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Abstract: On May 27, 2006, Special Province of Yogyakarta was hit by an earthquake registered 5.9 on the Richter scale, resulting 428.909 people to be recorded as homeless. To handle the Earthquake disaster in Yogyakarta, Governor of Yogyakarta issued Governor Regulation No. 23, year 2006, which expressed that the basic principle of Housing Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program in DIY was based on Community Groups. Based on the Governor Regulation, Sleman subdistrict government chose that the housing rehabilitation and reconstruction policy was handed fully to the community, starting from the data collection process until the fund reconstruction disbursement. According to Sleman Regency government, the reconstruction fund distribution would be difficult to control by the government because the community had their own manner to distribute the aid that they received,

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this bottom-up policy was then accommodated in an institution that was called as Local Community Organization (OMS). This research used a qualitative approach, with qualitative descriptive analysis method. The data were collected by using interviews, observations, and literature studies. Based on the research result discussion, the following conclusion points were obtained: OMS was a policy breakthrough created by Sleman Regency Government to minimize the potential conflicts emergence in the community. OMS position was responsible to the two parties at the same time, namely the government and the society. The institution reported the result of its assessment to the government. This report was made to be the basis for the community groups' formation which in turn would receive reconstruction fund. OMS carried out a partial role of Sleman Regency Government, namely in the data collection of the community damage houses. OMS was deemed to be more capable to conduct the data collection because they knew exactly about the houses location, the ownership status and the condition after hit by the earthquake.

Key Words: Earth Quake, Empowerment, Local Government Policy, Local Community Organization

1. Introduction

The earthquake which hit Special Province of Yogyakarta on May 27, 2006 damaged 428,909 houses, 161,389 units of them collapsed / severely damaged and 86,445 units were declared inappropriate for human habitation. This disaster caused 1,470 school buildings, 71 traditional markets, 330 government buildings and offices, and 433 health facilities to be left damaged. (http://krjogja.com/).

In such situation, the recovery policy which is fast, efficient and well-targeted is needed. Responding to such needs, the President of the Republic of Indonesia issued Presidential Decree No.9, year 2006 on the Team of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Coordination of Post-

Kawuryan, Rochmansjah, Purnomo, & Susantina

Earthquake Affected Area in Special Region of Yogyakarta and Central Java.

Presidential Decree No. 9, year 2006 becomes the basic principle scheme of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program which is community-based in DIY, namely the policy of DIY Government to rebuild the damaged community's housing due to the earthquake; underlain by the principles of community empowerment and organizing.

housing rehabilitation The steps of the reconstruction program in DIY is begun byte community the socialization consolidation; establishment of community group (POKMAS); the identification, prioritization of housing rehabilitation and reconstruction and the technical planning arrangement of earthquakeresistant housing; the preparation of the disbursement administration, and it is ended by the fund distribution and the housing rehabilitation.

The operational instructions issued by Yogyakarta Governor state that the Regent/Mayor is given full authority to determine the areas that will receive aid for the housing rehabilitation and reconstruction. The criteria set by the Operational instructions are as follows:

- 1. Collapsed / damaged housing;
- 2. Still living in tents;
- 3. Have not been repaired;
- 4. The head of the family died, due to earthquake and other causes;
- 5. The elderly;
- 6. Having children under five year-old;
- 7. The status of the land is clear (additional);
- 8. Have cleared the ruins (additional).
- 9. and other criteria that is based on consensus and local wisdom

The families who meet the above criteria are included in community groups (POKMAS). The formation of community groups is made in one hamlet. If there is some remaining/reside in a hamlet, the grouping is done in one village/ward. The POKMAS is consisted minimally of 8 and maximally of 15 members. The data as December 20, 2006 shows that the number of POKMAS existed throughout DIY Province is 11,533. In Sleman Regency, the number of POKMAS is 1,657. Each of POKMAS member will receive the housing reconstruction aid as much as IDR 15 million. The fund will be distributed through three stages. (www.slemankab.go.id)

The criteria of aid recipient families as outlined in the operational instructions are potential to rise issues. Criteria (2) until (8) are relatively unclear and they do not allow the emergence of another interpretation, therefore in the implementation, they are not relatively causing problems. The conflict between the society due to relative differences in the interpretation can be minimized. The problems arise in the interpretation of the criteria (1) and (9). In regard to criterion (1), there is no significant problem when the assessment on the collapsed house into category is conducted. Then, what about the severely damaged criteria?. By what indicators and criteria that a house is said to be severely damaged?. The criterion of "severely damaged" is potentially causing controversy among the community. If this is not handled properly, the emergence of conflicts between the community versus community, and the community versus the government officials is highly probable to happen.

