

Assessment of Policy and Institutional Approaches to International Terrorism in Uganda

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Abstract

Uganda is one of the countries that have suffered the consequences of international terrorism and remains among those targeted for more terrorist attacks. Different approaches have been formulated and implemented to contain international terrorism and domestic collaborators in different countries particularly those who carry out vicious terrorist attacks such as the al-Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Shabaab, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and Boko Haram in Nigeria, all of which seem to draw profound inspiration and moral courage from the Middle East terrorist groups. Using an intensive desk review methodology the study established firstly, that the major policy and institutional approaches employed include those which accentuate continuous efforts to design and execute anti-terrorist legal instruments, establishment of specialist security, administrative and legal agencies. Secondly, results suggest that reforming existing administrative structures, procedural responses to terrorism and coordination of government agencies' security roles with those of other countries through Interpol constituted yet another strategic response against terrorism. Thirdly, the policy and institutional approaches which have been developed and implemented in Uganda appear to have been underscored by recent successful operations against terrorist networks in East Africa as well as other strategies adopted against international terrorism. I conclude that the security and legal responses, their levels of success and the challenges imbedded provide the basis for appropriate policy action to diverse countries which must coordinate their responses to terrorism at national, regional and global levels.

Keywords: Terrorism, Public Policy, Security Agencies, Institutional Approach, Uganda

Introduction

International terrorism tops the 21st century security challenges that have raised critical global anxiety because of the increasing scale of its ferocity and threat to world peace, security and development (Cameron, 2014; Sandler, Arce & Enders, 2008). The furtive manner in which it is masterminded has, together with the vicious mode of its occurrence anywhere, anytime, made it the topmost cause of most recent callous and catastrophic consequences, including harmful, excruciating and usually massive loss of life, property and businesses of innocent civilians (Campos & Gassebner, 2009; Krueger, 2007). Various countries have been and continue to be exposed to the challenge of international terrorism at different times and in diverse ways. These countries have sought to combat terrorism using different policy and institutional approaches (Bundeshaus, 2014; United Nations, 2014; Zalman, 2013; Simonsen & Spindlove, 2007; Wolfgang & Jan-Michael, 2005). Uganda has not been an exception in these efforts. The country is located in the terrorism-volatile zone of Eastern Africa (Kimunguyi, 2010; Ploch, 2010), and



has been exposed to both domestic and international terrorism (Munyua, 2013). This chapter addresses the responses to these two aspects of terrorism, but more profoundly assesses the latter.

Uganda's earliest exposure to international terrorism is traced to different insurgent groups that started springing up a year after Museveni-led National Resistance Army (NRA) toppled the Okello Lutwa junta in 1986 (Munyua, 2013). Firstly, notable among these groups is the Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a transnational terrorist group which for a long time operated in Uganda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and currently Central African Republic where it still maintains terrorist hideouts. This group sprang up in 1988 as a reinvigoration of Alice Auma Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement that had been decisively repulsed by the NRA in 1987. The LRA started with a mission to establish a theocratic state in Uganda based on the Biblical Ten Commandments (Munyua, 2013; Kisiangani, 2011). Its ways of introducing this theocracy were logistically supported by the National Congress Party (NCP) regime in neighbouring Sudan (Christian Aid, 2014). The execution of its mission involved the most heinous acts of terrorism, including raiding, ambushing, kidnapping, maiming, raping, defiling, planting grenades, bombing, beheading and setting houses and other property ablaze; some of the well known features of terrorism (Wojciech & Lloyd-Jones, 2012).

The LRA has been in existence for over two decades now and has caused a lot of ferocious consequences to innocent civilians in northern Uganda, South Sudan, north eastern part of Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic (Briggs, 2005). Kony's terrorism has so far claimed an estimated 800,000 lives (Munyua, 2013). It has destroyed a great deal of property, has led to total collapse of many businesses and left over 5 million people internally displaced, especially in northern Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic and eastern DRC (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010; O'Kadameri, 2002).


Secondly, Jamiru Mukulu's Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), sometimes also called the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) is another transnational terrorist group with operational bases in the DRC. This group was established in 1995 in the Rwenzori region, which is located between western Uganda and eastern DRC (International Crisis Group, 2012). This group has been terrorizing innocent civilians with a mission to introduce a Shariah-based theocratic state in Uganda (Kaganda, 2014; Candia, 2013). Thirdly, at another level, the country also has in the recent past experienced other international terrorist attacks in form of suicide bombers executed strategically against crowds of innocent civilians as they watched the 2010 World Cup final of July 11, 2010 in Kampala (Munyua, 2013). The attacks took place at two separate locations in Kampala, leaving 74 people dead and 70 others critically injured (BBC, 2010). The al-Shabaab, a militant terrorist group based in Somalia with ties to al-Qaeda (largely based and operating in the Middle East), claimed responsibility for the attacks citing the rationale as retaliation against Uganda's involvement in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Sciutto, 2010). Of importance to this chapter is the verity that Uganda continues to receive threats from the above international terrorist groups (Museveni, 2015; Barrabi, 2014).

Such international terrorist threats have not been experienced by Uganda alone. Attacks have taken place in other countries, causing loss of life, untold suffering and destruction of property (Gutfraind, 2013). The worst terrorism affected countries in the region apart from Uganda itself

include the neighbouring countries of Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania as well as others such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia on the African continent.

Outside Africa, the most serious terrorist attacks have been recorded in the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Turkey, Russia, and France amongst many others (BBC, 2015; Bundeshaus, 2014; Cameron, 2014; Hanna, 2014). Far greater terrorist occurrences have however been reported in the Middle East generally, and specifically, in countries such as Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey and the Palestinian Territories. Generally, the world has annually experienced the wrath of international terrorism as the worldwide trend presented in Figure 1 below indicates.

Figure 1



Source: *Burke (2013)*.

