan, where they are fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Afghan Taliban (it was the Tehreek-e Taliban militants who attacked the CIA base at the Camp Chapman camp in Afghanistan in 2009). The leaders of the Afghan Taliban, in turn, prefer not to condemn the actions of their Pakistani comrades (the only exception is the attack on the military school in Peshawar in December 2014, when 145 people died, mostly children).

But the main thing is that both movements help each other in case of danger. In 2009, the Pakistani army, during Operation "Black Storm", pressed the TTP fighters and their allies to the border, but they calmly crossed it, taking refuge with Afghan friends. Two years later, three thousand Taliban from the TTP, who came from Afghanistan, cut out seven Pakistani roadblocks. Desperate to separate the good terrorists from the bad, Islamabad decided to build on the border with Afghanistan a 485-kilometer-long wall with barbed wire from above and a trench at the foot to prevent undesirable elements from penetrating Pakistan's territory.

This caused a sharp reaction from Kabul, and it is not surprising: the Afghans in Pakistan also have their own interests. The Tehreek-e-Taliban established their camps and sent several hundred of their fighters in the Syrian conflict to fight against the regime of Bashar Assad and as a sign of strengthening ties with al-Qaeda. The media reported the establishment of a Pakistani Taliban base in Syria. One of the Pakistani commanders of the Taliban said: “As our Arab friends came to help us here, we must in turn help them in their countries, which we are doing in Syria”.

On January 10, 2015, the former representative of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, well-known as Shahidullah Shahid, announced that several Taliban units were uniting under the leadership of Hafiz Said Khan of Orakzai and swearing to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Islamic state. The leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Mullah Fazlullah reportedly did not encroach on the loyalty of the IS, as he is currently on the run in connection with the ongoing military operations in the North of Waziristan aimed at eradicating his group.

Afghan Taliban and Islamic State: According to expert Dr. Florance Ebrahimi there are ideological coincidences between the Taliban and the Islamic State, but there are quite a few factors that hold back the possibility of partnership and, especially, of a close alliance:

First, the Afghan Taliban, first of all, is aimed at overthrowing the Afghan government. It is a tough extremist organization, but it demonstrates an interest in working within the existing political system. This is evident from the Taliban leaders' statements at the talks on the end of the war. The IS is aimed at creating an Islamic caliphate, and their goal is completely different from that set by the Taliban, it is much more ambitious and extremist. This is the creation of a new caliphate in the East, on the territory of the Greater Khorasan, which includes the territories of Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan⁹.

Secondly, the Afghan Taliban is very close to “Al-Qaeda”, which broke away from the IS, and it is unlikely that the Taliban will want to unite with the IS. The Islamic state will flood the region with weapons and money and provoke militants, disappointed by Mullah Omar's silence, to demonstrate violence and brutality. This will only add to the suffering of ordinary people, which has already happened, as we see, in Syria and Iraq. Both the government and politicians should focus not only on counter-operations

⁹ Dr. Florance Ebrahimi "IS VS Taliban: Afghanistan's Nightmare" Alain Lamballe "Insurrections et terrorisme en Asie du Sud. Fontainebleau : Ès Stratégies", Insurrections and terrorism in South Asia. Fontainebleau: ès Strategies,

against the Taliban, but also formulate a clear strategy to combat the threat of the Islamic State.

Third, religious differences are that the Pashtuns¹⁰ are representatives of the conservative offshoot of Hanafism (as well as the majority of Afghan citizens). This is one of the Sunni branches, which recognizes other versions of Islam, for example, Shi'ism and Sufism. Consequently, the question of the purity of faith does not stand before the Taliban. But the IS is Wahhabis who are intolerant of any other religious currents, considering them to be infidels and schismatics. Accordingly, even the issue of Shariah rule is treated differently by these two groups.

Fourth, the IS has more money and, accordingly, Islamic militants are paid more than the Taliban.

According to expert T. Dervish, today the Taliban is not a single military-political organization. At the moment there are three branches of the Taliban movement - one actively cooperates with Qatar, the other - with Pakistan, and the third - in itself. Today, the organization is quite severely divided, so the desertion of some fighters and their transfer to the ranks of the IS can not be ruled out. Taliban leaders also assess the situation differently, in particular the new leadership can no longer agree on a unified position, so the official policy of the Taliban against the IS can not even be formed.¹¹

In 2014, the Taliban proposed to the IS to conclude an agreement and fight together for the Islamic Caliphate, but this did not lead to anything. Since then, no agreement has been reached between these groups, although the IS has shown some activity, both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. The Taliban forbade their supporters to enter into any contact with the recruiters of the IS. For today, the option of replacing the Taliban by the IS more likely, since the Taliban has already lost appeal among its social base. At the same time, the Taliban are more familiar and already understandable to the world community, so they will soon receive the support of superpowers, rather than the IS.