Criterion (9) also opens vast opportunities for the emergence of multiple interpretations. Deliberation and local wisdom can be used as one of the important determinants in deciding who are entitled to receive the reconstruction fund, thus, implicitly it means that "anyone can receive

reconstruction fund if it is approved by deliberation mechanisms in the official forum organized by the society".

To address the gap that still remains in the Operating Instructions, Sleman government gives authority to the disaster affected community to handle the stages themselves; ranging from data collection of the housing condition until the usage of the reconstruction fund. The Vice-Regent of Sleman Regency, Sri Purnomo, during the socialization of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program stated that the local wisdom will be a spearhead of the implementation of this program. The realization of such wisdom is the common agreement among the members of the community, which is finally contained in an institution called Local Community Organizations (OMS).

The realization of the common agreement is Local Community Organizations (OMS). The institution is an *adhoc* institution, and it is established to carry out the data collection of the disaster victims' housing condition, and to address the issues that will arise in the future related to the distribution of reconstruction fund.

Thus, the <u>first</u> problem presented in this research is; how the position and the role of OMS from the initial until the final stages of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Sleman Regency? The <u>second</u> question is; to what extent the policy empowers the community?, <u>Third</u>, how is the implementation of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program carried out?

2. Research Methodology

This research aims to conduct in depth analyze on the role and the position of OMS the rehabilitation and reconstruction program for the earthquake victims' housing; the empowerment aspects contained therein; and the relationship between the bureaucracy and society in the

context of the OMS. The approach deemed to be the most appropriate to address these goals is a qualitative approach. Farouk and Djaali (2003:100) state that qualitative research can provide an in-depth description of a problem, which is also specifically brought to the surface without any intention to generalize. Qualitative research is considered appropriate for this study because this research used in-depth interviews to the informants which are aimed to provide a description of the three problems of the research.

The research was conducted in Sleman Regency. Sleman Regency was chosen because the policy taken in the context of reconstruction fund put up the data collection process from the disbursement until the reconstruction to the community fully. In Sleman Regency, the number of OMS is 1,657. Each of OMS member will receive the housing reconstruction aid as much as IDR 15 million. The fund will be distributed through three stages. (www.slemankab.go.id)

Among the 15 sub-districts in Sleman Regency, Berbah and Prambanan sub-district were the most severely affected sub-districts due to the earthquake on May 27, 2006. In Prambanan Sub-district, 75 died and 257 were injured, while in Berbah Sub-district, 54 died and 87 were injured. Viewed from the physical damage, both of these districts were also the second worst regions. In Prambanan Subdistrict, 3,584 houses were severely damaged or collapsed, meanwhile in Berbah **Sub-districts** 4,453 experienced the same thing. 1.2 The following Table 1.2 provides a description of the sub-districts condition postearthquake.

Table 1.1.
The Fatalities and Material Lost Due to Earthquake Disaster on May 27, 2006

Sub-district	Fatalities	Fatally	Collapsed/
Names		Injured	Severely

		Victims	Damaged
			Houses
Prambanan	75	257	3.584
Berbah	54	87	4.453

Sources: www.slemankab.go.id

In the selection of research sites, two hamlets were set as the samples of OMS research, namely: Jlatren Hamlet and Gunung Gebang Hamlet. Jlatren Hamlet was located in Jogotirto Village, Berbah Sub-district, and Gunung Gebang Hamlet located in Sumberharjo Village, Prambanan Sub-district. Jlatren Hamlet was chosen because 75% of the houses in the village were damage, besides, Jlatren Hamlet was the earliest hamlet completed the data collection, as well as the earliest to get the rehabilitation and reconstruction fund. Meanwhile, Gunung Gebang Hamlet was chosen, because the village was the hamlet of which damage level was the most severe, approximately at 95% of the community housing were affected by the earthquake on May 27, 2007, for more detail, it can be seen in the following table:

Table 1.2. The Selection of The Research Sites

Sub-districts	Berbah	Prambanan
Villages	Jogotirto	Sumberharjo
Hamlets	Jlatren	Gunung Gebang

3. Findings

3.1 The Position and The Role of OMS

The most crucial first step in the disaster management was the speed and the accuracy of the data. The operational instructions did not mention on detail about the procedures and the process of the damage houses data collection. Thus, there were opportunities for regency government to run the data collection process according to the specific conditions in each region. In Sleman Regency Government, the data

collection of the damage houses was handed over to an *adhoc* agency that later was known as the Local Community Organization (OMS).