Understanding the Concept of International Terrorism

The conception of international terrorism is, unfortunately, not uniform in all countries (Bakker, 2014). Acts condemned by the attacked as terrorism are justified by the attackers as deeds for fighting for freedom or for attaining just goals (Snowden & Whitsel, 2005). As a perpetrator, for instance, Himmler cited in Campos and Gassebner (2009:1), considered terrorism as the best political weapon of cruelty that commands respect based on instigating fear in the population. This concept is differently defined in the national legislation of different countries (Miller, 2013). The universally acceptable and legally binding definition is still elusive. In fact, a scrutiny of the available definitions reveals that the meaning of international terrorism depends on who defines it, the context under which it is defined, and the rationale and political intention behind it (Bakker, 2014). Notwithstanding this state of affairs, current evidence indicates that international terrorism can ordinarily be best understood from a moral perspective of terrorism as its mother concept.

Thus, from the moral perspective, terrorism is described as premeditated violence that occurs indiscriminately in opposition to a government, and not against soldiers and those who govern

but against non-combatants or innocent civilians and their property (United States Institute of Peace, undated). The violence is conceived to cause severe panic among citizens and to use this panic as a means of attracting and maximizing media attention first to the committed cruel deeds, then to the group committing the deeds and ultimately, to the goal for which the deeds are executed (Mackey, 2009; Krueger). The goal may be political, ideological, religious or economic or a combination of all these perspectives (van Uma, 2009). Terrorism is distinguished from a civil war and guerrilla warfare in that instead of targeting military bases, personnel or combatants as the latter two do to attain their ends, it targets non-combatants or innocent civilians and their property to achieve the intended goals (Sambanis, 2008). In Uganda, terrorism is defined as “any act of violence or threat of violence carried out for purposes of influencing government or intimidating the public and for a political, religious, social and economic aim, indiscriminately without due regard for the safety of others or property (Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002).

Terrorism can be domestic or international (Kisangani & Nafziger, 2007; Sageman, 2004). It is referred to as domestic terrorism when it occurs in a country without any external links or support (Yager, 2010; Pape, 2003). It becomes international terrorism when it is masterminded and executed in a country or countries by perpetrators in another country (Pastor, 2009; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003). It is transnational terrorism when its perpetrators have many foreign bases from which they operate globally but clandestinely (Gutfraind, 2013). International terrorism is executed in form of cruel deeds and by covert state or non-state actors, called terrorists (Pastor, 2009; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003). The deeds cause very grave consequences, including harmful, excruciating and usually massive loss of life, property and businesses of innocent civilians (Krueger, 2007; Martin, 2003). Consequently, international terrorism is considered the topmost critical challenge to world peace, security and development (Bush, 2010). Not only does it pose a serious threat to national security but it is also a danger to the fundamental democratic values of society (European Council, 2007). Effective containment of terrorism has therefore taken centre stage in the global political discourse of the 21st century (Casale, 2008).

Different approaches have been and continue to be developed and implemented to respond to diverse forms of terror. Some of these approaches are policy and administrative in nature (British Government, 2009; Jenkins, 2004). Policy approaches refer to ways of fighting international terrorism using action plans already laid down either legally, politically or militarily (Eijkman & Schuurman, 2011; Oldrich, 2011; Council of the European Union, 2006). Administrative approaches involve executive actions taken to combat international terrorism either by implementing enacted anti-terrorism instruments or by taking economic, intelligence or security-based managerial actions deemed swiftly appropriate to pre-empt imminent terrorism threats or to deal pertinently with perpetrators of terrorism, even when the actions do not follow any anti-terrorism policy (British Government, 2011; Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011; Coolsaet, 2010).

Developing and implementing policy and institutional approaches received more critical attention after suicide airliner hijackers committed horrendous terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and suicide bombings in Madrid, Istanbul, Moscow and London (Jenkins, 2004). The reason for this is in the very nature of terrorism which is essentially clandestine and which attacks anywhere without any prediction. Thus, the policy and

institutional approaches received even much more attention in countries that had been earmarked as targets by the masterminds of terrorism (Axelrod & Borzutzky, 2006; White, 2006). This chapter assesses the progress that Uganda has made in this respect. The assessment is rooted in the theoretical framework for international terrorism as presented in the next section.

Theoretical Framework for International Terrorism Response in Uganda

Responding to the challenge of international terrorism in a manner that can effectively combat it requires a thorough understanding of the theories that explain why and how it takes place. This understanding is vital because it provides knowledge needed to develop and implement policy, administrative or any other approaches needed to strategically contain international terrorism from its manifestations (O’Kane, 2005). It should be noted right from the outset that several theories have been developed to explain why and how terrorism occurs. Those developed to explain the ‘why’ dimension include the political theories of anarchism and fascism, the philosophical theory of religion, rational choice theory, globalization theory, sociological theory, psychological theory, biological theory, and criminological theory, amongst others (O’Connor, 2014; Nassar, 2004). The theories that explain the ‘how’ dimension include the instrumental theory and the organizational process theory (Crenshaw, 2001). A review of these theories reveals that those that provide a convincing rationale for the nature of international terrorism facing Uganda include the philosophical theory of religion, rational choice theory, instrumental theory and organizational process theory of terrorism. These are therefore the theories which underpin the theoretical framework of this chapter.

Firstly, the philosophical theory of religion was developed from the disciplines of theology, religious studies, and philosophy (Stitt, 2003; Kraemer, 2004). This theory advances a view that terrorism occurs because of a strong belief that God demands and approves of violence against infidels or non believers in Islam (Feldman & Ruffle, 2008). Infidels are all those people who do not believe in the God-demanded and approved cause; so destroying them with whatever means (including self-sacrifice means) does not offend but pleases God, who indeed, will abundantly reward such sacrifice (O’Connor, 2014). The theory regards the cause for such destruction as sacred theocracy and that this cause combines a strong sense of vengeance for the past and hope for eternal opulent life after death (O’Connor, 2014). Followers are recruited by convincing and indoctrinating them about some duty demanded by God and therefore fundamental to their faith, but was either abused, neglected, suppressed by infidels in the past, or has been neglected; yet executing it using any possible means is critical to obeying God and attaining His promised eternal life (Stitt, 2003). Recruits are indoctrinated to believe that what moralists (infidels) perceive as terrorism is what God requires of them.