For the first time, the presence of IS in Afghanistan was recorded in early 2015, when the group established the so-called "Islamic state of the province of Khorasan", which includes Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan and Iran. All this time, there remains the danger that the IS will want to take the territory of Afghanistan under its control, since this has already been

¹⁰ Alain Lamballe « Les Pachtouns. Un grand peuple sans pays » (VA Press).

¹¹ T.Dervish „Afgan Taliban Ile DAIS“ Ankara 2018.

Dr. Florance Ebrahimi "IS VS Taliban: Afghanistan's Nightmare"

officially announced. In particular, propaganda leaflets of IS appeared in the area of the Afghan-Pakistan border two years ago. There was even created a representation of the “Islamic state” in Afghanistan, where hundreds of militants were sent for active work with the population. Nevertheless, the Taliban did not hurry to swear allegiance to the caliph Al-Baghdadi, which already testifies to the non-recognition of the Islamic caliphate by the Pashtuns¹².

Accordingly, the merger of these two groups is more likely than not, as the power claims of both sides are affected, but the massive outflow of people from the Taliban movement in the IS quite possible. This is precisely what the propaganda of Islamists is directed at. IS refers to the Taliban as an outdated movement, which is propagated by conservative Islam. And the fact that the leaders of the Pashtun group did not swear allegiance to Al-Baghdadi made them religious criminals in the person of the IS. As a result, in early 2015, a war was officially declared between these groups.

There are reports that the IS terrorist groups are gaining supporters in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IS rebels began to operate in southern Afghanistan, in particular in the province of Helmand, a few months after the British armed forces left the region. The former Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Rauf, is actively recruiting fighters into his groupings, which, according to some reports, are fighting the Taliban militants under the black guards of IS. The Taliban are loyal to Mullah Omar and adhere to a different ideology than the IS, but perhaps there are those who are disillusioned with the Taliban and ready to go the other way.

The Taliban restricts its zone of action to the territory of Afghanistan alone and does not support the model of pan-Islamist jihad, which is proclaimed by the Islamic State. The IS controls a third of Syria and Iraq, where a caliphate is declared, governed by strict Sharia law. The Taliban focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and some of its leaders went to meet the latest peace proposals. Disappointed extremists leave the Taliban and other groups and abut the local armed units of IS, yielding to the influence of their propaganda and standing under their black banners.¹³

The UN in its report announced that 70 IS commanders in Syria and Iraq arrived in Afghanistan to revive the Afghan organization of this state. The terrorist group of the IS is active in 25 provinces of Afghanistan. However,

¹² Alain Lamballe "Insurrections et terrorisme en Asie du Sud. Fontainebleau : Ès Stratégies", Insurrections and terrorism in South Asia. Fontainebleau: ès Strategies, T. Dervish Afgan Taliban ile DAIS" Ankara 2018.

Dr. Florance Ebrahimi "IS VS Taliban: Afghanistan's Nightmare"

¹³ Dr. Florance Ebrahimi "IS VS Taliban: Afghanistan's Nightmare"

the Afghan government indicates that the IS active only in two provinces of the country. According to analysts, the Afghan authorities have not yet formed an adequate response to the extremist threat. The fight against the Taliban has been going on for a very long time, but the IS still does not notice that they constitute a huge danger.

The total number of Taliban militants is about 50-60 thousand people. In turn, the strength of the IS group according to various sources is from 5 to 12 thousand people. Therefore, the Taliban at the moment are the only real military force in Afghanistan, which can effectively fight the IS. A vivid example of clashes between the Taliban and the IS militants are clashes in the provinces of Farah, Nimruz, Helmand, Zabol and Nangarhar.

Thus, in the near term, armed clashes between the Taliban and the Islamic State will continue. If it is still possible to negotiate with the Taliban, then with the IS militants, a peaceful dialogue will hardly be possible. The greatest danger will be the spread of radical ideology, especially among young people. Nevertheless, the war between the Taliban and IS militants will become a destabilizing factor for the entire region. The IS will seek to gain a foothold in Afghanistan with the prospect of turning the country into a springboard for exports of managed chaos, at least to the countries of Central Asia and the XUAR of China. The problem of international cooperation in the struggle against the IS will become of special importance.

Relations between the two extremist Islamist groups, the Taliban and IS, worry both experts and ordinary people. Will they unite for the common goal and for trouble to the rest of the world, or will they start fighting with each other because they will find irreconcilable contradictions or will not be able to divide power? Today, there is a possibility that both options are possible, and this is carefully analyzed by both researchers and politicians.