At first, the community themselves did not really understand the significance of the role of OMS. The community was only aware that there were few people who were appointed as the heads of the villages who served to assess the houses damage. The community later knew that 4 days after the earthquake, they signed the official reports of the damage houses condition assessment.

On the socialization event in Gamping Sub-district, Sleman Vice-Regent, Sri Purnomo, said that the reconstruction fund distribution would be difficult to be controlled by the government because the community had their own way to distribute the aid they received. With local wisdom, the community was welcomed to make a village or hamlet agreement to determine the recipients of the fund. (Kompas, 9 September 2006).

Sleman Regency Government moved the bureaucracy below them to establish institution named with OMS (Local Community Organization). This institution was established in RW or in hamlet level, depending on the size of the population in a hamlet. This was related to the optimal work ability of this institution. OMS member consisted of 8 persons, consisted of the local community figures or RT / RW leaders.

Although the institution was merely an ad-hoc institution, OMS played a vital role in the whole context of a series of rehabilitation and reconstruction program. The OMS consisted of 1 leader, 1 secretary and 6 members. They recorded the data of the buildings one by one in their villages. Each house would have an official report, signed by

the building owner and all the board as well as OMS members, and acknowledged by the Hamlet Head.

3.2. The Implementation of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

3.2.1. The Bureaucracy Organizing

Mechanism Chart of the Disbursement In and Distribution of the Housing Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Fund, the role played by the Sleman Regency was materialized in the form of Committing Officers (PPK). PPK coordinated directly with the Provincial Task Force. This institution was coordinating with Sub-district Management Consultant (KMK), and it had a coordination track with PJP (The person in charge for the program), which in this case was run by the Village Chief/ Lurah. The Village Chief had a command line directly to the community groups.

Actually there were two positions that played a vital role but they were not explicitly mentioned, namely the Sub-district Head/ *Camat* and the Hamlet Head/ *Dukuh*. In the implementation, Sub-district Head coordinated the Village Chiefs in his area in order to condition the people to implement the housing rehabilitation and reconstruction program. By the Sub-district Head, the Head Hamlet was placed as the regional coordinator. He was responsible for the implementation of the program in his hamlet area.

3.3. The Community Organizing

3.3.1. The Program Socialization

In general, the socialization was carried out by the two parties, namely the government and community members. In

the socialization done by Sleman Regent on August 12, 2006, all the village authorities in Berbah Sub-district were invited, and so as the representatives of each village community. The result of socialization was then followed up by an official community meeting done at RW or Hamlet level.

In addition to get the information from their Hamlet Head, the community discussed the topic of reconstruction fund with the community from other Hamlets, Villages or even other Sub-districts. This was done for two reasons. *First*, the information that they had taken during the socialization was not intact, thus, they required references from other people. *Second*, they compared, examined the similarities and the differences in the information submitted by each of their local leader. Critical attitude in digesting the information had always been something that is put first.

3.3.2. The Housing Condition Assessment

The criteria for damage houses, as made by Sleman Regency Government in the implementation caused problems. There were many houses which were not actually on the instantaneous collapse condition during an earthquake. The houses were still standing, with varying levels of damage. OMS as a trusted team to assess the housing damage had considerable authority. The team was faced with two difficult choices. On one hand, they wanted to stick to the established criteria.

On the other hand, there were certain considerations that drove them to provide an assessment of the condition of a house. The consideration was more subjective; for example, related to the kinship of the homeowners; the services given to the community, and the concerning economic conditions. There were two ways that usually taken. *First*, the relatives'

Kawuryan, Rochmansjah, Purnomo, & Susantina

houses which were actually included in the damage criteria were being incorporated into the severely damaged criteria. Generally, other OMS members did not dare to express this condition because they were more oriented to maintain their long-term relationship. <u>Second</u>, when the close relatives' house was inhabited by several families, then the official report was made to be as many as the head of household who lived there. Thus, the house that originally was only one, in turn was listed as many as the family heads inhabiting it.