The indoctrination is based on illustrations of violence erroneously presented as condoned by God, but cited directly from the holy books (Bible or Koran). The main aim of the instruction is to replace recruits’ fear of death with readiness for destruction or self-destruction based on apocalyptic thinking or eschatology (Ruggiero, 2005). The recruits are further indoctrinated by manipulating theodicy to make what is morally evil appear to them as good or as part of God’s plan (Ruggiero, 2005). Terrorism from such indoctrination is therefore not only about extremism, fanaticism or cultism (Ruggiero, 2005). It is about a militant and fundamentalist



interpretation and application of the basic tenets of a faith (O'Connor, 2014). In fact, the aims of the LRA in Uganda suggest that its formation was based on this very interpretation. The argument was and still is that God wants Uganda to be governed based on the Biblical Ten Commandments, but this government is suppressed by infidels in Uganda, and it was the duty of the LRA to use any means to liberate the country from the infidels (Green, 2008; O'Kadamari, 2002). Even the ADF/NALU uses the same rationale to make its case for introducing Shariah-based rule in Uganda.

Secondly, the rational choice theory postulates that terrorist groups and leaders are rational agents capable of strategic decision-making (van Uma, 2009). At a minor level, this theory maintains that the decisions are made to rationally maximize self-interest, but in a broad sense, the decisions are made to logically benefit not only an individual but also a group to which the individual is loyal (Hindmoor, 2006). The latter case is what works for terrorist organizations. It is attained by indoctrinating recruits and members following the rationale of the organizational process theory. This theory is based on the premise that the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself (Crenshaw, 2001). A terrorist organization maintains itself by indoctrinating recruits and members to align their ambitions with its own goals and objectives (Victoroff, 2005). The indoctrination is carried out by ideology based on provision and promises of tangible and intangible incentives that match with or even surpass recruits' and members' personal ambitions, and which, therefore, satisfy and keep them loyal to the organization and committed to the pursuit of its public ends (Victoroff, 2005).

The public ends of a terrorist organization express themselves in terror deeds which cause maximum damage and pain to innocent humanity. Therefore, gaining members' commitment to them is tantamount to making the members carry out terrorism as a means of satisfying their personal ambitions as well as the goals of the organization. Incentives for loyalty and commitment are provided while promising pardon for repentance and severe punishment for defection to infidels, including eternal death as opposed to paradise (Snowden & Whitsel, 2005). In general, following the rationale of the rational organizational process theory enables a terrorist group to maintain itself through recruiting and indoctrinating members to become rationally convinced that engaging in terrorist acts benefits them as individuals and their group equally. It ensures that the rational decisions made by all the individual members of a terrorist group become the aggregate rational decision of the group (Enders & Su, 2007). This theory is important to understand how to combat international terrorism from the perspective of changing the mindsets of those who take rational terrorist decisions after being thoroughly indoctrinated with incentives that match or exceed personal ambitions and severe punishment for defection.

According to Lake (2002), the decisions of terrorist groups are expressions of instrumental rationality. Terrorists act strategically after calculating the value to gain from an action, the costs of the attempt and of its failure, the consequences of inaction, or the probability of success (Crenshaw, 2001). This suggests that terrorist decisions are made following the instrumental theory of terrorism. Indeed, this theory postulates that terrorism is intentional and is not executed for the sake of it, but as a means to a political end (Crenshaw, 2001). The theory views government and terrorists as adversaries of each other, and the actions of one are intended to influence the political behavior of the other (van Uma, 2009). It takes terrorism as a form of

violent coercion, an act of bargaining based on the power to hurt and intimidate as a substitute for the use of military force. The intention of terrorism is to produce a desired change in government's political position, but not to destroy its military potential (Özdamar, 2008). This intention is clandestinely pursued rationally and strategically (Rapoport, 2004). In other words, the political or propaganda value to gain from a terrorist deed to commit is regarded as much greater than the cost, the status quo is intolerable or is full of desperation, the probability of success is high, the anticipated rewards are irresistible, even at the cost of life, and the opportunity to act is available (Garrison, 2004).

The deed and its intention are masterminded with so much precision and concealment that both are accomplished in the same astonishing, sometimes simultaneous attacks on the target(s). Terrorists therefore realize their intention using surprise, destructive attacks that compensate for a weakness in military capacity. Indeed, with such attacks, it takes only one well-equipped and precise terrorist to cause widespread surprise and severe destruction of civilian life and property under the nose of an unprepared military giant. Surprise comes about as a result of the defender's lack of preparation, ignoring intelligence warnings of an impending attack, complacency, or lack of capacity to deal with the level of sophistication of attackers, or even as a result of the attackers hitting the target quickly and cheaply (Crenshaw, 2001).

The rationale of the instrumental theory of terrorism is important in the fight against international terrorism. It reveals that terrorism does not occur without a political end to achieve. This implies that it can be fought by addressing the ends for which it is executed. The rationale also reveals that terrorists succeed by exploiting weaknesses in government preparation against them. This implies that increasing readiness and alertness to deal with terrorists minimizes the likelihood of their attacks. Terrorists act out of desperation. This suggests that addressing what causes desperation can help reduce terrorism. Terrorists translate their ideological goals into action when the opportunity presents itself. Avoiding creating these opportunities can therefore help prevent terrorism.