So, in September 2014, Russian Presidential Special Representative for Afghanistan told in an interview about a possible union of the Islamic state and the Taliban movement. When asked if IS will try to take control of the territory of Afghanistan, he noted that "there is a danger, and such intentions have already been indicated by IS. In August, leaflets of IS appeared, which spread from Peshawar in the zone of Pashtun tribes on the other side of the Pakistani-Afghan border. Some sources claim that the office of IS has already been established in Afghanistan. We know that about a hundred IS militants have already penetrated there.

The number of groups that have broken away from the movement is growing internal conflicts are increasingly emerging, which does not bode well for further peace negotiations. Afghan youth looks at the more extreme

tactics and the brighter self-presentation of IS. The fact is that they are perceived by jihadists, especially the young part of the jihadists, who are fighting in the ranks of the Taliban, as the most preferable force. They are attractive in the eyes of these young people who do not have a sense of homeland and they feel themselves to be “Islamic cosmopolites” and are fighting for the caliphate wherever they need to fight. Perhaps they find it more attractive, and the Taliban must feel the need to compete with IS, become more radical or hold several acts of intimidation, as do Islamic state militants and that's when IS will become really dangerous for Afghanistan.¹⁴

The Taliban remains the main problem of the region, with its almost 20-year experience of fighting the Afghan army and international security forces. But today, it seems, the Taliban are no longer so attractive from the point of view of ideology or military force, and there is a risk that the Taliban are outdated and can be replaced by a more extreme and ferocious variant - the Islamic State or Daesh¹⁵ We suggested that, more likely a variant of the transition of a part of the Taliban “under the banners” of IS can be possible than the merger of these movements: The Taliban and even Al-Qaeda IS views as a conservative and somewhat outdated model. And they put forward themselves as a new ideology, which is more offensive, aggressive and advanced.

A month later, in October 2014, there were reports that the Taliban had proposed to IS together to conduct a campaign to create a “world Islamic caliphate”. However, there was no obvious evidence of a conclusion between the groupings of a treaty, although the supporters of IS were seen in the north of Pakistan, in the city of Peshawar, where they distributed leaflets praising the Pakistani Taliban. As a result, a complex dynamics of relations between Islamist groups is being formed. The Taliban demanded that residents of Helmand not contact Mulla Abdul Rauf, who is the main recruiter for IS, or his people. And although the Taliban named the names of several Afghan and Pakistani militants who took the side of IS, one can speak not only about the upcoming battles between the IS and the Afghan forces, but also between IS and the Taliban. This will lead to an escalation of violence in the country, which will inevitably affect the civilian population.

Already for several years the Islamists have been using the territory of Pakistan to regroup forces, plan operations and train militants. The complex landscape, the transparency of the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan make this region attractive to international Islamism. Al Qaeda's

¹⁴ Dr. Florance Ebrahimi "IS VS Taliban: Afghanistan's Nightmare"

¹⁵ Dr. Florance Ebrahimi "IS VS Taliban: Afghanistan's Nightmare"
DAESH - al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa al-Sham. -ISIS

interest in Pakistan has increased significantly since the introduction of coalition forces into Afghanistan. The leadership of Al-Qaeda is aware of the important role that Washington assigns to Islamabad in the fight against terrorism. Therefore, Al-Qaeda acts as an activator of local Islamists against the government for their support of Washington. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), NWFP, Baluchistan form a kind of “security belt” for radical Islamists.

Al-Qaeda ideological attitudes deny many provisions of the code of conduct of Pashtuns, treating them as pagan and anti-Islamic. This affects certain norms regulating intra-family and inter-relationship relations. Pashtun tribes strictly follow the Sunni branch of Islam, but they can not abandon traditional customs. Historically, tribal formations had practically complete control over their territories, and their leaders over members of their hierarchical tribal association, including the supreme political, military, legal and economic power.

Staying in the region with strong influence of local customs which contradict the attitudes of Salafism, forces foreign mujahideen-the supporters of “pure Islam” to carefully adjust the tactics of action. Focusing on military operations in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda prefers to operate through local groups. Moreover, at the present stage, Al-Qaeda pursues its policy, remaining in the shadow that is, directly participating in the activities of local Taliban factions, does not seek to lead the conduct of sabotage operations in the country. It has become a common practice when the Al-Qaeda terrorist attack is conducted by local groups. For example, in 2003 Abu Faraj al-Libi prepared an attempt on the President of Pakistan P. Musharraf, and the militants were the militants of the Pakistani radical Islamist organization “Jaysh Muhammad”. The organization of the explosion at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad involved “Al-Qaeda”, “Lashkar-e Taiba” and the Taliban.