Some OMS was distinction following the rules. One of the considerations was that the OMS secretary was a civil servant. He did not want a problem to hit him when he must justify his work result to the government.

The fax of the determination of the damage criterion was motivated by the sense of common fate; to maintain the harmony among the community, and to prevent any conflict that would arise in the future. The tendency to the creation of harmony, peace, balance, and serenity became one of the characteristics of Javanese culture (Geertz, 1983).

The insecure situation befell on the members of OMS and the government officials was resolved when the Sub-district government through their Regents and Vice-Regents explicitly handed over the data collection process until the usage of the reconstruction fund to the community through village deliberation. Whatever be the decision of the village deliberation forum, everyone must obey and support it. The damage criteria and the residents who were eligible to receive the reconstruction fund were decided in this village deliberation. To overcome the problem associated with the absence of the heirs, the hamlet deliberation took one of the following two decisions. *First*, the houses were not included in the community groups. It was based on the consideration of the administration, namely the absence of a legitimate

reconstruction recipient. <u>Second</u>, the hamlet head was asked to contact the relatives of the house owner who considered could represent the fund receipt.

To overcome the problem associated to the status of the disputed land, the hamlet deliberation decided to continue to register the house, but under the condition that the fund would be given to the beneficiary after the dispute had been settled. The problem associated with the head of household who remained to live with their parents, one of the following two steps was taken. *First*, the hamlet deliberation decided to include each of the head of household into the community groups. This was based on the consideration that in the association activity, each of family had their own stand. The case which can be used as an example was in Sumberharjo Village, Prambanan Sub-district. *Second*, it was decided that the fund would given per house, not per household, therefore there was only one house registered.

The problem associated with the head of a household that had more than one house, it was decided that every house would be registered. It was being worried that a problem would emerge associated with multiple community group membership. To overcome this, several houses owned by the same person would be registered under the name of the husband, or wife, or children, or close relatives.

The new data was agreed upon as the final data that would be reported to the village government. Physical verification had never been done. There was only administrative verification by the Village Government. All being proposed by the hamlet deliberation was designated as the members of the community groups. The list of those who were registered as the members of community groups based on the final assessment had been carried out through the deliberation at the hamlet level or RW.

3.3.3. Mentoring

The next stage to go was mentoring. The Mentoring was conducted by the facilitators at the village level. They were appointed by the technical team of disaster management through open recruitment mechanism. Most of the members were *fresh graduate* bachelors and undergraduate students of engineering and social sciences faculties.

The mentoring included two aspects, namely the socioeconomic mentoring and physical mentoring. Socially, the facilitators were utilized to accelerate the disbursement procedure. From the information received by the community, the faster and the more accurate the administration being completed, then the sooner the fund would be distributed. Because the fund was distributed simultaneously per village, then the village government, with the help of a facilitator, moved the lower bureaucracy officials to undertake a variety of acceleration efforts. The mentoring also covered the physical aspects. The facilitators provided counseling on the earthquake-resistant buildings. The counseling covered the foundation depth, the foundation base material, the cementsand mixture, the buffer steels size, the building form, the safety height of the building, and the roof frame. The counseling was primarily for those who had not started to rebuild their houses.

The next stage was the fund the disbursement. The fund was disbursed through Bank Pembangunan Daerah (BPD) DIY to the accounts made on the behalf of the community groups. The accounts creation procedure was done jointly per village, coordinated by the respective village heads. The chairman and the secretary of the community groups attached their signature and full names as proof of the accounts opening. For Prambanan and Berbah Sub-districts, the accounts were opened in the office of BPD DIY of Prambanan Branch.

The community groups in Prambanan Sub-district took the funds directly in BPD of Prambanan Branch. The people who had withdrawal authority were the chairman and the secretary of community organization. Because of the amount taken totaling over 150 million - a huge amount for the Prambanan and Berbah Sub district community - the members of the community organization voluntarily escorted their chairman and secretary since they got out of the Bank until they arrived in their hamlet.

They considered that this way was safer and more efficient. Actually, the police had offered the security services, but due to the personnel shortage, technically, it was hard to do.

3.3.4. Conflicts

Although generally there was no prominent turmoil, there from were a number of conflicts that arose implementation of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program. Since the beginning, Sleman regency government had sought to minimize the potential conflicts among the community. The tactical step taken was by creating OMS, consisted of the community member representatives. The OMS membership composition which was quite big, coupled with the strong kinship culture of the villagers was expected to prevent the individuals in the community to commit actions that would lead to the life harmony disruption. Through OMS, Each resident being recorded knew exactly the result of their house assessment.