Generally, the theories whose rationale can help understand the nature of international terrorism facing Uganda and how it can be contained include the philosophical theory of religion, rational choice, instrumental theory and organizational theories. These theories therefore summarize the diverse types of terrorism that include ethno-nationalist, religious, ideology oriented, state-sponsored terrorism and other types inspired to promote diverse causes. These are therefore the theories used in the theoretical framework to guide the arguments in this chapter.

Recent Developments in Operations of Terrorist Networks in East Africa and the Middle East

The death of al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, through a U.S. Navy's SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) raid on his base in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011 raised global hope that international terrorism would soon be contained (CNN, 2014). This hope has however been dashed by the recent escalation in terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and East African region. The Council on Foreign Relations (2013) indicates that after the U.S. had declared its resolve to attack any government sponsoring terrorism, perpetrators changed tactics by shifting from

dependency on state sponsorship to being non-state actors operating as individuals and groups, but mainly as dangerous terrorist networks. They now started taking more advantage of the porous borders and interconnected international finance, communications, and transport systems to reach their strategic targets all over the globe. Some of the terrorist networks began focusing more on influencing local or national political dynamics while others have remained seeking to promote desired global changes (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013).

In particular, after beheading two U.S. journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, the ISIS attracted global media hype as a brutal terrorist organization that had emerged in 2014 with a mission to establish a Shariah-ruled state between Syria and Iraq (Banco, 2014). The ISIS is an al-Qaeda group based in Iraq. Motivated by a fundamentalist Salafi ideology, the main al-Qaeda group, which is based in the Arabian Peninsula, continued to pursue a worldwide agenda. It focuses on fighting Western influence with a mission to replace this influence with a global theocracy based on Shariah law implemented by fundamentalist Islamic caliphate (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). With its base in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the al-Qaeda has spread its network in many countries in the Middle East, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, and others (Metzger, 2014). It has also established branches and sought affiliates in other regions, including North Africa, Yemen, Southeast Asia, and East Africa (CNN, 2012). Notable among the East African terrorist groups that have ties with the al-Qaeda is the al-Shabaab (Agbibo, 2014; Sciutto, 2010).

The al-Shabaab had effectively occupied Somalia since the 1990s, but without being recognized as a government (Chalk, 2007). When the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) started attacking the al-Shabaab in 2007 to dislodge them from Somalia and make the hitherto stateless country orderly and peaceful with a recognized government, the al-Shabaab began issuing threats to attack countries whose forces were involved in AMISOM (Sciutto, 2010). Instead of taking offensive against AMISOM, the al-Shabaab resorted to typical terrorist tactics involving implementing their threats organizing suicide bombers and attacking strategic security positions. Driven out of its major urban bases, the al-Shabaab has now adopted a strategy involving asymmetric attacks intended to discredit and destabilize the nascent Federal Government of Somalia. They attack civilians in the Somali areas under AMISOM control (Botha, undated). Their continued defeat and loss of territory in Somalia forced them to scale up and extend their terrorism to neighboring countries.

According to the Bureau of Counterterrorism (2013), the al-Shabaab launched an attack on Kenya in 2013 to retaliate the involvement of Kenyan armed forces in Somalia. Kenya's forces had in 2012 repulsed the al-Shabaab from the port city of Kismayo, which was this terrorist group's major source of revenue. The retaliation was made against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, leaving at least 65 innocent civilians dead (Agbibo, 2014). The al-Shabaab had earlier in 2010 made attacks on Uganda to retaliate her pioneer involvement in AMISOM. The attack claimed 74 lives and left 70 people seriously injured (BBC, 2010). Following the attacks, al-Shabaab began to be viewed as a threat not only to Somalia, but to the entire East African region (Schwartz, 2012).

With regard to the LRA, recent developments indicate that since its dislodgement from its bases

in northern Uganda and South Sudan in 2006 through a Ugandan military offensive code-named Operation Iron Fist (Lacey, 2002), it continued terrorising civilians in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Kisiangani, 2011). Even when LRA was attacked in 2008 in an offensive coded named Operation Lightening Thunder (consisting of a force jointly formed by Ugandan, Rwandan and Congolese troops), its top leadership fled to Central African Republic (CAR) from it is still masterminding surprise terrorist attacks on innocent civilians up to date (Kisiangani, 2011). The attacks involve retaliatory mass rapes, kidnappings as a means of recruitment (Christian Aid, 2014). By 2013, civilians totalling 325,931 had been rendered internally displaced (OCHA, 2013). The data available at the U.S. Department indicate that LRA has since 2008 killed more than 2,400 people and abducted more than 3,400. The UN estimates indicate that over 380,000 people are displaced across CAR, the DRC and South Sudan as a result of LRA terrorism (Aljazeera, 2014a; Arieff & Ploch, 2014).

As far as the ADF/NALU is concerned, recent developments indicate that owing to the significant losses this group suffered as a result of UPDF offensive in 2014 and the capture of Jamilu Mukulu in June 2015, it has been left dormant (McGregor, 2014, Observer, 2015). In recent years, the once poorly-armed terrorists had re-launched their operations after replacing machetes and knives, on which they had relied previously, with machine-guns, mortars and rockets, which they had obtained from thousands of M23 rebels who were surrendering after being defeated by Tanzania which operated under UN auspices in the Nord-Kivu region (McGregor, 2014).

According to Aljazeera (2014b), the ADF had established a network currently operating in around 15 camps in different locations across the east of Beni and west of Oicha. The network is highly organized with different bases for training, logistics and command and control. It also has anti-aircraft weapons (Aljazeera, 2014b). It is currently spreading out into the nearby forests and stateless areas, and has strong foreign connections and backing as well as alliances with local militias and a significant section of the local community. The resumption of terrorist activities by newly armed ADF-NALU terrorists constitutes. In fact, the several tribal gunmen, who were armed with machetes and spears and who attacked Kasese, Ntoroko and Bundibugyo districts in July 2014, and killed civilians, military officers and policemen, were linked to the renewed operations of the ADF/NALU. The attack led to a loss of 93 people and property worth millions of shillings.