Al-Qaeda is most active in interacting with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which shares the ideology of the worldwide jihad movement. The formation in December 2007 of a TTP, which in fact unified 27 local groups, was seen as an attempt to further the country's Talibanization and a “defensive” jihad against the Pakistani security forces operating in FATA and in province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North Western Frontier Province-NWFP). B. Mehsud, who heads the TTP, is responsible for most of the suicide attacks in FATA, NWFP and Punjab in 2007. He is also accused of involvement in the assassination of former Prime Minister

Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.



The presence of a significant number of radical Islamists from Al-Qaeda in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, FATA, is providing strong support to various groups of the Pakistani Taliban movement. Local militants take over from Al-Qaeda activists the experience of creating and using explosive devices, preparing and using suicide bombers. Nevertheless, Taliban groups that have joined the TTP are subject to strong influence of local tribal leaders and often set themselves local tasks, preferring to avoid large-scale actions against the authorities of the country.

The unity of the Taliban is also hindered by the historical conflicts of tribal groups. Despite the fact that most Pashtuns in the “tribal zone” are subject to Talibanization, they set themselves goals that are far from the

strategy pursued by B. Mehsud, avoiding the transformation of territories populated by their clans into an arena of hostilities. Therefore, the factions of the Taliban, formally part of the TTP, often act independently and are not subordinate to the parent organization, but to the local leader.

One of the priorities set by Al-Qaeda in Pakistan is the unification of local organizations with various program settings, often fighting among themselves and fighting against the ruling regime. First of all among the Pashtun tribes, nationalism and clan predominate. The peculiarity of the interaction of Islam and nationalism is due to their functional similarity with the essential difference. And even when Islam becomes a factor of political action here, Islamic solidarity is everywhere inferior to the power of ethnic and clan ties that contradict the centripetal forces of religious and community unity put forward by Al-Qaeda.

In 2017, Mavlavi Nazir, the Taliban commander in the Ahmadzai Wazir tribal area in South Waziristan, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the Taliban leader in the Usmanzai Wazir and Daur clans in North Waziristan, announced the unification of their groups to fight NATO units and Afghan security forces on the territory of the IRA. Subsequently, H. Bahadur was appointed head of the new structure, which included both Usmansai and Ahmadzai, M. Nazir became his deputy. The new organization was named in the Western press as the “Waziri Alliance”, since Nazir and Bahadur belong to various sub-clans of the Wazir tribe. The borders of the wazir's residence surround the settlement zone of the Mehsud clan on three sides, from where Beytullah comes. The bloc was created to counter the groupings of B. Mehsud and protect the interests of the Wazir tribe in the North and South Waziristan.

This happened against the backdrop of the intensification of ongoing TTP operations against the Pakistani government, as well as the punitive actions of Beitullah's units against the country's bitterly supporting country. One of the reasons for the confrontation between the TTP and the “alliance” was the support of Beytulla by Uzbek fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), violating, according to M. Nazir, customs and traditions involved in the killing of **local elders**.

Nazir and Bahadur are supporters of the fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan and at the same time categorically oppose terrorist activities in Pakistan. Thus, the aspirations of Bahadur and Nazir correspond to the strategy of the Afghan Taliban, calling on Pakistani Islamists to concentrate resources on Afghanistan, avoiding confrontation with the Pakistani security forces. At the same time B. Mehsud, sharing the ideological guidelines of the global struggle of al-Qaeda, is in favor of carrying out terrorist attacks not only against the Americans, the Afghan army, but also against the ruling regime in Pakistan.

The appearance of the “alliance” substantially limited the possibilities of B. Mehsud in the North and South Waziristan. In this regard, the confrontation between these two factions of the Taliban could deprive the TTP of unimpeded access to the IRA. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, B. Mehsud distributed leaflets in North Waziristan, in which he assured his influential competitors in refusing to fight against them.

The confrontation was so strong that the operations against the US troops in Afghanistan were jeopardized. Thus, defending the interests of Al-Qaeda, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Omar reconciled the conflicting parties, urging them to concentrate their efforts on strikes against coalition forces in the IRA. In addition, he played a decisive role in education in April this year. “Majlis Ittihad-ul-Mujahidin”. The new alliance is an attempt by the Pakistani Taliban groups to coordinate their actions in Afghanistan.

At the head of this structure is B. Mehsud. His deputy H. Bahadur in an interview with Islamist media company “As-Sahab”, responding to a question about interaction with other factions of the Taliban, in particular B. Mehsud, said: “We forgot about all the contradictions between us and became a single force”. Contradictions between the Taliban, of course, were used by the Pakistani government. The historically well-established “divide and conquer” policy may prove to be more effective than the use of troops and the conduct of military operations against Islamists.