However, the anticipative efforts still opened gaps for the conflict emergence. Based on the interviews conducted to a number of informants, the data was obtained; that basically the areas experiencing conflict had a long conflict history among the communities. The conflict history was related to

Kawuryan, Rochmansjah, Purnomo, & Susantina

the competition in getting a particular position in a hamlet or village level.

The reconstruction aid fund issue in the case became canalization of the long conflict that had developed in the middle of the society. The emerging conflict was hard to disentangle because it had been intertwined with many other issues. The conflicts emerged in the context of rehabilitation program implementation were especially regarding the distribution of the fund.

Those sorts of things happened when there was a resident who felt that his houses should have been included into damage category, but in fact he was not included in the list of the reconstruction fund recipients. The concerned resident tried to include his name on the list, whilst comparing his house' condition with other people houses of which condition was the same or even less damaged according to him. He realized that he had signed the official report of the houses condition assessment made by OMS, thus, he was trying to lobby the relevant authorities.

The steps taken by the concerned resident, were considered to disturb the atmosphere by the other residents and it caused disharmony among the residents. As one of the efforts to resolve the conflict, the community conducted a policy of which they referred as "local wisdom". This term referred on the portion cutting on half of the fund received to be given to other residents who did not receive the reconstruction fund. The amount of the cutting was imposed vary in each Village and Hamlet. Before the fund distribution was held, facilitated by the Hamlet Head, the residents conducted deliberation to ask their willingness to let their fund to be taken partly; and then it would be granted to other citizens, as well as the amount that would be granted.

In the context of housing development after the receipt of reconstruction fund stage I, stage II and stage III, mutual

assistance in building the house could not work. Suggestions to give priority in the residents' houses surfaced early in the community deliberation. The subject of the suggestion was that after the fund stage I had been received, the community members would hold a meeting to decide which house that would be built first. Besides, a mutual assistance involving all members of community groups would be conducted. On its development, the suggestion was considered impossible to do because of several reasons. First, to build a house in accordance with the quality set by the government, the workers required to have sufficient ability in term of building techniques were needed, both as the craftsmen and the craftsmen' assistant. Second, there was still no certainty about the definitive time of the distribution of fund stage II. This made the members of community groups worried, because it meant that they did not know for sure of how long they would stay in a tent or in a halfway house. *Third*, there was labor shortage.

Based on these considerations, a decision was finally taken; the community was welcomed to start building their houses with personally paid workers. The mutual assistance was still given for the community members that were considered very poor and did not have the sufficient workers to be able to work on their houses.

Another emerging problem was the rising prices of the building materials. Iron size 12" with SS2 quality, for example, in July 2006, still worth IDR 26 thousand. By October within the same year, iron with the same quality had reached up to IDR 46 thousand. Brick had also increased from IDR 200 up to IDR 350 or IDR 400 per item. Cement had also increased significantly from IDR 22 thousand up to IDR 30 thousand per sack.

The most recent data reported by National Technical Committee until August 2007 was that 94.36% of the houses have been repaired. 35% of them were completed in less than a month, 37.45% of them between 1 to 3 months, 14.47% of them between 3-6 months, 6.37% of them between 6-12 months and 6.7% of them were completed more than 12 months. From the funding source, it was reported that 83.88% of the fund used by the community to build their house scheme from independent fund. The government only contributed at 2:56%.

4. Data Analysis

4.1. The Position and The Role of OMS

OMS was a courageous and brilliant breakthrough from Sleman Regency Government, in the handling of the housing rehabilitation and reconstruction of the earthquake victims. Sleman Regency Government handed over half of its authority that was crucial to the community.

The government continued to play a role as the regulator and facilitator. This is in line with Rashid opinion (2000: 13) which state that the main tasks of government are; (1) to maintain order and ensure the peaceful life among the community,(2) to perform public works and provide public services, and (3) to make efforts to increase the social welfare.

In a disaster situation, Sleman Regency Government efforts to maintain order and ensure the peaceful life among the society seen was seen in the socialization process, data collection and the distribution of the reconstruction fund to disaster victims.