In general, recent developments in terrorist operations in East Africa and Middle East reveal that international terrorism has become more sophisticated, vicious and therefore a more critical threat in these two regions. Terrorist groups have established networks by which they now are operating, killing thousands of civilians. In fact, the available statistics indicate that with other groups that operate outside the Al-Qaeda network and hotspots, international terrorists launched more than 8,500 attacks in 2012, thereby killing nearly 15,500 civilians in Africa, Asia and the Middle East (Burke, 2013). The terrorist operations masterminded in the same year resulted into a 69% rise in attacks and an 89% jump in fatalities that had been recorded in 2011. Six of the seven most dangerous terrorist groups that claimed responsibility for the attacks have ties with Al-Qaeda. Evidently, diffusion of the pernicious threat of terrorism cannot be ignored and Uganda is not immune from it at all.

Institutional and Procedural Responses to International Terrorism

Procedural strategies are ways of dealing with international terrorism systematically following agreed guidelines, action plans and methods (European Union Counter-radicalization Strategy, 2008). These strategies include preventing, protecting, pursuing, and responding to terrorism (Public Safety Canada, 2011). According to HM Government (2012), prevention focuses on stopping people from turning to terrorism. The strategy addresses all forms of terrorism not only by actively stopping radicalization through challenging any ideology that supports terrorism but also addressing extremism or intolerance related to terrorism while encouraging community integration through community policing (OSCE, 2014). Institutional and procedural responses also focus on protecting vulnerable individuals (such as giving start-up capital or creating employment for the unemployed, monitoring internal activities of shadowy religious groups/fellowships, and dealing with factors which can lead to radicalization and recruitment as well as supporting sectors and institutions (such as churches, mosques and training institutions or schools) where there is a risk of radicalization (Saunders, 2013; Llussá & Tavares, 2008). It also involves using psychological disengagement as a method of providing rehabilitative or restorative assistance to those turning away from terrorism (Jones, 2014), and setting laws against terrorism and communicating them to the public as a way of raising fear of the consequences should any person be caught joining terrorism (Blomberg & Rosendorff, 2006).

Protection involves putting in place infrastructure, public awareness and intense internal and international cooperation and intelligence services that reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks (OSCE, 2014). The infrastructure includes detectors and surveillance equipment such as street cameras, CCTVs, and others (Jones, 2014). The protection strategy further involves maintaining highly sophisticated and strict immigration checks at the airports and border entry posts, minimizing porous borders, encouraging appropriate mail-handling procedures, recruiting staff or contractors after checking their identities so as to ease follow up, and protection of information by taking proper IT security precautions (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 2007). It further involves legislating laws that protect citizens against terrorism, and changing the architecture of city and town suburbs to make them not easy targets for terrorists (Chong, 2014).

Pursuit focuses on detecting and investigating terrorists and disrupting their support networks. This strategy involves intelligence and analysis operations focusing on detecting and identifying and dealing with terrorists, terrorist organizations and their supporters, their capabilities and the nature of their plans (Public Safety Canada, 2011). It involves extensive collaboration and information sharing with domestic and international partners. It further involves countering terrorist financing by freezing their bank accounts or even closing the banks handling financial transactions linked to terrorists, hindering access to critical military infrastructure and explosives and to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear materials, and criminal procession through arresting and interrogating suspected terrorists, and sentencing those found guilty of the offense (OSCE, 2014). The strategy further involves denying terrorists the means and opportunities to pursue terrorist activities. This involves mitigating vulnerabilities and aggressively intervening in terrorist planning, including prosecuting individuals involved in

terrorist related criminal activities, and making a country's national interests a more difficult to target by terrorists (Public Safety Canada, 2011).

Response deals with managing and minimizing the consequences of a terrorist attack (UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2012). This strategy involves developing local and national emergency response capacities, that is, capabilities that can effectively respond to terrorist activities proportionately, rapidly and in an organized manner and to mitigate their effects so as to return to ordinary life as soon as possible (Public Safety Canada, 2011; Bennett, 2007). Managing the effects involves ensuring the country is prepared for the consequences of a terrorist attack, that is, that it can carry out reconstruction of destroyed property, provide psychological and restorative assistance to survivors, and support the bereaved with funeral and burial expenses (UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2012).

In summary, a critical look the procedural strategies for countering international terrorism suggests that each is effective only when it is implemented not in isolation but using an interdisciplinary, all-inclusive and multifarious approach. This implies that procedural strategies need to be implemented institutionally. They therefore need institutional strategies as means of implementing them. Accordingly, institutional strategies are the administrative ways used to combat terrorism using systems or structures that support the execution of procedural strategies in a coordinated and reinforcing manner (Orttung & Makarychev, 2006). These systems include the military, central and local government, banking, judiciary, legislature, police, education, health, religious, counseling, immigration, prison, media, nongovernmental and other national and international structures (Murthy, 2013). In fact, when each of these systems is not effectively utilized in the coordinated fight against international terrorism, no procedural strategy can achieve the desired end in an effective manner.

As illustrations, preventive strategies are best handled by educational and religious institutions since these are systems that can effectively discourage any ideology that supports terrorism (Berman & Laitin, 2008). Pursuit strategies cannot be effectively implemented without the participation of the banking system in detecting and fighting money laundering for financing terrorism (Tsang, 2009). Protection strategies can hardly be effective without the participation of international and national intelligence institutions as well as the media and community policing systems that can provide information needed to pre-empt terrorist attacks (Barrabi, 2014). International and national military institutions are needed to dislodge the identified terrorists from their bases and/or to annihilate them (United States Department of State, 2012). The police institution also provides fire brigade services and facilitates prosecution of suspected terrorism while the judicial, prison and counseling institutions pass judgment, and keep and rehabilitate imprisoned terrorists, respectively (Abi-Saab, 2002). The international Red Cross and health systems are needed to take care of responses such as emergency handling, provision of treatment needed by casualties of terrorism, and to stop drug abuse (United Nations, 2012). The legislature enacts the laws and policies needed to guide what all other institutions are support to do in order to implement procedural counterterrorism strategies (Martínez, 2008). Overall, institutional and procedural strategies have to work together in order to combat international terrorism in an effective manner.