The authorities of the country use interclan contradictions, blood feuds to weaken the influence of B. Mehsud. Recently, with the support of the government, there was a strong alliance against Beitullah, formed by T. Bittani and Kari Zain Mehsud. Speaking at a local jirga, they vowed to avenge Beitullah for killing innocent civilians and security forces. Belonging to the same tribe as Beytullah, Kari Zain did not share the views of the head of the TTP on the methods of struggle and also was in a state of bloody revenge with Beitullah because of the murder of his close relatives. T. Bittani, a former military associate of Beytullah, fought with him in Afghanistan, but then their ways broke up - mostly due to the radical methods of the leader of the TTP.

B. Mehsud is pursuing a rather tough policy with respect to his political opponents. For example, Kari Zain Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban grouping up to 1,000 people, was killed for attempting to tune the elders of the Mehsud tribe against Beitullah for contacting the Pakistani special services. In turn, the killings of religious figures and suicide attacks in mosques and markets created a circle of dissatisfied with the policy of B. Mehsud. The government seeks to strengthen the rift in the ranks of the Taliban and isolate the leader of the TTP. Nevertheless, under his leadership

are up to 10 thousand well-trained fighters and several hundred suicide bombers capable of striking in various areas of Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda also focuses on advocacy for spreading the ideas of “pure Islam” and discrediting the ruling regime in Islamabad. In this regard, the events around the “Red Mosque” in 2007 were used to stir up a conflict against the authorities. However, right after the incident, bin Laden said that Al-Qaeda should begin an active phase of the struggle against the regime of P. Musharraf six years earlier. Touching upon the issue of fighting against the “near” and “distant” enemy in Pakistan, the well-known ideologue of radical Islamism, Abu Yahya al-Libi, notes that under the present conditions the line between such two concepts as “near enemy” (local regime) and “distant enemy” (The West and the United States, in particular), has worn off, “now this is one army”.

Under the influence of Al-Qaeda, in the statements of the leaders of local groups, the emphasis is shifting towards the globalization of jihad. So, the above-mentioned M. Nazir calls on the Mujahideen not to confine themselves only to Pakistan or Afghanistan. According to him, “our jihad is inter-muslim, it is directed against the US and its allies, the Pakistani and Afghan governments”.

The military action in Waziristan is different from the recent operation in Swat. In Swat it was called “Roh-e Rast” which means the right way. Its purpose was to return militants in the Swat valley back to the right path. After the expulsion of Islamists from Swat, the army will remain in the region to restore the local authorities. The operation in Waziristan was called “Roh-e Nejat” (Way of deliverance). The army plan in this area consisted in the destruction of B. Mehsud and his group.

Here the Pakistani authorities pursue two goals. In addition to isolating Beytullah from other tribal paramilitary formations, they seek to strengthen the schism in the Mehsud tribe, on whose descendants the odious leader rests. After the death of Kari Zain, his place was taken by Misbahuddin Mehsud. He, like his predecessor, relies on the Pakistani authorities in the fight against the supporters of Beytullah. Currently, Misbahuddin is trying to gather the militants of his predecessor.

Beitullah, in turn, hopes that other Pakistani Taliban leaders in the tribal areas will begin to respond to government forces after their invasion of the territory of the local clans. The Pakistani special services are doing their best to keep M. Nazir and H. Bahadur, the two Taliban leaders in Waziristan, out of the game. In many ways, expectations of Beytullah were confirmed. The leaders of the Taliban were displeased with the military

operation of the regular army, as well as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to strike at their territory, which resulted in casualties and destruction.

During the passage of military columns, a number of incidents occurred. In July 2009, Bahadur fighters ambushed a military convoy near Miramshah in North Waziristan and killed 22 soldiers. After that, the representative of Bahadur announced the break of the peace agreement with the government. Mawlawi, operating in South Waziristan, also hastened to announce the withdrawal from the peace accords with the authorities. To this the military immediately replied that their measures were directed solely against Beytullah. Probably, the government of Pakistan sought to avoid conflict with local tribes.

The Pakistani army must do something that it has never been possible to do by armed means during the two thousand-year chronology of the events of the “tribal zone”. On August 7, Western media reported that Beitullah Mehsud was killed by a missile fired from an American drone. According to Western media reports, at the time of the attack, the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan leader was on the roof of his father-in-law's house, Malik Ikramuddin, in the Zangar district. Several relatives of Beytullah were also injured. According to the BBC, he is buried near the village of Nardusay.

It can be added that B. Mehsud enjoyed popularity and respect among young people on both sides of the border, which allowed him, in the opinion of experts, to be the connecting link between the Afghan and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan. Nevertheless, as noted above, the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan are represented by various factions, often acting autonomously, and setting local goals and not always obeying the leader of the TTP. However, most of the Taliban factions agree on one thing - fighting against coalition forces in Afghanistan and supporting Islamists in the IRA. The ongoing operation in Waziristan entails casualties among civilians, which causes an increase in discontent among local civilians, as well as the number of Taliban entering the ranks.