Socialization was done by presenting two local leaders directly among the community (the Regent and Vice Regent), the socialization of these two highest leaders in Sleman

Regency government could be seen by a social marketing frame, according Folla (1995:22-23) the social marketing activities undertaken by an institute / organization of public servants happen because:

- 1. The existence of a "vulnerable" condition in the community.
- 2. The existence of the new things needed to be known by the public.
- 3. The refreshment is needed, it is shown to keep the old concept that has a positive and profitable value, but it begins to shift.
- 4. To maintain the community situation.

This indicates that social marketing activities usually are associated with the presence of dangerous or vulnerable condition or situation that is considered to be disturbing, or because of the new things that are known by the public, this situation then raises the need to eliminate them and to replace them with a better condition.

OMS emerged as a response to concerns over the emergence of the above situation. As an institution that was placed between the government and the society, OMS performed the service function to the community. The form of services provided was data collection and the condition assessment of the community's damage houses and to report the assessment result to the village government level and then to continue to the upper government. At the same time, this institution also played an empowering role. This was seen from the active involvement of the community representatives appointed in this institution. in the end, this institution also had contribution to the community independency. With the data collection carried out by OMS,

then each house of the earthquake victims got compensation as planned by the government. The service, empowerment and welfare functions were in line with Rashid's idea on three essential functions of the government (2000: 59).

The policy logic was also included into the formation of OMS institution. By Friedrich (in Wahab: 2001: 30), the policy is carried out in the context of a number of obstacles, while looking for opportunities to achieve the common goals. OMS emerged because of fear of the emergence of conflict in the reconstruction fund distribution. Sleman Regency Governments saw a gap in the rules of the Operational Guidelines that state other "criteria" according to the community agreement. This gap was used to prevent conflicts that might arise among the society.

4. 2. Community Empowerment

Prijono and Pranaka (1996: 30) state that empowerment containing two terms, namely the power provision, transferring power or delegating authority to others; and efforts to provide ability or empowerment. The concept was appropriate in the case of reconstruction fund provision for the earthquake victims. The power provision was manifested in the form of OMS. Data collection and verification is the government power domain. With its bureaucracy, Sleman Regency Government could have handled the data collection and verification process of the housing damage by its own. Precisely OMS, which was an ad-hoc institution, was given a huge authority to handle these two crucial things. It is also significant delegation of authority.

Operationally, the community empowerment program by Isbandi Rukminto Adi (2002:179-191), consisting of 6 stages, namely: 1. Engagement stage (engagement), 2. assessment stage (assessment), 3. program or activity designing stage (designing), 4. implementation stage, 5. Evaluation stage, and 6. disengagement stage. In the

program of the housing rehabilitation and reconstruction, the policy of Sleman Regency Government appeared to be using four of the six steps above, namely:

- 1. Engagement stage: at this stage, Sleman Regency Government conducted 2 matters, namely: engagement of the officers, and b) engagement of the field. The engagement of good officers in policy socialization was needed to foster trust in the community, for the disaster victims' community, good policy socialization would be able to grow the community life spirit. In addition to the officers engagement, no least was the engagement of the field, good socialization would be meaningless if the field was not supporting, from the two sub-districts examined, it appeared that the community was waiting for the certainty of assistance to rebuild their houses, therefore, Sleman Regency Government used the lowest bureaucratic apparatus; namely RT and RW to perform continuous socialization, RT and RW were chosen because they were considered to be most understood of the community condition in hamlet level.
- 2. Assessment and Activity Designing Stage (designing): in this stage Sleman Regency government conducted the problems identify (the needs perceived) and also the community-owned resources, in this assessment stage, it appeared that the residents really wished to rebuild their houses as soon as possible. This appeared from the various informal discussion forums in the community about the disbursement certainty of the rehabilitation and reconstruction fund aid.
- 3. <u>Program or Activity implementation stage</u> (implementation): In this housing data collection stage, the

role of OMS was very prominent, whereas OMS was given a full authority to collect and assess the level of the housing damage, it appeared that Sleman Regency government did not do any intervention. Sleman Regency governments only gave blanks for the data collection of the houses damaged by the earthquake, of which the blanks contents were the housing damage assessment parameter and the names of OMS officials, houses owners, and Hamlets Heads.