All the institutions mentioned above exist in Uganda. However, while some of them are avidly utilized to counter international terrorism, others are yet to be effectively employed. Uganda's counterterrorism strategy relies largely on the military institution reinforced by international forces, and on the police, judicial and legislative system to a large extent (Kimunguyi, 2013; Munyua, 2013; Uganda Police Force, 2013). A number of nongovernmental organizations are also involved in psychological disengagement of those captured or escaping from the control of terrorist groups (Young, 2007).

In particular, the international military system is made up of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) that fights the al-Shabaab terrorists using AMISOM (Schwartz, 2012) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), a partnership formed in 2009 by Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda to fight terrorism from the region (United States Department of State, 2014). According to Sarkar (2014), PREACT is U.S.-funded and is implemented as a multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build counterterrorism capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including (1) reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, (2) developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations, (3) enhancing border security, (4) countering the financing of terrorism, and (5) reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism.

Another counterterrorism institutional strategy in which Uganda is participating at the international level involves a Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) funded by the U.S. from its base in Djibouti. The CJTF-HOA is a component of the wider U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), established in 2008. Other countries that participate in CJTF-HOA operations encompass Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Yemen, and the Seychelles and Tanzania (Ibrahim, 2010). CJTF-HOA participates in fighting terrorism by providing logistical organization of transport and support to Ugandan troops in the AU peacekeeping force deployed in Mogadishu after the collapse of the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union (Ibrahim, 2010). Working with other superpowers such as the United Kingdom, CJTF-HOA is also providing counterterrorism training in Uganda amongst other countries, including Yemen, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.

It is important to note that although other states have joined AMISOM, Uganda remains the leading contributor, providing over 6,000 troops and police officers, mostly in Sector I around Mogadishu, Sector III around Baidoa and in the Multinational Force Headquarters also in Mogadishu (Jowell, 2014). Four consecutive AMISOM force commanders were Ugandan before the current commander was appointed from Burundi. In addition, around 2,000 Ugandan soldiers, along with troops from CAR, DRC and South Sudan, are part of a UN-AU Regional Task Force (RTF) targeting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Jowell, 2014). This is evidence for the significance of regional collaborative efforts to fight international terrorism since it knows no borders.

Internally, Uganda strengthened institutional counterterrorism strategy by forming the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT) in 1999 to coordinate the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence

(CMI), Criminal Investigations Department (CID), Special Branch (SB), External Security Organisation (ESO), and Internal Security Organisation (ISO) in countering terrorism by collecting intelligence information that could lead to successful prosecution of terrorists (Schwartz, 2012). The JATT was formed following the bomb attacks in Kampala City and Jinja Municipality largely blamed on the ADF in 1999. The media is also used to raise public awareness of how to report suspected terrorists and terror objects, and to use equipment that can detect terrorism gadgets (Kaihura, 2014). The institutions that are yet to be effectively linked to the fight against international terrorism in Uganda are mainly educational institutions and religious organizations (Athumani, 2014).

Policy Responses to Terrorism in Uganda: Security and Legal Critique

Policy responses to terrorism in Uganda have largely been legislative and military in nature. They began with the enactment of the Amnesty Act (2000). The aim of this Act was serve as a policy tool for ending terrorism by encouraging terrorists to voluntarily lay down arms without facing prosecution for crimes committed during their rebellion against the government. A scrutiny of this Act reveals that its functions include providing amnesty to rebels who renounce rebellion and give up their arms; facilitating an institutionalized resettlement and repatriation process; and providing reintegration support, including skills training for ex-combatants, and promoting reconciliation. The Act also establishes the Amnesty Commission as its implementer through issuing certificates of amnesty (Agger, 2012).

Despite the benevolent terms of the Amnesty Act of 2000, some hardcore LRA and ADF terrorists stick to their guns. This was aggravated by the fact that Uganda started receiving terrorist threats after the 1998 simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. This scenario culminated into efforts to develop a policy for countering terrorism (Munyua, 2013). Consequently, the Anti-Terrorism Act, No.14/2002 was enacted. Part III of this Act makes terrorism and anything that promotes it capital offenses punishable by death. The specific punishable terrorist deeds include murder, kidnapping, maiming or attack, whether actual, attempted or threatened, on a person or groups of persons, in public or private institutions, official premises, private accommodation, or means of transport or diplomatic agents or other internationally protected persons. Other specified deeds include intentional and unlawful manufacture, delivery, placement, discharge or detonation of an explosive or other lethal device, whether attempted or actual, in, into or against a place of public use, a State or Government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or extensive destruction likely to or actually resulting in major economic loss.

Other terrorist offences specified by the Act included unlawful seizure of an aircraft or public transport or the hijacking of passengers or group of persons for ransom; serious interference with or disruption of an electronic system; and unlawful importation, sale, making, manufacture or distribution of any firearms, explosive, ammunition or bomb. Others are intentional development or production or use of, or complicity in the development or production or use of a biological weapon; and unlawful possession of explosives, ammunition, bomb or any materials for making of any of the foregoing. In addition, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 states that any person who

aids or abets or finances or harbors, or renders support to any person, knowing or having reason to believe that the support will be applied or used for or in connection with the preparation or commission or instigation of acts of terrorism, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to suffer death. The punishment is also prescribed for any person convicted in establishing, running or supporting any institution for promoting terrorism; publishing and disseminating news or materials that promote terrorism; or training or mobilizing any group of persons or recruiting persons for carrying out terrorism or mobilizing funds for the purpose of terrorism. It should be noted that public awareness of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) is very low (Bajjwa, 2014). Following this Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Act (2013) was enacted to strengthen the Financial Institutions Act (FIA) in fighting money laundering and financing of terrorism.