With 2009 during current situation in Pakistan is characterized by a significant increase in militant pro-Taliban groups. This is particularly felt in the border agencies of the Tribal Areas of the Federal Administrative Administration and the Khyber -Pakhtunkhwa provinces bordering Afghanistan. One of the most active of the factions increasingly declaring as a force capable of posing a serious problem for government forces of the Pakistan, is Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan / TTP. Confirmation of this can serve as the emerging complex modern situation in the agency Kurram, characterized by a significant increase in the armed actions of the TTP against government troops, as well as official representatives of the local administration of the Pakistan.

According to the regional media, the field commanders of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan Akhunzada Aslam Farooqi (the zone of action - the agency Orakzai) and Moulavi Fakir Muhammad (Bajaur Agency) sent groups of militants to the Kurram Agency to confront the federal troops conducting the military operation there. On August 2, 2011, TTP militants organized an ambush on a column of government troops in the Muzazay district (7 servicemen were killed and 4 were injured). In the Zishmat and Alisherzai Kurram districts, the TTP militants carry out repressions against tribal elders loyal to Islamabad, conduct forced recruitment of local youth into their ranks, and block the resettlement of civilians from the areas of combat operations that are under their control.

The activation of pro-Taliban factions, which are resisting the government troops of the Pakistan, has already caused a mass flow of internally displaced persons. By July 30, 2011, the number of refugees from combat areas was about 100 thousand people. They are located in the camps of Sadd and Durrani (Kurram), and some of the settlers are moving to neighboring agencies and districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

The militants' active actions, as well as the factor of the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units from Afghanistan, raise a very unreasonable question concerning the security and stability of not only the Pakistan and the Afghanistan, but the entire region of West Asia¹⁶. In other words, is it possible for the official Islamabad, relying solely on its own forces and rejecting the very possibility of attracting foreign troops to force actions on its territory, to contain and effectively oppose the pro-Taliban factions? One can not fail to note the effectiveness of the operations carried out by the Pakistani army against militants, which resulted in the destruction of three training camps for militants and suicide bombers, weapons and ammunition depots (including a workshop for the production of improvised explosive devices).

Nevertheless, such a serious challenge from the militants, which was adopted by the government of the Pakistan, requires concentration of efforts not only of the army, but of the entire Pakistani society. In this regard, in order to counter the influence of the pro-Taliban factions, as well as to prevent the armed incursions of militants from Afghanistan into the territory of the tribal areas of the Pakistan, the Pakistani leadership intends to rely not only on the armed forces, but also on the detachments of the Lashkars (tribal militia).

¹⁶ Alain Lamballe "Insurrections et terrorisme en Asie du Sud. Fontainebleau : Ès Stratégies", *Insurrections and terrorism in South Asia. Fontainebleau: ès Strategies*,

In early August 2011, in Van, the representative of the military command of the Pakistan, Major-General Rizwan Akhtar (ISI) held a meeting with the influential elders of the Pashtun tribes of the Wazir and Mehsud agencies of South Waziristan in order to develop a strategy for joint action against militants. As a result of negotiations by the elders of the tribes, support was guaranteed to government troops of the Pakistan and detachments of Lashkars from Pashtun tribes were formed in the agency South Waziristan.

According to the plan of the Pakistani military leadership, newly created detachments of militias (numbering up to 3-4 thousand people), together with government troops will patrol the Pakistani-Afghan border, participate in operations to clean up the militants of the Angoradda, Katolai, Zamchin, Kaniguram and Makin areas. It is assumed that the militias will monitor along the Pakistani-Afghan border and in the border areas with the Mohmand and Bajaur agencies in order to stop the infiltration and armed incursions of militants into Pakistan's border agencies.

The election of Mullah Fazlullah as the new leader of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan on Shura (Council) in North Waziristan on November 7, 2013, makes significant adjustments, both to the organization itself, and to the political situation in Pakistan, in the Pakistani-Afghan borderlands, and in general in the region. Initially, Shura actually approved Hafiz Said Khan's candidacy as the leader of the TTP, but later the events went in a different scenario. The rebel groups, although they expressed readiness for the leadership of the Mawlana Fazlullah, but they were not completely satisfied with this decision. They would be more willing to give preference to a candidate from Waziristan's agencies.

But the possible disagreements in the ranks of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan made them agree with Shura's decision. Among those who supported Mullah Fazlullah were: Al-Fatah, Saddik Akbar, Jaishe Arab, Lashkar-i Usama, Ilyas Kashmiri Group. Basically, these groups emerged and operate outside the administrative boundaries of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, (FATA). Despite the fact that Hafiz Said Khan was given more votes, he was not officially recognized. It should be explained that in recent years, in view of the growing influence of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, its growing ties with the Afghan Taliban in the region, Pakistani insurgents are increasingly involved in the orbit of regional militant activity, with Mullah Omar (emir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 1996-2001 he fled to the territory of Pakistan). His voice became decisive. The official notification of the appointment of Fazlullah as the new leader of the TTP was made on November 8, 2013 by phone by

the press secretary of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan Shahid from Afghanistan.