4. Evaluation Stage: evaluation stage was the process of residents and officers supervision towards the running community empowerment program, and it was carried out with the involvement of the residents. In OMS, the involvement of the residents was seen very real since the beginning of the data collection up to the fund disbursement, where the community collected their housing data, with the assistance of OMS with the elements of community leaders therein. From the field observations it appeared that "by the name" data proposed by OMS to Sleman Regency Government through the sub-districts remained unchanged, meaning that the community of the two sub-districts being recorded had accepted exactly the same rehabilitation and reconstruction fund with the OMS data collection result.

4. 3. Implementation of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program

In the context of the program implementation, Prambanan and Berbah sub-districts government obeyed the process set forth in Operational Guidelines. The steps were started from the community consolidation and socialization. In community consolidation and socialization in Berbah and Prambanan sub-districts it appeared that social marketing ideas were used, according to Kotler (1989:24), marketing is the usage of techniques and principles in efforts to increase the acceptance of an idea or social behavior, further Kotler

(1971:557) argues social marketing in this context by using marketing skills to assist translating the existing social actions to become a more effective design and communication program that will bring the desired audiences' response.

Kotler's opinion above could be seen in the program socialization which was carried out by utilizing the bureaucracy officers in the level of sub-districts, villages, hamlets, until the RW and RT, by using the local " opinion leader", namely; the Village Chief, Hamlets Head and RT chief, the socialization process became more effective and easily accepted by the public, besides, in this stage, the government took a cautious step in conveying information regarding the amount and time of reconstruction fund disbursement. J village head, example, did not explicitly convey about the certainty of reconstruction fund disbursement, unless he had already got an official letter from the government above him, J Village Head more emphasized the community to work together in rebuilding the houses. This socialization and consolidation stage was a crucial stage that would determine the success of the next stages. At this stage, the efforts were more emphasized on the psychological condition recovery, to revive the life spirit of the disaster victims. At this stage OMS was being also formed.

The second stage was the formation of the community groups (Pokmas). Pokmas existence was dependent on the housing condition assessment made by OMS. Through these community groups, the reconstruction fund was distributed. It also conducted participatory decision-making process that puts all CSO members equally. The next stage was the priority identification of the housing development and then followed by administrative preparation and ended the fund distribution and rehabilitation implementation.

There were two parties being organized in the rehabilitation and reconstruction program implementation, namely the bureaucracy and the public. In Suradinata's thought (1993: 19), the government policy is developed by institutions or agencies and government officials. The bureaucracy in the two districts being examined played in this role, especially at the stage of the community engagement.

In addition to OMS, the output resulted from the organization of the two parties was the community group. It had participatory and democratic processes in the decision-making in progress. Community groups provided a significant scope for the community members who had building and carpentry skills. This is consistent with Craig and Mayo's idea in Hikmat, (2001: 4) that state if the participatory process encourages the community to begin realizing of the situation and problem that they encounter, therefore, it can be used to solve their problems.

The success of this program was supported by community participation. Two of the nine FAO participation definitions cited by Mikkelsen (1999: 64) are the active process of the community in taking the initiative and establishing the dialogue, starting from the stage of the program engagement, the implementation until monitoring. In the case of OMS, the active process of the community members was shown through their involvement in providing input to their community and to local government in term of the manners that they should take to handle the reconstruction fund distribution. The initiative was supported by ongoing dialogues between the members of the community to achieve agreements that would be acceptable to all parties.

About conflicts arising among community, it could be mapped from three aspects. First, the conflict roots had been

embedded in the community. This had gone far since the days before the rehabilitation and reconstruction program was run. Second, there was an issue of fund management transparency by the local authorities. Dissatisfaction and lack of transparency made long-time problems reemerging and found its momentum, therefore, the conflict blasted. At a glance as if they were only resulted from the problems of reconstruction fund. In fact, the reconstruction fund was simply a trigger the conflict. Third, the conflict was triggered because there were residents who did not receive the rehabilitation fund, due to various things, for example: when the data collection was conducted, they were skipped because they were not present at the moment, there was no living heirs, the status of the land and the building was in dispute, the building status which was not residential.