There are other important measures that involved ratification of not only eleven of the UN conventions against terrorism but also the 1999 Algiers Convention of OAU on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the IGAD Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Conventions and Interpol (Schwartz, 2012). Uganda is also an active party to the U.S. counterterrorism policy that aims to go beyond law enforcement, intelligence, and military efforts that thwart terrorists to seeking shape and constrain the environments where terrorists operate (Ploch, 2010). It is through being an active party to this policy that Uganda managed to have LRA rebels declared as international terrorists that should be hunted down and killed, or captured, indicted and tried before the International Criminal Court (ICC). These policy initiatives have produced some successes notwithstanding the fact that they are still facing challenges.

Challenges in Policy and Institutional Approaches to Terrorism

While it is a fact that Uganda has made appreciable progress in the fight against terrorism in the region between Central African Republic and Somalia, but especially in her own territory, the progress has been achieved while facing challenges (Ibrahim, 2010). According to the Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (2012), the main policy challenge is the lack of an acceptable definition of terrorism in the IGAD sub-region. Each country defines terrorism its own way, with some definitions criminalizing what others do not. The same source indicates that this challenge is complicated by language barriers, since some IGAD countries are officially English-speaking while others are Arabic-speaking and others are French-speaking countries. It is further aggravated by the fact that the definitions of terrorism of some IGAD countries focus on local groups that other states do not see as terrorist groups. This is also an institutional challenge because some countries even militarily support some groups that other countries consider terrorist. Uganda has, for instance, constantly accused Sudan of supporting LRA.

According to Schwartz (2012), another challenge constitutes lack of policy that adequately covers Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) needed by Uganda to deal with captured terrorists legally. The lack of MLA poses a challenge in the working relationship between the Attorney General as the central authority and the Director of Public Prosecutions when it comes to extradition and handling of requests for assistance and evidence submitted by foreign actors and the ability to submit Uganda's own requests to those actors. This challenge is aggravated by the weak criminal justice capacity that exists in every country in the respect of fighting terrorism. It

is particularly acute in Somalia, the major source of terrorism threats, South Sudan, the youngest country, and others, especially in matters pertaining to interstate judicial coordination. According to Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (2012), the absence of this policy implies that IGAD countries cannot rely on each other's judicial systems to provide efficient, timely, and reliable evidence or extraditions. They therefore continue resorting to non-legal methods of dealing with international terrorism, a tendency that has resulted into some countries conflicting with others.

Institutionally, there is still a weak interstate integration of policing cooperation into broader legal cooperation frameworks. States' participation in Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) and Interpol to share police intelligence has not led to a more structured process of cross-border cooperation on the development of evidence (MLA) and the arrest of fugitives extradition (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012).

As far as fighting particularly the al-Shabaab terrorism is concerned, the main challenge is associated with the IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT). According to Kimunguyi (2010), the geopolitical and internal ethnic and religious conditions of Somalia are hindering the development of a successful security and counterterrorism agenda in the country. Islamic extremism that grew in Somalia since 1989 when the al-Shabaab were in effective occupation of the territory is another challenge preventing a proportion of the local population from welcoming liberation led by Westerner countries (Rosand, Millar & Ipe, 2009). Geopolitically, the absence of Eritrea from the IGAD forum has a negative impact on the overall effectiveness of ICPAT. Uganda's participation in fighting al-Shabaab is also challenged by faint political will among most of the IGAD member states. Only few members are cooperating towards effective implementation of the pursued military counterterrorism strategy (Kimunguyi, 2010), yet the full cooperation of all IGAD member states is crucial to winning the struggle against terrorism and to ensuring that other forms of transnational crime do not similarly jeopardize the IGAD sub-region's growth, prosperity, and stability (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012).

There is still no comprehensive policy regarding how to deal with the highly porous borders of Somalia as far as fighting terrorism is concerned. Matters are complicated by Kenya's continued complacency to institutionally patrol and deal with its porous border with Somalia (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012). This has made it possible for the al-Shabaab to launch successful attacks on Kenya and to continue posing a serious threat to the entire East African region (Ibrahim, 2010)

Turning to the LRA, the Christian Aid (2014) indicates that one of the critical challenges faced in the fight against LRA terrorism constitutes the absence of trusted collaboration between military forces controlling the region in which this terrorism gets committed. The National Conservative Party in Khartoum does not allow African Union (AU) troops some of whom are Ugandan soldiers to cross the border into Sudan in pursuit of LRA commanders hiding in South Darfur. In addition, Ugandan soldiers in the AU task force in the CAR are not permitted to cross into DRC to dislodge LRA fighters who retreat and hide there (Christian Aid, 2014). Furthermore, there is no full range of state control in much of the eastern part of DRC. The

military forces such as the FARDC (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo) that fight terrorists and restore security in this region provide a short-term and unsustainable solution when the government is not fully in control. They come, fight and repulse the terrorists and leave. As if that is not enough, MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), has recently acquired aerial surveillance capabilities in the form of drones with cameras, they cannot penetrate forest canopies (Hellyer, 2013). The ADF and LRA exploit these weaknesses as opportunities for reorganizing and launching terrorist attacks in the region while maintaining that they cannot disarm until the International Criminal Court drops war crimes charges against them (Long, 2014).