Thus, with the election of Mullah Fazlullah, the center of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan is currently moving to the Swat Valley of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan, therefore, beyond the administrative boundaries of the FATA, moves into the interior of the country. The transfer of leadership by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan to a person from another tribe and agency has already led to the exit from Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan a number of groups that openly disagree with Shura's decision. In the long run, this may lead to a further split and, consequently, the decentralization and uncontrollability of the militant groups themselves. And experts predict a scenario in which Maulana Fazlullah will surrender, if he is unable to control internal disagreements in Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan.

For the first time, the Pakistani media started talking loudly about Mullah Fazlullah in 2009. Under his command was a squad of local militants of the Taliban Pakistani Movement (Swat) in the administrative districts of Malakand, the Swat Valley of the North-Western Frontier Province (since April 2010 - Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The group is affiliated with an TTP in 2007-2009. He is also known by the nickname mullah-radio for anti-government sermons. In the North-Western Frontier Province in 2008 - 2009 the Shari'ah Movement (SHS), again led by Maulana Sufi Muhammad (Mullah Fazlull's father-in-law), was again activated.

The requirements of the Shari'ah Movement and the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (Swat) were reduced to the introduction of Shariah courts in the areas of Sunni Muslims in the southern part of the province. They were reinforced by acts of violence against the local population. Negotiations and assurances of a unilateral cease-fire, they managed to obtain from the federal government and President Asif Ali Zarlari the signing of the decree on the partial introduction of the Shi'a system of legality and justice of the "Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Sharia" (moderate version of the Sharia) on April 13, 2009 in a number of areas of the NWFP in Pakistan. It was assumed that Sharia courts would function in parallel with civil proceedings in Malakand.

The federal authorities viewed the agreement as part of a deal with the Islamists, which gave hope for the cessation of militancy and terror in the Upper and Lower Dir areas of the Swat Valley. But already in April 2009, Sufi Muhammad stated that "democracy is incompatible with Sharia law, and the existing political system of Pakistan contradicts the Koran". The militant groups moved to Islamabad. The federal army introduced troops to Malakand. Fazlullah fled to Afghanistan, and from there he was led by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (Swat). The then Minister of Internal Affairs of Pakistan, Rehman Malik, warned of a possible operation in the territory of

a neighboring country against Mullah Fazlullah in case he does not stop terrorist activities in Pakistan.

The Pakistani media in November 2013 named the reasons for Fazlullah's election: "... he has two advantages: he has a lot of money and is followed by Afghan Taliban". In reality, this means not only strengthening further ties with the center of militants in Afghanistan, but possibly changing the strategy of Tehrik-e Taliban in Pakistan. The first signs of changing their goals are already evident - Fazlullah's threats to the security forces, government agencies, new political leaders, police, and the Sharif family, whose domain is the Punjab. This is the most densely populated, economically developed province of the country. In previous years, the factions avoided the Punjab, except, perhaps, Lahore. This was facilitated by the policy pursued by Navazi against the Taliban, in which there was no criticism of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan.

The Taliban movement of Pakistan is an organization that united as of November 1, 2013 81 a group of militants. The Pakistani Taliban from the very beginning was represented by free militant groups united by extremist convictions. They sent the point of their struggle against the federal government and the army, accusing them of a pro-American course aimed at supporting the occupying forces in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, they acted relatively independently of the Taliban in Afghanistan, who are fighting against the coalition forces of the United States and NATO. The revival of terrorist activity, in particular in Punjab, the use of an additional combat reserve in the face of various armed groups (Sipah-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-i-Jangvi and Jais-i-Muhammad) illegally based in the province, will lead to a new wave of terrorist activity only in the country, but, according to the said organizations, in neighboring India. Moreover, some of them (based on the materials of the Pakistani press) were formed to fight against Indian troops in Kashmir. In recent years, in view of the growing influence of Pakistani Taliban, its growing ties with the Afghan Taliban in the region, Pakistani insurgents are increasingly involved in the orbit of regional activity of militants.

Iran: The authorities of Iran in recent months are stepping up their support for the Taliban militants. This is reported by the Times with reference to sources in Kabul and in the group itself. As one of the Taliban advisers based in Pakistan told the publication, the ultimate goal of such efforts was to fight against the interests of the US and NATO. Probably, the reason is unprecedented pressure, which Washington began to exert on Tehran. The expert community says: the Iranian leadership has all the resources to change the situation in Afghanistan.