To resolve those three conflicts, Sleman Regency government minimized them by the following manners: First, to open dialogue spaces between the government and the community, this could be seen by Sleman Vice Regent who set his office in Prambanan sub-district, by setting his office in Prambanan sub-district, Vice Regent could conduct the dialogue directly and organize various assistance to the community, therefore, communication confusion and the misuse of fund which was not transparent could be minimized, because the community could interact directly and complain to the their leader, Second, government gave authority to the community to collect the data of the earthquake victims' houses by creating OMS, government intervention in OMS was very small, meanwhile the role of community in determining the houses condition assessment resulting in fund disbursement was very dominant, this policy created the existing potential conflict for not growing bigger, conflicts between communities, and government with the community could be anticipated, and Third, the community took initiative to anticipate the conflicts between them, by giving some reconstruction fund that they received to their neighbors who did not receive the reconstruction fund, the amount of the fund given depended on the agreement of the community deliberation in the level of hamlet, the residents in the two sub-districts being examined stated that this was not fund cutting, but it was a local wisdom, for the community of the two sub-districts being examined, the creation of harmony in hamlet level was more important than the value of money, it is in accordance with Javanese culture tendency which is not accustomed to conflict and puts first *ayem tentrem* atmosphere. (Geertz, 1983).

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

Based on the description, several conclusions can be generated as follows.

- a) OMS is a policy breakthrough determined by Sleman Regency Government to minimize the possibility of the conflict emergence in the society, due to the implementation of housing reconstruction funding policy to the earthquake victims.
- b) OMS position of is responsible for two parties at the same time, namely the government and society. The institution reportsits assessment resultto the government. Thereport is made to be the basis for the formation of community groups; which in turn will receive the reconstruction fund. OMS management composition is consisted of the community figures, and the RT leaders. They are appointed directly by the hamlet head and the community deliberation, because they are deemed to have sufficient proficiency in

- handling public affairs and administration skills required in the data collection process.
- c) OMS carries out partial role of Sleman Regency Government, namely the data collection of the community housing damage. OMSis deemed to able to collect the data because they know exactly the location, the ownership status and the condition of the housing after hit by earthquake. Sleman Regency Government cannot intervene in the decisions made by OMS. Even, the Hamlet Head who serves as the coordinator of the region cannot intervene it. He only deserves to acknowledge and to sign the official reports of the housing condition assessment. The institution also represents the community interests. This is demonstrated by the inclusion of the community figures and RT leader into the board structure.
- d) The community empowerment is seen from several indications. *First*, the craftsmen whoare in daily life do not get much role in the social processes. In the rehabilitation reconstruction and program become the key players for their mastery in technical matters concerning home building. Second, individuals who have administrative skills are placed in one important position in community groups, either as a chairman, secretary or treasurer. Third, a number of critical decisions in the local level mostly completed by the community themselves without much interference from the upper government officials
- e) Mutual assistance in building the houses may not run optimally. This does not mean that the spirit of mutual assistance has been missing from the public. The ineffectiveness of such practice is more likely caused by technical problems, especially the scarcity of the labor and time constraint. Mutual assistance was done to the houses whose owners are considered

- economically disadvantaged and do not have the workers.
- f) As a result of the massive construction of the community housing, there is huge price increase in building materials and labors. The price increase of the housing construction cannot be addressed by the local community. This is caused by the inability of the community to control the demand-supply pressure that is created from the market mechanism.
- g) The community independence of the can be seen from the rapid process of the houses rebuilding and the large portion of the independent fund (above 80 percent) that they used throughout the construction process.

Recommendations

OMS can serve as an alternative model of the communitybased data collection of the disaster victims, which can be applied to other areas that encounter similar problems, with some conditions:

- a) The government gives full trust and authority to the community, from the data collection up to disbursement and the usage of the disaster victims' reconstruction fund.
- b) The government intervention in the data collection should be kept to a minimum level until the disbursement and the usage of the disaster victims' reconstruction fund.
- c) Deliberation or village deliberation is an institution that can be used to decide all issues in the data collection and the disbursement and the usage of the disaster victims'reconstruction fund.
- d) Various kinds of disputes or conflicts in the community, should be handled by community meetingswith a number of stages, starting from RT, RW, and Hamlet. If the issues still left unaddressed, it

- should be handled by the Village Head or Sub-district Head, this is because in a disaster situation, the bureaucracy has not been able to work normally.
- e) In rebuilding the houses, an approach to the local culture should be put first, for example by mutual assistance, instead of being held by the third party (contractor).
- f) There should be more intensively market operations to stabilize the highly increasing prices due to the high demand of the building materials and labors after the disaster. Thus, the disaster victims do not suffer repeatedly when they are rebuilding their houses.

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B. Act, Presidential Decree and Local Regulation

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D. Internet Sites:

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