According to Agger (2012), Uganda ended amnesty that had been granted to rebels surrendering or escaping from terrorist groups. This considerably lowered the chances of convincing terrorists out of the vice. Indeed, it was amnesty that had contributed considerably to success in cutting down the number of LRA fighters. Its removal is therefore a blow to curbing terrorism. Amnesty was removed because it was incompatible with norms of international justice (Agger, 2012). The World Bank (2007) indicates that another challenge involves some banks in Uganda not cooperating as expected when it comes to prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism in Uganda. In fact, some Ugandan banks have had to be closed as a result of being suspected to be involved in money laundering (Edopu, 2004).

Generally, a number of challenges are still faced in the counterterrorism approaches used by Uganda singly and in collaboration with other partner states. The challenges occur in form of legal and institutional weaknesses as well as in the way terrorism is conceived in the different partner states.

Discussion

The preceding review reveals that Uganda has responded to international terrorism using both internal and international policy and institutional approaches, and while facing a number of challenges internally and at interstate level, has made appreciable successes in terms of repulsing terrorists and foiling their plots. Internally, the policy approach Uganda has been using is essentially prescriptive. It involves enacting and implementing different acts of parliament, including the Amnesty Act (2000), the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), and the Anti-Money Laundering Act (2013). While this approach is necessary, the way it is applied in Uganda is not sufficient. Uganda uses it only in the pursuit strategy of countering terrorism. Its use in the prevention strategy is negligible because the level of public awareness of the enacted acts, particularly the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), is very low. It is necessary to raise public awareness of the content of this Act, particularly the content of Part III of the Act, but this has hardly been carried out. The media need not be used to raise public awareness of only community policing, vigilant use of terrorism detectors and encouraging the public to accept being checked for possible terror objects. The media needs to also be used to raise public awareness about the content of the anti-terrorism act while putting more emphasis on the consequences suffered should a person get convicted of any offence specified in this act. This can help scare people from turning to terrorism.

The review also reveals that Uganda's fight against international terrorism is virtually devoid of using educational and religious institutions; yet these institutions are very important in implementing the prevention strategy of countering the nature of terrorism facing Uganda. Indeed, the review indicates that the LRA, ADF and al-Shabaab perpetrate terrorism using what the philosophical theory of religion regards as the fundamentalist interpretation of religion. This implies that individuals can be prevented from turning to this terrorism through education and training that suppresses radicalization and extremism. It is therefore imperative that Uganda improves her fight against terrorism by using educational and religious institutions. Of course, the use of educational institutions presupposes development of curriculum content that can be imparted to learners in a manner that discourages them from joining terrorism.

The review indicates further that at the international level, Uganda's progress in the fight against terrorism is appreciable given the recorded contribution to the AMISOM that is countering al-Shabaab's terrorism in Somalia and in the East African region in general. The progress is however, constrained by policy and institutional weaknesses such as lack of policy that adequately covers MLA in the IGAD member countries. The lack of MLA constrains extradition and exchange of evidence needed in the courts of laws to secure a successful prosecution of terrorism suspects. A policy on MLA is therefore needed to facilitate any country fighting international terrorism to do so legally and expeditiously. Not only does the development of this policy need to focus on defining terrorism in a manner that is acceptable to all IGAD member states. It also needs to be reinforced by strengthening and synchronizing the criminal justice institutions of these countries. This will ensure that these countries rely on each other's judicial systems to provide efficient, timely, and reliable evidence or extraditions instead of depending on non-legal methods of dealing with international terrorism. Better results will be realized through strengthening interstate policing institutions such as Interpol and border surveillance and protection agencies.

The religious extremism that has been growing in Somalia since 1989 when the al-Shabaab took its effective occupation suggests that the threat of terrorism is still prevalent in this country. Indeed, the theoretical review indicates clearly that extremism is a major cause of terrorism. This threat can however, be minimized through systematic application of psychological disengagement and de-radicalization using education and proper Islamic teachings. This is vital in ensuring that terrorism is completely erased from the minds of the Somalis who have been exposed to the fundamentalist view of their religion. IGAD member countries need to also increase and demonstrate their political will in supporting military countering of al-Shabaab terrorism.

Recommendations

The main terrorist response strategies in recent years have included the policy and administrative approaches. These approaches essentially mean policy guidelines for fighting international terrorism which scrupulously use action plans already laid down either legally, politically or militarily to contain the terrorist threat. In the case of Uganda, administrative approaches have involved creation of new security agencies, executive actions taken to combat international terrorism either by implementing enacted anti-terrorism instruments or by taking economic,

intelligence or security-based managerial actions to promptly forestall impending terrorism threats or to deal appropriately with perpetrators of terrorism in the anti-terror courts established. The key message here is that since these approaches seem to have effectively averted terrorist activities in Uganda and abroad, they can be broadly adopted by other countries in Africa and the Middle East.

The internal and international policy and institutional approaches used in Uganda to respond to international terrorism have resulted into appreciable progress. Not only has Uganda used a combination of these approaches to effectively defeat the LRA and ADF terrorism by repulsing these terrorist forces off her territory but also pursuing them up to the forests of CAR and DRC. The evidence presented therefore is essentially to underline the fact that the policy and institutional approaches can deliver results when followed meticulously. All countries big and small can meticulously the policy and institutional approaches to respond to terrorist threats with success.

Remarkable contributions in the fight and weakening of the Somali-based al-Shabaab terrorists have been made. This is essentially evidence that the fight against terrorism is not only for one country, but a well coordinated strategy involving well trained forces supported by regional and other international security organizations. Uganda is however, facing internal and interstate challenges that need to be addressed in order to improve her contribution to the fight against international terrorism, especially in the African region but where the terrorists have intricate international linkages especially with the Middle East where evidence suggests they draw inspiration from. Uganda and many countries including those in the Middle East need to improve the role of educational and religious institutions to develop and implement an MLA policy while strengthening internal judicial systems and Interpol relationship with other countries participating in the fight against international terrorism.

All regional security groupings need to improve their political will in the area of supporting anti-terrorism efforts through making necessary military, financial, diplomatic and moral contributions.

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