The hundreds of Taliban fighters are trained in Iran, reports the Times. Moreover, officers from the local special force are sharing experience with opponents of official Kabul and Washington, which the newspaper calls an unprecedented increase in aid. According to the publication, the scale, quality and duration of this training can become a factor in the shift in the Afghan armed conflict and even affect its outcome. One of the representatives of the main military political body of the Taliban - the Council of Quetta (Shura-e-Quetta) - confirmed the Times on condition of anonymity: "The Iranians offered to conduct training with two conditions: we must focus on confrontation with US and NATO interests in Afghanistan and increase the onslaught on IS". According to the Taliban adviser, training for militants began this spring - around the time when US President Donald Trump announced the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the "nuclear deal" concluded between Tehran and the six international mediators in 2015. Recall that in addition to breaking the agreement, the head of the White House announced the resumption of the sanctions regime regarding the "Ayatollah regime." Preparation of the Taliban, which is designed for six months, is conducted by Iranian officers, the interlocutors of the Times said. One of these camps, where training is conducted, is in the region of Kermanshah (west of Iran). Official representatives of Afghan intelligence believe that there may be other areas where Tehran is preparing a military force to counteract the US and NATO.

According to him, in the training camp is from 500 to 600 people. "We are taught everything: from tactics, leadership skills, recruitment to making bombs and possession of weapons", says the source of the Times. "All the instructors are the employees of the Iranian special services". Many of them, he said, speak Pashto. They wear a uniform without identification marks. These data coincide with what senior Afghan military intelligence officers say, which warns that the use of US sanctions against Iran could negatively affect American interests in Afghanistan. A member of the Afghan National Army Command explained: "Every day the Taliban are getting stronger, and the territory where their influence is growing is expanding, but at the same time, the Pakistani influence on the Taliban is weakening". It is the support of the Taliban by Iran that has recently had a strong impact. "He clarifies: it is not yet a question of using weapons - the Taliban receive only training".

It should be recalled that the relationship between Iran and the Taliban is quite complex: the parties belong to different currents of Islam. Recently, the Iranian leadership has been trying to show initiative and participate in various formats for the peaceful settlement of the Afghan crisis. However, for example, the Washington Institute of the Middle East believes that the preservation of the Taliban in Afghanistan meets the interests of the regime

in Tehran. The first reason is the fears of the Iranian leadership: it fears that the Afghan territory will become a springboard for the United States, which, as is known, is hostile to it. The second reason is the counteraction of the IS. The Taliban are heterogeneous, but most of its factions are opponents of those who support the “Caliphate”. From these two positions, the Iranian assistance to the Taliban, albeit limited, seems reasonable.

In the expert environment, it is recalled that the Iranian influence on Afghanistan is significant both from a cultural and economic point of view. There are a lot of Persian-speaking people in Afghanistan who treat Iran well, Tehran has had and has rather good positions in the government of Afghanistan. If we talk about relations with the Taliban, Iran was perhaps the main force that created the conditions for the victory of the Americans in the struggle against the Taliban in 2001.

Then the “Northern Alliance”, which was fully supported from Tehran, did much to ensure the victory of the United States and the countries that fought with them. The relationship between the Taliban and Iran was sufficiently hostile, but much time has passed since then. From Kabul, the Taliban left, their defeat in the struggle for the Afghan state led to the fact that they split. They were not yet a single whole, but their heterogeneity at that time was compensated by the fact that they were in power¹⁷.

Current the Taliban is very fragmented and one faction is not opposed to having any ties with Kabul, the other is against it sharply, the third is against the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, but is ready to cooperate with Kabul. As for Iran, it has the ability to influence the situation. Certain Taliban groups had relations with Iran after their expulsion from Kabul.

On some accounts, the Iranians even gave weapons to these factions, provided financial help for them to fight against the Americans, against of the foreign contingent. The situation that has developed around Iran in connection with the US administration's exit from the “nuclear deal” has hit Iran politically and will still hit it economically. In the world arena, Tehran is trying to take such actions to show the Americans that Trump is doing wrong. At the same time, the Iranians have other levers of influence on the situation in Afghanistan. Having significant opportunities, they will take steps to complicate the presence of the Americans. There are many Shiites in Afghanistan: they are Hazaras who, incidentally, are actively fighting in Syria under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the elite formation of the Iranian army, which is involved in, among other

¹⁷ Alain Lamballe "Insurrections et terrorisme en Asie du Sud. Fontainebleau: Ès Stratégies", Insurrections and terrorism in South Asia. Fontainebleau: ès Strategies,

things, military campaigns abroad.) It may well be that the Iranians will transfer these past wars to their native Afghanistan so that they continue to follow the orders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.